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THE FCEDERALIST:
COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, WRITTEN IN FAVOR
OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION, AS
AGREED-UPON BY
THE FGEDERAL CONVENTION,
SEPTEMBER 17, 1787.
REPKINTED FROM THE ORIGINAL TEXT.
UNDER THE EDITOKIAL SUPERVISION OF
HENRY B^ DAWSON.
NEW YORK:
CHARLES SCRIBNER, 124 Grand Street.
1865.
Cheeked
i "aSTOR, LENOX AND
i lU^SNFOUaOATIONS.
W^m*
Entered according to Act of Congress in tlie year 1864, by
Henry B. Dawson,
ia the Clerk's OflSce of the District Court for the Southern District of New York.
BITERSIBE, CAMBRIDGE:
STEREOTTPED AND PRINTED BY
H. 0. HOCQHTON AND COMPANT.
PREFACE.
The use of The Fcederalist as a text-book, in the
collegiate institutions of the United States, is by no
means a new and untried experiment ; and the recent
introduction of the work into the classes of the venera-,
ble University at Cambridge, and the proposed intro-
duction of it into those of other institutions in other
States of the Union, will, it is hoped, be productive of
the best results in the future of our country's political
history.
To promote so commendable a purpose this edition
has been prepared; in which, beside the original text,
a carefully prepared Analysis of the work, and of the
claims to authorship of its several Numbers, have been
introduced.
The text employed is that which the distinguished
Authors themselves originally gave to the world, with-
out addition, abridgment, or the least alteration, except
where typographical errors were subsequently corrected
by the Authors themselves, or are apparent and unques-
tionable ; and as the People for whom it was written,
iv Preface.
and to whom it was especially addressed, received and
acted on it in the form in which its Authors presented
it, the Editor has neither felt at liberty to alter that
form in the least degree himself, nor to recognize any
such alterations by others, except in the cases already
referred to. Henry B. Dawson.
MoKEisAKiA, N. Y., September, 1864.
SYNOPTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS.
I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION, No. I. 1
II. " THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR [the People of
the State of New York] POLITICAL PROSPERITY," IL 6
1. introduction, g
2. iB its political relations with foreign nations, III. 12
A, by securing it against dangers from foreign arms and influence, 12
A. through a removal of the usual causes of just war, , 13
a. violations of compacts and treaties, 13
A. by securing a more perfect administration of govern-
ment, 13
a. by the employment of better men than those employed
in State governments, 13
b. by an uniform interpretation of the provisions of those
compacts and treaties, 14
c. by avoiding the local temptation to bad faith to which
a single State may yield, 14
d. by avoiding local prejudices to which a single State may
be subject, 14
b. direct and unlawful violence, 15
B. through the greater abiUty which it will aflfbrd to settle ami-
cably those causes of just war, 16
a. in the absence of local pride and prejudices, 16
b. in the greater strength of the States when united, 16
C. through its removal beyond the influence of unjust causes, IV. 17
a. the superior power of neighboring nations, 17
b. the jealousy of foreign powers from successful trade, 18
B. by securing it from similar influences in the several States, if
disunited, y_ 22
C. by preventing European alliances with rival States or con-
federacies, 26
3. in its political relations with the Peoples of other States, VI. 27
A by securing it from inter-State hostilities, 27
A. the danger of hostilities arising between " independent, un-
connected sovereignties," 27
a. through love of power, 28
b. through jealousy of power, 28
c. through competitions of commerce, 28
d. through individual passions and influences, 28
vi CoiUeiUs.
Essay. Page
A. Pericles and Aspasia referred to, No. VI. 28
B. the Peloponnesian war referred to, 28
C. Cardinal Wolsey referred to, 29
D. Madame de Maintenon referred to, 29
E. Duchess of Marlborough referred to, 29
F. Madame de Pompadour referred to, 29
G. Shays and the rebellion in Massachusetts referred to,. . 30
B. objections of anti-constitutionists answered, 30
a. " the genius of republics is pacific," 30
b. "the spirit of commerce tends to peace," 30
A. Introductory remarks, 30
B. Sparta referred to, 31
C. Athens referred to, 31
D. Rome referred to, 31
E. Carthage referred to, 31
F. Venice referred to, 31
G. Holland referred to, 31
H. Great Britain referred to, 32
c. an appeal to the People, founded on these examples, ... 32
O. the inducements ^7hich the disunited States could have to
make war on each other considered, VII. 34
a. the same which have produced wars elsewhere, 34
b. special causes within themselves, 34
A. unadjusted territorial disputes, 34
a. introductor}' remarks, 84
b. crown-lands, within the States, 34
c. western lands, 35
d. "Wyoming lands, 36
e. New Hampshire grants, 36
B. commercial rivalry, 37
a. disregard of local revenue laws generally, 37
b. jealousy of New York in New Jersey and Connecticut, 38
C. the existing debt of the confederacy, 38
a. in its apportionment among the States, 38
b. in its extinguishment, 38
D. local laws violative of private contracts, 40
E. incompatible alliances between individual States and
foreign powers, 40
D. the consequences of inter-State hostilities, VIII. 41
a. primarily, great destruction of life and property, 42
b. ultimately, 43
A. the establishment of standing armies, '. 43
B. the extension of the power of the executive, 44
C. the elevation of the military over the civil power, 44
C. objections answered, 44
A. standing armies were not created in ancient Greece, ... 45
Contents. vii
Essay. Page.
B. the impotency of the army in Great Britain,. No. VIII. 46
d. the general subject discussed, and the value of the Union
enforced, 47
4. in affording a barrier to domestic faction and insurrection,. . .IX. 48
A. liability of republics to experience these troubles, 48
B. they afford arguments for the advocates of despotism, 49
C. the utility of a confederacy to guard against these troubles, 50
A. resorted to in other ages and countries, 50
B. approved by most authors on the subject of politics, 50
a. Montesquieu's sentiments concerning extended territories,
under republican governments, misrepresented by the
Anti-fcederahsts, 50
b. his views on a confederate republic, 51
C. distinction between a confederacy and a consolidation of the
States discussed, 53
a. what a confederacy is said to be, 53
b. what a confederacy really is, 53
A. the proposed Constitution a confederate republican
form of government, 54
B. the Lycian Confederacy a confederate republic, 54
D. the propensity of popular governments to faction, X. 55
E. the United States liable to the same result, 55
F. what constitutes " a faction," 56
G. in what way its mischief may be cured, 56
A. by removing its causes, 56
a. in the destruction of the liberty of the People, 56
b. by causing every citizen to possess the same opinions,
passions, and interests, 56
c. the first unwise, the second impracticable, , . . 56
B. by controlling its effects, 56
a. the nature and purposes of " factions," 57
b. when the faction is a minority, " by regular vote," 59
C. when the faction is a majority, 59
A. by dividing the prevailing influences, 60
B. by preventing the concentration of those influences, 60
H. the advantage of a representative government over a democracy
in curing the mischiefs of faction, 60
I. the advantages of an extei^ed republic over a small one, in like
cases, 62
5. in their commercial relations with foreign nations, XI. 64
A. the growing commerce of America has excited the jealousy
of foreign powers, 65
B. the necessity of uniformity of action in America in order to
secure the benefits arising from its own markets, 65
C. the establishment of a Fcederal navy another resource for
commanding the respect of foreign nations, 67
viii Contents.
D. " a steady adherence to the Union " necessary to secure all the
commercial advantages which America possesses,. . . .No. XI. 67
E. the effects of disunion on the commerce of America, 68
A. the rivalship of the different parts would frustrate all their
natural advantages for promoting commerce, 68
B. it would become " a prey to the wanton intermeddling of all
nations who are at war with each other," 68
a. neutrality is respected only when it can be adequately de-
fended, ; 68
C. it would produce " little arts of little politicians to control or
vary the irresistible course of nature " in the growth of
our commerce, ^ 68
D. it would invite foreign nations to interfere with our rights, 68
a. by prescribing the conditions of our political existence, ... 68
b. by embarrassing our commerce, 68
c. by interfering witli the commercial rights of the Union,
which had been then acquired, 69
A. in the fisheries, 69
a. the importance of the fisheries to France and Britain, 69
b. our " decided mastery " therein, a subject of impor-
tance to those powers, 69
c. their importance to all the commercial States, 69
i. in affording a field for their enterprise, 69
ii. in affording a nursery for the mercantile marine,.. 69
d. their importance in promoting the establishment of a
Foederal navy, 70
B. in the navigation of the western lakes, 69
C. in the navigation of the Mississippi River, 69
a. the jealousy of Spain on that subject, 69
6. in promoting the establishment of a Foederal n.avy, 70
A. such a navy would be mutually advantageous to all the States, 70
7. in their commercial relations with the Peoples of other States,... 70
A. it would promote the interchange of their respective produc-
tions, 70
B. " the veins of commerce would be replenished " and invig-
orated, 70
C. a greater variety would be afforded to the commerce of the
country, ^ 71
D. the aggregate balance of trade would be increased, in favor
of America, 71
E. objection, concerning the necessary course of inter-State com-
merce, in any event, answered, 71
F. the assumed superiority of Europe referred to, and Americans
appealed to to disprove it, 71
8. in respect to revenue, XII. 73
A. commerce the most productive source of national wealth, .... 73
Contents. ix
Essay. Page
B. it increases the ability of tke inhabitants to pay taxes. No. XII. 74
C. the system of " direct taxation " unsuccessful in the United
States 74
D. " indirect taxation " the main dependence for the necessary
revenues, 75
A. because " the genius of the People " is opposed to excise
laws, 75
B. because the scarcity of money will render the collection of
excise duties difficult, 75
E. the union of the States will best enable us to improve this
resource, 75
A. by being conducive to commerce from whence it is drawn,.. 76
B. by simplifying the regulations for its collection, 76
F. the separation of the States would destroy this source of
revenue,.
76
A. by promoting illicit trade, 76
B. by promoting jealousy between the States, and ultimate re-
duction of impost duties, in order to secure trade, 76
C. from the absence of sufficiently rigorous border-guards be-
tween the States, and the improbability of their establish-
ment, 76
a. the ordinary powers of border-guards intolerable in a free
country, 76
b. border-guards unnecessary with the States united, 77
G. the effect of a destruction of this resource, 78
A. necessity of revenue to the existence of a nation, 78
B. if it cannot be obtained from commerce it must be taken
from the real estate of the inhabitants, 79
a. because excises will not be available, 79
b. because the objects proper for excise within the agricul-
tural States will be insufficient to produce the requisite
revenue, 79
c. because it is difficult to trace personal property, 79
9. in the greater economy in the administration of government, XIII. 80
A. " if the States are united under one government, there will
be but one national civil list to support," 80
B. " if they are divided into several confederacies, there will be
as mjxny national civil lists to be provided for," 80
A. speculations on the number of confederacies to be formed
from the debris of the Union, 80
B. each small confederacy will require a civil list as extended
as has been proposed in the new system for the aggregate
of a« the States, 80
a. because of the extent of territory which each will occupy, 80
b. because of the necessary plurality of the revenue depart-
ments 82
X Contents.
Essay. Page,
c. because of the necessary plurality of the military estab-
lishments, No. Xin. 83
10. the objection which has been drawn from the extent of territory
wliich the Union occupies, answered, XIV. 83
A. the distinction between a repubUc and a democracy noticed,.. 84
B. the errors of political writers concerning the turbulence in
the ancient republics, 84
C. practicability of extending the Umits of a republic, 85
D. the territory of the United States not too extended for their
proper government, 85
E. the territory of the United States compared with those of
some European nations, 86
F. the jurisdiction of the United States limited to objects of general
interest, 86
G. the objects of the proposed Constitution are to secure the union
of the thirteen primitive States, and to add to their number,. 87
H. the intercourse between the States will be daily facilitated by
improvements for transit of passengers, etc., 87
I. almost every State being a frontier State, all will be exposed to
foreign aggression, and all, alike, need protection, 87
J. an appeal to the People of New York to avoid disunion, 88
m. "THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFED-
ERATION TO PRESERVE THAT UNION," XV. 90
1. introductory remarks, 90
2. the proposition neither controverted nor doubted, 91
3. disastrous result of its inefficacy, 91
4. an appeal to the People to " break the charm " of the confedera-
tion, 93
5. the character of the opposition to the Constitution, and its incon-
sistency, 93
6. the character of the defects in the confederacy, 94
A. the legislation for States, in their corporate capacity, 94
A. the bad effect of this evil in raising men and money, 94
B. the opposition to the new system, because it deviates from
this principle, considered generally, 94
c. the peculiarities of a simple league between independent
nations, considered, 94
D. the effect of a simple league, as the bond of union between
the States, considered generally, 95
E. such a bond of union inconsistent with the organization of
" a superintending power, imder the direction of a common
council," 96
T. it is also inconsistent with the authority, over the persons of
the citizens, which is necessary in the establishment of a
government, 96
a. the purposes of government considered generally, • 96
Contents. xi
b. the penalties which governments find it necessary to in-
flict on offenders against their laws, No. XV. 96
A. the coercion of the magistracy, which is appUcable only
to men, gg
B. the coercion of arms, which is applicable only to States, 96
a. it would be productive of constant war, 96
h. it would be subversive of every purpose of govern-
ment, 96
C. the argument that breaches of the laws by the States need
not be expected, considered, 96
A. such breaches would arise from the passions of the in-
dividual members of the States, 97
B. from the impatience of control which arises from the
sovereign powers of the States, 97
O. the improbability of the execution of the Foederal measures,
in a simple league of the States, considered and averred, . . 98
a. supported by the natural constitution of the local author-
ities.
98
b. 'supported by the experience of the United States, under
the old confederation, 99
c. supported by the experience of similar confederacies, else-
^^ere,.. XVI. 100
A. the Lycian and Achaean leagues not thus exposed, 100
H. the employment of force in executing the measures of such
a league, " in its application to us," considered, 100
a. it would be productive ofconstant war between the States, 101
b. it would lead to counter-alliances between individual
States, iQi
c. it would lead to alliances between foreign nations and
portions of the Union, _ jOl
d. it would lead to " the violent 'death of the confederacy," 102
e. and to the establishment of a military despotism, 103
I. the impracticability of sustaining the Union by military co-
ercion, -.Qn
J. an efficient government can only be established on the re-
sponsibility of individual citizens, IO3
a. objections answered ; that the States, as such, may still
interpose their authority, and obstruct the execution of
the laws, 204
b. that individuals, also, more or less numerous, may still
oppose the government, 105
c. that the reserved rights of the States would be invaded
by the Foederal government, XVII. 107
A. the absence of any competent inducement, 107
B. the People of the several States, through the House of
Representatives, could frustrate such an attempt, .... 108
xii Contents.
Essay. Page
C. tlie greater danger that the delegated authority of the
Fcederal government will be invaded by the State
governments, No. XVII. 108
o. from the superior influence which they will exercise
over the People, 108
i. from the diffusive construction of the Fcederal gov-
ernment, 108
ii. from the nature of the objects of local control, — 108
b, the general subject considered, 169
i. enforced by argument 109
ii. illusfrated from the history of the feudal system,. 110
iii. illustrated from the history of Scotland, Ill
iv. illustrated from the history of the Amphictyonic
league, XVIII. 112
T. illustrated from the history of the Achaean league, 115
vi. illustrated from the history pf the Germanic
league, : '. XIX. 119
vii. illustrated from the history of Poland, 125
viii. illustrated from the history of Switzerland, 125
ix. illustrated from the history of the United Nether-
lands XX. 126
K. concluding remarks, 131
B. " the total want of a sanction to its laws," XXI. 132
A. the Fcederal government possesses no power to exact obe-
dience, 132
B. the Fcederal government possesses no power to punish dis-
obedience, 132
c. the Fcederal government has received no express delegation
of authority to use force against the States, 132
C. "the want of a mutual guaranty of the State governments," 133
A. the consequent absence of authority in the Fcederal govern-
ment to assist a State in enforcing its own laws, 134
B. the danger of an " officious interference in the domestic
concerns of its members" by the Fcederal government
considered, 134
D. " the principle of regulating the contributions of the States
to the common treasury, by quotas," 135
A. the standard of constitutional wealth, 135
B. the causes on which it is dependent, 136
c. the rule of the confederation, on taxation, is unequal and
oppressive, 136
». this cause alone is sufficient to work the destruction of the
Union, 136
E. the remedy proposed for this evil, 137
a. the advantages of taxes on articles of consumption, 137
b. the advantages attending indirect taxation, 138
Contents. xiii
Essay. Page
£!. "the want of a power to regulate commerce,". .. .No. XXII. 139
A. it operates as a bar to the formation of commercial treaties, 139
B. it has given occasion for dissatisfaction between the States, 139
F. the raising of troops by quotas, 140
A. it produces great expense in raising troops, 140
B. it is not conducive to a vigorous system of defence, 140
C. it is unequal in the burden it imposes on the several States, 141
G. the right of equal suffrage among the States, in the Congress, 141
A. arising from the inequality of weight among the States, . . 142
a. objection that sovereigns are equal, answered, 142
b. objection that " a majority of the States will be a major-
ity of confederated America," answered, 142
c. objection that two thirds of the States, in approval, are
necessary to the most important acts 142
A. the mischief which is incident to the last-named rule, 143
B. the danger from foreign corruption which it imposes, 144
a. republics particularly exposed to this evil, 145
6. instances when this evil has prevailed, 146
i. the deputies of the United Provinces, 146
ii. the authorities in Sweden, 146
H. " the want of a judiciary power," 146
A. to expound and define the true meaning and operation of
the laws, 146
B. to ascertain the true import of treaties with foreign na-
tions, 146
c. to secure uniformity in the decision of the judges, 147
I. " the organization of Congress utterly improper for the ex-
ercise of those powers which are necessary to a Foederal
Union, 148
J. the existing Foederal system never had a ratification by the
People, 149
IV. "THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST
EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED,
TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT " [the preser-
vation of the Union], XXIII. 160
1. concerning " the objects to be provided for by the Foederal
government," 160
A. " the common defence of the members," 150
A. " the authorities essential to the care of the common de-
fence," 150
a. " to raise armies," 150
b. " to build and equip fleets," 150
c. " to prescribe rules for the government of both " the ar-
mies and the fleets, 150
d. " to direct their operations," 150
e. " to provide for their support," 160
xiv Contents.
Eeeay. Pa^
B. " these powers ought to exist without limitation," No. XXIII. 160
a. " because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent
and variety of national exigencies," 150, 151
b. because it is impossible to foresee "the extent and
variety of means which may be necessary to satisfy "
those exigencies, 150, 151
c. this principle fully recognized in the Articles of Confed-
eration, 151
d. no " proper or adequate provision for its exercise "
made in those articles, 151
e. the expectations concerning it of the framers of those
articles, 152
f. " this expectation was ill-founded and illusory," 152
g. the effect of that failure, 152
h. the remedy therefor, the measures proposed in the new
Constitution, 152
C. objection, the danger of standing armies, considered,
XXIV. 156
a. the powers referred to are delegated to the legisla-
tive department, not to the executive of the Union, 156
b. the Congress itself, in the exercise of the powers re-
ferred to, is expressly limited by the terms of the
proposed Constitution, 157
c. the State constitutions, with two exceptions, contain no
interdiction of standing armies, in time of peace, 157
d. the Articles of Confederation " had not imposed a single
restraint on the authority of the United States " on
this subject, 158
e. the constant danger of the United States from foreign
and Indian hostilities renders such authority in the
Fcederal government necessary, 159
f. the growing commerce of the United States demands a
navy for its protection, 161
D. objection, " that the objects enumerated above ought to
be provided for by the State governments," considered,
XXV. 162
a. "it would be an inversion of the primary principle of
our political association," by transferring the care of
the common defence to the individual members of the
Union, 162
A. the result of which would be "oppressive to some
States," 162
B. it might become dangerous to all the States, through
the ineflSciency or inability of some of them, 163
C. it would create jealousy by increasing the military
power of some of the States, 163
Contents. xv
Essay. Page
D. it might afford temptation for invading the constitu-
tional authority of the Union, No. XXV. 163
b. the provisions of the Articles of Confederation on State
military and naval establishments, referred to, 164
E. the impropriety of restraining the discretion of Congress,
on keeping up armies, further considered, 164
a. the uncertainty of the period or extent of the danger to
be guarded against, 164
b. it presumes a possibility of collusion between the Con-
gress and the executive, in schemes of usurpation,. . . . 165
F. the impropriety of restraining Congress in raining armies
in times of peace considered, 165