ered as a dangerous weapon of power, it had better be
in those hands, of which the People are most likely to be
iealous, than in those of which they are least likely to
be iealous. For it is a truth which the experience of aU
a^es has attested, that the People are always most in
danger when the means of injuring their rights are in
the possession of those of whom they entertain the least
suspicion. , . <• n
The framers of the existing Confederation, fully aware
of the danger to the Union from the separate possession
of military forces by the States, have, in express terms,
prohibited them from having either ships or troops, un-
less with the consent of Congress. The truth is that
the existence of a Foederal Government and military
establishments, under State authority, are not less at
variance with each other, than a due supply of the i^ced-
eral treasury and the system of quotas and reqmsitions.
There are other lights besides those already taken notice
of, in which the impropriety of restraints on the discre-
tion of the National Legislature will be equally manifest.
The design of the objection, which has been mentioned,
is to preclude standing armies in time of peace; though
we have never been informed how far it is designed the
prohibition should extend : whether to raising armies, as
well as to keeping them up, in a season of tranquillity,
or not If it be confined to the latter, it will have no
precise signification, and it will be ineffectual for the
purpose intended. When armies are once raised, what
shall be denominated "keeping them up," contrary to
the sense of the Constitution? What time shall be
requisite to ascertain the violation ? Shall it be a week,
a month, a year ? Or shall we say, they may be con-
The Feeder alist 165
tinued as long as the danger which occasioned their
being raised continues ? This would be to admit that
they might be kept up in time of peace, against threat-
ening or impending danger ; which would be at once to
deviate from the literal meaning of the prohibition, and
to introduce an extensive latitude of construction. Who
shall judge of the continuance of the danger? This
must undoubtedly be submitted to the National Gov-
ernment ; and the matter would then be brought to this
issue, that the National Government, to provide ^^gainst
apprehended danger, might in the first instance raise
troops, and might afterwards keep them on foot, as long
as they supposed the peace or safety of the community
was in any degree of jeopardy. It is easy to perceive,
that a discretion so latitudinary as this would afford
ample room for eluding the force of the provision.
The supposed utility of a provision of this kind can
only be founded on the supposed probability, or at least
possibility, of a combination between the Executive and
the Legislative, in some scheme of usurpation. Should
this at any time happen, how easy would it be to fabri-
cate pretences of approaching danger! Indian hostili-
ties, instigated by Spain or Britain, would always be at
hand. Provocations to produce the desired appearances
might even be given to some foreign power, and ap-
peased again by timely concessions. If we can reason-
ably presume such a combination to have been formed,
and that the enterprise is warranted by a sufficient pros-
pect of success, the army when once raised, from what-
ever cause, or on whatever pretext, may be applied to
the execution of the project.
If, to obviate this consequence, it should be resolved
to extend the prohibition to the raising of armies in
time of peace, the United States would then exhibit
the most extraordinary spectacle which the world has
yet seen, — that of a nation incapacitated by its Consti-
166 The Federalist.
tution to prepare for defence, before it was actually in-
vaded. As the ceremony of a formal denunciation of
war has of late fallen into disuse, the presence of an
enemy within our territories must be waited for, as the
legal warrant to the Government to begin its levies of
men for the protection of the State. We must receive
the blow, before we could even prepare to return it. All
that kind of policy by which nations anticipate distant
danger, and meet the gathering storm, must be ab-
stained from, as contrary to the genuine maxims of a
free Government. We must expose our property and
liberty to the mercy of foreign invaders, and invite them
by our weakness to seize the naked and defenceless
prey, because we are afraid that rulers, created by our
choice, dependent on our will, might endanger that
liberty, by an abuse of the means necessary to its
preservation.
Here I expect we shall be told that the Militia of the
country is its natural bulwark, and would be at all times
equal to the National defence. This doctrine, in sub-
stance, had like to have lost us our independence. It
cost millions to the United States that might have been
saved. The facts, which from our own experience for-
bid a reliance of this kind, are too recent to permit us
to be the dupes of such a suggestion. The steady
operations of war against a regular and disciplined
army can only be successfully conducted by a force of
the same kind. Considerations of economy, not less
than of stability and vigor, confirm this position. The
American Militia, in the course of the late war, have, by
their valor on numerous occasions, erected eternal monu-
ments to their fame ; but the bravest of them feel and
know that the liberty of their country could not have
been established by their efforts alone, however great
and valuable they were. War, like most other things,
The Federalist. 167
is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence,
by perseverance, by time, and by practice.
All violent policy, as it is contrary to the natural
and experienced course of human affairs, defeats itself.
Pennsylvania, at this instant, affords an example of
the truth of this remark. The Bill of Rights of that
State declares, that standing armies are dangerous to
liberty, and ought not to be kept up in time of peace.
Pennsylvania, nevertheless, in a time of profound peace,
from the existence of partial disorders in one or two of
her counties, has resolved to raise a body of troops :
and in all probability, will keep them up as long as
there is any appearance of danger to the public peace.
The conduct of Massachusetts affords a lesson on the
same subject, though on different ground. That State
(without waiting for the sanction of Congress, as the
Articles of the Confederation require) was compelled
to raise troops to quell a domestic insurrection, and
still keeps a corps in pay to prevent a revival of the
spirit of revolt. The particular Constitution of Massa-
chusetts opposed no obstacle to the measure ; but the
instance is still of use to instruct us, that cases are
likely to occur under our Governments, as well as under
those of other nations, which will sometimes render a
military force in time of peace essential to the security
of the society; and that it is therefore improper, in this
respect, to control the Legislative discretion. It also
teaches us, in its application to the United States, how
little the rights of a feeble Government are likely to be
respected, even by its own constituents. And it teaches
us, in addition to the rest, how unequal parchment pro-
visions are to a struggle with public necessity.
It was a fundamental maxim of the Lacedaemonian
commonwealth, that the post of Admiral should not be
conferred twice on the same person. The Peloponne-
sian confederates, having suffered a severe defeat at sea
168 The Federalist.
from the Athenians, demanded Lysander, who had
before served with success in that capacity, to com-
mand the combined fleets. The Lacedaemonians, to
gratify their allies, and yet preserve the semblance of
an adherence to their ancient institutions, had recourse
to the flimsy subterfuge of investing Lysander with the
real power of Admiral, under the nominal title of Vice-
Admiral. This instance is selected from among a mul-
titude that might be cited, to confirm the truth already
advanced and illustrated by domestic examples ; which
is, that nations pay little regard to rules and maxims,
calculated in their very nature to run counter to the
necessities of society. Wise politicians will be cau-
tious about fettering the Government with restrictions,
that cannot be observed ; because they know, that ev-
ery breach of the fundamental laws, though dictated
by necessity, impairs that sacred reverence, which ought
to be maintained in the breast of rulers towards the
Constitution of a country, and forms a precedent for
other breaches, where the same plea of necessity does
not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable.
PUBLIUS.
For the Independent Journal.
THE FCEDERALIST. No. XXYI.
To THE People of the State of New York :
IT was a thing hardly to be expected that in a pop-
ular revolution the minds of men should stop at
that happy mean which marks the salutary boundary
between Pow^er and Privilege, and combines the
The Fcederalist. 169
energy of Government with the security of private
rights. A failure in this delicate and important point
is the gi-eat source of the inconveniences we experience ;
and if we are not cautious to avoid a repetition of the
error, in our future attempts to rectify and ameliorate
our system, we may travel from one chimerical project
to another ; we may try change after change ; but we
shall never be likely to make any material change for
the better.
The idea of restraining the Legislative authority, in
the means of providing for the National defence, is one
of those refinements, which owe their origin to a zeal
for liberty more ardent than enlightened. We have
seen, however, that it has not had thus far an extensive
prevalency ; that even in this country, where it made
its first appearance, Pennsylvania and North Carolina
are the only two States by which it has been in any
degree patronized ; and that all the others have refused
to give it the least countenance ; wisely judging that
confidence must be placed somewhere ; that the neces-
sity of doing it, is implied in the very act of delegating
power ; and that it is better to hazard the abuse of that
confidence, than to embarrass the Government and
endanger the public safety, by impolitic restrictions on
the Legislative authority. The opponents of the pro-
posed Constitution combat, in this respect, the general
decision of America ; and instead of being taught by
experience the propriety of coi;recting any extremes into
which we may have heretofore run, they appear dis-
posed to conduct us into others still more dangerous,
and more extravagant. As if the tone of Government
had been found too high, or too rigid, the doctrines they
teach are calculated to induce us to depress or to relax
it, by expedients which, upon other occasions, have been
condemned or forborne. It may be affirmed without
the imputation of invective, that if the principles they
170 The Fcederalist.
inculcate, on various points, could so far obtain as to
become the popular creed, they would utterly unfit the
People of this country for any species of Government
whatever. But a danger of this kind is not to be appre-
hended. The citizens of America have too much dis-
cernment to be argued into anarchy. And I am much
mistaken, if experience has not wrought a deep and
solemn conviction in the public mind, that greater
energy of Government is essential to the welfare and
prosperity of the community.
It may not be amiss in this place concisely to remark
the origin and progress of the idea, which aims at the
exclusion of military establishments in time of peace.
Though in speculative minds it may arise from a con-
templation of the nature and tendency of such institu-
tions, fortified by the events that have happened in other
ages and countries, yet as a National sentiment, it must
be traced to those habits of thinking, which we derive
from the nation from whom the inhabitants of these
States have in general sprung.
In England, for a long time after the Norman Con-
quest, the authority of the monarch was almost un-
limited. Inroads were gradually made upon the pre-
rogative, in favor of liberty, first by the Barons, and
afterwards by the People, till the greatest part of its
most formidable pretensions became extinct. But it
was not till the revolution in 1688, which elevated the
Prince of Orange to the throne of Great Britain, that
English liberty was completely triumphant. As inci-
dent to the undefined power of making war, an ac-
knowledged prerogative of the crown, Charles II. had,
by his own authority, kept on foot in time of peace a
body of 5,000 regular troops. And this number Jambs
XL increased to 30,000 ; who were paid out of his civil
list. At the revolution, to abolish the exercise of so
dangerous an authority, it became an article of the Bill
The Fcdderalist. Ill
of Rights then framed, that " the raising or keeping a
" standing army within tlie kingdom in time of peace,
" unless with the consent of Parliament^ was against
« law."
In that kingdom, when the pulse of liberty was at its
highest pitch, no security against the danger of stand-
ing armies was thought requisite, beyond a prohibition
of their being raised or kept up by the mere authority
of the Executive magistrate. The patriots, who effected
that memorable revolution, were too temperate, and too
well-informed, to think of any restraint on the Legisla-
tive discretion. They were aware, that a certain num-
ber of troops for guards and garrisons were indispensa-
ble ; that no precise bounds could be set to the National
exigencies ; that a power equal to every possible con-
tingency must exist somewhere in the Government :
and that when they referred the exercise of that power
to the judgment of the Legislature, they had arrived at
the ultimate point of precaution, which was reconcilable
with the safety of the community.
From the same source, the People of America may
be said to have derived a hereditary impression of dan-
ger to liberty, from standing armies in time of peace.
The circumstances of a revolution quickened the public
sensibility on every point connected with the security
of popular rights ; and in some instances raised the
warmth of our zeal beyond the degree, which consisted
with the due temperature of the body politic. The at-
tempts of two of the States, to restrict the authority of
the Legislature in the article of military establishments,
are of the number of these instances. The principles
which had taught us to be jealous of the power of a
hereditary monarch, were by an injudicious excess ex-
tended to the representatives of the People in their pop-
ular assemblies. Even in some of the States, where this
error was not adopted, we find unnecessary declarations,
172 The Fcederalist.
that standing armies ought not to be kept up, in time
of peace, without the consent of the Legislature.
I call them unnecessary, because the reason which had
introduced a similar provision into the English Bill of
Rights is not applicable to any of the State Constitu-
tions. The power of raising armies at all, under those
Constitutions, can by no construction be deemed to re-
side anywhere else, than in the Legislatures themselves ;
and it was superfluous, if not absurd, to declare, that a
matter should not be done without the consent of a
body, which alone had the power of doing it. Accord-
ingly, in some of those Constitutions, and among oth-
ers, in that of this State of New York, which has been
justly celebrated, both in Europe and America, as one
of the best of the forms of Government established in
this country, there is a total silence upon the subject.
It is remarkable, that even in the two States, which
seem to have meditated an interdiction of military es-
tablishments in time of peace, the mode of expression
made use of is rather cautionary than prohibitory. It is
not said, that standing armies shall not be kept up, but
that they ought not to be kept up, in time of peace.
This ambiguity of terms appears to have been the re-
sult of a conflict between jealousy and conviction ; be-
tween the desire of excluding such establishments at all
events, and the persuasion that an absolute exclusion
would be unwise and unsafe.
Can it be doubted that such a provision, whenever
the situation of public affairs was understood to require
a departure from it, would be interpreted by the Legisla-
ture into a mere admonition, and would be made to yield
to the necessities or supposed necessities of the State ?
Let the fact already mentioned, with respect to Penn-
sylvania, decide. What then (it may be asked) is the
use of such a provision, if it cease to operate the mo-
ment there is an inclination to disregard it ?
The Fcederalist. 173
Let us examine whether there be any comparison, in
point of efficacy, between the provision alluded to, and
that which is contained in the New Constitution, for
restraining the appropriations of money for military pur-
poses to the period of two years. The former, by aim-
ing at too much, is calculated to effect nothing : the lat-
ter, by steering clear of an imprudent extreme, and by
being perfectly compatible with a proper provision for
the exigencies of the Nation, will have a salutary and
powerful operation.
The Legislature of the United States will be obliged^
by this provision, once at least in every two years, to
deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force
on foot ; to come to a new resolution on the point ; and
to declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in
the face of their constituents. They are not at liberty
to vest in the Executive department permanent funds
for the support of an army, if they were even incau-
tious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a
confidence. As the spirit of party, in different degrees,
must be expected to infect all political bodies, there will
be, no doubt, persons in the National Legislature will-
ing enough to arraign the measures and criminate the
views of the majority. The provision for the support
of a military force will always be a favorable topic for
declamation. As often as the question comes forward,
the public attention will be roused and attracted to the
subject, by the party in opposition ; and if the majority
should be really disposed to exceed the proper limits,
the community will be warned of the danger, and will
have an opportunity of taking measures to guard against
it. Independent of parties in the National Legislature
itself, as often as the period of discussion arrived, the
State Legislatures, who will always be not only vigi-
lant, but suspicious and jealous guardians of the rights
of the citizens, against encroachments from the Foederal
174 The Federalist.
Government, will constantly have their attention awake
to the conduct of the National rulers, and will be ready
enough, if anything improper appears, to sound the
alarm to the People, and not only to be the voice, but,
if necessary, the arm of their discontent.
Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great communi-
ty requ're time to mature them for execution. An army,
so large as seriously to menace those liberties, could
only be formed by progressive augmentations ; which
would suppose, not merely a temporary combination be-
tween the Legislature and Executive, but a continued
conspiracy for a series of time. Is it probable that such
a combination would exist at all ? Is it probable that
it would be persevered in, and transmitted along through
all the successive variations in a representative body,
which biennial elections would naturally produce in both
houses ? Is it presumable, that every man, the instant
he took his seat in the National Senate or House of
Representatives, would commence a traitor to his con-
.stituents and to his country? Can it be supposed, that
there would not be found one man, discerning enough
to detect so atrocious a conspiracy, or bold or honest
enough to apprise his constituents of their danger? If
such presumptions can fairly be made, there ought at
once to be an end of all delegated authority. The Peo-
ple should resolve to recall all the powers they have
heretofore parted with out of their own hands, and to
divide themselves into as many States as there are
counties, in order that they may be able to manage their
own concerns in person.
If such suppositions could even be reasonably made,
still the concealment of the design, for any duration,
would be impracticable. It would be announced, by
the very circumstance of augmenting the army to so
great an extent, in time of profound peace. What col-
orable reason could be assigned, in a country so situ-
The Federalist. 175
ated, for such vast augmefttations of the military force ?
It is impossible that the People could be long deceived ;
and ths destruction of the project, and of the projectors,
would quickly follow the discovery.
It has been said, that the provision which limits the
appropriation of money for the support of an army to
the period of two years would be unavailing ; because
the Executive, when once possessed of a force large
enough to awe the People into submission, would find
resources in that very force, sufficient to enable him to
dispense with supplies from the acts of the Legislature.
But the question again recurs : upon what pretence
could he be put in possession of a force of that magni-
tude in time of peace? If we suppose it to have been
created in consequence of some domestic insurrection or
foreign war, then it becomes a case not within the prin-
ciples of the objection ; for this is levelled against the
power of keeping up troops in time of peace. Few
persons will be so visionary, as seriously to contend that
military forces ought not to be raised to quell a rebel-
lion, or resist an invasion ; and if the defence of the
community, under such circumstances, should make it
necessary to have an army so numerous as to hazard its
liberty, this is one of those calamities for which there is
neither preventative nor cure. It cannot be provided
against by any possible form of Government : it might
even result from a simple league offensive and defen-
sive, if it should ever be necessary for the confederates
or allies to form an army for coinmon defence.
But it is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in
an united than in a disunited state : nay, it may be safe-
ly asserted that it is an evil altogether unlikely to attend
us in the latter situation. It is not easy to conceive a
possibility that dangers so formidable can assail the
whole Union, as to demand a force considerable enough
to place our liberties in the least jeopardy, especially if
176 The Fcederalist.
*
we take into our view the aid to be derived from the
militia, which ought always to be counted upon as a
valuable and powerful auxiliary. But in a state of dis-
union, (as has been fully shown in another place,) the
contrary of this supposition would become not only
probable, but almost unavoidable.
PUBLIUS.
l^From tJie New York Packet, Tuesday, December 25, 1787.]
THE FCEDERALIST. No. XXYII.
To THE People of the State of New York:
IT has been urged, in different shapes, that a Consti-
tution of the kind proposed by the Convention, can-
not operate without the aid of a military force to execute
its laws. This, however, like most other things that
have been alleged on that side, rests on mere general
assertion, unsupported by any precise or intelligible des-
ignation of the reasons upon which it is founded. As
far as I have been able to divine the latent meaning of
the objectors, it seems to originate in a presupposition,
that the People will be disinclined to the exercise of
Foederal authority in any matter of an internal nature.
Waiving any exception that might be taken to the inac-
curacy, or inexplicitness, of the distinction between in-
ternal and external, let us inquire what ground there is
to presuppose that disinclination in the People. Unless
we presume, at the same time, that the powers of the
general Government will be worse administered than
those of the State Governments, there seems to be no
room for the presumption of ill-will, disaffection, or op-
position in the People. I believe it may be laid down
The Fcederalist. 177
as a general rule, that their confidence in, and obedience
to a Government, will commonly be proportioned to the
goodness or badness of its administration. It must be ad-
mitted, that there are exceptions to this rule ; but these