agitation in regard to an alteration or modification
of that law, I would not be the man to introduce
it as a new subject of agitation upon the general
question of slavery.
In regard to the other question, of whether I am
pledged to the admission of any more slave States
into the Union, I state to you very frankly that I
Abraham Lincoln 247
would be exceedingly sorry ever to be put in a posi
tion of having to pass upon that question. I should
be exceedingly glad to know that there would never
be another slave State admitted into the Union;
but I must add that if slavery shall be kept out of
the Territories during the territorial existence of
any one given Territory, and then the people shall,
having a fair chance and a clear field, when they
come to adopt the constitution, do such an extraor
dinary thing as to adopt a slave constitution, un
influenced by the actual presence of the institution
among them, I see no alternative, if we own the
country, but to admit them into the Union.
The third interrogatory is answered by the answer
to the second, it being, as I conceive, the same as
the second.
The fourth one is in regard to the abolition of
slavery in the District of Columbia. In relation to
that, I have my mind very distinctly made up. I
should be exceedingly glad to see slavery abolished
in the District of Columbia. I believe that Congress
possesses the constitutional power to abolish it.
Yet as a member of Congress, I should not, with my
present views, be in favor of endeavoring to abolish
slavery in the District of Columbia, unless it would
be upon these conditions: First, that the abolition
should be gradual; second, that it should be on a
vote of the majority of qualified voters in the Dis
trict; and third, that compensation should be made
to unwilling owners. With these three conditions,
I confess I would be exceedingly glad to see Congress
abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and,
248 Lincoln and Douglas Debates
in the language of Henry Clay, "sweep from our
capital that foul blot upon our nation."
In regard to the fifth interrogatory, I must say
here that, as to the question of the abolition of the
slave-trade between the different States, I can truly
answer, as I have, that I am pledged to nothing about
it. It is a subject to which I have not given that
mature consideration that would make me feel
authorized to state a position so as to hold myself
entirely bound by it. In other words, that question
has never been prominently enough before me to
induce me to investigate whether we really have
the constitutional power to do it. I could investi
gate it if I had sufficient time to bring myself to a
conclusion upon that subject; but I have not done
so, and I say so frankly to you here, and to Judge
Douglas. I must say, however, that if I should be
of opinion that Congress does possess the constitu
tional power to abolish the slave-trade among the
different States, I should still not be in favor of the
exercise of that power, unless upon some conserva
tive principle as I conceive it, akin to what I have
said in relation to the abolition of slavery in the
District of Columbia.
My answer as to w r hether I desire that slavery
should be prohibited in all the Territories of the
United States is full and explicit within itself, and
cannot be made clearer by any comments of mine.
So I suppose in regard to the question whether I am
opposed to the acquisition of any more territory
unless slavery is first prohibited therein, my answer
is such that I could add nothing by way of illustra-
Abraham Lincoln 249
tion, or making myself better understood, than the
answer which I have placed in writing.
Now in all this the Judge has me, and he has me
on the record. I suppose he had flattered himself
that I was really entertaining one set of opinions for
one place, and another set for another place; that
I was afraid to say at one place what I uttered at
another. What I am saying here I suppose I say
to a vast audience as strongly tending to Abolition
ism as any audience in the State of Illinois, and I
believe I am saying that which, if it would be
offensive to any persons and render them enemies
to myself, would be offensive to persons in this
audience.
I now proceed to propound to the Judge the in
terrogatories, so far as I have framed them. I will
bring forward a new installment when I get them
ready. I will bring them forward now only reach
ing to number four.
The first one is:
Question i. If the people of Kansas shall, by
means entirely unobjectionable in all other respects,
adopt a State constitution, and ask admission into
the Union under it, before they have the requisite
number of inhabitants according to the English
bill, some ninety -three thousand, will you vote to
admit them?
Q. 2. Can the people of a United States Territory,
in any lawful way, against the wish of any citizen
of the United States, exclude slavery from its limits
prior to the formation of a State constitution?
Q. 3. If the Supreme Court of the United States
250 Lincoln and Douglas Debates
shall decide that States cannot exclude slavery from
their limits, arc you in favor of acquiescing in, adopt
ing, and following such decision as a rule of political
action ?
Q. 4. Are you in favor of acquiring additional
territory, in disregard of how such acquisition may
affect the nation on the slavery question?
As introductory to these interrogatories which
Judge Douglas propounded to me at Ottawa, he
read a set of resolutions which he said Judge Trum-
bull and myself had participated in adopting, in the
first Republican State Convention, held at Spring
field in October, 1854. He insisted that I and Judge
Trumbull, and perhaps the entire Republican party,
were responsible for the doctrines contained in the
set of resolutions which he read, and I understand
that it w r as from that set of resolutions that he
deduced the interrogatories which he propounded
to me, using these resolutions as a sort of authority
for propounding those questions to me. Now, I
say here to-day that I do not answer his interroga
tories because of their springing at all from that set
of resolutions which he read. I answered them be
cause Judge Douglas thought fit to ask them. I
do not now, nor ever did, recognize any responsi
bility upon myself in that set of resolutions. When
I replied to him on that occasion, I assured him that
I never had anything to do with them. I repeat
here to-day that I never in any possible form had
anything to do with that set of resolutions. It
turns out, I believe, that those resolutions were
never passed in any convention held in Springfield.
Abraham Lincoln 251
It turns out that they were never passed at any
convention or any public meeting that I had any
part in. I believe it turns out, in addition to all
this, that there was not, in the fall of 1854, any con
vention holding a session in Springfield, calling itself
a Republican State Convention; yet it is true there
was a convention, or assemblage of men calling
themselves a convention, at Springfield, that did
pass some resolutions. But so little did I really
know of the proceedings of that convention, or what
set of resolutions they had passed, though having a
general knowledge that there had been such an
assemblage of men there, that when Judge Douglas
read the resolutions, I really did not know but they
had been the resolutions passed then and there.
I did not question that they were the resolutions
adopted. For I could not bring myself to suppose
that Judge Douglas could say what he did upon
this subject without knowing that it was true. I
contented myself, on that occasion, with denying, as
I truly could, all connection with them, not denying
or affirming whether they were passed at Spring
field. Now, it turns out that he had got hold of
some resolutions passed at some convention or
public meeting in Kane County. I wish to say
here, that I don t conceive that in any fair and just
mind this discovery relieves me at all. I had just
as much to do with the convention in Kane County
as that at Springfield. I am as much responsible
for the resolutions at Kane County as those at
Springfield, the amount of the responsibility being
exactly nothing in either case; no more than there
252 Lincoln and Douglas Debates
would be in regard to a set of resolutions passed in
the moon.
I allude to this extraordinary matter in this can
vass for some further purpose than anything yet
advanced. Judge Douglas did not make his state
ment upon that occasion as matters that he be
lieved to be true, but he stated them roundly as
being true, in such form as to pledge his veracity for
their truth. When the whole matter turns out as it
does, and when we consider who Judge Douglas is,
that he is a distinguished Senator of the United
States; that he has served nearly twelve years as
such; that his character is not at all limited as an
ordinary Senator of the United States, but that his
name has become of world-wide renow r n, it is most
extraordinary that he should so far forget all the
suggestions of justice to an adversary, or of prudence
to himself, as to venture upon the assertion of that
which the slightest investigation would have shown
him to be wholly false. I can only account for his
having done so upon the supposition that that evil
genius which has attended him through his life,
giving to him an apparent astonishing prosperity,
such as to lead very many good men to doubt there
being any advantage in virtue over vice, I say I can
only account for it on the supposition that that evil
genius has as last made up its mind to forsake him.
And I may add that another extraordinary feature
of the Judge s conduct in this canvass made more
extraordinary by this incident is, that he is in the
habit, in almost all the speeches he makes, of charg
ing falsehood upon his adversaries, myself and
Abraham Lincoln 253
others. I now ask whether he is able to find in any
thing that Judge Tmmbull, for instance, has said,
or in anything that I have said, a justification at all
compared with what we have, in this instance, for
that sort of vulgarity.
I have been in the habit of charging as a matter of
belief on my part that, in the introduction of the
Nebraska Bill into Congress, there was a conspiracy
to make slavery perpetual and national. I have
arranged from time to time the evidence which
establishes and proves the truth of this charge. I
recurred to this charge at Ottawa. I shall not now
have time to dwell upon it at very great length;
but inasmuch as Judge Douglas, in his reply of half
an hour, made some points upon me in relation to it,
I propose noticing a few of them.
The Judge insists that, in the first speech I made,
in which I very distinctly made that charge, he
thought for a good while I was in fun! that I was
playful; that I was not sincere about it; and that
he only grew angry and somewhat excited when he
found that I insisted upon it as a matter of earnest
ness. He says he characterized it as a falsehood
so far as I implicated his moral character in that
transaction. Well, I did not know, till he pre
sented that view, that I had implicated his moral
character. He is very much in the habit, when he
argues me up into a position I never thought of
occupying, of very cosily saying he has no doubt
Lincoln is "conscientious" in saying so. He should
remember that I did not know but what he was
ALTOGETHER " CONSCIENTIOUS " in that matter. I
254 Lincoln and Douglas Debates
can conceive it possible for men to conspire to do
a good thing, and I really find nothing in Judge
Douglas s course of arguments that is contrary to
or inconsistent with his belief of a conspiracy to
nationalize and spread slavery as being a good and
blessed thing; and so I hope he will understand
that I do not at all question but that in all this
matter he is entirely "conscientious."
But to draw your attention to one of the points
I made in this case, beginning at the beginning:
When the Nebraska Bill was introduced, or a short
time afterward, by an amendment, I believe, it was
provided that it must be considered the true intent
and meaning of this Act not to legislate slavery into
any State or Territory, or to exclude it therefrom,
but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to
form and regulate their own domestic institutions
in their own way, subject only to the Constitution
of the United States." I have called his attention
to the fact that when he and some others began
arguing that they were giving an increased degree
of liberty to the people in the Territories over and
above what they formerly had on the question of
slavery, a question was raised whether the law was
enacted to give such unconditional liberty to the
people; and to test the sincerity of this mode of
argument, Mr. Chase, of Ohio, introduced an amend
ment, in which he made the law if the amendment
were adopted expressly declare that the people of
the Territory should have the power to exclude
slavery if they saw fit. I have asked attention also
to the fact that Judge Douglas and those who acted
Abraham Lincoln 255
with him voted that amendment down, notwith
standing it expressed exactly the thing they said
was the true intent and meaning of the law. I have
called attention to the fact that in subsequent times
a decision of the Supreme Court has been made, in
which it has been declared that a Territorial Legis
lature has no constitutional right to exclude slavery.
And I have argued and said that for men who did,
intend that the people of the Territory should have
the right to exclude slavery absolutely and uncon
ditionally, the voting down of Chase s amendment
is wholly inexplicable. It is a puzzle, a riddle.
But I have said, that with men who did look forward
to such a decision, or who had it in contemplation
that such a decision of the Supreme Court would or
might be made, the voting down of that amend
ment would be perfectly rational and intelligible.
It would keep Congress from coming in collision
with the decision when it was made. Anybody
can conceive that if there was an intention or ex
pectation that such a decision was to follow, it
would not be a very desirable party attitude to get
into for the Supreme Court all or nearly all its
members belonging to the same party to decide
one way, when the party in Congress had decided
the other way. Hence it would be very rational
for men expecting such a decision to keep the niche
in that law clear for it. After pointing this out, I
tell Judge Douglas that it looks to me as though
here was the reason why Chase s amendment w r as
voted down. I tell him that, as he did it, and
knows why he did it, if it was done for a reason
256 Lincoln and Douglas Debates
different from this, he knows what that reason was
and can tell us what it was. I tell him, also, it will
be vastly more satisfactory to the country for him
to give some other plausible, intelligible reason why
it was voted down than to stand upon his dignity
and call people liars. Well, on Saturday he did
make his answer; and what do you think it was?
He says if I had only taken upon myself to tell the
whole truth about that amendment of Chase s, no
explanation would have been necessary on his part
or words to that effect. Now, I say here that
I am quite unconscious of having suppressed any
thing material to the case, and I am very frank to
admit if there is any sound reason other than that
which appeared to me material, it is quite fair for
him to present it. What reason does he propose?
That when Chase came forward with his amend
ment expressly authorizing the people to exclude
slavery from the limits of every Territory, General
Cass proposed to Chase, if he (Chase) would add to
his amendment that the people should have the
power to introduce or exclude, they would let it go.
This is substantially all of his reply. And because
Chase would not do that, they voted his amendment
down. Well, it turns out, I believe, upon examina
tion, that General Cass took some part in the little
running debate upon that amendment, and then
ran away and did not vote on it at all. Is not that
the fact? So confident, as I think, was General
Cass that there was a snake somewhere about, he
chose to run away from the whole thing. This is an
inference I draw from the fact that, though he took
Abraham Lincoln 257
part in the debate, his name does not appear in the
ayes and noes. But does Judge Douglas s reply
amount to a satisfactory answer? [Cries of "Yes,"
"Yes," and "No," "No."] There is some little
difference of opinion here. But I ask attention to a
few more views bearing on the question of whether
it amounts to a satisfactory answer. The men who
were determined that that amendment should not
get into the bill, and spoil the place where the Dred
Scott decision was to come in, sought an excuse to
get rid of it somewhere. One of these ways one
of these excuses was to ask Chase to add to his
proposed amendment a provision that the people
might introduce slavery if they wanted to. They
very well knew Chase would do no such thing, that
Mr. Chase was one of the men differing from them
on the broad principle of his insisting that freedom
was better than slavery, a man who would not con
sent to enact a law, penned with his own hand,
by which he was made to recognize slavery on the
one hand, and liberty on the other, as precisely
equal; and when they insisted on his doing this, they
very well knew they insisted on that which he would
not for a moment think of doing, and that they were
only bluffing him. I believe (I have not, since he
made his answer, had a chance to examine the
journals or Congressional Globe and therefore speak
from memory) I believe the state of the bill at that
time, according to parliamentary rules, was such
that no member could propose an additional amend
ment to Chase s amendment. I rather think this
is the truth, the Judge shakes his head. Very
258 Lincoln and Douglas Debates
well. I would like to know, then, if they wanted
Chase s amendment fixed over, why somebody else
could not have offered to do it ? If they wanted it
amended, why did they not offer the amendment?
Why did they not put it in themselves ? But to put
it on the other ground : suppose that there was such
an amendment offered, and Chase s was an amend
ment to an amendment; until one is disposed of
by parliamentary law, you cannot pile another on.
Then all these gentlemen had to do was to vote
Chase s on, and then, in the amended form in which
the whole stood, add their own amendment to it, if
they wanted to put it in that shape. This was all
they were obliged to do, and the ayes and noes show
that there were thirty-six who voted it down, against
ten who voted in favor of it. The thirty-six held
entire sway and control. They could in some form
or other have put that bill in the exact shape they
wanted. If there was a rule preventing their amend
ing it at the time, they could pass that, and then,
Chase s amendment being merged, put it in the
shape they wanted. They did not choose to do so,
but they went into a quibble with Chase to get him
to add what they knew he would not add, and be
cause he would not, they stand upon the flimsy
pretext for voting down what they argued was the
meaning and intent of their own bill. They left
room thereby for this Dred Scott decision, which
goes very far to make slavery national throughout
the United States.
I pass one or two points I have, because my time
will very soon expire; but I must be allowed to say
Abraham Lincoln 259
that Judge Douglas recurs again, as he did upon one
or two other occasions, to the enormity of Lincoln,
an insignificant individual like Lincoln, upon his
ipse dixit charging a conspiracy upon a large number
of members of Congress, the Supreme Court, and
two Presidents, to nationalize slavery. I want to
say that, in the first place, I have made no charge
of this sort upon my ipse dixit. I have only ar
rayed the evidence tending to prove it, and pre
sented it to the understanding of others, saying
what I think it proves, but giving you the means of
judging whether it proves it or not. This is pre
cisely what I have done. I have not placed it upon
my ipse dixit at all. On this occasion, I wish to
recall his attention to a piece of evidence which I
brought forward at Ottawa on Saturday, showing
that he had made substantially the same charge
against substantially the same persons, excluding
his dear self from the category. I ask him to give
some attention to the evidence which I brought
forward that he himself had discovered a "fatal
blow being struck" against the right of the people
to exclude slavery from their limits, which fatal
blow he assumed as in evidence in an article in the
Washington Union, published "by authority." I
ask by whose authority? He discovers a similar or
identical provision in the Lecompton Constitution.
Made by whom ? The f ramers of that Constitution.
Advocated by whom? By all the members of the
party in the nation, who advocated the introduction
of Kansas into the Union under the Lecompton
Constitution.
260 Lincoln and Douglas Debates
I have asked his attention to the evidence that
he arrayed to prove that such a fatal blow was be
ing struck, and to the facts \vhich he brought for
ward in support of that charge, being identical with
the one which he thinks so villainous in me. He
pointed it, not at a newspaper editor merely, but at
the President and his Cabinet and the members of
Congress advocating the Lecomption Constitution
and those framing that instrument. I must again
be permitted to remind him that although my ipse
dixit may not be as great as his, yet it somewhat
reduces the force of his calling my attention to the
enormity of my making a like charge against him.
Go on, Judge Douglas.
MR. DOUGLAS S SPEECH.
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN : The silence with which
you have listened to Mr. Lincoln during his hour is
creditable to this vast audience, composed of men
of various political parties. Nothing is more honor
able to any large mass of people assembled for the
purpose of a fair discussion than that kind and re
spectful attention that is yielded, not only to your
political friends, but to those who are opposed to
you in politics.
I am glad that at last I have brought Mr. Lincoln
to the conclusion that he had better define his
position on certain political questions to which I
called his attention at Ottawa. He there showed
no disposition, no inclination, to answer them. I
Stephen A. Douglas 261
did not present idle questions for him to answer,
merely for my gratification. I laid the foundation
for those interrogatories by showing that they con
stituted the platform of the party whose nominee he
is for the Senate. I did not presume that I had the
right to catechise him as I saw proper, unless I
showed that his party, or a majority of it, stood
upon the platform and were in favor of the proposi
tions upon which my questions were based. I de
sired simply to know, inasmuch as he had been
nominated as the first, last, and only choice of his
party, whether he concurred in the platform which
that party had adopted for its government. In a
few minutes I will proceed to review the answers
which he has given to these interrogatories; but, in
order to relieve his anxiety, I will first respond to
these which he has presented to me. Mark you, he
has not presented interrogatories which have ever
received the sanction of the party with which I am
acting, and hence he has no other foundation for
them than his own curiosity.
First, he desires to know if the people of Kansas
shall form a constitution by means entirely proper
and unobjectionable, and ask admission into the
Union as a State, before they have the requisite
population for a member of Congress, whether I will
vote for that admission. Well, now, I regret ex
ceedingly that he did not answer that interrogatory
himself before he put it to me, in order that we
might understand, and not be left to infer, on which
side he is. Mr. Trumbull, during the last session
of Congress, voted from the beginning to the end
262 Lincoln and Douglas Debates
against the admission of Oregon, although a free
State, because she had not the requisite population
for a member of Congress. Mr. Trumbull would
not consent, under any circumstances, to let a State,
free or slave, come into the Union until it had the
requisite population. As Mr. Trumbull is in the