Lake Erie A Detroit River Ry. Co. T. Barclay. 30 Can. S-CR. 360.
[Discussed in Champagne T. Grand Trunk Ry. COL, 4 Can. Ry. Cas. 2O9.
9 O.LJL 589: distinguished in Grand Trunk Ry. Co. T. McKay, 34 Can.
S.CJK. 81: followed in Bnrtch v. Can. Pae. Ry. COL, 13 O-LvR_ 632.]
DAXGEWHTS coxomox or CEOSSIXG.
Where the railway traffic at the crossing of a highway was very great.
and there was no gate, guardian, lamp, or other protection, for the public.
although the railway company had been notified of the dangerous condi-
tion of the crossing, the company was responsible under s. 288 of the Rail-
Can. Ry. L. Dig. 13.
194 CROSSING INJURIES.
way Act, 1888, for a collision which caused the death of plaintiff's son,
and which occurred without any fault on his part.
Girouard v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co., 1 Can. Ry. Cas. 343, 19 Que. S.C. 539.
SPEED GATES AND WATCHMAN STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS.
By the Railway Act, 1888, s. 197, as amen '-d by 55 & 56 Viet. c. 27, s. 6,
it is provided that "at every public road crossing at rail level of the rail-
way, the fence on both sides of the track shall be turned in to the cattle
guards, so as to allow of the safe passage of trains." By s. 259 of the
former Act, as amended by s. 8 of the latter, it is provided that "no loco-
motive or railway engine shall pass in or through any thickly peopled por-
tion of any city, town or village, at a speed greater than six miles an
hour, unless the track is fenced in the manner prescribed by this Act:
Held, that the words "in the manner prescribed by this Act" do not refer
to the turning in of the fence to the cattle guards; and, although no other
fence is specifically prescribed in the railway legislation, the meaning of
s. 259 is, that unless the track, including the crossing, is properly fenced
or otherwise protected so as to efficiently warn or bar the traveler while
a train is crossing or immediately about to cross, the maximum speed
at which a train may cross in thickly peopled portions of cities, towns
and villages, is six miles an hour. The plaintiff was struck by a train at
a crossing over a main street in an incorporated town, not protected by a
gate or watchman. In an action to recover damages for his injuries,
the jury found that the train was traveling at the rate of twenty miles
an hour, and that the injury complained of was caused by this excessive
speed, coupled with the absence of proper protection at the crossing, and
without negligence on the plaintiff's part; and the Court, though there was
strong evidence of contributory negligence, declined to interfere.
McKay v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 3 Can. Ry. Cas. 42, 5 O.L.R. 313.
[Reversed in 34 Can. S.C.R. 81, 3 Can. Ry. Cas. 52.]
PROTECTION AT CROSSINGS SPEED OF TRAINS.
The Railway Act, 1888, ss. 197, 259, as amended by 55 & 56 Viet. c.
26 (D.), ss. 6, 8, do not require that railway companies shall erect fences
and gates at highway crossings in thickly peopled parts of cities, towns,
and villages before running their trains across such highways at a
greater speed than six miles an hour. The power to determine whether
gates should be placed at highway crossings rests with the Railway Com-
mittee and not with a jury. [Lake Erie, etc., Ry. Co. v. Barclay, 30 Can.
S.C.R. 360, distinguished.]
McKay v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 3 Can. Ry. Cas. 52, 34 Can. S.C.R. 81.
[Followed in Tabb v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 8 O.L.R. 514; Clark v.
Can. Pac. Ry. Co., 14 Can. Ry. Cas. 51, 2 D.L.R. 331; adhered to Grand
Trunk Ry. Co. v. Hainer, 36 Can. S.C.R. 183; Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v.
Perrault, 36 Can. S.C.R. 678; Lake Erie & D.R. Ry. Co. v. Marsh, 35 Can.
S.C.R. 198; discussed in Perrault v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 14 Que. K.B.
248, 260; distinguished in Burtch v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co., 13 O.L.R. 632; fol-
lowed in Carrier v. St. Henri, 30 Que. S.C.R. 47; Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v.
Daoust, 14 Que. K.B. 551; Quebec & Lake St. John Ry. Co. v. Girard, 15
Que. K.B. 53; referred to in R. v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 17 O.L.R. 601;
Smith v. Niagara & St. Catharines Ry. Co., 9 O.L.R. 158 ; Wabash Ry. Co.
v. Misener, 6 Can. Ry. Cas. 70, 38 Can. S.C.R. 99; relied on in Girard v.
Quebec & Lake St. John Ry. Co., 25 Que. S. C. 248.]
PUBLIC PARK GATE AND WATCHMAN AT RAILWAY CROSSING.
Within a public park maintained and controlled by the defendants, a
CROSSING INJURIES. 195
municipal corporation, they erected a gate near a railway crossing, and
kept a watchman, to open the gate when there was no danger from passing
trains, and to close it when train? were approaching the crossing. The
plaintiff, driving through the park, desiring to pass through the gate to the
highway beyond the railway, and finding the gate open, took that as an
intimation that no train was approaching, and attempted to cross the rail-
way, when be was struck by a train and injured: Held, that the defend-
ants owed him no duty, and were not liable in damages for his injuries.
Soulsby v. Toronto. 7 Can. Ky. Cas. 65. 15 O.L.R. 13.
[Referred to in Woodburn Milling Co. v. Grand Trunk By. Co.. 19
FAILURE TO FENCE AND PROTECT CROSSING SOT A HIGHWAT.
A crossing built by a railway company and designated by a sign as a
"railway crossing"' which the public is permitted to use. but the opening
of which has not been sanctioned by the Board is not a highway under
the Railway Act, 1906. ss. 242, 243. so as to impose a duty on the rail-
way company as to construction and maintenance of fences and the pro-
tection of highway?, and, therefore, cannot be charged with negligence for
any omission to fence or for defective approaches, particularly where the
crossing had been previously used safely by the same person and other?.
Bird v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co.". 7 Can. Ry." Ca's. 195. 6 W.LJL 393.
[Reversed in 1 SJJEL 266. 8 Can. R~y. Cas. 314.)
CROSSING SOT AUTHORIZED BT BOARD DEDICATION.
When a railway company establishes a crossing, not authorized by the
Board, over its railway, at a point other than on a highway and invites
the public to use such crossing, it ia the duty of the company to take every
precaution for the safety of the public using such crossing, and in view
of the statutory provisions requiring the company to fence the approaches
to a railway crossing over a highway properly authorized, the failure
of the company to so fence an authorized crossing constitutes such negli-
gence as will render the company liable for injury to any person sustained
on such crossing when the proximate cause of such injury is the failure
of the company to fence. 7 Can. Ry. Cas. 195. 6 W.LR. 393. reversed.
Bird v. Can" Pac. Ry. Co.. S Can. Ry. Cas. 314, 1 S-L.R. 266.
ENTERING BETWEEN GATES CONTRIBUTORT NEGLIGENCE FAILURE AS TO
WARSTSGS AND FLAGMEN.
Where the erection of gates at a level highway crossing is not auth-
orized or required by an order of the Board, the lowering of the gates is but
a warning to persons desiring to cross the tracks that it is dangerous to
do so. and the entry of a person upon the portion of the highway between
the gates, when the gates are down, is not as a matter of law. or per se.
negligence, disentitling him to recover damages for injuries sustained by
him while upon that portion of the highway, by reason of the negligence
and breach of duty of the railway company as to signals and warnings.
Garside v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co.. IS Can!. Ry. Cas. 272. 23 DJxR. 463.
See Farm Crossings: Highway Crossings; Railway Crossings; Junctions.
DOMINION AND PROVINCIAL RAILWAY JURISDICTION DOUBLE TRACK CROSS-
ING TRACKS AND CONNECTIONS COST.
The Board has jurisdiction under ss. S, 29 r 32, 227 of the Railway Act,
196 CUSTOMS DUTIES.
1906, to order a single track crossing (provided under an order of the
Railway Committee) of a Dominion railway by a Provincial street rail-
way, to be changed to a double track crossing, in the public interest. The
applicant which made the application for the double track crossing was
ordered to furnish the necessary diamonds, and the street railway com-
pany to pay interest at 7 per cent upon the expense incurred by the
applicant, the street railway company to lay the necessary tracks and con-
London v. London Street Ry. Co., 19 Can. Ry. Cas. 436.
[Followed in Midland Ry. Co. v. Grand Trunk Pacific Ry. Co., 23 Can.
Ry. Cas. 80.]
JURISDICTION DOMINION RAILWAY CROSSING PROVINCIAL.
The Board has jurisdiction to regulate the crossing of a Provincial
over a Dominion railway at the point of intersection. [Lake Erie &
Northern Ry. Co. v. Braritford Street Ry. Co., 16 Can. Ry. Cas. 244, at p.
245; Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney-General for Canada, 
A.C. 363, 19 Can. Ry. Cas. 153; City of London v. London Street Ry. Co.,
19 Can. Ry. Cas. 436, followed.]
Midland Ry. Co. v. Grand Trunk Pacific Ry. Co., 23 Can. Ry. Cas. 80.
See Government Railways.
Duty to fence, see Farm Crossings.
EXEMPTION FROM DUTY STEEL RAILS FOR USE ON STREET RAILWAYS.
The exemption from duty in 50 & 51 Viet. c. 39, item 173, of "steel rails
weighing not less than twenty-five pounds per lineal yard, for use on
railway tracks," does not apply to rails to be used for street railways,
which are subject to duty as ''rails for railways and tramways of any
form," under item 88. Strong, C.J., and King, J., dissenting.
Toronto Ry. Co. v. The Queen, 25 Can. S.C.R. 24.
[Reversed in  A. C. 551.]
IMPORTED STEEL RAILS STREET RAILWAYS.
Although there may be in various Canadian Acts and for other purposes
substantial distinctions between railways or railway tracks and street rail-
ways and tramways, yet, for the purpose of separating free and dutiable
articles, such distinction is not maintained in Canadian Act, 50 & 51
Viet. c. 39, and its three predecessors. According to the true construction
of that Act (see s. 1, item 88, and s. 2, item 173), the question whether
imported steel rails are taxed or free depends solely upon their weight, not
upon the character of the railway track for which they are intended. 25
Can. S.C.R. 24, allirming 4 Can. Ex. 262, reversed.
Toronto Ry. Co. v. The Queen,  A.C. 551.
[Approved in Edison Gen. Elec. Co. v. Edmonds, 4 B.C.R. 367; com-
mented on in Ross v. The King, 32 Can. S.C.R. 538.]
Foeacx wnu SHIPS.
A foreign-built skip bought in tke United States and brought to Canada
is liable to tie duty imposed by tke Canadian Customs Tariff Act, 1897,
s. 4. [32 Cam. BUBJL 277, a&nwd.'
Alguma Central By. Co. T. Ike King.  A.C 478.
AGEST FOB CTSTOMS COCTEBSIOX or MOXET FTKXESHXD FO* PAYMENT or
IMTTTES- LJABUJTT OF FUXCXTAI.
Where, without the knowledge of a railway nnut|nnj mm agent appointed
by it under R&C. 1886, CL 32. & 157. etc. for mstoKs purposes, by a sre-
toi of frauds IB tbe mderpaimait to tke Cnm of cvstoaw duties tan-
T<rtcd to his on use utoapr^ fnrai^ed by tbe touqauy for tke pa IBM ail
of tke rujbtful anount of dories, tke coutpaay is aaswnble to tke Cron
upou tke discovery of tke fraud, for duties ou all *oods. vhick. by reason
of tke agent's fraud, were not declared or entered and tke eutitoure paid
tkereon. since the agent's aets in vkkh tke frauds wre conmutted were
vitkin tke $cope of hi* euqrfopnent. An internal rule of a eustonw house
prohibiting tke cashier front furnihiuf; ekan^e beyond fifty cents, is not a
limitation of his autkority $affitient to relieve a company front liability for
unpaid duties ou good? entered fraudulently by its duly appointed custout?
agent, where tke company fnroiskcd cheque*, for tke roiTect amount of
duties and tke ea$kier letuined to tke agent, who euuteited it to his own
use. the difference betnen the amount of tke eheuue and tke duties actu-
ally paid, since the agent's authority mas broad enough to include the
receipt of such moneys. In an action by tke Crown to letuvea customs
duties on goods not entered or declared, tke onus rests upon tke defendant
to shew payment and full compliance with tke requirements of tke Cus-
toms Act. [Lloyd T. Grace.  A.CL 735; Brottiesfay T. Temperance
Permanent Building Society, [1S95] A.C. 173; Fry T. Smeflie,  3
KB. 295. spatially referred to; Erb T. G-W.R. COL, 5 Can. &CJL 179;
City Bank r. Harbour Commissioners of Montreal. 1 L.CJ. 288, disnn-
The King T. Can. Pae. By. Co- 11 D.LJL C81, 14 Cam. Ex. ISO.
Damages in lien of injunction, see Injunction.
Damages caused by operation of gorernment railways, see Government
Lord Campbell's Act. measure and apportionment of damages. 2 Can.
By. Cas. 18.
Inadequacy of damages. 3 Can. By. Cas. 287.
Damages for nervous shock. 4 Can. By. C*s. 23L
Dunages for personal injuries, o Can. By. Cas.
Damages for death and personal injury. 9 Can. Ry. Cas. 247.
Compensation for injuries caused by operation of railway. 20 Can. Ry.
A. Assessment; Excessiveness.
BY WHOM DAMAGES ASSESSED Jt'DGE OH JURY EXCES.SIVENESS.
The words "the Court may give such damages," in consolidated ordi-
nances, N.W.T. (1808) c. 48,' s. 3 means the Judge at trial, or the Judge
and the jury, as the case may be. Semble. a verdict of $4.500, awarded
to a widow for the death of her husband caused by the defendants' negli-
gence cannot be seriously excepted to.
Toll v. Can. Pac. Ry. CO., 1 Alta. L.R. 318, 8 Can. Ry. Cas. 294.
HOW DAMAGES ASSESSED COURT OR JURY.
S. 3, c. 48 of the Con. Ord. N.W.T. providing that damages are to be de-
termined by the Court, means a "Court" consisting of a Judge and jury,
and the jury is the proper part of the Court to fix the amount of damages.
Andreas v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co., 5 Can. Ry. Cas. 440, 2 W.L.R. 249.
[Affirmed in 5 Can. Ry. Cas. 450, 37 Can* S.C.R. 1.]
REMOTENESS DEPRIVATION OF USE.
Damages for breach of contract must be direct and none are recoverable
that are indirect or remote. Hence, where a carrier for hire loses a piece
of machinery, sent through him for repairs, the owner is not entitled to
recover from him, as damages, the loss incurred through having been de-
prived of the use of it for a season.
Thiauville v. Canadian Express Co., 33 Que. S.C. 403.
.SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGES DIFFICULTY IN ASSESSING.
Substantial damages may be awarded in spite of the fact that some
speculation and uncertainty is necessarily involved in the assessment there-
of. [Chaplin v. Hicks,  2 K.B. 786, followed.]
Wood v. Grand Valley Ry. Co., 5 D.L.R. 428, 20 O.L.R. 441.
[Varied, and damages reduced, 16 Can. Ry. Cas. 220, 10 D.L.R. 726.]
REFERENCE: POWERS OF CLERK.
The clerk of a Court cannot, upon a reference to him to ascertain the
plaintiff's damages, consider the question of the liability of the defendant
in the action, since that was settled by the order of reference.
Lavallee v. Can. Northern Ry. Co.' (No. 2), 4 D.L.R. 376, 20 W.L.R.
ASSESSMENT ON REFERENCE.
If the clerk of a Court, on a reference to ascertain the plaintiff's dam-
ages, misconceiving his duty, hears evidence and, determining that the
defendant was not liable, refuses to assess damages in the plaintiff's fav-
our, the Supreme Court of Alberta may, on an application to vary the
clerk's report, .direct him to proceed with the assessment of damages.
Lavellee v. Can. Northern Ry. Co. (No. 2), 4 D.L.R. 376, 20 W.L.R.
MISDIRECTION AS TO ASSESSMENT EXCESSIVE.
Where there was a misdirection as to the assessment of damages merely,
and it appeared to the Court that the damages assessed by the jury were
grossly excessive, the Supreme Court made a special order, applying
the principle of art. 503 C.C.P. directing that the appeal should
be allowed,, and a new trial had to assess damages, unless the plaintiff con-
sented that the damages should be reduced to an amount mentioned.
Central Vermont Ry. Co. T. Franehere, 35 Can. S.C.R. 68.
[Referred to in Renwick T. Gait Street Ry. Co.. 11 O.L.R. 168; Sadlier
v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 28 Que. S.C. 502.]
REVIEW OF AMOUNT BT APPELLATE COURT.
Where the damages awarded by the jury at the first trial were held to
be excessive and the Court of Appeal had ordered a new trial and the re-
sult of the new trial was a verdict for a still larger sum. the Court of
Appeal, upon an appeal from the second verdict, may itself fix the amount
of damages instead of sending the case back for a third trial before a jury
bv virtue of its statutory powers. [See Annotation to this case.]
" Taylor T. B.C. Elec. Ry". Co., 1 D.L.R. 384, 10 WJ^R. 851.
[Affirmed in 8 D.LR/724.]
EXCESSIYENESS DISREGARDING DIRECTION OF COURT.
To justify the setting aside of a verdict on the ground of excessive dam-
ages, the Appellate Court must find that the damages are so excessive that
twelve reasonable men could not hare given them, or that the jury have
disregarded some direction of the Judge or have considered topics which
they ought not to have considered, or have applied a wrong measure of
damages. [Ptaed v. Graham, 24 Q.B.D. 53. and Johnston v. Great West-
ern Ry..  2 K.B. 250. 73 L-JJKJB. 568. 20 Times L.R. 455. applied.]
Taylor v. British Columbia Eke, Ry. Co^ 1 D-I^R. 384. 19 W.LJL 851.
[Affirmed in 8 D.L.R. 724.]
REDUCTION BT APPELLATE COUBT.
The rule that the Supreme Court of Canada win not interfere with the
judgment of a Provincial Court of Appeal reducing the quantum of dam-
ages assessed by the trial Court does not prevent interference in eases
where some element of damages for which no compensation is allowed by
law may have been given a place in the total of damages reached. [Praed
v. Graham. 24 Q.B.D. 53. considered: see also Johnston v. Great Western
Ry. Co., [19O4] 2 K.B. 250, and Dunn v. Prescott Elevator Co., 26 A.R.
(Ont.| 389, 30 Can. S.C.R. 620.] (Dictum per Idington. J.)
Taylor T. British Columbia Elec. Ry. Co. (Xo. 2), 8 DJ^R. 724.
REVIEW OF QCANTTM BT APPELLATE COCBT.
The Supreme Court of Canada will not disturb a judgment of the Court
of Appeal of British Columbia on a mere question of quantum of dam-
ages, where that Court, by virtue of the power given to it by rule 869 (at
of the rules of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, has reduced a
verdict of the trial Court in an action for personal injuries arising out
of an accident. [Taylor v. British Columbia Elec. Ry. COL, 1 DX.R. 384.
16 B.C.R. 420. affirmed.]
Taylor v. British Columbia Elee. Ry. Co. (Xo. 2), 8 D.L.R. 724.
VABTTNG ASSESSMENT ox REFERENCE.
The Supreme Court of Alberta cannot entertain an application to vary
the finding of a clerk of the Court on a reference to him to ascertain
damages, since that can be done only on an appeal from the final judg-
ment in the action. [Marson v. G.T.P. Ry. Co.. 17 WJLR. 693. on appeal.
1 D.KR. 850, 20 W.LR. 161, followed.]
Lavallee T. Can. Northern Rv. Co. (Xo. 2>, 4 DJ^R. 376, 547, 4 Aha.
REDUCTION BY APPELLATE COURT.
Where an action has been twice tried with a jury, and upon the second
trial the jury have found in favour of the same party, but have reduced
the damages, a third trial will not be ordered merely because the findings
of the jury at the second trial are contrary to what the Appellate Court
regards as the weight of evidence, if there is some evidence upon which
the verdict can be sustained.
Zufelt v. (an. Pac. Ry. Co., 7 D.L.R. 81, 4 O.W.N. 39.
AGREEMENT FOR COMPENSATION SCOPE AS TO COSTS "INCIDKXTAL TO THE
Where a railway company agreed with a town corporation to pay the
latter any damages accruing by reason of the building of a bridge by the
railway company, such damages to be ascertained in a summary manner
by a Referee appointed by the Board for the purpose, and subsequently
pursuant to this agreement an application was made to the Board and a
Referee appointed, in which order of appointment it was provided "that
the costs of and incidental to the reference, including those of the Referee
shall be in the discretion of the said Referee," the Referee has power to
award the costs of the application to the Board, notwithstanding the gen-
eral policy of the Board not to award costs of proceedings before it.
[Curry v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co., 13 Can. Ry. Cas. 31, criticized; Re Bronson
and Canada Atlantic Ry. Co., 13 P.R. (Ont.), 440, applied. See also Re
False Creek Flats Arbitration, 8 D.L.R. 922.]
Re Can. Pac. Ry. Co. and Walkerton, 10 D.L.R. 347, 15 Can. Ry. Cas.
REDUCTION CONSENT NEW TRIAL.
The Court of Appeal pronounced judgment dismissing the defendants'
appeal except upon the question of damages. It was held that the damages
assessed by the jury were excessive, and a new trial was ordered unless
the plaintiff would consent to a reduction. The certificate of this judg-
ment not having issued, the Court reconsidered the matter, and, acting
under rule 786, directed a new trial confined to the question of the amount
of damages: Held, following Watt v. Watt,  A.C. 115, that the
Court has no jurisdiction, without the defendants' consent, to make the
new trial dependent upon the consent of the plaintiff to reduce the dam-
Hockley v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 5 Can. Ry. Cas. 122, 10 O.L.R. 363.
SUSPENDING THE PAYMENT op DAMAGES TO INFANT DURING MINORITY.
The Court has the power, by its judgment, to order that a sum assessed
by a jury as the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, a minor
suing through his tutor in an action of tort or ex quasi-delicto, be paid,
in part at once, the remainder when he becomes of age, and not at all if he
dies before, and that the interest on such remainder be paid to his tutor
until he comes of age or dies during minority.
Montreal Street Ry. Co. v. Girard, 21 Que. K.B. 121.
MEASURE OF COMPENSATION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACTS TO COMPLETE RAIL-
The loss of benefits which would ordinarily accrue to merchants in the
transaction of their business from the construction of a line of railway
connecting with another railway the place where their respective businesses
were being carried on, is not too remote to be considered in assessing dam-
ages to such merchants who purchased bonds of the railway under an agree-
ment by the railway company to complete and operate the line in respect
of the company's failure so to do. [Candy v. Midland Ry. Co., 38 L.T.
226; Simpson v. London 4 X. W. Ry. Co., 1 Q.B.D. 274, 277, and Chaplin
v. Hicks,  2 K-B. 786. followed".]
Wood v. Grand Valley Ry. Co., 16 Can. Ry. Cas. 220, 27 O.L.R. 556, 10
[Affirmed in 16 D.L.R. 361.]
NOT EXCESSIVE PERSOXAL IXJTTRIES COXTLXCAL rXCAPACTTT VERDICT OF
JTTRT SrFFiciExcT AXD OORRECTXE,SS OMISSIOX TO AXSWEK SOME
The verdict of a jury in an action for the recovery of damages arising
out of a railway accident, which allows the plaintiff (aged 45 and earning
2.000 per annum), besides the cost of his medical treatment. $1,000 for
past suffering. $1,500 for future suffering and medical attendance, and
$18,000 for other damages, is not excessive, when the evidence shews that
the injuries he has incurred have diminished his physical capacity one half
and he is likely to suffer from morbidness, insomnia, vertigo, etc., for the
rest of his life. The omission of the jury to find in what these damages
consist, and their nature, under some particular question which called
for same, is not ground for setting aside the verdict, when all this is suffi-
ciently shewn in the answers to the other questions.
Can. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Roy, 17 Can. Ry. Gas. 46, 22 Que. K.B. 459.
APPEAL REBrcTJOx or DAMAGES.
An award of damages greater than the amount claimed in the pleadings
will be reduced on appeal. [Dntton v. Can. Northern Ry. Go., 23 D.L.K.
43, 19 Can. Ry. Cas. 72. affirmed except as to damages.]
Dutton v. Can. Northern Rv. Co., 21 Can. Ry. Cas. 294. 26 Man. R. 493,
30 D.L.R. 250.
IXJTRY TO RAILWAY EXGLXEER PERMAXEXT IXCAPACTTT PAFX AXD ST7F-
An award of $27.000 to a railway engineer aged 32. and earning a yearly
income of $2.122. for personal injuries incapacitating him for life, such
award being ba^ed on the pain and suffering and the pecuniary loss for
the duration of life, was held by a divided Court to be a fair compensation
under the circumstances. [Phillips v. L. 4 S-W.R. Co., 5 Q.B.D. 78, 5
CJMX 280; Johnston v. Great Western Ry. Co.,  2 K^. 250; Row-
ley T. L. 4 X.W. Ry. Co.. L.R. 8 Ex. Ch. 221, applied.]
" Jackson v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co. 24 D.L.R. 380.
VERDICT EXCESSIVE AWARD PERSOXAL IXOTTUES COMPLETE REPARATION
LOSS OF PROSPECTIVE EARXIXGS PAIX AXD SCFFERIXG EVIDEXCE
MORTCARY TABLES PRACTICE XEW TRIAL.