0. the objection that " the militia of the country is its natu-
ral bulwark," considered, 166
a. it often wants " vigor and stability," 166
b. it is not the most economical,-. 166
c. standing armies sometimes necessary in times of external
peace, 167
A. instance of Pennsylvania, notwithstanding her Bill of
Rights, 167
B. instance of Massachusetts, notwithstanding the Arti-
cles of Confederation, 167
H. the danger of "fettering the government with restric-
tions " considered, 167
1. " the idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the
means of providing for the national defence," further con-
sidered, XXVI. 169
a. its origin, 169
b. it never found much favor in America, 169
J. "the idea which aims at the exclusion of military estab-
lishments in times of peace," further considered, 170
a. its origin and progress, 170
b. vesting authority on the subject in the Congress, a suffi-
cient safeguard, 171
^. because the subject must be reconsidered every two
years, 173
B. because " schemes to subvert the liberties of a people
require time to mature them for execution," which
cannot be secured, 174
C. objection, that the executive may seize supplies, an-
swered, 175
D. an appeal for the Union based on this objection 175
B. concerning the administration of the laws, XXVII. 176
A. the assertion that the laws which the Constitution au-
thorizes cannot be executed without the aid of a military
force, considered, 178
xvi Contents.
Essay Page
a. unless the Foederal government shall be worse admin-
istered than the State governments, there will be no
danger from popular ill-will, No. XXVII. 176
b. it is probable that the former will be better administered
than the latter, 177
A. from the greater latitude of choice, in the selection of
officers, 177
B. from the peculiar care and judgment with which the
^ Fcederal Senate will be composed, 177
C. from the superior intelligence of the Fcederal Con-
gress,
177
D. from the absence of faction therein, 177
c. there will be less liability to sedition, because there will
be a greater power to suppress it, 178
d. the Fcederal government " will be strengthened by its
extension to matters of internal concern," 178
. the proposed form of government " bids much fairer to
avoid the necessity of using force," than that proposed
by its opponents, 179
a. because " it enables the Fcederal government to employ
the ordinary magistracy of each State, in the execution
of its laws," 179
b. because it displays to the People the common origin of
both the Fcederal and the State governments, 179
c. because it conveys to the People the consideration of its
superior power to enforce obedience, and thereby checks
disaffection, 179
A. "the laws of the confederacy, as to the enumerated
and kfiitimate objects of its jurisdiction, the sufeemb
LAW of the land," 180
!. "there may happen cases in which the National govern-
ment may be necessitated to resort to force,".. .XXVIII. 181
a. in which cases /o7-ce must be employed, 181
A. examples referred to, in the individual States, 182
B. it would be equally necessary in the plan proposed by
the opponents of the new system, 182
b. it will be entirely controlled by the representatives of
the People, 183
A. if the Congress betrays the People there is no remedy
but " the original right of self-defence, which is para-
mount to all positive forms of government," 183
B. in that case it may be remedied better than if a State
government should be similarly treacherous, 183
C. tho State governments the greatest security against
Fcederal usurpations of power by the Fcederal au-
tliorities. 18o
Contents. xvii
Essay. Page
D, the great extent of our territory affords additional se-
curity, No. XXVIII. 185
E. the Hinited resources of tlie country afford still more
security 185
C. concerning " a general power of taxation," XXIX. 186
A. such authority is necessary in every constitution, 187
a. the want of such authority leads either to official plunder,
or, 187
b. to " a fatal atrophy " in the government, and speedy dis-
solution, 187
B in the present confederation, tlie want of it has produced
disaster, 187
0. the only remedy is " that of permitting the National gov-
ernment to raise its own revenues by the ordinary meth-
ods of taxation," 188
D. objection, that the authority of Congress should be limited
to " external taxation," answered, 188
E. reply, "that deficiencies may be provided for by requisitions
upon the States," considered, 189
a. the " vices and deformities " of the system of requisi-
tions, considered, 189
b. its effect in time of war, 190
A. primarily, no " proper dependence " on the plan,. . . . 191
B. secondly, the diversion of other funds, already appro-
priated, to tlie defence of the State, 191
C. thirdly, the destruction of public credit, 191
D. fourthly, difficulty in procuring loans, 191
E. finally, disaster to the country, 191
p. surrejoinder, "that, firom the scantiness of tlie resources
of the country, the necessity of diverting the establislied
funds would exist, though the National government should
possess this power," considered, 191
a. " the resources of the community, in their full extent,
will be brought into activity for the benefit of the
Union," 191
b. " whatever deficiency there may be, can readily he sup-
plied by loans, 191
A. confidence inspired, among lenders, by the delegation
of this authority of taxation, 192
B. distrust arising from the absence of that authority, in
the Confederation, removed, 192
O. the necessity of " a general power of taxation " further
considered, XXX. 192
a. the importance of " first principles," on every general
subject, 192
b. " first principles " in morals and politics less frequently
b
xviii Contents.
assented to tlian those of other branches of knowl-
edge, No. XXX. 194
C. the reason for that diversity of opinion in morals and
politics is the passions and prejudices of the rea-
soner, 194
d. the same influences prevail among the opponents of the
new system, 194
A. the reasoning of the anti-Fcederalists reviewed, 194
B. their fairness, in argument, considered, 195
C. a review of Publius's arguments on the powers of the
government, 197
D. a review of the anti-Foederal arguments on the proba-
bility of usurpation by the Foederal government, 197
E. a review of the arguments on the probable aggres-
sions of the State governments on the Foederal au-
thority, 197
a. the sympathy of the People with the State govern-
ments, 197
t. objection, tliat such a power in the Foederal government
would interfere with the State governments in their
levies of money, considered, XXXI. 198
a. the sense of the People, a barrier to the oppressive use
of this power by the Foederal authorities, 198
b. the hazard of provoking the resentments of the State
governments, another barrier thereto, 198
C. a conviction of the utility and necessity of local adminis-
trations, for local purposes, a third barrier thereto, 198
d. the several States would still retain an independent and
uncontrollable authority to raise their own revenues,. . . 198
A. an attempt, by the Foederal authorities, to abridge that
authority will be a violent assumption of unconstitu-
tional power, 199
B. the sovereignty of the Foederal authorities limited in
extent, 199
a. " where the Constitution in express terms grants an ex-
clusive authority to the Union," 199
b. " where it grants an autliority to the Union and
prohibits the States from exercising the like au-
thority," 199
c. " where it grants an authority to the Union, to which
a similar authority in the States would be absolutely
and totally contradictory and repugnant ," 199
C. the only exclusive power of taxation which is delegated
to the Foederal government is that of imposing taxes
on imports, 200
D. the authority to impose taxes on all other articles is
Contents. xix
concurrent and coequal in the Foederal and the State
authorities, No. XXXI. 200
a. it has not been exclusively granted to the Union, 200
b. it has not been prohibited to the several States, 200
c. it is a necessary deduction from the particular re-
straint wliich has been imposed on the States con-
cerning duties on exports and imports, 200
i. the contrary would be an unnecessary restraint on
the States, 201
ii. it would also be a dangerous restraint on them, 201
iii. "the restriction in question is a negative preg-
nant," 201
d. there is no repugnancy between the authority to
levy taxes by the Foederal authorities, and that un-
der which the State governments do the same, . . . 202
e. concurrent authority to levy taxes the necessary re-
sult of a division of the sovereign power, 202
:. objection to the delegation of incidental powers of taxation
to the Fcederal government considered, 203
a. no authority delegated which it would not have necessarily
possessed, 203
b. the authority to levy taxes carries with it all the incidental
authority which may be necessary and proper to carry it
into execution, 204
c. the express delegation of incidental authority an act of
caution, 205
d. the Fcederal authorities must judge, in the first instance,
what may be necessary and proper powers for them to
exercise, 205
e. the constituents of that government must be the ultimate
judge of the necessity and propriety of employing such
powers, 205
A. how the constitutional impropriety of a Fcederal meas-
ure must be determined, 206
B. instances wherein such impropriety would be evident, 206
. objection, tliat the laws of the Union concerning taxation
are supreme, considered, 206
a. any other than supreme laws would be useless, 206
b. all laws must, necessarily, be supreme to those to whom
they apply, 206
c. "acts which are not pursuant to the Constitution are
merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be trea^
ed as such," 207
d. the new system " expressly confines this supremacy to
laws made pursuant to the Constitution," 207
e. any act of the United States which interferes with a
XX Contents.
Essay. Page
State tax-law (unless upon imports and exports) an un-
constitutional usurpation of power, No. XXXI. 207
K. " concurrent authority concerning taxation tlie only ad-
missible substitute for an entire subordination of the
States," XXXII. 208
a. absurdity of denying the practical impossibility of coor-
dinate authority, 208
b. illustrations of its practicability, from Roman history, . . . 209
c. difficulties which will interfere with its execution less
powerful than those which existed in Rome, 209
d. purposes of a Foederal revenue more extended than those
which the State governments must provide for, 210
A. " there ought to be a capacity to provide for future
contingencies," 210
B. there must be a capacity to provide for the public de-
fence, 210
C. for the payment of public debts, 212
e. concluding remarks, urging that a delegation of concur-
EENT AUTHORITY was preferable to an entire subordi-
nation of the States to the Foederal authorities, 214
li. objection, " that the jurisdiction of the National govern-
ment, in the article of revenue, should be restricted to
particular objects," considered, XXXIII. 215
a. it would oppress particular branches of industry, 215
b. taxes would be unequally distributed, 215
c. illustration from the proposed limitation of its jurisdic-
tion to duties on imports, 215
A. objections against a high tariff, 216
a. it encourages smuggling, 216
b. it renders other classes tributary to the manufactur-
ing classes, who will hold a monopoly of the mar-
kets, 216
c. it will force industry out of its more natural channels
into those which are less beneficial, 216
d. it will oppress the merchant in the payment of duties, . 216
B. the limitation proposed would be productive of in-
equality of taxation among the several States, 216
C the objection, " that the interest of the revenue itself
would be a sufficient guard against an extreme
tariff," considered, 217
u. objection, that the House of Representatives cannot con-
tain representatives of all classes of tax-paying citizens,
considered, 218
a. such a special representation of each class impracticable, . 219
b. merchants the natural representatives of the mechanic
and manufacturing classes, 219
Contents. xxi
Essay Page
c the learned professions form no distinct class in so-
ciety,
.No. XXXIII. 219
d. the landholders will be well represented by those in
whom they have most confidence, without regard to
the extent of their property, 220
e. the good effects of a mixed representation, and the
impracticability of special delegations from particular
classes, 220
f. men possessing the most extensive information will best
represent all classes, 221
g. men of strong minds, who belong to no particular class,
will sometimes command the attention which is due to
their merit, XXXIV. 222
h. men of different trades will seldom possess greater sym-
pathy for each other than the merchant will for both, . . 222
r. objection, that a power of internal taxation in the Fced-
eral Congress cannot be exercised with advantage for the
want of sufficient knowledge of local circumstances, con-
sidered, ^-^
a. the members from each State can obtain the necessary
information, 224
b. systems of finance are usually framed by a few per-
sons, 224
c. local disabilities may be easily ascertained and under-
stood, 225
d. the assessment of property to be taxed will devolve on
discreet persons who are acquainted with " local de-
tails," 225
e. " the National legislature can make use of the system of
each State within that State," 226
f. the proportion of taxes among the States is fixed, and
is " to be determined by the numbers of each State,"
respectively, 226
g. if this power should prove " to be really inconvenient,"
it need not be used, and requisitions may be resorted
to, ;•• 226
A. " why not omit that ambiguous power, in the first in-
stance, and rely on requisitions ? " answered, 227
a. because, if convenient, this mode will be prefer-
able, ••• 227
h. because the existence of such authority will give
greater efficacy to requisitions, 227
0. clashing of authority concerning taxation, Stote and Foed-
eral, cannot occur, 227
p. minor objections to the delegation of authority to levy
taxes considered, ^^'
\
\
xxii Contents. ,
Essay. Page
a. double sets of revenue officers, No. XXXIV. 228
b. ' ' duplication of the popular burdens by double taxa-
tions," 229
c. " the frightful forms of odious and oppressive poll-
taxes," 229
2. in " the power of regulating tlie militia, and of commanding
its services in times of insurrection and invasion,". XXXV. 231
A. uniformity in its organization and discipline is desirable,. . . . 231
B. that uniformity is attainable only by confiding the regulation
of the militia to the Fcederal authorities, 231
C. the weakness of those who oppose the delegation of this au-
thority to the Fcederal authorities, 232
D. objection, that no provision has been made for calling out
the posse comttatus, to assist the Ecederal magistrate, con-
sidered, 232
E. objection, that danger may be apprehended from the dele-
gation of such an authority, considered, 233
A. the project for a miUtia establishment which " Pdblids "
approved, 233
B. the necessity for a miUtary establishment would, thereby,
be diminished, 235
c. the pretence of danger from a disciplined militia ridiculed,. 235
D. the authority absolutely retained by the States, to appoint
the officers of the militia, a sufficient safeguard, 235
F. objection, based on the authority to order the militia into
distant States, considered, 236
V. "THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITU-
TION TO THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN
GOVERNMENT," XXXVI. 238
1. introductory remarks, 238
A. difficulty of investigating public measures with moderation
and candor, 239
B. the manner in which the proposed Constitution has been dis-
cussed, considered, 239
A. the predetermined friend of the new system may be up-
right, 240
B. the predetermined opponent " cannot be upright and must be
culpable," 240
C. The Fcederalist not addressed either to predetermined enemies
or friends of the measure, but to those who desire the happi-
ness of their country, 240
D. in considering the plan allowances must be made for the dif-
ficulties, inherent in the very nature of the undertaking,
which the Convention experienced, 240
A. the novelty of the undertaking 240
B. the difficulty of " combining the requisite stability and en-
Contents. xxiii
Essay. Page
ergy in government with a due regard to liberty and the
republican form," No. XXXVI. 241
C. the diihculty of " marking the proper line of partition be-
tween the authority of the General, and that of the State
governments," • • 242
D. " the interfering pretensions of the larger and smaller
States," 245
E. "other combinations [of the States], resulting from a dif-
ference of local position and policy," 245
E. it need not excite wonder if the proposed Constitution shall
want harmony between its several parts, 246
F. the experience of the past, on similar subjects, when com-
pared with the result in this case, proves, 246
A. that the Convention was not afflicted with party animosi-
ties, and, 247
B. that " all the deputations composing the Convention were
finally accommodated," 247
G. " in every case reported by ancient history in which gov-
ernment has been established with deliberation and con-
sent," it has been framed by a single individual,
XXXVII. 247
H. the difficulties which they experienced in the estabUshment
of their governments, 248
I. the errors which the new system contains are rather the re-
sult of the defect of antecedent experience, than of the
want of accuracy and care in preparing it, 249
A. proved from general causes, 249
B. from the peculiar amendments to the Articles of Confedera-
tion which have been proposed for ratification, 250
J. the present situation of America considered, 250
A. the severity of " her malady," 251
B. the diversity of the advice given for her relief, 251
C. improbability that those who object to the new system
could improve it, 254
D. the proposed Constitution, notwithstanding its defects, an
improvement on the old one, 254
E. the principal grounds of objection to the new one exist, or
are permitted to be exercised, under the old one, 255
F. answer, that notwithstanding these practices, under the
old constitution, they are rendered harmless by the entire
dependence of the Congress on the constituent States,
considered, 255
G. the Congress not open to censure for assuming doubtful
authority, 257
I. " a candid survey of the plan of government reported by the
Convention," XXXVHI. 238
xxiv Contents.
A. no other than a strictly republican form of government recon-
cilable with the genius of the People of America,
No. XXXVIII. 258
A. -what are the distinctive characters of the republican form,
considered, 258
a. the example of Holland referred to, 258
b. the example of Venice referred to, 258
c. the example of Poland referred to, 258
d. the example of England referred to, 259
e. the general subject discussed, 259
B. the proposed Constitution conforms to the standard here fixed, 260
A. in the tenure of its offices, » . . . . 260
B. in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, 261
C. objection, that it has not preserved tlie Fcedeml form, but
provides for a National government, considered, 261
a. what is the real character of the proposed government, . . 261
A. it will be founded on the assent and ratification of
the People of the several States, as such, 262
B. the sources from which its ordinary powers will be
drawn, 263
a. the House of Representatives, from the People of
America, 263
h. the Senate, from the States, as such, 263
c. the Executive, 263
i. immediately from the States in their political char-
acters, 263
ii. eventually by the House of Representatives, as
representatives of the States, as distinct and co-
equal bodies politic, 263
C. the operation of its ordinary powers, 263
D. the extent of its ordinary powers, 264
E. the authority by which amendments are to be made,. 265
F. the subject generally discussed, 266
b was the Convention authorized to frame and propose a
mixed system XXXIX. 266
A. the commissions of its members examined, 266
B. the recommendatory acts considered 266
C. the authority of the Convention deduced therefrom,. 267
a. " to establish, in these States, a firm National govern-
ment," 267
h. that government to be "adequate to the exigencies of
government, and the preservation of the Union," 267
c. these purposes were " to be effected b.y alterations and 'â–
provisions in the Articles of Coifederation," 268
d. these alterations were to be reported to the Congress
and to the States, for approval and ratification,.. . . 268
Contents. xxv
Essay Page
D. the general subject discussed, No. XXXIX. 268
c. how far considerations of duty might have supplied any
defect of regular authority in the Convention, ....... 272
A. as its powers were merely advisory and recommen-
datory, the proposed system is harmless until it
shall be approved, 272
B. the importance, to the United States, of the result of
its deliberations, 273
C the necessity which existed for a radical change in
the form of government, 274
D. the question whether the Convention exceeded its
powers does not affect the propriety of ratifying
the proposed Constitution, 275
C. the Constitution proposed by the Convention considered, . XL. 276
A. "the sum or quantity of power which it vests in the [Fced-
eral] government " considered, 276
a. is the aggregate of that power greater than it should be,. 276
A. the arguments of opponents considered generally, 277
B. the objects of those powers considered, 277
a. concerning " security against foreign danger," 278
i. the power of declaring war and granting letters of
marque, 278
ii. that of providing armies and fleets, 278
i. it must be indefinite, 278
ii. it must extend to times of peace as well as to
those of war, 278
Hi. the danger from military estabhshments consid-
ered, 279
ill. that of regulating and calling fortii the militia,. . . 284
iv. that of levying and borrowing money, 284
i. the authority to levy internal taxes considered, . . 285
ii. the indefinite character of the authority consid-
ered, 285
A. it has been sufficientlj'' restricted, 286
B. it was copied from the old system, 287
C. an appeal to the objectors, 287
h. concerning the " regulation of the intercourse with
foreign nations," XLI. 288
i. the power to send and receive ambassadors and
consuls and to make treaties, 288
ii, to punish piracies and felonies committed on the
high seas, and offences against the laws of nations, 289
iii. to regulate foreign commerce, 290
J. reflections on the sanction of the slave-trade, 290
ii. objection to the Constitution, based on that
clause, considered, 291
xxvi Contents.
Essay. Page
c. the "maintenance of harmony and proper inter-
course among the States," No. XLI. 291
i. to regulate commerce among the States and the
Indian tribes, 292
ii. to coin money, and to regulate its value and that
of foreign coin, 294
iii. to provide for the punishment of counterfeiters of
coin and public securities, 294
iv. to fix the standard of weiglits and measures, 294
V. to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, 294
vi. to establish an uniform law of bankruptcy, 296
vii. to establish a rule by which public acts, etc.,
shall be proved, and with what eifect, 296
viii. to establish post-roads and post-offices, 296
d. " miscellaneous powers," XLII. 297
i. the power to pass laws for securing the exclusive
right to their works to authors and inventors,. . 297
ii. the exclusive right of legislation over the seat of
the Fcederal government, 297
iii. the punishment of treason against the United
States, 299
iv. to admit new States into the Union, 299
V. to dispose of and govern the territories and pubUc
property of the United States, 300
Ti. to guarantee to every State a republican form of
government, 300
vii. to protect the States against invasion, 302
viii. to protect the States against domestic violence,. 302