ernment.
The limitations connected therewith ar6 precisely the same as in the
great self-governing colonial governments of Canada and Australia. In both
cases local affairs are controlled \y\ the local people, and in each case there
is no participation in the Federal Government.
No one certainly will claim that the Canadian and Australian govern-
ments are the victims of a "sordid policy."
This talk is buncombe.
Point 9. We do not need this territory in which to expand oiir popu-
lation. * * *
We shall not require an overflow for a century.
We have a vast empire sparsely settled.
Our 70,000,000 of people can be put into Texas alone without interfering 1
with their freedom of action.
There is nothing in the national growth, either present or prospective,
which requires annexation.
THE PRIME VALUE OF HAWAII.
Reply. The same argument would have excluded Louisiana, Florida,
Texas, and California.
All the population of the United States could to-day be accommodated
east of the Mississippi, but it does not rationally follow that if the United
States had remained east of the Mississippi only it would not have been
beneficial to them to secure territory west of the Mississippi.
The physical possibility of squeezing a given population into a given
territory is not the criterion by which the benefit of acquiring additional
territory should be judged.
It may be phj-sicallj- possible for all the people now in the United
States, or who may live there for a hundred years to come, to exist within
the present limits of the country: but conditions have demonstrated that
already the need of foreign markets for United States products is pressing.
The prime value of Hawaii to the United States is not by reason of the
trade or area of Hawaii alone, but the vastly greater trade of the Pacific
with which it is so intimately connected and which it to so great a degree
controls.
Point 10. "The acquisition of Hawaii means the strengthening, not of
the centripetal, but of the centrifugal, force in this nation."
He favors "centralized and unified power," and opposes "the acquisition
of insular territorial possessions, pursued in flagrant violation either of lines-
of latitude or longitude."
13
"Every island and every ignorant alien taken into the Union makes for
dismemberment and disintegration."
OBJECT OF ACQUIRING HAWAII.
Reply. The objection that the acquiring of colonies and outlying- terri-
tory tends to weaken the central government is directly contrary to the
argument usually made in this connection, which is that the control by the
central government of provinces which are not fully self-governing pro-
duces an undue centralization of power in the "central government."
So far from the acquisition of Hawaii being "pursued in flagrant viola-
tion either of lines of latitude or longitude, " Hawaii is well within them.
Hawaii lies on almost the same line of latitude that Key West does, and
lies 500 miles within the line of longitude bounding the western limit of the
mainland of Alaska and more than a thousand miles within the line of
longitude bounding the Aleutian and Midway islands, both of which belong
to the United States.
So far as the inclusion of Hawaii within the boundaries of the Union
tending to "disintegrate and dismember," the main object of acquiring
Hawaii is to defend that which the United States already owns on the
Pacific coast, and to protect its commerce upon the 1'a.cific, which is rapidly
growing to be the greatest in the world.
The local government of Hawaii will settle all local problems, of which
there will be many, without involving the National Government or the peo-
ple of other localities in the United States, any more than does the settle-
ment of a county-seat fight or a local-option election in Arizona.
Point 11. It is a departure from the traditions of the country, a foolish
experiment, to annex territory not contiguous. The one experiment, Alaska,
is still an experiment.
Reply. There is no departure from the traditions of the country.
The country has already made numerous annexations of insular ter-
ritory.
MIDWAY ISLAND.
This island was annexed in 1808 by order of the executive department
of the United States. The action taken thereunder is fully described in
Senate Executive Document No. 79, Fortieth Congress, second session. An
appropriation of $50,000 was made by the third session of the Fortieth Con-
gress by act approved March 1, 1809.
This is contained in United States Statutes at Large, volume 15, chapter
48, page 279. It is also referred to in the Report of the Secretary of the
Navy for 1870, on page 8, and Report o.f the Secretary of the Navy for 1871,
pages 6, 7, and 8.
The object of the annexation was to create a naval station there. Mid-
way Island is the westernmost of the Hawaiian group.
OTHEB ISLAND ANNEXATION*.
The United States owns the Aleutian Islands, extending a thousand
miles west of Hawaii, which it acquired in conjunction with Alaska. It also
owns fifty-seven other islands and groups of islands in the Pacific and thir-
14
teen in the Caribbean Sea, which hare been taken possession of by American
citizens under act of Congress dated August 15, 1856, which provides for
the registration and protection of islands so annexed. The principal object
of such annexations was to secure the guano located on such islands, but
it only makes the precedent so much the stronger in that it indicates that
so small a matter as the securing of a limited amount of fertilizer is suffi-
cient reason for insular annexation.
The traditions of the country are to annex whatever territory or country
is needed.
The fact that the greater portion of the territory annexed was not insu-
lar is no precedent or tradition against insular annexations when such an-
nexations would be valuable to the country.
In other words the question of whether the territory proposed to be
annexed is insular or continental is not and should not be the criterion,
but the deciding line is whether or not its annexation would be valuable to
the United States.
The names, location, and date of acquisition of the islands which have
become United States territory under the above-mentioned act of 185G are
as follows:
Date of acquisition.
Name.
Date of acquisition.
Name.
October 28, 1856
Bakers.
Februarys, I860....
Liderous.
.Tarvis.
Low Islands.
August 31, 1856
Navassa.
Mackin.
DeceinlKT 3, 18'"<
Howlands.
Mary Letitiai.
September 6, 18MV...
Johnsons.
Marys.
December 27, 1859...
Barren or Starve.
Mat hews.
Enderbury.
Nassau.
McKean.
Oniros.
Phoenix.
Palmyroa.
December 29, 1R5!>...
Christmas.
Pescado.
Haldens.
Phoenix.
February 8, I860....
America.
Prospect.
A unes.
Riorsens.
Barber*.
Rogewiens.
Baumas.
Samarang.
Birnies.
Sarah Anne.
Caroline.
Sidneys,
Clarence.
Starbuck of Hero.
Dangerous.
Steavers.
Danger's Rock.
Walkers.
Davids.
Washington of Uahagn.
Duke of York.
December 30, 18'".2..
Great and Little Swan in the
Knderbury. .
Caribbean Sea.
Farmers.
Favorite.
August 12, 18G9
Islands in the Caribbean Sea
not named in latitude 4 4o',
longitude 160 07'.
Flint.
November 22, 1869..
Pedro Keys.
Flints.
Quito Sereno.
Frances.
Petrel Roncador.
Frienhaven,
Gardners.
September 8, 1879...
Serranilla Keys.
Morant Keyi.
.
Gallego.
Ganges.
September 13, 1880..
De Aves.
Serranilla Keys.
Gronique.
Western Triangles.
Humphreys.
October 18, 1880
Islands of Arenas.
Kemns.
June 21, 1891
Alacrans Islands.
See record^ of the State and Treasury Departments.
In the Pacific 57
In the Caribbean Sea 15
Total.
... 7t
15
AGGRESSIONS OF THE FRENCH.
Point It. Hawaii was offered to the United States in 1853 and declined
by President Pierce and Secretary of State Webster.
Reply. Mr. Johnson is incorrect in saying that Hawaii was offered to
the United States and declined.
The transaction which he refers to was the document which was dated
March 10, 1851, to be found in volume 2, page 896, of the Morgan report to
the Senate of 1894, being Senate Executive Document No. 45, Fifty-second
Congress, second session.
The document mentioned simply states that by reason of the aggres-
sions of the French, the King of Hawaii placed the country under the pro-
tection and safeguard of the United States of America until some arrange-
ments could be made to "place our said relations with France upon a footing
compatible with my rights as an independent sovereign under the laws of
nations, and compatible with my treaty engagements with other foreign
nations," with the proviso that if such arrangements be impracticable the
protection of the United States should be perpetual.
This document was delivered to the American minister in Hawaii, but
the French learning thereof and ceasing their aggressions, no action was
taken thereon by the United States.
Point IS. The "possession of Hawaii means that they will become a
source of irritation for all time to come between ourselves and foreign
nations."
"Insular territorial possessions are a prolific source of contention."
Annexation will devolve upon the United States "the responsibility for
their management and control."
"Vexed and annoying questions" will "arise with powerful maritime
nations" concerning the "occupation by them of Hawaiian waters and har-
bors, the use of the islands for coaling stations, and the hundreds of contro-
versies which are liable to arise with respect to this territory."
UNITED STATES WILL NOT ALLOW ANY OTHER COUNTRY TO
CONTROL HAWAII.
Reply. The possession of Hawaii is far less liable to prove a source of
"irritation wifh foreign nations" than is Hawaii's continued independence
and the declaration of the United States which has been constantly reit-
erated that the United States will not allow any other country to control
Hawaii.
So far as interference in Hawaii by other countries is concerned, this
country is already committed to the full responsibility which ownership
would devolve upon it, without any of the control of ownership.
Annexation will give the United States the control as well as the respon-
sibility, while under the present status it has all the responsibility with no
control to keep the islands from getting into difficulties with foreign gov-
ernments.
"Vexed and annoying questions will arise with foreign governments
concerning the occupation of Hawaiian waters and harbors."
These are the very questions which will arise in case annexation does
not take place, but which can not arise in case of annexation any more
than they arise concerning the waters of California and Florida.
What controversies will arise concerning Hawaii that do not arise in any
other territory which the United States has annexed?
Point 14. "This nation is practically invulnerable to successful attack
from a foreign foe. The ocean forms an impassable barrier to dangerous
aggression."
"We have a splendid navy and excellent coast defenses."
"Annexation will destroy our contiguity, take away our base of gup-
16
plies, surrender the natural advantages of defense, and furnish a hone of
contention to fight over and defend in time of peace."
Reply. The statement that the nation is now practically invulnerable, and
that "the ocean forms an impassable barrier" to dangerous aggression, is
considered by the military and naval authorities, and replied to in their
statements contained in the pamphlet herewith.
They unite in the opinion that with the control of Hawaii the Pacific
coast would be impregnable, but without its control it will be liable to
attack.
Moreover, the proposition that the United States is safe by remaining
on t-he continent does not cover the. safety of its foreign commerce, which i.i
now so large and rapidly growing.
So far from the acquisition of Hawaii "taking away the bases of sup-
I lies," it secures to the United States the base of supplies which contiols a
uiger area of the earth's surface than any other one spot and prevents an ,
foieign nation from securing a base of supplies from which the commcicc
and the coast of the United Sta.tes on the Pacific can be interfered willi.
Point 15. In case of annexation we must fortify Hawaii. We must in-
crease our Navy to defend and communicate with them. This will enor-
mously increase appropriations.
CONTROL A MEASURE OF ECONOMY.
Reply. It will be necessary to maintain a navy in connection with Amer-
ican interests in the Pacific, but it will require a larger navy and expendi-
tures to protect the Pacific coast without than with Hawaii.
The control of Hawaii, so far from being a source of expense, will be
a measure of economy, in that by fortifying one point in Hawaii, the
battle ships of all nations can be prevented from getting to the Pacific
coast, because they can not carry coal enough to cross the Pacific without
recoaling at Hawaii.
Therefore the one fortification a.t Hawaii will answer the same object
that would the fortification of all the principal points on the Pacific coast.
Point 16. Annexation will form a bad precedent and will be followed
by the annexation of c uba and Samoa.
This "will be fortified by artful sophistries of men who will pander to
the national vanity and cupidity."
Annexation is, as a rule, a source of weakness.
Reply. So far as precedent is concerned, the United States does not stand
in need of anj r precedent, in the way of annexing territory.
It has annexed territory all the way from the Tropics to the Arctic, on
the Atlantic, the Gulf, the Pacific, and the islands of the Pacific, and in the
Caribbean Sea.
So far as precedents are concerned, there are precedents enough on
hand to form a basis of justification for annexing anything in the Western
Hemisphere.
So far as the annexation of Hawaii is concerned, there is no parallel
between it and the islands on the Atlantic side, for the reason that lunvaii
stands alone as a base of supplies within the practical steaming distance
of the Pacific coast.
The securing of this one point removes practically all possible bases of
trans-Pacific attack.
On the other hand, there are so many islands on the Atlantic side, any
one of which can be made a base of atta.uk, that in order to secure immunity
from attack on that side all the islands must be annexed, a practical impos-
sibility.
The status of Hawaii, therefore, is unique and entirely different from
Cuba or any other Atlantic island.
Point 17. The United States should heed the advice of Washington and
17
"avoid all entangling alliances," and turn its attention to the development
of its own resources.
"We sha'l be wise if we devote ourselves to internal development and
growth."
ANNEXATION IN CONFORMITY TO THE ADVICE OF WASHINGTON.
Reply. The annexation of Hawaii is in direct conformity with the advice
of Washington to "avoid entangling alliances."
The opponents of annexation have advocated in the past, and advocate
now, that the United States should enter into a joint agreement with Euro-
pean nations concerning Hawaii, thereby directly entering an "entangling
alliance."
By absorbing Hawaii the United States will remove the possibility of
"entangling alliances" and will effectually eliminate Hawaii from interna-
tional disagreements.
As long' a* Hawaii remains independent, without the power to maintain
its independence, it vrill be a, source of international irritation and be a
menace to the peace of the Pacific.
Th necessary incidentals to the development of internal resources are
the development f foreign commerce, and Hawaii is indirectly incidental
to the control of that commerce iu that all the commerce to and from the
Pacific and trans-Pacific nations Hiust pass its door.
Point 18. The United States is all powerful. All people realize our great
strength and therefore seek no difficulty with us.
Reply. Whether or not the strength of the United States is sufficient
to prevent foreign aggressions is unnecessary to discuss hi view of current
events.
The reiterated sentiments of Washington. Jackson, and others, "that
preparedness for war is the most certain method of maintaining peace,"
applies as well to Hawaii as it does to Spain.
The incidents of the day demonstrates more than argument the ne-
cessity of a navy, aid if the United States is to have any navy on the
Pacific it must, in otder to maintain its control of the Pacific, have a coal-
ing station at Hawaii, and it can not have that coaling station in time of
war unless it owns the country. * * *
ORGANIZED LABOR IN FAVOR OF ACQUISITION.
Now, the gentleman spoke of the opposition of organized labor to the
passage of the bill. There has been published in a morning paper a
declaration of a certain gentleman who says that he is opposed to the
admission or the acquisition of these islands because he has some fears-
born, in my judgment, of a lack of intelligence and a lack of experience
in the United States, and a lack of knowledge of its institutions; born or
the fact that he was not born under them. I hold in my hand and will
publish a letter from representatives of the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, the Order of Railway
Conductors, the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, the Order of Railway
Telegraphers, and a telegram just received from Montreal from Mr. Sargent,
the head of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Locomotive Engi-
neers, and also a letter from a distinguished gentleman representing the
Order of Knights of Labor, and I will summarize what they state.
They state, first, that there never was any action by the organized
labor of this country against the acquisition of these islands, and they
state, in the next place, that so far as their knowledge goes they are all
of them in favor of this acquisition. I can not conceive how it is possible
that the workingmen, the laboring men of America, can be opposed to the
opening up of the magnificent opportunities that seem to me to be pre-
sented by (lie acquisition of these islands.
18
MB. GOMPEBS STANDS ALMOST ALONE.
WASHINGTON, U. C., June IS, 1898.
DEAR SIB: In reply to your inquiry of even date as to the feeling of
"organized labor" on the question of the annexation of Hawaii, I beg leave
to state that my individual opinion, based on thirty-three years experience
as wage-earner and twenty years among organized men, constrains me to
take issue with Mr. Gompers, who was quoted as opposed to annexation
by Hon. CHAMP CLARK, of Missouri, in his speech in the House of Kepresen-
tatives on Saturday last.
In this opinion Mr. Gompers should have been quoted as an individual
and not as a representative of organized labor, and no man has authority
to say that organized labor is for or against annexation, for the question
has never been placed before organized labor.
Mr. Gompers himself, I am reliably informed, is a man of limited ex-
perience as a wage-earner, and does not correctly gauge the patriotic feel-
iug among American workingmen, who desire to uphold in time of war
the Administration, regardless of their own political opinions, and he seems
to ignore their oft-expressed desire to "extend commerce and multiply the
opportunities to labor." My belief is that Mr. Gompers, on this question,
stands si 1 most alone, as I am informed he did at the last convention of his
own organization on the anti-Cuban war resolution.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
A. M. LA WROX,
Master Workman District Assembly 66, Washington, D. C.
Hon. CHARLKS II. GKOSVENOR,
House of Representatives.
THE HOTEL RALEIGH, Washington, D. C., June IS, 1898.
As to the annexation of Hawaii, which in no sense is a party issue.
while it is true that we have not in any council or convention taken any
position on the matter, it is also true that the sentiment of the great mass
of the membership favor the proposition, as do many of their chief execu-
tive officers, as shown by the inclosed telegrams. This expression has
become more pronounced as the apparent necessity grows since the brilliaiit
victory of Manilla. Such feelings are inspired by the same motives which
prompted so many of our members to enter the volunteer service.
It is not at all probable that in the event of annexation the condition
of labor in Hawaii would or could be transplanted to this country, no more
than the quasi serfdom of Mexico would find lodgment under our Consti-
tution, but, on the contrary, I submit there is every reason to believe that
the advanced intelligence, conservatism, and patriotism of the organized
American workman would meet such conditions and vastly improve them.
There are so many illustrations that it would be idle to enumerate them.
Yours truly,
W. F. HYXES,
Representing Brotherhood Locomotive Engineers, Brotherhood
Locomotive Firemen, Order of Railway Conductors,
Brotherhood of Trainmen, Order of Railway Teleg-
raphers.
Hon. CHARLES H. GROSVENOR,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. 0.
19
MONTREAL, QUEBEC, June 14, 1898.
W. F. HYNES, Raleigh Hotel, Washington, D. C.:
As an American citizen, I am heartily in favor of the annexation of
Hawaii.
F. P. SARGENT,
Chief of Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen.
PEORIA, ILL., June 1%, 1898.
W. F. HYNES, care C. Grosvenor:
Answering- your telegram, in my opinion the United States should annex
the Hawaiian Islands. The necessity of our control over the islands in
time of war is now apparent to everyone. Commercially, too, they are of
great importance to us.
P. H. MORRISSEY,
Grand Master Brotherhood Railroad Trainmen.
CEDAR RAPIDS, IOWA, June 14, 1898.
W. F. HYNES, The Raleigh, Washington, D. C.:
in the position which it seems the United States must hereafter occupy
1 deem Hawaii a very valuable, if not indispensable, acquisition.
E. E. CLARK,
Chief Order of Railway Conductors.
CAPTAIN MAHAN ON THE NECESSITY OE ANNEXATION.
From the speech of Hon. Robert Hitt, of Illinois (Congressional Record 142, TO!. 31, p. 67G6).
Captain Mahan, the most distinguished writer and authority of our
time on the history of sea power, says:
"It is obvious that if we do not hold the islands ourselves, we can not
expect the neutrals in the war to prevent the other belligerent from occu-
pying them; nor can the inhabitants themselves prevent such occupation.
The commercial value is not great enough to provoke neutral interposition,
[n short, in war we should need a larger Navy to defend the Pacific coast,
because we should have not only to defend our own coast, but to prevent,
by naval force, an enemy from occupying the islands; whereas, if we preoc-
cupied them, fortifications could preserve them to us.
"In nay opinion it is not -practicable for any trans-Pacific country to in-
vade our Pacific coast without occupying Hawaii as a base."
GENEBAL SCHOFIELD ON ANNEXATION.
General Schofield, who spent three months on the islands and made a
careful survey of Pearl River Harbor, stated to our committee:
"At this moment the Government is fitting out quite a large fleet of
steamers at San Francisco to carry large detachments of troops and mili-
tary supplies of all kinds to the Philippine Islands. Honolulu is almost in
the direct route. That fleet, of course, will want very much to recoal at
Honolulu, thus saving that amount of freight and tonnage for essential
stores to be carried with it. Otherwise they would have to carry coal
enough to carry them all the way from San Francisco to Manila, and that
would occupy a large amount of the carrying capacity of the fleet, and if
20
they recoal at Honolulu all that will be saved. More than that, a fleet is
liable at any time to meet with stress of weather, or perhaps a heavy storm,
and there might be an accident to the machinery which will make it neces-
sary to put into the nearest port possible for repairs and additional sup-
plies. By the time it reaches there its coal supply may be well-nigh ex-
hausted; it then has to replenish its coal supply to carry it to whatever port
it could reach. ******* Now, let us suppose,
on the other hand, that the Spanish navy in the Pacific as well as in the
Atlantic, or both, were a little stronger than ours instead of being some-
what weaker. The first thing they would do would be to go and take pos-
session of the Sandwich Islands and make them the base of naval opera-