the force suspended for a time.
Taking all the means within my reach to form
a judgment, I do not believe it is the popular
wish of Kentucky that this force shall be re-
moved beyond her limits, and, with this impres-
sion, I must respectfully decline to so remove it.
I most cordially sympathize with your Excel-
lency in the wish to preserve the peace of my
own native State, Kentucky ; but it is with regret
I search [for], and cannot find, in your not very
short letter any declaration or intimation that you
entertain any desire for the preservation of the
Federal Union.
Your obedient servant,
Abraham Lincoln.
[April 9, 1862. See Halleck, Henry W.]
Malhiot, E. E., and Others.
On June 19, 1863. the President replied to a letter of
E. E. Malhiot, Bradish Johnson, and Thomas Cottman,
a committee appointed by Louisiana planters to secure
Federal recognition of a loyal State government, as
follows :
MALTBY, HARRISON 243
Since receiving the letter, reliable information
has reached me that a respectable portion of the
Louisiana people desire to amend their State con-
stitution, and contemplate holding a State con-
vention for that object. This fact alone, as it
seems to me, is a sufficient reason why the Gen-
eral Government should not give the committal
you seek to the existing State constitution. I
may add that while I do not perceive how such
committal could facilitate our military operations
in Louisiana, I really apprehend it might be so
used as to embarrass them.
As to an election to be held next November,
there is abundant time without any order or proc-
lamation from me just now. The people of Lou-
isiana shall not lack an opportunity for a fair
election for both Federal and State officers by
want of anything within my power to give
them.
Your obedient servant,
A. Lincoln.
Maltby, Harrison.
[Confidential]
Springfield, September 8, 1856.
Harrison Maltby, Esq.
Dear Sir : I understand you are a Fillmore
man. Let me prove to you that every vote with-
held, from Fremont and given to Fillmore in this
State actually lessens Fillmore's chance of being
President. Suppose Buchanan gets all the slave
States and Pennsylvania, and any other one State
besides ; then he is elected, no matter who gets
all the rest. But suppose Fillmore gets the two
slave States of Maryland and Kentucky; then
244 LETTERS
Buchanan is not elected; Fillmore goes into the
House of Representatives, and may be made
President by a compromise. But suppose, again,
Fillmore's friends throw away a few thousand
votes on him in Indiana and Illinois ; it will in-
evitably give these States to Buchanan, which
will more than compensate him for the loss of
Maryland and Kentucky, will elect him, and leave
Fillmore no chance in the House of Representa-
tives or- out of it.
This is as plain as adding up the weight of
three small hogs. As Mr. Fillmore has no pos-
sible chance to carry Illinois for himself, it is
plainly to his interest to let Fremont take it, and
thus keep it out of the hands of Buchanan. Be
not deceived. Buchanan is the hard horse to
beat in this race. Let him have Illinois, and
nothing can beat him ; and he will get Illinois
if men persist in throwing away votes upon Mr.
Fillmore. Does some one persuade you that Mr.
Fillmore can carry Illinois ? Nonsense ! There
are over seventy newspapers in Illinois opposing
Buchanan, only three or four of which support
Mr. Fillmore, all the rest going for Fremont.
Are not these newspapers a fair index of the
proportion of the votes? If not, tell me why.
Again, of these three or four Fillmore news-
papers, two, at least, are supported in part by
the Buchanan men, as I understand. Do not they
know where the shoe pinches? They know the
Fillmore movement helps them, and therefore
they help it. Do think these things over, and
then act according to your judgment.
Yours very truly,
A. Lincoln.
MARCY, R. B. 245
Mann, Mrs. Horace.
Executive Mansion,
Washington, April 5, 1864.
Mrs. Horace Mann.
Madam : The petition of persons under eight-
een, praying that I would free all slave children,
and the heading of which petition it appears you
wrote, was handed me a few days since by Sen-
ator Sumner. Please tell these little people I am
very glad their young hearts are so full of just
and generous sympathy, and that, while I have
not the power to grant all they ask, I trust they
will remember that God has, and that, as it seems,
he wills to do it.
Yours truly,
A. Lincoln.
Mansfield, J. K. F.
Executive Mansion, June 19, 1861.
General Mansfield.
My dear Sir: The inclosed papers of Colonel
Joseph Hooker speak for themselves. He desires
to have the command of a regiment. Ought he
to have it, and can it be done, and how?
Please consult General Scott, and say if he
and you would like Colonel Hooker to have a
command. Yours very truly,
A. Lincoln.
Marcy, R. B.
[ Telegram. ]
Washington, May 29, 1862. 10 a. m.
General R. B. Marcy,
McClellan's Headquarters :
Yours just received. I think it cannot be cer-
246 LETTERS
tainly known whether the force which fought
General Porter is the same which recently con-
fronted McDowell. Another item of evidence
bearing on it is that General Branch commanded
against Porter, while it was General Anderson
who was in front of McDowell. He and Mc-
Dowell were in correspondence about prisoners.
A. Lincoln.
[Telegram.]
Washington, May 29, 1862. 1.20 p. m.
General R. B. Marcy:
Your despatch as to the South Anna and Ash-
land being seized by our forces this morning is
received. Understanding these points to be on
the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, I
heartily congratulate the country, and thank Gen-
eral McCleflan and his army for their seizure.
A. Lincoln.
Mathers, John.
Springfield, July 20, 1858.
Jno. Mathers, Esq.,
Jacksonville, 111.
My dear Sir : Your kind and interesting letter
of the 19th was duly received. Your sugges-
tions as to placing one's self on the offensive
rather than the defensive are certainly correct.
That is a point which I shall not disregard. I
spoke here on Saturday night. The speech, not
very well reported, appears in the " State Journal"
of this morning. You doubtless will see it; and
I hope that you will perceive in it, that I am al-
ready improving. I would mail you a copy now,
MAYNARD, HORACE 247
but have not one on hand. I thank you for you/
letter and shall be pleased to hear from you again.
Yours very truly,
A. Lincoln.
Matteson, Joel A.
Springfield, November 25, 1858.
Hon. Joel A. Matteson.
Dear Sir : Last summer, when a movement was
made in court against your road, you engaged us
to be on your side. It has so happened that,
so far, we have performed no service in the case ;
but we lost a cash fee offered us on the other side.
Now, being hard run, we propose a little com-
promise. We will claim nothing for the matter
just mentioned, if you will relieve us at once
from the old matter at the Marine and Fire In-
surance Company, and be greatly obliged to boot.
Can you not do it?
Yours truly,
A. Lincoln.
Maynard, Horace.
[ Telegram. ]
Executive Mansion,
Washington, February 13, 1864.
Hon. Horace Maynard,
Nashville, Tennessee :
Your letter of [the] second received. Of
course Governor Johnson will proceed with re-
organization as the exigencies of the case appear
to him to require. I do not apprehend he will
think it necessary to deviate from my views to
any ruinous extent. On one hasty reading I see
no such deviation in his program, which you send.
A. Lincoln.
248 LETTERS
McCall, G. A.
[ Telegram. ]
Washington, May 31, 1862. 3.35.
Brigadier-General McCall,
Commanding, Fredericksburg :
Are you about to withdraw from Fredericks-
burg ; and if so, why, and by whose orders ?
A. Lincoln.
[ Telegram. ]
Washington, May 31, 1862.
General McCall :
The President directs me to say to you that
there can be nothing to justify a panic at Fred-
ericksburg. He expects you to maintain your
position there as becomes a soldier and a gen-
eral.
Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.
McClellan, George B.
[Nov. 1, 1861. See Scott, Winfield.]
Executive Mansion, December 6, 1861.
Major-General McClellan.
My dear Sir: Captain Francis G. Young, of
the California regiment (Colonel Baker's), is in
some difficulty — I do not precisely understand
what. I believe you know I was unfavorably im-
pressed toward him because of apparently con-
tradictory accounts he gave me of some matters
at the battle of Ball's Bluff. At length he has
brought me the paper which accompanies this,
showing, I think, that he is entitled to respectful
consideration. As you see, it is signed by several
senators and representatives as well as other well-
McCLELLAN, GEORGE B. 249
known and respectable gentlemen. I attach con-
siderable consequence to the name of Lieutenant-
Colonel Shaler, late Major Shaler, of the New
York Seventh. These things, and his late con-
nection with Colonel Baker, induce me to ask you
if, consistently with the public service, the past,
whatever it is, cannot be waived, and he placed in
service and given another chance?
Yours truly,
A. Lincoln.
Washington, December 10, 1861.
Your Excellency : I inclose the paper you left with me,
filled as requested.* In arriving at the numbers given,
I have left the minimum number in garrison and obser-
vation.
Information received recently leads me to believe that
the enemy could meet us in front with equal forces nearly,
and I have now my mind actively turned toward another
plan of campaign that I do not think at all anticipated
by the enemy nor by many of our own people.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
George B. McClellan, Major-General.
[Inclosure.]
If it were determined to make a forward movement of
the Army of the Potomac without awaiting further in-
crease of numbers or better drill and discipline, how long
would it require to actually get in motion?
If bridge trains ready by December 15, probably 25th.
After leaving all that would be necessary, how many
troops could join the movement from southwest of the
river?
Seventy-one thousand.
How many from northeast of it?
Thirty-three thousand.
Suppose, then, that of those southwest of the river
fifty thousand move forward and menace the enemy at
Centreville ; the remainder of the movable force on that
* McClellan's notes are written in pencil. They are here printed
in italics.
250 LETTERS
side move rapidly to the crossing of the Occoquan by the
road from Alexandria to Richmond, there to be joined
by the whole movable force from northeast of the
river, having landed from the Potomac, just below the
mouth of the Occoquan, moved by land up the south side
of that stream to the crossing point named, then the
whole move together by the road thence to Brentsville
and beyond to the railroad just south of its crossing of
Broad Run, a strong detachment of cavalry having gone
rapidly ahead to destroy the railroad bridges south and
north of the point.
If the crossing of the Occoquan by those from above
be resisted, those landing from the Potomac below to
take the resisting force of the enemy in rear ; or, if the
landing from the Potomac be resisted, those crossing the
Occoquan from above to take that resisting force in the
rear. Both points will probably not be successfully re-
sisted at the same time.
The force in front of Centreville, if pressed too hardly,
should fight back slowly into the intrenchments behind
them.
Armed vessels and transportation should remain at the
Potomac landing to cover a possible retreat.
Executive Mansion,
Washington, February 3, 1862.
Major-General McClellan.
My dear Sir : You and I have distinct and dif-
ferent plans for a movement of the Army of the
Potomac — yours to be down the Chesapeake, up
the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land
to the terminus of the railroad on the York River ;
mine to move directly to a point on the railroad
southwest of Manassas.
If you will give me satisfactory answers to
the following questions, I shall gladly yield my
plan to yours.
First. Does not your plan involve a greatly
larger expenditure of time and money than mine ?
Second. Wherein is a victory more certain by
your plan than mine?
McCLELLAN, GEORGE B. 251
Third. Wherein is a victory more valuable by
your plan than mine ?
Fourth. In fact, would it not be less valuable in
this, that it would break no great line of the
enemy's communications, while mine would?
Fifth. In case of disaster, would not a retreat
be more difficult by your plan than mine?
Yours truly,
Abraham Lincoln.
[Memorandum.']
First. Suppose the enemy should attack us in
force before we reach the Occoquan, what?
Second. Suppose the enemy in force shall dis-
pute the crossing of the Occoquan, what? In
view of this, might it not be safest for us to cross
the Occoquan at Colchester, rather than at the
village of Occoquan ? This would cost the enemy
two miles more of travel to meet us, but would,
on the contrary, leave us two miles farther from
our ultimate destination.
Third. Suppose we reach Maple Valley with-
out an attack, will we not be attacked there in
force by the enemy marching by the several roads
from Manassas; and if so, what?
Executive Mansion,
Washington, March 31, 1862.
Major-General McClellan.
My dear Sir : This morning I felt constrained
to order Blenker's division to Fremont, and I
write this to assure you I did so with great pain,
understanding that you would wish it other-
wise. If you could know the full pressure of
the case, I am confident that you would justify
2 5 2 LETTERS
it, even beyond a mere acknowledgment that the
commander-in-chief may order what he pleases.
Yours very truly,
Abraham Lincoln.
[ Telegram. ]
Washington, April 6, 1862. 8. p. m.
General G. B. McClellan :
Yours of 11 a. m. to-day received. Secretary
of War informs me that the forwarding of trans-
portation, ammunition, and Woodbury's brigade,
under your orders, is not, and will not be, inter-
fered with. You now have over one hundred
thousand troops with you, independent of Gen-
eral Wool's command. I think you better break
the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick
River at once. This will probably use time as
advantageously as you can.
A. Lincoln, President.
Washington, April 9, 1862.
Major-General McClellan.
My dear Sir: Your despatches, complaining
that you are not properly sustained, while they
do not offend me, do pain me very much.
Blenker's division was withdrawn from you be-
fore you left here, and you knew the pressure
under which I did it, and, as I thought, ac-
quiesced in it — certainly not without reluctance.
After you left I ascertained that less than 20,-
©00 unorganized men, without a single field-
battery, were all you designed to be left for the
defense of Washington and Manassas Junction,
and part of this even was to go to General
Hooker's old position; General Banks's corps,
McCLELLAN, GEORGE B.
253
once designed for Manassas Junction, was di-
vided and tied up on the line of Winchester and
Strasburg, and could not leave it without again
exposing the upper Potomac and the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad. This presented (or would
present, when McDowell and Sumner should be
gone) a great temptation to the enemy to turn
back from the Rappahannock and sack Washing-
ton. My explicit order that Washington should,
by the judgment of all the commanders of corps,
be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It
was precisely this that drove me to detain Mc-
Dowell.
I do not forget that I was satisfied with your
arrangements to leave Banks at Manassas Junc-
tion ; but when that arrangement was broken up
and nothing was substituted for it, of course I
was not satisfied. I was constrained to sub-
stitute something for it myself.
And now allow me to ask, do you really think
I should permit the line from Richmond via
Manassas Junction to this city to be entirely open,
except what resistance could be presented by less
than 20,000 unorganized troops ? This is a ques-
tion which the country will not allow me to
evade.
There is a curious mystery about the number of
the troops now with you. When I telegraphed
you on the 6th, saying you had over 100,000 with
you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of
War a statement, taken as he said from your
own returns, making 108,000 then with you and
en route to you. You now say you will have
but 85,000 when all en route to you shall have
reached you. How can this discrepancy of 23,000
be accounted for?
254 LETTERS
As to General Wool's command, I understand
it is doing for you precisely what a like number
of your own would have to do if that command
was away. I suppose the whole force which
has gone forward to you is with you by this
time; and if so, I think it is the precise time for
you to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will
relatively gain upon you — that is, he will gain
faster by fortifications and reinforcements than
you can by reinforcements alone.
And once more let me tell you it is indispensa-
ble to you that you strike a blow. I am power-
less to help this. You will do me the justice
to remember I always insisted that going down
the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting
at or near Manassas, was only shifting and not
surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the
same enemy and the same or equal intrenchments
at either place. The country will not fail to
note — is noting now — that the present hesitation
to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the
story of Manassas repeated.
I beg to assure you that I have never written
you or spoken to you in greater kindness of feel-
ing than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain
you, so far as in my most anxious judgment I
consistently can ; but you must act.
Yours very truly,
A. Lincoln.
[Telegram.]
Washington, April 21, 1862.
Major-General McClellan :
Your despatch of the 19th was received that
day. Fredericksburg is evacuated and the
bridges destroyed by the enemy, and a small part
McCLELLAN, GEORGE B. 255
of McDowell's command occupies this side of
the Rappahannock, opposite the town. He pur-
poses moving his whole force to that point.
A. Lincoln.
[Telegram.]
Executive Mansion, \
Washington, May 1, 1862.
Major-General McClellan :
Your call for Parrott guns from Washington
alarms me, chiefly because it argues indefinite
procrastination. Is anything to be done?
A. Lincoln.
Fort Monroe, Virginia, May 9, 1862.
Major-General McClellan :
My dear Sir: I have just assisted the Secretary
of War in framing part of a despatch to you re-
lating to army corps, which despatch of course
will have reached you long before this will.
I wish to say a few words to you privately on
this subject. I ordered the army corps organiza-
tion not only on the unanimous opinion of the
twelve generals whom you had selected and as-
signed as generals of division, but also on the
unanimous opinion of every military man I could
get an opinion from (and every modern military
book), yourself only excepted. Of course I did
not on my own judgment pretend to understand
the subject. I now think it indispensable for
you to know how your struggle against it is re-
ceived in quarters which we cannot entirely dis-
regard. It is looked upon as merely an effort
to pamper one or two pets and to persecute and
degrade their supposed rivals. I have had no
word from Sumner, Heintzelman, or Keyes. The
256 LETTERS
commanders of these corps are of course the
three highest officers with you, but I am con-
stantly told that you have no consultation or com-
munication with them ; that you consult and com-
municate with nobody but General Fitz-John
Porter and perhaps General Franklin. I do not
say these complaints are true or just, but at all
events it is proper you should know of their
existence. Do the commanders of corps disobey
your orders in anything?
When you relieved General Hamilton of his
command the other day, you thereby lost the con-
fidence of at least one of your best friends in
the Senate. And here let me say, not as applica-
ble to you personally, that senators and repre-
sentatives speak of me in their places as they
please without question, and that officers of the
army must cease addressing insulting letters to
them for taking no greater liberty with them.
But to return. Are you strong enough — are
you strong enough, even with my help — to set
your foot upon the necks of Sumner, Heintzel-
man, and Keyes all at once? This is a practical
and very serious question for you.
The success of your army and the cause of the
country are the same, and of course I only desire
the good of the cause.
Yours truly,
A. Lincoln.
[Telegram.]
Washington City, May 15, 1862.
Major-General McClellan,
Cumberland, Virginia :
Your long despatch of yesterday is just re-
ceived. I will answer more fully soon. Will
McCLELLAN, GEORGE B. 257
say now that all your despatches to the Secre-
tary of War have been promptly shown to me.
Have done and shall do all I could and can to
sustain you. Hoped that the opening of James
River and putting Wool and Burnside in com-
munication, with an open road to Richmond, or
to you, had effected something in that direction,
I am still unwilling to take all our force off the
direct line between Richmond and here.
A. Lincoln.
Washington, May 18, 1862. 2 p. m.
General : Your despatch to the President, ask-
ing reinforcements, has been received and care-
fully considered.
The President is not willing to uncover the
capital entirely; and it is believed that even if
this were prudent, it would require more time
to effect a junction between your army and that
of the Rappahannock by the way of the Potomac
and York Rivers than by a land march. In order,
therefore, to increase the strength of the attack
upon Richmond at the earliest moment, Gen-
eral McDowell has been orderd to march upon
that city by the shortest route. He is ordered,
keeping himself always in position to save the
capital from all possible attack, so to operate as
as to put his left wing in communication with
your right wing, and you are instructed to co-
operate so as to establish this communication as
soon as possible by extending your right wing to
the north of Richmond.
It is believed that this communication can be
safely established either north or south of the
Pamunkey River.
In any event, you will be able to prevent the
258 LETTERS
main body of the enemy's forces from leaving
Richmond and falling in overwhelming force
upon General McDowell. He will move with
between thirty-five and forty thousand men.
A copy of the instructions to General Mc-
Dowell are with this. The specific task assigned
to his command has been to provide against any
danger to the capital of the nation.
At your earnest call for reinforcements, he is
sent forward to cooperate in the reduction of
Richmond, but charged, in attempting this, not
to uncover the city of Washington ; and you will
give no order, either before or after your junc-
tion, which can put him out of position to cover
this city. You and he will communicate with
each other by telegraph or otherwise as fre-
quently as may be necessary for efficient coop-
eration. When General McDowell is in position
on your right, his supplies must be drawn from
West Point, and you will instruct your staff-
officers to be prepared to supply him by that
route.
The President desires that General McDowell
retain the command of the Department of the
Rappahannock and of the forces with which he
moves forward.
By order of the President :
Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.
Major-General George B. McClellan,
Commanding Army of the Potomac, before
Richmond.
[Telegram.]
Washington, May 21, 1862.
Major-General McClellan :
I have just been waited on by a large commit-
McCLELLAN, GEORGE B. 259
tee who present a petition signed by twenty-three
senators and eighty-four representatives asking
me to restore General Hamilton to his division.
I wish to do this, and yet I do not wish to be
understood as rebuking you. Please answer at
once.
A. Lincoln.
[Telegram.']
Washington City, May 22, 1862.
Major-General McClellan :
Your long despatch of yesterday just received.
You will have just such control of General Mc-
Dowell and his forces as you therein indicate.
McDowell can reach you by land sooner than he
could get aboard of boats, if the boats were
ready at Fredericksburg, unless his march shall