be resisted, in which case the force resisting him
will certainly not be confronting you at Rich-
mond. By land he can reach you in five days
after starting, whereas by water he would not
reach you in two weeks, judging by past experi-
ence. Franklin's single division did not reach
you in ten days after I ordered it.
A. Lincoln, President United States.
[ Telegram. ]
Washington, May 24, 1862.
Major-General George B. McClellan:
I left General McDowell's camp at dark last
evening. Shields's command is there, but it is
so worn that he cannot move before Monday
morning, the 26th. We have so thinned our line
to get troops for other places that it was broken
yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable less
2 6o LETTERS
to us of one regiment infantry, two companies-
cavalry, putting General Banks in some peril.
The enemy's forces under General Anderson
now opposing General McDowell's advance have
as their line of supply and retreat the road to
Richmond.
If, in conjunction with McDowell's movement
against Anderson, you could send a force from
your right to cut off the enemy's supplies from
Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across
the two "forks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the
enemy's retreat, you will prevent the army now
opposed to you from receiving an accession of
numbers of nearly 15,000 men; and if you suc-
ceed in saving the bridges you will secure a line
of railroad for supplies in addition to the one
you now have. Can you not do this almost as
well as not while you are building the Chicka-
hominy bridges? McDowell and Shields both
say they can, and positively will, move Monday
morning. I wish you to move cautiously and
safely.
You will have command of McDowell, after he
joins you, precisely as you indicated in your long
despatch to us of the 21st.
A. Lincoln.
[ Telegram. ]
Washington, May 24, 1862. 4 p. m.
Major-General George B. McClellan :
In consequence of General Banks's critical po-
sition, I have been compelled to suspend General
McDowell's movements to join you. The enemy
are making a desperate push upon Harper's
Ferry, and we are trying to throw General Fre-
McCLELLAN, GEORGE B. 261
mont's force and part of General McDowell's in
their rear.
A. Lincoln, President.
[ Telegram. ]
Washington, May 25, 1862. 2 p. m.
Major-General McClellan :
The enemy is moving north in sufficient force
to drive General Banks before him — precisely in
what force we cannot tell. He is also threaten-
ing Leesburg and Geary, on the Manassas Gap
Railroad, from both north and south — in pre-
cisely what force we cannot tell. I think the
movement is a general and concerted one, such
as would not be if he was acting upon the pur-
pose of a very desperate defense of Richmond. I
think the time is near when you must either
attack Richmond or give up the job and come
to the defense of Washington. Let me hear from
you instantly.
A. Lincoln, President.
[Telegram in Cipher.]
War Department, Washington City, D. C.,
May 25, 1862. 8.30 p. m.
Major-General McClellan :
Your despatch received. General Banks was
at Strasburg, with about 6000 men, Shields hav-
ing been taken from him to swell a column for
McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and the rest
of his force scattered at various places. On the
23d a rebel force of 7000 to 10,000 fell upon one
regiment and two companies guarding the bridge
at Front Royal, destroying it entirely ; crossed the
Shenandoah, and on the 24th (yesterday) pushed
to get north of Banks, on the road to Winchester.
262 LETTERS
Banks ran a race with them, beating them into
Winchester yesterday evening. This morning a
battle ensued between the two forces, in which
Banks was beaten back into full retreat toward
Martinsburg, and probably is broken up into a
total rout. Geary, on the Manassas Gap Rail-
road, just now reports that Jackson is now near
Front Royal, with 10,000, following up and sup-
porting, as I understand, the force now pursuing
Banks; also that another force of 10,000 is near
Orleans, following on in the same direction.
Stripped bare, as we are here, it will be all we can
do to prevent them crossing the Potomac at Har-
per's Ferry or above. We have about 20,000 of
McDowell's force moving back to the vicinity of
Front Royal, and General Fremont, who was at
Franklin, is moving to Harrisonburg; both these
movements intended to get in the enemy's rear.
One more of McDowell's brigades is ordered
through here to Harper's Ferry ; the rest of his
force remains for the present at Fredericksburg.
We are sending such regiments and dribs from
here and Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's
Ferry, supplying their places in some sort by
calling in militia from the adjacent States. We
also have eighteen cannon on the road to Har-
per's Ferry, of which arm there is not a single
one yet at that point. This is now our situation.
If McDowell's force was now beyond our
reach, we should be utterly helpless. Appre-
hension of something like this, and no unwilling-
ness to sustain you, has always been my reason
for withholding McDowell's force from you.
Please understand this, and do the best you can
with the force you have.
A. Lincoln.
McCLELLAN, GEORGE B. 263
[ Telegram. ]
Washington, May 26, 1862. 12.40 p. m.
Major-General McClellan:
We have General Banks's official report. He
has saved his army and baggage, and has made a
safe retreat to the river, and is probably safe
at Williamsport. He reports the attacking force
at 15,000.
A. Lincoln, President.
[ Telegram. ]
Washington, May 26, 1862.
Major-General George B. McClellan:
Can you not cut the Aquia Creek Railroad?
Also, what impression have you as to intrenched
works for you to contend with in front of Rich-
mond ? Can you get near enough to throw shells
into the city?
A. Lincoln, President.
[ Telegram. ]
Washington, May 28, 1862.
Major-General McClellan:
What of F. J. Porter's expedition? Please
answer.
A. Lincoln.
[ Telegram. ]
Washington, May 28, 1862. 840 p. m.
Major-General McClellan:
I am very glad of General F. J. Porter's vic-
tory. Still, if it was a total rout of the enemy,
I am puzzled to know why the Richmond and
Fredericksburg Railroad was not seized again,
as you say you have all the railroads but the
264 LETTERS
Richmond and Fredericksburg. I am puzzled to
see how, lacking that, you can have any, except
the scrap from Richmond to West Point. The
scrap of the Virginia Central from Richmond to
Hanover Junction, without more, is simply noth-
ing. That the whole of the enemy is concen-
trating on Richmond, I think cannot be certainly
known to you or me. Saxton, at Harper's Ferry,
informs us that large forces, supposed to be
Jackson's and Ewell's, forced his advance from
Charlestown to-day. General King telegraphs us
from Fredericksburg that contrabands give cer-
tain information that 15,000 left Hanover Junc-
tion Monday morning to reinforce Jackson. I am
painfully impressed with the importance of the
struggle before you, and shall aid you all I can
consistently with my view of due regard to all
points.
A. Lincoln.
[Telegram.]
War Department, Washington City, D. C,
May 29, 1862. 10.30 a. m.
Major-General McClellan :
I think we shall be able within three days to
tell you certainly whether any considerable force
of the enemy — Jackson or any one else — is mov-
ing on to Harper's Ferry or vicinity. Take this
expected development into your calculations.
A. Lincoln.
[Telegram.]
Washington, May 31, 1862. 10.20 p. m.
Major-General McClellan :
A circle whose circumference shall pass
through Harper's Ferry, Front Royal, and Stras-
burg, and whose center shall be a little north-
McCLELLAN, GEORGE B. 265
east of Winchester, almost certainly has within
it this morning the forces of Jackson, Ewell, ajid
Edward Johnson. Quite certainly they were
within it two days ago. Some part of their forces
attacked Harper's Ferry at dark last evening,
and are still in sight this morning. Shields, with
McDowell's advance, retook Front Royal at 11
a. m. yesterday, with a dozen of our own pris-
oners taken there a week ago, 150 of the enemy,
two locomotives, and eleven cars, some other
property and stores, and saved the bridge.
General Fremont, from the direction of Moore-
field, promises to be at or near Strasburg at 5
p. m. to-day. General Banks at Williamsport,
with his old force and his new force at Harper's
Ferry, is directed to cooperate. Shields at Front
Royal reports a rumor of still an additional force
of the enemy, supposed to be Anderson's, hav-
ing entered the valley of Virginia. This last may
or may not be true. Corinth is certainly in the
hands of General Halleck.
A. Lincoln.
[Telegram.']
Washington City, D. C,
June 1, 1862. 9.30.
Major-General McClellan :
You are probably engaged with the enemy. I
suppose he made the attack. Stand well on your
guard, hold all your ground, or yield any only
inch by inch and in good order. This morning
we merge General Wool's department into yours,
giving you command of the whole, and sending
General Dix to Fort Monroe and General Wool
to Fort McHenry. We also send General Sigel
to report to you for duty.
A. Lincoln.
266 LETTERS
[ Telegram. ]
War Department, Washington City, D. C,
June i, 1862. 5 p. m.
Major-General McClellan:
Thanks for what you could and did say in your
despatch of noon to-day to the Secretary of War.
If the enemy shall not have renewed the attack
this afternoon, I think the hardest of your work
is done.
Shields's advance came in collision with part
of the enemy yesterday evening, six miles from
Front Royal, in a direction between Winchester
and Strasburg, driving them back, capturing a
few prisoners and one rifled cannon. Firing in
that direction to-day, heard both from Harper's
Ferry and Front Royal, indicates a probability
that Fremont has met the enemy.
We have concluded to send General Sigel to
Harper's Ferry, so that what I telegraphed you
about him this morning is revoked. Dix goes
to Fort Monroe to-night.
A. Lincoln.
[Telegram.]
Washington City, D. C,
June 1, 1862. 1. 15 p. m.
Major-General McClellan :
You are already notified that General Sigel is
to report to you for duty. I suggest (do not
order) that he have command of such of the
forces about Fort Monroe, Norfolk, Newport
News, etc., as you may see fit to put into active
service, or such other command as may be suita-
ble to his rank.
A. Lincoln.
McCLELLAN, GEORGE B. 267
[ Telegram. ]
Washington, June 3, 1862.
Major-General McClellan :
With these continuous rains I am very anxious
about the Chickahominy — so close in your rear
and crossing your line of communication. Please
look to it.
A. Lincoln, President.
War Department, Washington City, D. C,
June 15, 1862.
Majpr-General McClellan.
My dear Sir : The night between your two late
battles of Saturday and Sunday I went earnestly
to work to find a way of putting General Wool's
force under your control without wounding any
one's feelings. But, after all, General Dix was
a little hurt at being taken from an independent
command and put in a dependent one. I could
not help this without giving up the principal
object of the move. So soon as you can (which
I do not expect is yet), I wish you to give me the
benefit of your suggestions as to how an inde-
pendent command can be given him without
detriment.
The Secretary of War has turned over to me
your despatch about sending McDowell to you
by water, instead of by land. I now fear he can-
not get to you either way in time. Shields's divi-
sion has got so terribly out of shape, out at
elbows, and out at toes, that it will require a long
time to get it in again. I expect to see McDowell
within a day or two, when I will again talk with
him about the mode of moving. McCall's divi-
sion has nearly or quite reached you by now.
268 LETTERS
This, with what you get from General Wool's
old command, and the new regiments sent you,
must give you an increase since the late battles
of over twenty thousand. Doubtless the battles
and other causes have decreased you half as much
in the same time; but then the enemy have lost
as many in the same way. I believe I would
come and see you were it not that I fear my pres-
ence might divert you and the army from more
important matters.
Yours truly,
A. Lincoln.
[Telegram.]
War Department,
Washington, D. C, June 18, 1862.
Major-General McClellan:
Yours of to-day, making it probable that Jack-
son has been reinforced by about 10,000 from
Richmond, is corroborated by a despatch from
General King at Fredericksburg, saying a
Frenchman, just arrived from Richmond by way
of Gordonsville, met 10,000 to 15,000 passing
through the latter place to join Jackson.
If this is true, it is as good as a reinforcement
to you of an equal force. I could better dispose
of things if I could know about what day
you can attack Richmond, and would be glad to
be informed, if you think you can inform me with
safety.
A. Lincoln.
[Telegram.]
Washington, June 19, 1862.
Major-General McClellan:
Yours of last night just received, and for which
I thank vou.
McCLELLAN, GEORGE B. 269
If large reinforcements are going from Rich-
mond to Jackson, it proves one of two things:
either that they are very strong at Richmond, or
do not mean to defend the place desperately.
On reflection, I do not see how reinforcements
from Richmond to Jackson could be in Gordons-
ville, as reported by the Frenchman and your'
deserters. Have not all been sent to deceive?
A. Lincoln.
[ Telegram. ]
Washington City, June 20, 1862.
Major-General McClellan:
We have this morning sent you a despatch of
General Sigel corroborative of the proposition
that Jackson is being reinforced from Richmond.
This may be reality, and yet may only be contri-
vance for deception, and to determine which is
perplexing. If we knew it was not true, we could
send you some more force ; but as the case stands
we do not think we safely can. Still, we will
watch the signs and do so if possible.
In regard to a contemplated execution of Cap-
tains Spriggs and Triplett the government has no
information whatever, but will inquire and ad-
vise you.
A. Lincoln.
[Telegram.]
Washington, June 21, 1862. 6 p. m.
Major-General George B. McClellan:
Your despatch of yesterday (2 p. m.) was re-
ceived this morning. If it would not divert too
much of your time and attention from the army
under your immediate command, I would be glad
to have your views as to the present state of
270 LETTERS
military affairs throughout the whole country,
as you say you would be glad to give them. I
would rather it should be by letter than by tele-
graph, because of the better chance of secrecy.
As to the numbers and positions of the troops
not under your command in Virginia and else-
where, even if I could do it with accuracy, which
I cannot, I would rather not transmit either by
telegraph or letter, because of the chances of its
reaching the enemy. I would be very glad to
talk with you, but you cannot leave your camp,
and I cannot well leave here.
A. Lincoln, President.
Washington, June 26, 1862.
Major-General McClellan:
Your three despatches of yesterday in relation
to the affair, ending with the statement that
you completely succeeded in making your point,
are very gratifying.
The latter one of 6.15 p. m., suggesting the
probability of your being overwhelmed by 200,-
000, and talking of where the responsibility will
belong, pains me very much. I give you all I
can, and act on the presumption that you will
do the best you can with what you have, while
)^ou continue, ungenerously I think, to assume
that I could give you more if I would. I have
omitted and shall omit no opportunity to send
you reinforcements whenever I possibly can.
A. Lincoln.
P. S. General Pope thinks if you fall back it
would be much better toward York River than
toward the James. As Pope now has charge of
the capital, please confer with him through the
telegraph.
McCLELLAN, GEORGE B. 271
[ ' Telegram.]
&'
War Department,
Washington City, June 28, 1862.
Major-General McClellan :
Save your army, at all events. Will send re-
inforcements as fast as we can. Of course they
cannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day.
I have not said you were ungenerous for saying
you needed reinforcements. I thought you were
ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them
as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you
and your army quite as keenly as you feel it
yourself. If you have had a drawn battle, or a
repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy
not being in Washington. We protected Wash-
ington, and the enemy concentrated on you. Had
we stripped Washington, he would have been
upon us before the troops could have gotten to
you. Less than a week ago you notified us
that reinforcements were leaving Richmond to N
come in front of us. It is the nature of the
case, and neither you nor the government is to
blame. Please tell at once the present condi-
tion and aspect of things.
A. Lincoln.
[ Telegram. ]
Washington, July 1, 1862. 3.30 p. m.
Major-General George B. McClellan:
It is impossible to reinforce you for your pres-
ent emergency. If we had a million of men, we
could not get them to you in time. We have
not the men to send. If you are not strong
enough to face the enemy, you must find a place
of security, and wait, rest, and repair. Maintain
272 LETTERS
your ground if you can, but save the army at all
events, even if you fall back to Fort Monroe.
We still have strength enough in the country,
and will bring it out.
A. Lincoln.
War Department,
Washington, D. C, July 2, 1862.
Major-General McClellan:
Your despatch of Tuesday morning induces me
to hope your army is having some rest. In this
hope allow me to reason with you a moment.
When you ask for 50,000 men to be promptly
sent you, you surely labor under some gross
mistake of fact. Recently you sent papers show-
ing your disposal of forces made last spring for
the defense of Washington, and advising a return
to that plan. I find it included in and about
Washington 75,000 men. Now, please be assured
I have not men enough to fill that very plan by
15,000. All of Fremont's in the valley, all of
Banks's, all of McDowell's not with you, and
all in Washington, taken together, do not exceed,
if they reach, 60,000. With Wool and Dix added
to those mentioned, I have not, outside of your
army, 75,000 men east of the mountains. Thus
the idea of sending you 50,000, or any other con-
siderable force, promptly, is simply absurd. If, in
your frequent mention of responsibility, you have
the impression that I blame you for not doing
more than you can, please be relieved of such
impression. I only beg that in like manner
you will not ask impossibilities of me. If
you think you are not strong enough to
take Richmond just now, I do not ask you
to try just now. Save the army, material
McCLELLAN, GEORGE B. 273
and ^personal, and I will strengthen it for the
offensive again as fast as I can. The governors
of eighteen States offer me a new levy of 300,-
000, which I accept.
A. Lincoln.
War Department,
Washington, D. C, July 3, 1862.
Major-General George B. McClellan:
Yours of 5.30 yesterday is just received. I am
satisfied that yourself, officers, and men have done
the best you could. All accounts say better
fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks
for it.
On the 28th we sent General Burnside an
order to send all the force he could spare to you.
We then learned that you had requested him to
go to Goldsborough ; upon which we said to him
our order was intended for your benefit, and
we did not wish to be in conflict with your views.
We hope you will have help from him soon.
To-day we have ordered General Hunter to send
you all he can spare. At last advices General
Halleck thinks he cannot send reinforcements
without endangering all he has gained.
A. Lincoln, President.
War Department,
Washington City, D. C, July 4, 1862.
Major-General McClellan :
I understand your position as stated in your
letter and by General Marcy. To reinforce you
so as to enable you to resume the offensive within
a month, or even six weeks, is impossible. In
addition to that arrived and now arriving from
the Potomac (about 10,000 men, I suppose, and
274
LETTERS
about 10,000 I hope you will have from Burn-
side very soon, and about 5000 from Hunter a
little later), I do not see how I can send you
another man within a month. Under these cir-
cumstances the defensive for the present must
be your only care. Save the army — first, where
you are, if you can ; secondly, by removal, if you
must. You, on the ground, must be the judge
as to which you will attempt, and of the means
for effecting it. I but give it as my opinion
that with the aid of the gunboats and the rein-
forcements mentioned above, you can hold your
present position — provided, and so long as, you
can keep the James River open below you. If
you are not tolerably confident you can keep the
James River open, you had better remove as
soon as possible. I do not remember that you
have expressed any apprehension as to the dan-
ger of having your communication cut on the
river below you, yet I do not suppose it can have
escaped your attention.
Yours very truly,
A. Lincoln.
P. S. If at any time you feel able to take the
offensive, you are not restrained from doing so.
A. L.
Washington, July 5, 1862. 9 a. m.
Major-General George B. McClellan :
A thousand thanks for the relief your two de-
spatches of 12 and 1 p. m. yesterday gave me. Be
assured the heroism and skill of yourself and
officers and men is, and forever will be, appre-
ciated.
If you can hold your present position, we shall
hive the enemy yet. A. Lincoln.
McCLELLAN, GEORGE B. 275
[Memorandum of Interviews Between the Presi-
dent and General McClellan and Other Offi-
cers at Harrisons Landing, Virginia.]
General McClellan's Headquarters,
July 9, 1862.
General McClellan, July 8, 1862.
What amount of force have you now?
About 80,000. Can't vary much ; certainly 75,000.
What is likely to be your condition as to health in this
camp?
Better than in any encampment since landing at Fort
Monroe.
Where is the enemy now?
From four to five miles from us, on all the roads —
I think nearly the whole army — both Hills, Long-
street, Jackson, Magruder, Huger.
If you desired, could you remove the army safely?
It would be a delicate and very difficult matter.
Cavalry about 5000.
General Sumner, July 9, 1862.
What is the whole amount of your corps with you now?
About 16,000.
What is the aggregate of your killed, wounded, and
missing, from the attack on the 26th ultimo till now?
1 175.
In your present encampment what is the present and
prospective condition as to health?
As good as any part of eastern Virginia.
Where and in what condition do you believe the enemy
to be now?
I think they have retired from our front. Were
much damaged, especially in their best troops, in
the late action from the superiority of our arms.
If it were desired to get the army away, could it be
safely effected?
I think we could, but I think we give up the cause
if we do it.
Is the army secure in its present position?
Perfectly so, in my judgment.
276 LETTERS
General Heintzelman, July 9, 1862.
What is the whole amount of your corps now with you?
15,000 for duty.
What is the aggregate of your killed, wounded, and
missing, from the attack on the 26th ultimo till now?
Not large. 745.
In your present encampment what is the present and
prospective condition as to health?
Excellent for health, and present health improving.
Where and in what condition do you believe the enemy
to now be?
Don't think they are in force in our vicinity.
If it were desired to get the army away from here, could
it be safely effected?
Perhaps we could; but think it would be ruinous to
the country.
Is the army secure in its present position?
I think it is safe.
General Keyes, July 9, 1862.
What is the whole amount of your corps with yor now?
About 12,500.
What is the aggregate of your killed, wounded, and
missing, from the attack on the 26th till now?
Less than 500.
In your present encampment what is the present and
prospective condition as to health?
A little improved, but think camp is getting worse.
Where, and in what condition, do you believe the enemy
to now be ?
Think he has withdrawn, and think preparing to go
to Washington.