A. Lincoln.
[ Telegram. ]
War Department, July 11, 1862.
Major-General Halleck, Corinth :
Governor Johnson, at Nashville, is in great
trouble and anxiety about a raid into Kentucky.
The governor is a true and a valuable man — in-
dispensable to us in Tennessee. Will you please
get in communication with him, and have a full
conference with him before you leave for here?
I have telegraphed him on the subject.
A. Lincoln.
[ Telegram. ]
War Department, July 13, 1862.
Major-General Halleck,
Corinth, Mississippi :
They are having a stampede in Kentucky.
Please look to it.
A. Lincoln.
[ Telegram. ]
War Department, July 14, 1862.
Major-General Halleck,
Corinth, Mississippi :
I am very anxious — almost impatient — to have
HALLECK, HENRY W. 71
you here. Have due regard to what you leave
behind. When can you reach here?
A. Lincoln.
[Order.]
Washington, D. C, September 3, 1862.
Ordered, that the general-in-chief, Major-Gen-
eral Halleck, immediately commence, and proceed
with all possible despatch, to organize an army,
for active operations, from all the material within
and coming within his control, independent of
the forces he may deem necessary for the defense
of Washington when such active army shall take
the field.
By order of the President :
Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.
McClellan's Headquarters,
October 3, 1862.
Major-General Halleck:
General Stuart, of the rebel army, has sent in
a few of our prisoners under a flag of truce,
paroled with terms to prevent their fighting the
Indians, and evidently seeking to commit us to
their right to parole our prisoners in that way.
My inclination is to send the prisoners back with
a distinct notice that we will recognize no paroles
given to our prisoners by rebels as extending
beyond the prohibition against fighting them, yet
I wish your opinion upon it based both upon the
general law and our cartel. I wish to avoid vio-
lations of law and bad faith. Answer as quickly
as possible, as the thing if done at all should be
done at once.
A. Lincoln,
President.
72 LETTERS
Steamer Baltimore, off Aquia Creek,
Virginia,
November 2J, 1S62.
Major-General Halleck.
Sir: I have just had a long conference with
General Burnside. He believes that General
Lee's whole army, or nearly the whole of it, is in
front of him, at and near Fredericksburg. Gen-
eral Burnside says he could take into battle now
any day about 110,000 men; that his army is in
good spirit, good condition, good morale, and
that in all respects he is satisfied with officers and
men ; that he does not want more men with him,
because he could not handle them to advantage ;
that he thinks he can cross the river in face of
the enemy and drive him away ; but that, to use
his own expression, it is somewhat risky. I wish
the case to stand more favorably than this in
two respects : First, I wish his crossing of the
river to be nearly free from risk; and, secondly,
I wish the enemy to be prevented from falling
back, accumulating strength as he goes, into his
intrenchments at Richmond. I therefore pro-
pose that General Burnside shall not move imme-
diately ; that we accumulate a force on the south
bank of the Rappahannock — at, say, Port Royal —
under protection of one or two gunboats, as
nearly up to 25,000 strong as we can ; at the same
time another force of about the same strength as
high up the Pamunkey as can be protected by
gunboats. These being ready, let all three forces
move simultaneously: General Burnside's force
in its attempt to cross the river, the Rappahan-
nock force moving directly up the south side of
the river to his assistance, and ready, if found
admissible, to deflect off to the turnpike bridge
HALLECK, HENRY W. ' 73
over the Mattapony in the direction of Rich-
mond ; the Pamunkey force to move as rapidly as
possible up the north side of the Pamunkey, hold-
ing all the bridges, and especially the turnpike
bridge immediately north of Hanover Court
House ; hurry north and seize and hold the
Mattapony bridge before mentioned, and also,
if possible, press higher up the streams and de-
stroy the railroad bridges. Then if General
Burnside succeeds in driving the enemy from
Fredericksburg, he (the enemy) no longer has
the road to Richmond, but we have it, and can
march into the city. Or, possibly, having forced
the enemy from his line, we could move upon
and destroy his army. General Burnside's main
army would have the same line of supply and re-
treat as he has now provided. The Rappahan-
nock force would have that river for supply,
and gunboats to fall back upon ; and the Pamun-
key force would have that river for supply, and
a line between the two rivers — Pamunkey and
Mattapony — along which to fall back upon its
gunboats. I think the plan promises the best
results, with the least hazard, of any now con-
ceivable.
Note. — The above plan proposed by me was
rejected by General Halleck and General Burn-
side on the ground that we could not raise and
put in position the Pamunkey force without too
much waste of time.
A. L.
Executive Mansion,
Washington, January 1, 1863.
Major-General Halleck.
My dear Sir : General Burnside wishes to cross
the Rappahannock with his army, but his grand di-
7 4 LETTERS
vision commanders all oppose the movement. If in
such a difficulty as this you do not help, you fail
me precisely in the point for which I sought your
assistance. You know what General Burnside 's
plan is, and it is my wish that you go with him
to the ground, examine it as far as practicable,
confer with the officers, getting their judgment
and ascertaining their temper — in a word, gather
all the elements for forming a judgment of your
own, and then tell General Burnside that you do
approve or that you do not approve his plan.
Your military skill is useless to me if you will
not do this. Yours very truly,
A. Lincoln.
{Indorsement.]
January i, 1863.
Withdrawn, because considered harsh by Gen-
eral Halleck.
A. Lincoln.
Headquarters of the Army,
Washington, January 1, 1863.
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War,
Washington, D. C.
Sir : From my recent interview with the President
and yourself, and from the President's letter of this
morning, which you delivered to me at your reception,
I am led to believe that there is a very important dif-
ference of opinion in regard to my relations toward
generals commanding armies in the field, and that I
cannot perform the duties of my present office satis-
factorily at the same time to the President and to my-
self. I therefore respectfully request that I may be
relieved from further duties as general-in-chief.*
Very respectfully your obedient servant,
H. W. Halleck.
[Jan. 5, 1863. See Burnside, Ambrose E.]
* This application was withdrawn upon the withdrawal of the
President's letter.
HALLECK, HENRY W. 75
Executive Mansion,
Washington, January 7, 1863.
Major-General Halleck.
My dear Sir : What think you of forming a re-
serve cavalry corps of, say, 6000, for the Army of
the Potomac? Might not such a corps be con-
stituted from the cavalry of Sigel's and Slocum's
corps, with scraps we could pick up here and
there ?
Yours truly,
A. Lincoln.
Soldiers' Home,
Washington, July 6, 1863. 7 p. m.
Major-General Halleck :
I left the telegraph office a good deal dissat-
isfied. You know I did not like the phrase — in
Orders, No. 68, I believe — "Drive the invaders
from our soil." Since that, I see a despatch
from General French, saying the enemy is cross-
ing his wounded over the river in flats, without
saying why he does not stop it, or even intimat-
ing a thought that it ought to be stopped. Still
later, another despatch from General Pleasonton,
by direction of General Meade, to General
French, stating that the main army is halted be-
cause it is believed the rebels are concentrating
"on the road toward Hagerstown, beyond Fair-
field," and is not to move until it is ascertained
that the rebels intend to evacuate Cumberland
Valley.
These things all appear to me to be connected
with a purpose to cover Baltimore and Washing-
ton, and to get the enemy across the river again
without a further collision, and they do not ap-
pear connected with a purpose to prevent his
76 LETTERS
crossing and to destroy him. I do fear the
former purpose is acted upon and the latter is
rejected.
If you are satisfied the latter purpose is enter-
tained, and is judiciously pursued, I am content.
If you are not so satisfied, please look to it.
Yours truly,
A. Lincoln.
Executive Mansion, July 29, 1863.
Major-General Halleck:
Seeing General Meade's despatch of yesterday
to yourself causes me to fear that he supposes
the government here is demanding of him to
bring on a general engagement with Lee as soon
as possible. I am claiming no such thing of him.
In fact, my judgment is against it; which judg-
ment, of course, I will yield if yours and his
are the contrary. If he could not safely engage
Lee at Williamsport, it seems absurd to suppose
he can safely engage him now when he has
scarcely more than two thirds of the force he
had at Williamsport, while it must be that Lee
has been reinforced. True, I desired General
Meade to pursue Lee across the Potomac, hoping,-
as has proved true, that he would thereby clear
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and get some
advantages by harassing him on his retreat.
These being past, I am unwilling he should now
get into a general engagement on the impression
that we here are pressing him, and I shall be glad
for you to so inform him, unless your own judg-
ment is against it.
Yours truly,
A. Lincoln.
H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief.
HALLECK, HENRY W. 77
[Note.]
August 31, 1863.
It is not improbable that retaliation for the
recent great outrage at Lawrence, in Kansas, may
extend to indiscriminate slaughter on the Mis-
souri border, unless averted by very judicious
action. I shall be obliged if the general-in-chief
can make any suggestions to General Schofield
upon the subject.
A. Lincoln.
Executive Mansion,
Washington, September 15, 1863.
Major-General Halleck :
If I did not misunderstand General Meade's
last despatch, he posts you on facts as well as
he can, and desires your views and those of the
government as to what he shall do. My opinion
is that he should move upon Lee at once in
manner of general attack, leaving to develop-
ments whether he will make it a real attack. I
think this would develop Lee's real condition and
purposes better than the cavalry alone can do.
Of course my opinion is not to control you and
General Meade.
Yours truly,
A. Lincoln.
Executive Mansion,
Washington, September 19, 1863.
Major-General Halleck:
By General Meade's despatch to you of yes-
terday it appears that he desires your views and
those of the government as to whether he shall
advance upon the enemy. I am not prepared to
order, or even advise, an advance in this case,
78 LETTERS
wherein I know so little of particulars, and
wherein he, in the field, thinks the risk is so
great, and the promise of advantage so small.
And yet the case presents matter for very seri-
ous consideration in another aspect. These two
armies confront each other across a small river,
substantially midway between the two capitals,
each defending its own capital, and menacing the
other. General Meade estimates the enemy's in-
fantry in front of him at not less than 40,000.
Suppose we add fifty per cent, to this for cavalry,
artillery, and extra-duty men stretching as far
as Richmond, making the whole force of the
enemy 60,000.
General Meade, as shown by the returns, has
with him, and between him and Washington, of
the same classes of well men, over 90,000.
Neither can bring the whole of his men into a
battle; but each can bring as large a percentage
in as the other. For a battle, then, General
Meade has three men to General Lee's two. Yet,
it having been determined that choosing ground
and standing on the defensive gives so great
advantage that the three cannot safely attack
the two, the three are left simply standing on
the defensive also.
If the enemy's 60,000 are sufficient to keep
our 90,000 away from Richmond, why, by the
same rule, may not 40,000 of ours keep their
60,000 away from Washington, leaving us 50,000
to put to some other use? Having practically
come to the mere defensive, it seems to be no
economy at all to employ twice as many men for
that object as are needed. With no object, cer-
tainly, to mislead myself, I can perceive no fault
in this statement, unless we admit we are not
HALLECK, HENRY W. 79
the equal of the enemy, man for man. I hope
you will consider it.
To avoid misunderstanding, let me say that to
attempt to fight the enemy slowly back into his
intrenchments at Richmond, and then to capture
him, is an idea I have been trying to repudiate
for quite a year.
My judgment is so clear against it that I would
scarcely allow the attempt to be made if the gen-
eral in command should desire to make it. My
last attempt upon Richmond was to get Mc-
Clellan, when he was nearer there than the enemy
was, to run in ahead of him. Since then I have
constantly desired the Army of the Potomac to
make Lee's army, and not Richmond, its objective
point. If our army cannot fall upon the enemy
and hurt him where he is, it is plain to me it can
gain nothing by attempting to follow him over a
succession of intrenched lines into a fortified city.
Yours truly,
A. Lincoln.
Executive Mansion,
Washington, D. C, September 21, 1863.
Major-General Halleck :
I think it very important for General Rosecrans
to hold his position at or about Chattanooga, be-
cause if held from that place to Cleveland, both
inclusive, it keeps all Tennessee clear of the
enemy, and also breaks one of his most important
railroad lines. To prevent these consequences is
so vital to his cause that he cannot give up the
effort to dislodge us from the position, thus
bringing him to us and saving us the labor, ex-
pense, and hazard of going farther to find him,
and also giving us the advantage of choosing
80 LETTERS
our own ground and preparing it to fight him
upon. The details must, of course, be left to
General Rosecrans, while we must furnish him
the means to the utmost of our ability. If you
concur, I think he would better be informed that
we are not pushing him beyond this position ;
and that, in fact, our judgment is rather against
his going beyond it. If he can only maintain
this position, without more, this rebellion can
only eke out a short and feeble existence, as an
animal sometimes may with a thorn in its vitals.
Yours truly,
A. Lincoln.
Executive Mansion,
Washington, October 16, 1863.
Major-General Halleck :
I do not believe Lee can have over 60,000
effective men.
Longstreet's corps would not be sent away
to bring an equal force back upon the same road ;
and there is no other direction for them to have
come from.
Doubtless, in making the present movement,
Lee gathered in all available scraps, and added
them to Hill's and Ewell's corps; but that is
all, and he made the movement in the belief that
four corps had left General Meade; and Gen-
eral Meade's apparently avoiding a collision with
him has confirmed him in that belief. If General
Meade can now attack him on a field no worse
than equal for us, and will do so with all the
skill and courage which he, his officers, and men
possess, the honor will be his if he succeeds, and
the blame may be mine if he fails.
Yours truly,
A. Lincoln.
HALLECK, HENRY W. 81
Executive Mansion,
Washington, October 24, 1863.
Major-General Halleck:
Taking all our information together, I think it
probable that Ewell's corps has started for East
Tennessee by way of Abingdon, marching last
Monday, say, from Meade's front directly to the
railroad at Charlottesville.
First, the object of Lee's recent movement
against Meade ; his destruction of the Alexandria
and Orange Railroad, and subsequent with-
drawal, without more motive, not otherwise ap-
parent, would be explained by this hypothesis.
Secondly, the direct statement of Sharpe's men
that Ewell has gone to Tennessee.
Thirdly, the Irishman's statement that he has
not gone through Richmond and his further state-
ment of an appeal made to the people at Rich-
mond to go and protect their salt, which could
only refer to the works near Abingdon.
Fourthly, Graham's statement from Martins-
burg that Imboden is in retreat for Harrison-
burg. This last matches with the idea that Lee
has retained his cavalry, sending Imboden and
perhaps other scraps to join Ewell. Upon this
probability what is to be done?
If you have a plan matured, I have nothing to
say. If you have not, then I suggest that, with
all possible expedition, the Army of the Potomac
get ready to attack Lee, and that in the mean
time a raid shall, at all hazards, break the rail-
road at or near Lynchburg.
Yours truly,
A. Lincoln.
82 LETTERS
Executive Mansion,
Washington, January 28, 1864.
Major-General Halleck:
Some citizens of Missouri, vicinity of Kansas
City, are apprehensive that there is special danger
of renewed troubles in that neighborhood, and
thence on the route toward New Mexico. I am
not impressed that the danger is very great or
imminent, but I will thank you to give Generals
Rosecrans and Curtis, respectively, such orders
as may turn their attention thereto and prevent
as far as possible the apprehended disturbance.
Yours truly,
A. Lincoln.
Washington City, July 27, 1864.
Major-General Halleck,
Chief of Staff of the Army.
General : Lieutenant-General Grant having
signified that, owing to the difficulties and delay
of communication between his headquarters and
Washington, it is necessary that in the present
emergency military orders must be issued directly
from Washington, the President directs me to
instruct you that all the military operations for
the defense of the Middle Department, the De-
partment of the Susquehanna, the Department of
Washington, and the Department of West Vir-
ginia, and all the forces in those departments,
are placed under your general command, and
that you will be expected to take all military
measures necessary for defense against any at-
tack of the enemy and for his capture and de-
struction. You will issue from time to time such
orders to the commanders of the respective de-
HAMLIN, HANNIBAL 8 3
partments and to the military authorities therein
as may be proper.
Your obedient servant,
Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.
Hamlin, Hannibal.
Springfield, Illinois, July 18, i860.
Hon. Hannibal Hamlin.
My dear Sir : It appears to me that you and I
ought to be acquainted, and accordingly I write
this as a sort of introduction of myself to you.
You first entered the Senate during the single
term I was a member of the House of Repre-
sentatives, but I have no recollection that we
were introduced. I shall be pleased to receive a
line from you.
The prospect of Republican success now ap-
pears very flattering, so far as I can perceive.
Do you see anything to the contrary ?
Yours truly,
A. Lincoln.
Springfield, Illinois, September 4, i860.
Hon. Hannibal Hamlin.
My dear Sir: I am annoyed some by a letter
from a friend in Chicago, in which the following
passage occurs : "Hamlin has written Colfax
that two members of Congress will, he fears, be
lost in Maine — the first and sixth districts ; and
that Washburne's majority for governor will not
exceed six thousand."
I had heard something like this six weeks ago,
but had been assured since that it was not so.
Your secretary of state, — Mr. Smith, I think, —
whom you introduced to me by letter, gave this
84 LETTERS
assurance; more recently, Mr. Fessenden, our
candidate for Congress in one of those districts,
wrote a relative here that his election was sure by
at least five thousand, and that Washburne's ma-
jority would be from 14,000 to 17,000; and still
later, Mr. Fogg, of New Hampshire, now at New
York serving on a national committee, wrote me
that we were having a desperate fight in Maine,
which would end in a splendid victory for us.
Such a result as you seem to have predicted in
Maine, in your letter to Colfax, would, I fear,
put us on the down-hill track, lose us the State
elections in Pennsylvania and Indiana, and prob-
ably ruin us on the main turn in November.
You must not allow it.
Yours very truly,
A. Lincoln.
[Confidential.]
Springfield, Illinois, November 8, i860.
Hon. Hannibal Hamlin.
My dear Sir: I am anxious for a personal in-
terview with you at as early a day as possible.
Can you, without much inconvenience, meet me
at Chicago? If you can, please name as early a
day as you conveniently can, and telegraph me,
unless there be sufficient time before the day
named to communicate by mail.
Yours very truly,
A. Lincoln.
Springfield, Illinois, November 27, i860.
Hon. Hannibal Hamlin.
My dear Sir : On reaching home I find I have
in charge for you the inclosed letter.
HAMLIN, HANNIBAL 85
I deem it proper to advise you that I also find
letters here from very strong and unexpected
quarters in Pennsylvania, urging the appointment
of General Cameron to a place in the cabinet.
Let this be a profound secret, even though I do
think best to let you know it.
Yours very sincerely,
A. Lincoln.
[Private. ,]
Springfield, Illinois, December 8, i860.
Hon. Hannibal Hamlin.
My dear Sir: Yours of the 4th was duly re-
ceived. The inclosed to Governor Seward covers
two notes to him, copies of which you find open
for your inspection. Consult with Judge Trum-
bull ; and if you and he see no reason to the con-
trary, deliver the letter to Governor Seward at
once. If you see reason to the contrary, write me
at once.
I have had an intimation that Governor Banks
would yet accept a place in the cabinet. Please
ascertain and write me how this is.
Yours very truly,
A. Lincoln.
Springfield, Illinois, December 24, i860.
Hon. Hannibal Hamlin.
My dear Sir : I need a man of Democratic ante-
cedents from New England. I cannot get a fair
share of that element in without. This stands in
the way of Mr. Adams. I think of Governor
Banks, Mr. Welles, and Mr. Tuck. Which of
them do the New England delegation prefer ? Or
shall I decide for myself?
Yours as ever,
A. Lincoln.
86 LETTERS
Washington, D. C., May 6, 1861.
Hon. H. Hamlin, New York.
My dear Sir : Please advise me at the close of
each day what troops left during the day, where
going, and by what route ; what remaining at New
York, and what expected in the next day. Give
the numbers, as near as convenient, and what
corps they are. This information, reaching us
daily, will be very useful as well as satisfactory.
Yours very truly,
A. Lincoln.
[Strictly private.]
Executive Mansion,
Washington, September 28, 1862.
Hon. Hannibal Hamlin.
My dear Sir: Your kind letter of the 25th is
just received. It is known to some that while I
hope something from the proclamation, my ex-
pectations are not as sanguine as are those of
some friends. The time for its effect southward
has not come ; but northward the effect should
be instantaneous.
It is six days old, and while commendation in
newspapers and by distinguished individuals is
all that a vain man could wish, the stocks have
declined, and troops come forward more slowly
than ever. This, looked soberly in the face, is
not very satisfactory. We have fewer troops in
the field at the end of the six days than we had
at the beginning — the attrition among the old out-
numbering the addition by the new. The North
responds to the proclamation sufficiently in
breath ; but breath alone kills no rebels.
I wish I could write more cheerfully; nor do
HAMLIN, HANNIBAL 87
I thank you the less for the kindness of your let-
ter.
Yours very truly,
A. Lincoln.
An Act to Regulate the Duties of the Clerk of
the House of Representatives in Preparing for
the Organization of the House.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled, that, before the first meeting of
the next Congress, and of every subsequent Congress,
the clerk of the next preceding House of Representa-
tives shall make a roll of the Representatives-elect, and
place thereon the names of all persons, and of such
persons only, whose credentials show that they were
regularly elected in accordance with the laws of their
States respectively, or the laws of the United States.