Where from the amount of the damages awarded and the circumstances
of the case, it does not appear that the jury took into consideration mat-
ters which they should not have considered, or applied a wrong measure of
damages, the verdict ought not to be set aside or a new trial directed sim-
ply because the amount of damages awarded may seem excessive to an
Appellate Court. Duff, J., dissented on the ground that a jury appreciat-
ing the evidence and making due allowance for the risk of accident apart
from negligence, in the hazardous pursuit in which the plaintiff was em-
ployed, could not have given the verdict in question. Per Idington and
Anglin, JJ. The evidence of a witness testifying in regard to estimates
based on mortuary tables in use by companies engaged in the business of
annuity insurance is admissible, quantum valeat, notwithstanding that
he may not be capable of explaining the basis upon which the tables had
been prepared. [Rowley v. London & North Western Ry. Co., L.R. 8 Ex.
221, and Vicksburg & Meridian Ry. Co. v. Putnam, 118 U.S.R. 545, referred
to. | Judgment appealed from, 8 W.W.R. 1043, affirmed, Duff, J. dissenting.
Can. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 52 Can. S.C.R. 281.
B. Personal Injuries.
BODILY DISFIGUREMENT PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT OF PHYSICAL STRENGTH.
When damages from an explosion consist of total inability to work and
acute suffering during three months, bodily disfigurement, diminished sense
of hearing and permanent impairment of physical strength to a table-
waiter on a steamboat, whose earnings are about fifty dollars a month
during the season of navigation, a verdict of $6,000 is not so grossly exces-
sive that it should be set aside.
Richelieu & Ontario Navigation Co. v. Dorman, 16 Que. K.B. 375.
EXCESSIVE OB PUNITIVE DAMAGES PERMANENT INJURY.
Plaintiff was injured in a collision between two cars of the defendant
company, ihe collision having occurred admittedly through the company's
negligence. No evidence was offered by the company at the trial. Plain-
tiff's hip was dislocated and permanently injured, rendering him unable
to follow certain branches of his trade, that of tinsmith. There was some
medical evidence that an operation might improve his condition so as to
reduce the disability. He was, at the time of the accident, 24 years of
age, and earned $4 per day when working. His medical and other expenses
in connection with the accident amounted, roughly, to $500. Added to
this should be loss of work on account of the accident. In an action for
damages, the jury awarded him $11,500: Held, on appeal, that the dam-
ages were excessive, and there should be a new trial.
Farquharson v. British Columbia Elec. Ry. Co., 15 B.C.R. 280.
MARRIED WOMAN INJURY TO DAMAGES AWARDED HUSBAND.
The female plaintiff, 62 years of age, wife of the male plaintiff, who was
70 years of age, in attempting to alight from one of the defendants' cars,
was through the defendants' negligence thrown to the ground and seriously
injured. She was in the doctor's hands for several months, and her arm
and hand which were injured were not likely to be as useful to her as be-
fore the accident. The jury awarded the wife $1,000 and the husband
$.1.200: Held, that the amount awarded the wife could not be deemed
1o I>e unreasonable; but, as regarded the husband, after due allowance for
the medical expenses and for nursing, and attendance, and considering the
age of the parties, the amount awarded him was excessive, and a new-
assessment was ordered, unless an agreement was come to between the
parties that the damages should be reduced to $400.
Clarke v. London Street Ry. Co., 5 Can. Ry. Gas. 381, 12 O.L.R. 279.
IMPAIRMENT OF PROSPECTS OF MARRIAGE REMOTENESS EXCESSIVE DAM-
In an action for negligence, impairment of the prospects of matrimony,
in the case of a young woman, by reason of physical injuries, may be taken
into consideration by the jury in estimating the damages. In such a case
of accident to a young woman of about 21 years of age, living with her
father, but earning $6 a week as a stenographer, which accident resulted
in the amputation of her left leg at the knee, paresis in a hand and arm
of which there might never be complete recovery, injury to her back, and
a very serious shock to her nervous system: Held, that a verdict of
o.~>00 damages was not so excessive as to necessitate a new trial.
Morin T. Ottawa Elec. R. Co., 9 Can. Ry. Cas. 113. 18 O.L-R- 209.
TO MIXING ENGINEER PEKMAXEXT DISABILITY MEXTIOXIXG sen
The plaintiff, though not originally trained as a mining engineer, had
by long experience become an expert examiner of gold mining locations:
was 37 years of age. physically strong and healthy, and of excellent char-
acter. He was in receipt of a salary of $6.000 a year from employers in-
terested in gold properties, who spoke very highly of his capabilities and
prospects. He was permanently disabled by injury sustained on one of the
defendants' cars through their negligence. A jury awarded him $30.000:
Held, on appeal, that the amount was not so excessive as to entitle the
defendants to a new trial: Held. also, that by a reference in the charge
to the jury to $25.000 as a sum which would not appear large to a man
earning $6.000 a year, and by a mention of the sum claimed as $50.000.
the jury were not. reading the charge as a whole, left under the impression
that they were directed as to the amount they were to fix: Held. also.
that counsel for the plaintiff, in opening to the jury, mentioning the sum
claimed in the statement of claim, was not so objectionable as to be a
ground for granting a new trial. Judgment of Anglin. J.. affirmed.
Bradenbnrg v. Ottawa Elec. Ry. Co.. 9 Can. Ry. Cas. 242 r 19 O.L.R. 34.
LOSS OF BUSINESS PEOK1TS.
The plaintiff, a married woman, was injured while a passenger on one
of the defendants* cars, by reason of the negligence of the defendants* serv-
ants. as found by a jury, who assessed her damages at $1.900 for her inju-
ries and $600 for loss of business. The separation of the two items was
made by the jury, and the Judge entered judgment for $2.500: Held.
notwithstanding the form of the judgment, that the Court was enabled
by the division made by the jury, to consider the propriety of the allow-
ance made for loss of profits. The plaintiff was fifty-six years old. and
was in business as a baker. After her injury she sold the business. Some
evidence was given as to profits being earned in the business at the time
of the injury, but there was nothing to shew a reasonable certainty of fut-
ure profits: Held, that the allowance for loss of profits was not support-
able. the alleged damages being remote and conjectural, and the judg-
ment should be varied by reducing the amount to 1.900: Held. MS to
the $1.900. that the amount was not so large as to shew that the jury
nejrlected their duty or were actuated by any improper motive or did not
appreciate the grounds on which they might act in awarding damages.
Judgment of Britton. J.. varied.
Wright T. Toronto Ry. Co.. 10 Can. Ry. Cas. 10. 20 O.L.R. 498.
REDCCTIOX OF DAMAGES PEIXCIPLE OF ASSESSMEXT.
The plaintiff's damages for personal injury by the negligence of the de-
fendants having been assessed by a Judge at $10.000. the Court of Appeal
reduced the amount to $7.000. evidence having been received by the Court
to shew that a large sum paid to the plaintiff, and said by her to be pan
of her earnings, was in fact paid upon another account. Per Meredith.
J.A.: in estimating damages recoverable for personal injury by negligence.
the jury must not attempt to award the full amount of a perfect compen-
sation for the pecuniary injury, but must take a reasonable view of the
case and give what they consider, in all the circumstances, a fair compen-
sation; and the same rule applies to a Judge.
Sheahen v. Toronto Ry. Co., 13 Can. Ry. Cas. 270, 25 O.L.R. 310.
PERMANENT DISABILITY MEASURE OF DAMAGES REDUCTION REMITTITUR.
In an action for personal injuries in a negligence action against a street
railway, where it appeared that the plaintiff, a man aged thirty-one, was
permanently incapacitated by the injury from following any continuous
occupation, although he might be able to earn something towards his own
support, a verdict for $11,500 is not unreasonable and will not, under ordi-
nary circumstances, form a ground for ordering a new trial or redwing
the verdict on appeal.
Carty v. British Columbia Elec. Ry. Co., 2 D.L.R. 276, 19 W.L.R. 905.
PERMANENT DISABILITY CONDUCTOR.
Twelve thousand dollars is not an excessive verdict for damages for
personal injuries to one left a permanent cripple and unable to follow his
usual occupation as conductor of a construction train earning two hundred
and fifty dollars a month in summer and as conductor of a'freight train in
winter earning, at least, one hundred and twenty dollars a month, whose
future earning power would be problematical and such verdict cannot be
said to have been founded upon a wrong measure of damage where the
income which it would bring in, at current investment rates, would be less
than one-half of his previous earnings. [Johnson v. G.W.R. Co., 
2 K.B. 250; Bateman v. Middlesex, 25 O.L.R. 137, and Sheahen v. Toronto
Ry. Co., 13 Can. Ry. Cas. 270, 25 O.L.R. 310, specially referred to.]
*Tobin v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co., 2 D.L.R. 173, 5 S.L.R. 381.
[Followed in Staats v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co., 17 Can. Ry. Cas. 38, 17
LOSS OF HAND BRAKEMAN MEASURE OF DAMAGES.
The sum of ten thousand dollars is not excessive damages for personal
injuries to a servant twenty-six years old due to a collision between trains
causing him to be knocked down by the coal heater of the car he was in
and to be so severely burned by the coals that his face was badly disfig-
ured and his head was left so tender that he would not be able to stand
extreme heat or cold and his right hand was so severely burned as to
render it permanently useless, leaving him unable to follow his trade of
blacksmith. [Tobin v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co., 2 D.L.R. 173, and Johnston v.
Great Western Ry. Co.,  2 K.B. 250, specially referred to.]
Gordon v. Can.' Northern Ry. Co., 2 D.L.R. 183, 5 S.L.R. 169.
PERMANENT INJURIES EXCESSIVENESS.
$6,532.25 damages for injuries resulting from negligence, is not exces-
sive for a man thirty-four years of age, capable of earning $700 a year,
where his injuries were found to have resulted in a life-long loss of earn-
Can. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 11 D.L.R. 600.
INJURIES TO INFANT INCOME ACCIDENTS OF LIFE.
In awarding damages for injuries sustained by a child eight and one-
half years old by reason of a collision with a street railway car, whereby
the child's right arm had to be amputated below the elbow, the jury ought
not to give the plaintiff such a sum as, if invested, would produce the full
amount of income which he might be expected to earn if he had not been
injured, but they should take into account the accidents of life and other
DAMAGES. - 205
matters, aad give to the plaintiff what they consider, under all the eir-
enntanees, a fair f mpensalion far the Joss. [Rowley v. London Jfc X.W.
Ry. COL. LR. * Ex. 221. and Johnston v. Great W. Ry. Co., [18KI4] 2 K_B.
250. referred to.]
Schwartz v. Winnipeg Eke. Ry. COL, 12 DX.K. 36. 23 Man. L.R. 4S3.
.101 XT TOCTFEA-SOKS DIVISION OF DAMAGES NB.OJ<C.F_VCE.
The obligation of tortfeasors in respect of negligence is joint and sev-
eral as between them and the person injured, but as between themselves
the damage is apportionable under Quebec law. so where three parties were
equally in fault but only one is sued by the injured person, that one on
bringing: in the others to answer a* defendants in warranty i* entitled to
indemnity for two-thirds of the amount, one-third against each of the other
LeganH v. Montreal Terra Cotta Co., 20 D-LJL 388.
C. Nerrous or Mental
BT WAT OF
In an action for damages brought for the death of a person by the con-
sort and relations under Art. 1066. C.C, (Qne.i. which is a re-enactment
aad reproduction of the Con. Slat. LCL e. 78, damages by way of solatium
for the bereavement suffered cannot be lecuieied. Judgment of the Court
below reversed and new trial ordered. Mont. LR. 2 Q-B. 25, reversed.
Can. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Robinaoo. 14 Can. S.C-R. 1O5.
[Applied in 'Robinson v. Can. Pac. Ry. COL, Mont. LJL 5 S.C. 237: com-
mented on in Can. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Laehance. 42 Can. S.C.R. 208: followed
in Bernard v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co.. 11 Qne- S.C. 11; Filion v. The Queen.
4 Can. Ex. 145: Quebec Ry_ L. * P. Co. v. Poitras. 14 Qne. K.B. 431: Re
Central Bank and Yorke, 15 O.R. 625: followed in Jeannotte v. Couillard,
3 Qne. Q.B. 46L]
Loss OF srpTorr Ft3fEja. ESPEXSES XEBTOCS SHOCK.
Damages could not be claimed for the lose of the care and aid of a moth-
er 76 years old killed by the accident, or for the nervous shock to one
of the plaintiffs at her death, such damages being problematical, indirect
and remote; nor could plaintiffs, after accepting their mother's succes-
sion, claim to be reimbursed the expenses of the funeral of the victim
and of the mourning, as in paying them they only discharged the debts
inherent to the succession, which is presumed to be more advantageous
than onerous as they accepted it.
FUiatrault v. Canl Pac. Ry. Co^ IS Qne. S.C. 49L
The plaintiffs were driving on a highway in an enclosed vehicle which
owing, as was found, to the negligence of the defendants, was struck by
a moving car of the defendants, pushed a short distance sideways, and
struck on the other side by another car moving in the opposite direction.
The plaintiff* suffered no visible bodily injuries except slight bruises, but
complained of mental or nervous shock, and a jury assessed damages there-
for: Held. that damages of this kind were not recoverable notwithstand-
ing the impact and the bodily injuries. [Victorian Railways Commission-
ers v. Conltas (18881. 13 App. Cas. 222, and Henderson v. Canada Atlantic
Ry. Co. (1898. 25 A.R. 431. followed.]
Geiger v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co.. 5 < an. Ry. Cas. 85. 10 O.LJBL 51 L
[Distinguished in Toms r. Toronto RT. Co, 12 Can. Ry. Cas. 126 22
EXCE81VENESS SOLATIUM DOI.OKIS.
The Court refused to order a new trial or reduction of damages under
the provisions of arts. 502, 503, C.C.P., where it did not appear that, under
the circumstances, the amount of damages awarded by the verdict was so
grossly excessive as to make it evident that the jury had been led into
error or were influenced by improper motives. Davies, J., dissented in re-
spect of that part of the verdict awarding damages in favour of one of
the sons who was almost 21 years of age and earning wages at the time
deceased was killed. Quaere. In an action under art. 1056 C.C. (Que. ),
can a jury award damages in solatium doloris? [Robinson v. Can. Pac.
Ry. Co.,  A.C. 481, referred to.]
Can. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Lachance, 10 Can. Ry. Cas. 22, 42 Can. S.C.R. 205.
[Commented on in Montreal Street Ry. Co. v. Brialofsky, 19 Que. K.B.
COLLISION OF STREET CAK PHYSICAL SHOCK RESULTING NERVOUS CONDI-
The plaintiff, an elderly man, was a passenger in a street car of the
defendants, which was negligently allowed to come into collision with an
engine at a railway crossing. By the force of the collision he was violently
thrown from his seat over to the back of the next seat in front of him.
No bones were broken, and there was no great bruising or other external
injury. He got off the car without assistance and walked a short dis-
tance, and then, as he said, "collapsed," and for the time could go no
further. Eventually he reached the place where he was employed, hut
was quite unable to work, and was obliged to go to his home and to bed,
where he remained off and on for several weeks under a physician's care.
Subsequently, the condition of traumatic neurasthenia developed, as the
result, it was said, of the shock of the collision, and the plaintiff, it was
asserted, was still suffering from that trouble at the time of the trial.
A physician testified that the physical shock suffered excited the subsequent
condition, and that that condition did not arise purely from an effect
created on his mind: Held, that the case was different from those in
which the mental shock, as from fright and the like, was the primary
cause to which the resulting physical consequences had to be traced the
shock in this case was not primarily mental at all, but physical; the trial
Judge properly refused to direct the jury to assess separately the damages
resulting exclusively from mental shock and those resulting from physi-
cal injury: and a judgment for the plaintiff for $1,500 damages assessed
by the jury should not be disturbed. [Victorian Railways Commissioners
v. Coultas (1888), 13 App. Cas. 222, Henderson v. Canada Atlantic Ry.
Co. (1808), 25 A.R. 437, and Geiger v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (190o'),
10 O.L.R. 511, 5 Can. Ry. Cas. 85, distinguished.] Judgment of Falcon-
bridge, C.J.K.B.. affirmed'.
Toms v. Toronto Ry. Co., 12 Can. Ry. Cas. 126, 22 O.L.R. 204.
[Affirmed in 44 Can. S.C.R. 268, 12 Can. Ry. Cas. 250.]
PHYSICAL INJURIES MENTAL SHOCK.
T. was riding in a street car when it collided with a train. He was
thrown violently forward 'on the back of the seat in front of him, but
was able to leave the car and walk a short distance towards his place of
business when he collapsed and was taken home in a cab. He was laid
up for several weeks and never recovered his former state of health. On
the trial of an action against the railway company one medical witness
gave as his opinion that the physical shock received by T. was the excit-
ing cause of his condition, while others ascribed it to a disturbed nervous
system. Negligence on the part of the company was not denied, but
the trial Judge was asked to direct the jury to distinguish, in assessing
damages, between the physical and nervous injuries, which he refused to
do: Held, affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeal (22 Ont. L.It.
204, 12 Can. By. Cas. 126 1, that the trial Judge properly refused to direct
the jury as requested; that the injuries to T.'s nervous system were as
much the direct result of the negligence of the company as those to his phys-
ical system, and he could recover compensation for both; and that in any
ease it was impossible for the jury to sever the damages. [Victorian Rail-
way Commissioners v. Coultas. 13 App. Cas. 222. distinguished.]
Toronto Ry. Co. v. Toms. 12 Can. Ry. Cas. 250, 44 Can. S.C-R. 268.
MENTAL SHOCK EXCESSIVENESS.
A jury should not be asked to assess separately damages resulting from
shock caused by blows and those resulting from bodily injury independ-
ently of nervous shock. Remarks per Irving, J.A.. as to cases in which
the damages were so assessed. In this case a new trial was ordered
(Irving J.A.. dissenting), on the ground that the damages awarded were
excessive. [Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas (1888), 13 App.
Cas. 222, followed.]
Taylor v. British Columbia Elec. Ry. Co.. 13 Can. Ry. Cas. 400, 16
CONSEQUENTIAL INJURIES TRAUMATIC NEURASTHENIA.
Where, as a result of a collision between a railway train and a street
ear due to negligent operation of the train, a passenger on the street
ear was thrown into a subway, a verdict for substantial damages may
be given against the railway company whose negligence caused the in-
jury, although the only substantial injury proved was that the plaintiff
had in consequence suffered from traumatic neurasthenia and caused the
plaintiff to be subject to insomnia and nerve troubles incapacitating him
for his usual occupation, although such result is attributable to the
mental shock as well as to the physical. [Victorian Railways Commis-
sion v. Coultas (18881, 13 A.C. 222* and Dulieu v. White,  2 K.B.
669, considered: Geiger v. G.T.R. Co., 10 O.L.R. 511, and Henderson v.
Canada Atlantic. 25 O.L.R. 437, specially referred to.]
Ham v. Can. Northern Ry. Co., 1 D.LJL 377. 20 W.LJL 359.
[Varied by disallowing claim for interest, Ham T. Can. Northern Rv.
Co. (No. 2)* 7 DJ^R. 812.]
D. Lord Campbell's Act.
DEATH OF WIPE DAMAGES TO HUSBAND Loss OF HOUSEHOLD SEKYICES
CARE AXD TRAINING or CHILDREN.
Although on the death of a wife, caused by negligence of a railway
company, the husband cannot recover damages of a sentimental character,
yet the loss of household services, accustomed to be performed by the
wife, which would have to be replaced by hired services, may be a sub-
stantial loss for which damages may be recovered, and so also may be the
loss to the children of the care and moral training of their mother. In
this case the Privy Council refused leave to appeal: see Canada Gazette,
vol. 6. p. 583; 11 A.R. (Ont.) 1. reversing 1 O.R. 545, affirmed.
St. Lawrence * Ottawa Ry. Co. v. Lett. 11 Can. S.C.R. 422.
[Discussed in Ricketts v. Markdale. 31 O.R. 610; followed in McKeown
v. Toronto Ry. Co., 19 O.L.R. 361 : referred to in Beckett v. Grand Trunk
Ry. Co., 13 A.R. (Ont.) 174; HoDinger v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co., 21 O.R. 705;
New Brunswick Ry. Co. v. Van wart, IY Can. S.C.R. 37; Rombough v.
Balch, 27 A.R. (Ont.) 32; relied on in Davidson v. vStuart, 14 Man. L.R.
81, 89; adopted in Collins v. St. John, 38 N.B.R. 90, 91; applied in Canada
Atlantic Ry. Co. v. Henderson, 29 Can. S.C.R. 636.]
RIGHT TO DEDUCT LIFE INSURANCE FROM DAMAGES.
Where the life of the deceased is insured, the amount of the insurance
must not be deducted from the damages assessed. 13 A.R. (Ont.) 174,
8 O.R. 601, affirmed.
Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Beckett, 16 Can. S.C.R. 713.
PECUNIARY LOSS LIFE INSURANCE.
The right conferred by Lord Campbell's Act, adopted by Consolidated
Statutes of Ontario, c. 135, ss. 2, 3, to recover damages in respect of death
occasioned by wrongful act, neglect or default is restricted to the actual
pecuniary loss sustained by the plaintiff. Where the widow of deceased
is plaintiff, and her husband had made provision for her by a policy on
his own life in her favour, the amount of such policy is not to be deducted
from the amount of damages previously assessed irrespective of such
consideration. She is benefited only by the accelerated receipt of the
amount of the policy, and that benefit being represented by the interest
of the money during the period of acceleration, may be compensated by
deducting future premiums from the estimated future earnings of the de-
ceased. [Hicks v. Newport, etc., Ry. Co., 4 B. & S. 403, n., approved; 15
A.R. (Ont.) 477, affirmed.]
Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Jennings (1888), 13 App. Cas. 800.
[Adopted in Royal Paper Mills Co. v. Cameron, 39 Can. S.C.R. 369; re-
ferred to in Warboys v.-Lachine Rapids, etc., Co., 22 Que. S.C. 541; relied
on in Davidson v. Stuart, 14 Man. L.R. 81; applied in Allen v. Can. Pac.
Ry. Co., 19 O.L.R. 510; followed in London & Western Trusts v. Traders
Bank, 16 O.L.R. 382; referred to in Bicknell v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 26
A.R. (Ont.) 431;. Nightingale v. Union Colliery Co., 8 B.C.R. 136.]
EFFECT OF INSURANCE.
Where the widow or heirg of a person killed as the result of an acci-
dent sue the person responsible for such death in damages the defendant
is entitled to have the amount of damages suffered diminished by what-
ever sums the heirs may have received under the terms of accident poli-
cies carried by the deceased.
Can. Northern Quebec Ry. Co. v. Johnston, 7 D.L.R. 243, 22 Que. K. B.
GOVERNMENT RAILWAY NEGLIGENCE OP CROWN'S SERVANTS ACTION BY
PARENT OF DECEASED PECUNIARY BENEFIT PAIN AND SUFFERING.
In the case of death resulting from negligence, and an action taken by
the party entitled to bring the same under the provisions of R.S.N.S. 1900,
c. 178, s. 5, the damages should be calculated in reference to a. reasonable
expectation of pecuniary benefit, as of right or otherwise, from the con-
tinuance of the life. Such party is not to be compensated, for any pain
or suffering arising from the loss of the deceased, or for expenses of
medical treatment of the deceased, or for his burial expenses, or for
family mourning. [Osborne v. Gillett, L.R. 8 Ex. 88, distinguished.]
McDonald v. The King, 2 Can. Ry. Cas. 1, 7 Can. Ex. 216.
NEGLIGENCE CAUSING DEATH APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES BETWEEN WIDOW
An action brought against a railway company by a widow on behalf
of herself and four infant children, aged respectively seven, fire, three and