If it were desired to get the army away, could it be
safely effected?
I think it could, if done quickly.
Is the army in its present position secure?
With the help of gunboats can hold position.
General Porter.
What is the amount of your corps now with you?
About 23,000. Fully 20,000 fit for duty.
McCLELLAN, GEORGE B. 277
What is the aggregate of your killed, wounded, and
missing, from the attack on the 26th ultimo until now ?
Over 5000.
In your present encampment what is the present and
prospective condition as to health?
Very good.
Where, and in what condition, do you believe the enemy
now to be?
Believe he is mainly near Richmond. He feels he
dare not attack us here.
If it were desired to get the army away from here, could
it be safely effected?
Impossible. Move the army and ruin the country.
Is the army secure in its present position?
Perfectly so. Not only, but we are ready to begin
moving forward.
General Franklin.
What is the whole amount of your corps now with you?
About 15,000.
What is the aggregate of your killed, wounded, and
missing, from the attack on the 26th ultimo till now?
Don't think whole will exceed 3000 men.
In your present encampment what is the present and
prospective condition as to health?
Not good.
Where, and in what condition, do you believe the enemy
now to be?
I learn he has withdrawn from our front, and think
that is probable.
If it were desired to get the army away from here, could
it be safely effected?
I think we could, and think we better — think Rap-
pahannock true line.
Is the army secure in its present position?
Unless we can be closer, it is.
General Sumner 1,175
General Heintzelman 745
General Keyes 500
Fitz-J. Porter 5,000
Franklin 3,000
10,420
278 LETTERS
Executive Mansion,
Washington, July 13, 1862.
Major-General McClellan.
My dear Sir: I am told that over 160,000 men
have gone into your army on the Peninsula.
When I was with you the other day we made
out 86,500 remaining, leaving 73,500 to be ac-
counted for. I believe 23,500 will cover all the
killed, wounded, and missing in all your battles
and skirmishes, leaving 50,000 who have left
otherwise. Not more than 5000 of these have
died, leaving 45,000 of your army still alive and
not with it. I believe half or two thirds of them
are fit for duty to-day. Have you any more per-
fect knowledge of this than I have? If I am
right, and you had these men with you, you could
go into Richmond in the next three days. How
can they be got to you, and how can they be pre-
vented from getting away in such numbers for
thefuture? A.Lincoln.
[ Telegram. ]
War Department,
Washington City, July 14, 1862.
Major-General McClellan :
General Burnside's force is at Newport News,
ready to move, on short notice, one way or the
other, when ordered.
A. Lincoln.
[Telegram.]
War Department,
Washington City, D. C, July 21, 1862.
Major-General McClellan :
This is Monday. I hope to be able to tell you
on Thursday what is to be done with Burnside.
A. Lincoln.
McCLELLAN, GEORGE B. 279
Executive Mansion,
Washington, August 12, 1862.
Major-General McClellan.
My dear Sir : It seems that several young lieu-
tenants of whom Charles L. Noggle and George
A. Rowley are two, have been cashiered by court
martial for misconduct at the battle of June 27th.
The records in the cases of the two named are
now before me. I suppose that the law and the
nature of the service required it ; but these cases
seem hard. I inclose the copy of an informal let-
ter by the judge-advocate in regard to them gen-
erally. I shall be obliged if you and the regi-
mental officers can, consistently with your sense
of duty to the service, act upon the suggestions
of the judge-advocate's letter. I am very un-
willing for these young men to be ruined for so
slight causes.
Yours truly,
A. Lincoln.
[ Telegram. ]
Washington City, August 27, 1862. 4 p. m.
Major-General McClellan,
Alexandria, Virginia :
What news from the front ?
A. Lincoln.
[Telegram.]
Washington, August 29, 1862. 2.30 p. m.
Major-General McClellan:
What news from direction of Manassas Junc-
tion? What generally?
A. Lincoln.
2 8o LETTERS
[ Telegram. ]
Washington, August 29, 1862. 4.10 p. m.
Major-General McClellan :
Yours of to-day just received. I think your
first alternative — to wit, "to concentrate all our
available forces to open communication with
Pope" — is the right one, but I wish not to con-
trol. That I now leave to General Halleck, aided
by your counsels.
A. Lincoln.
[ Telegram. ]
Washington, D. C.,
September 8, 1862. 5 p. m.
Major-General McClellan:
Rockville, Maryland :
How does it look now ?
A. Lincoln.
[Telegram.]
War Department, Washington City,
September 10, 1862. 10.15 a. m.
Major-General McClellan,
Rockville, Maryland :
How does it look now?
A. Lincoln.
[Telegram.]
Executive Mansion, Washington City,
September 11, 1862. 6 p. m.
Major-General McClellan :
This is explanatory. If Porter, Heintzelman,
and Sigel were sent you, it would sweep every-
thing from the other side of the river, because
the new troops have been distributed among them,
as I understand. Porter reports himself 21,000
strong, which can only be by the addition of new
McCLELLAN, GEORGE B. 281
troops. He is ordered to-night to join you as
quickly as possible. I am for sending you all
that can be spared, and I hope others can follow
Porter very soon.
A. Lincoln.
[ Telegram. ]
Washington City, D. C,
September 12, 1862. 4 a. m.
Major-General McClellan,
Clarksburg, Maryland :
How does it look now?
A. Lincoln.
[ Telegram. ]
Washington City, D. C,
September 12, 1862. 5.45 p. m.
Major-General McClellan :
Governor Curtin telegraphs me :
I have advices that Jackson is crossing the Potomac
at Williamsport, and probably the whole rebel army will
be drawn from Maryland.
Receiving nothing from Harper's Ferry or
Martinsburg to-day, and positive information
from Wheeling that the line is cut, corroborates
the idea that the enemy is recrossing the Potomac.
Please do not let him get off without being hurt.
A. Lincoln.
[ Telegram. ]
War Department, Washington,
September 15, 1862. 2.45 p. m.
Major-General McClellan :
Your despatch of to-day received. God bless
282 LETTERS
you, and all with you. Destroy the rebel army,
if Possible. A Lincoln .
[Telegram.']
Washington, D. C, October 6, 1862.
Major-General McClellan :
I am instructed to telegraph you as follows: The
President directs that you cross the Potomac and give
battle to the enemy, or drive him south. Your army
must move now, while the roads are good. If you cross
the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover
the latter by your operation, you can be reinforced with
30,000 men. If you move up the valley of the Shenan-
doah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you.
The President advises the interior line between Wash-
ington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is
very desirous that your army move as soon as possible.
You will immediately report what line you adopt, and
when you intend to cross the river; also to what point
the reinforcements are to be sent. It is necessary that
the plan of your operations be positively determined on
before orders are given for building bridges and repair-
ing railroads. I am directed to add that the Secretary
of War and the general-in-chief fully concur with the
President in these instructions.
H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief.
Executive Mansion,
Washington, D. C, October 13, 1862.
Major-General McClellan:
My dear Sir: You remember my speaking to
you of what I called your over-cautiousness. Are
you not over-cautious when you assume that you
cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing?
Should you not claim to be at least his equal in
prowess, and act upon the claim? As I under-
stand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you
cannot subsist your army at Winchester unless
the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be
put in working order. But the enemy does now
subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance
McCLELLAN, GEORGE B. 283
nearly twice as great from railroad transportation
as you would have to do without the railroad last
named. He now wagons from Culpeper Court
House, which is just about twice as far as you
would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is
certainly not more than half as well provided with
wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased
for you to have the advantage of the railroad
from Harper's Ferry to Winchester, but it wastes
all the remainder of autumn to give it to you,
and in fact ignores the question of time, which
cannot and must not be ignored. Again, one of
the standard maxims of war, as you know, is to
"operate upon the enemy's communications as
much as possible without exposing your own."
You seem to act as if this applies against you, but
cannot apply in your favor. Change positions
with the enemy, and think you not he would break
your communications with Richmond within the
next twenty-four hours? You dread his going
into Pennsylvania ; but if he does so in full force,
he gives up his communications to you absolutely,
and you have nothing to do but to follow and
ruin him. If he does so with less than full force,
fall upon and beat what is left behind all the
easier. Exclusive of the water-line, you are now
nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route
that you can and he must take. Why can you not
reach there before him, unless you admit that
he is more than your equal on a march? His
route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the
chord. The roads are as good on yours as on
his. You know I desired, but did not order, you
to cross the Potomac below, instead of above,
the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. My idea was
that this would at once menace the enemy's com-
284 LETTERS
munications, which I would seize if he would
permit.
If he should move northward, I would follow
him closely, holding his communications. If he
should prevent our seizing his communications
and move toward Richmond, I would press
closely to him, fight him if a favorable oppor-
tunity should present, and at least try to beat him
to Richmond on the inside track. I say "try" ;
if we never try, we shall never succeed. If he
makes a stand at Winchester, moving neither
north nor south, I would fight him there, on
the idea that if we cannot beat him when he bears
the wastage of coming to us, we never can when
we bear the wastage of going to him. This prop-
osition is a simple truth, and is too important to
be lost sight of for a moment. In coming to us
he tenders us an advantage which we should not
waive. We should not so operate as to merely
drive him away. As we must beat him some-
where or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier
near to us than far away. If we cannot beat the
enemy where he now is, we never can, he again
being within the intrenchments of Richmond.
Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond
on the inside track, the facility of supplying from
the side away from the enemy is remarkable, as it
were, by the different spokes of a wheel extend-
ing from the hub toward the rim, and this
whether you move directly by the chord or on
the inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge more
closely. The chord-line, as you see, carries you
by Aldie, Hay Market, and Fredericksburg; and
you see how turnpikes, railroads, and finally the
Potomac, by Aquia Creek, meet you at all points
from Washington ; the same, only the lines length-
McCLELLAN, GEORGE B. 285
ened a little, if you press closer to the Blue Ridge
part of the way.
The gaps through the Blue Ridge I under-
stand to be about the following distances from
Harper's Ferry, to wit : Vestal's, 5 miles ; Greg-
ory's, 13; Snicker's, 18; Ashby's, 28; Manassas,
38; Chester, 45; and Thornton's, 53. I should
think it preferable to take the route nearest the
enemy, disabling him to make an important move
without your knowledge, and compelling him to
keep his forces together for dread of you. The
gaps would enable you to attack if you should
wish. For a great part of the way you would
be practically between the enemy and both Wash-
ington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you
the greatest number of troops from here. When
at length running for Richmond ahead of him
enables him to move this way, if he does so, turn
and attack him in rear. But I think he should
be engaged long before such point is reached.
It is all easy if our troops march as well as the
enemy, and it is unmanly to say they cannot do
it. This letter is in no sense an order.
Yours truly,
A. Lincoln.
[Telegram.]
Washington, October 21, 1862. 3 p. m.
Major-General George B. McClellan :
Your telegram of 12 m. has been submitted to the
President. He directs me to say that he has no change
to make in his order of the 6th instant. If you have
*not been and are not now in condition to obey it, you
will be able to show such want of ability. The Presi-
dent does not expect impossibilities, but he is very
anxious that all this good weather should not be wasted
in inactivity. Telegraph when you will move, and on
what lines you propose to march.
H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief.
286 LETTERS
[ Telegram. ]
War Department, Washington City,
October 24, 1862.
Major-General McClellan :
I have just read your despatch about sore-
tongued and fatigued horses. Will you pardon
me for asking what the horses of your army have
done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues
anything ?
A. Lincoln.
[Telegram.]
Executive Mansion, Washington,
October 26, 1862. 11.30 a. m.
Major-General McClellan:
Yours, in reply to mine about horses, received.
Of course you know the facts better than I ; still,
two considerations remain. Stuart's cavalry
outmarched ours, having certainly done more
marked service on the Peninsula and everywhere
since. Secondly, will not a movement of our
army be a relief to the cavalry, compelling the
enemy to concentrate instead of foraging in
squads everywhere? But I am so rejoiced to
learn from your despatch to General Halleck
that you begin crossing the river this morning.
A. Lincoln.
[Telegram.']
Executive Mansion, Washington,
October 27, 1862. 12.10 p. m.
Major-General McClellan :
Yours of yesterday received. Most certainly
I intend no injustice to any, and if I have done
any I deeply regret it. To be told, after more
than five weeks' total inaction of the army, and
'McCLELLAN, GEORGE B. 287
during which period we have sent to the army
every fresh horse we possibly could, amounting
in the whole to 7918, that the cavalry horses were
too much fatigued to move, presents a very cheer-
less, almost hopeless, prospect for the future,
and it may have forced something of impatience
in my despatch. If not recruited and rested then,
when could they ever be? I suppose the river is
rising, and I am glad to believe you are crossing.
A. Lincoln.
[Telegram.]
Executive Mansion, Washington,
October 27, 1862. 3.25 p. m.
Major-General McClellan :
Your despatch of 3 p. m. to-day, in regard to
filling up old regiments with drafted men, is re-
ceived, and the request therein shall be complied
with as far as practicable.
And now I ask a distinct answer to the ques-
tion, Is it your purpose not to go into action again
until the men now being drafted in the States
are incorporated into the old regiments?
A. Lincoln.
[ Telegram. ]
Executive Mansion,
Washington, October 29, 1862.
Major-General McClellan:
Your despatches of night before last, yesterday,,
and last night all received. I am much pleased
with the movement of the army. When you get
entirely across the river let me know. What do
you know of the enemy?
A. Lincoln.
238 LETTERS
[Order.]
Executive Mansion,
Washington, November 5, 1862.
By direction of the President, it is ordered
that Major-General McClellan be relieved from
the command of the Army of the Potomac, and
that Major-General Burnside take the command
of that army. Also that Major-General Hunter
take command of the corps in said army which
is now commanded by General Burnside. That
Major-General Fitz-John Porter be relieved from
command of the corps he now commands in said
army, and that Major-General Hooker take com-
mand of said Corps.
The general-in-chief is authorized, in [his]
discretion, to issue an order substantially as the
above, forthwith, or so soon as he may deem
proper.
A. Lincoln.
McClernand, John A.
Washington, November 10, 1861.
Brigadier-General McClernand.
My dear Sir : This is not an official, but a
social letter. You have had a battle, and with-
out being able to judge as to the precise measure
of its value, I think it is safe to say that you
and all with you have done honor to yourselves
and the flag, and service to the country. Most
gratefully do I thank you and them. In my
present position I must care for the whole na-
tion; but I hope it will be no injustice to any
other State for me to indulge a little home pride
that Illinois does not disappoint us. I have just
closed a long interview with Mr. Washburne, in
McCLERNAND, JOHN A. 289
which he has detailed the many difficulties you
and those with you labor under. Be assured we
do not forget or neglect you. Much, very much,
goes undone ; but it is because we have not the
power to do it faster than we do. Some of your
forces are without arms, but the same is true
here and at every other place where we have
considerable bodies of troops. The plain mat-
ter of fact is, our good people have rushed to
the rescue of the government faster than the
government can find arms to put into their hands.
It would be agreeable to each division of the
army to know its own precise destination ; but
the government cannot immediately, nor inflexi-
bly at any time, determine as to all ; nor, if de-
termined, can it tell its friends without at the
same time telling its enemies. We know you do
all as wisely and well as you can; and you will
not be deceived if you conclude the same is true
of us. Please give my respects and thanks to
all.
Yours very truly,
A. Lincoln.
Executive Mansion,
Washington, January 8, 1863.
Major-General McClernand.
My dear Sir : Your interesting communica-
tion by the hand of Major Scates is received.
I never did ask more, nor ever was willing to
accept less, than for all the States, and the peo-
ple thereof, to take and hold their places and
their rights in the Union, under the Constitution
of the United States. For this alone have I felt
authorized to struggle, and I seek neither more
nor less now. Still, to use a coarse but an ex-
290 LETTERS
pressive figure, "broken eggs cannot be mended."
I have issued the Emancipation Proclamation,
and I cannot retract it. After the commence-
ment of hostilities, I struggled nearly a year and
a half to get along without touching the "insti-
tution" ; and when finally I conditionally deter-
mined to touch it, I gave a hundred days' fair
notice of my purpose to all the States and peo-
ple, within which time they could have turned
it wholly aside by simply again becoming good
citizens of the United States.
They chose to disregard it, and I made the
peremptory proclamation on what appeared to me
to be a military necessity. And being made, it
must stand. As to the States not included in it,
of course they can have their rights in the Union
as of old. Even the people of the States in-
cluded, if they choose, need not to be hurt by
it. Let them adopt systems of apprenticeship
for the colored people, conforming substantially
to the most approved plans of gradual emanci-
pation; and with the aid they can have from
the General Government they may be nearly as
well off, in this respect, as if the present trou-
ble had not occurred, and much better off than
they can possibly be if the contest continues per-
sistently.
As to any dread of my having a "purpose
to enslave or exterminate the whites of the
South," I can scarcely believe that such dread
exists. It is too absurd. I believe you can be
my personal witness that no man is less to be
dreaded for undue severity in any case.
If the friends you mention really wish to have
peace upon the old terms, they should act at
once. Every day makes the case more difficult.
McCLERNAND, JOHN A. 291
They can so act with entire safety, so far as
I am concerned.
I think you had better not make this letter
public ; but you may rely confidently on my stand-
ing by whatever I have said in it. Please write
me if anything more comes to light.
Yours very truly,
A. Lincoln.
Executive Mansion,
Washington, January 22, 1863.
Major-General McClernand.
My dear Sir: Yours of the 7th was received
yesterday. I need not recite because you remem-
ber the contents. The charges in their nature are
such that I must know as much about the facts
involved as you can. I have too many family
controversies, so to speak, already on my hands
to voluntarily, or so long as I can avoid it, take
up another. You are now doing well — well for
the country, and well for yourself — much better
than you could possibly be if engaged in open
war with General Halleck. Allow me to beg that,
for your sake, for my sake, and for the coun-
try's sake, you give your whole attention to the
better work.
Your success upon the Arkansas was both bril-
liant and valuable, and is fully appreciated by
the country and government.
Yours truly,
A. Lincoln.
Executive Mansion,
Washington, August 12, 1863.
Major-General McClernand.
My dear Sir: Our friend, William G. Greene,
292 LETTERS
has just presented a kind letter in regard to your-
self, addressed to me by our other friends, Yates,
Hatch, and Dubois.
I doubt whether your present position is more
painful to you than to myself. Grateful for the
patriotic stand so early taken by you in this life-
and-death struggle of the nation, I have done
whatever has appeared practicable to advance you
and the public interest together. No charges,
with a view to a trial, have been preferred against
you by any one; nor do I suppose any will be.
All there is, so far as I have heard, is General
Grant's statement of his reasons for relieving
you. And even this I have not seen or sought
to see; because it is a case, as appears to me,
in which I could do nothing without doing
harm. General Grant and yourself have been
conspicuous in our most important successes ;
and for me to interfere and thus magnify a
breach between you could not but be of evil
effect. Better leave it where the law of the case
has placed it. For me to force you back upon
General Grant would be forcing him to resign.
I cannot give you a new command, because
we have no forces except such as already have
commanders.
I am constantly pressed by those who scold be-
fore they think, or without thinking at all, to give
commands respectively to Fremont, McClellan,
Butler, Sigel, Curtis, Hunter, Hooker, and per-
haps others, when, all else out of the way, I have
no commands to give them. This is now your
case ; which, as I have said, pains me not less than
it does you. My belief is that the permanent esti-
mate of what a general does in the field is fixed
by the "cloud of witnesses" who have been with
McCLERNAND, JOHN 293
him in the field; and that relying on these, he
who has the right needs not to fear.
Your friend as ever,
A. Lincoln.
War Department,
Washington City, September 14, 1863.
Major-General John A. McClernand, Spring-
field, Illinois.
General: Your letter of the 5th instant has
been submitted to the President, who directs me
to say that a court of inquiry embracing any one
of the subjects specified in that letter would neces-
sarily withdraw from the field many officers
whose presence with their commands is abso-
lutely indispensable to the service, and whose ab-
sence might cause irreparable injury to the suc-
cess of operations now in active progress. For
these reasons he declines at present your appli-
cation, but if hereafter it can be done without
prejudice to the service, he will, in view of your
anxiety upon the subject, order a court.
Your obedient servant,
Edwin M. Stanton,
Secretary of War.
McClernand, John.
[Telegram,.]
Executive Mansion,
Washington, December 24, 1864.
John McClernand, Nashville, Tenn.
A letter of yours is laid before me, in which
you seek to have John S. Young, James Mallory,
and R. T. Bridges released, adding: "My word
for it, they are innocent." It is fair to presume
294
LETTERS
that you would not say this without knowing