of a more precise answer. If such a spirit should in-
fest the councils of the Union, the most certain road to
the accomplishment of its aim w^ould be, to employ the
State officers as much as possible, and to attach them
to the Union by an accumulation of their emoluments.
This would serve to turn the tide of State influence into
the channels of the National Government instead of
making Foederal influence flow in an opposite and ad-
verse current. But all suppositions of this kind are in-
vidious, and ought to be banished from the considera-
Tlie Fcederalist. â– 225
tion of the great question before the People. They can
answer no other end than to cast a mist over the truth.
As to the suggestion of double taxation, the answer
is plain. The wants of the Union are to be supplied in
one way or another ; if to be done by the authority of
the Foederal Government, it will not be to be done by
that of the State Government. The quantity of taxes
to be paid by the community must be the same in either
case ; with this advantage, if the provision is to be made
by the Union — that the capital resource of commercial
imposts, which. is the most convenient branch of reve-
nue, can be prudently improved to a much greater ex-
tent under Foederal than under State regulation, and of
course will render it less necessary to recur to more in-
convenient methods ; and with this further advantage,
that as far as there may be any real difficulty in the ex-
ercise of the power of internal taxation, it will impose
a disposition to greater care in the choice and arrange-
ment of the means ; and must naturally tend to make
it a fixed point of policy in the National administration
to go as far as may be practicable in making the luxury
of the rich tributary to the public treasury, in order to
diminish the necessity of those impositions which might
create dissatisfaction in the poorer and most numerous
classes of the society. Happy it is when the interest
which the Government has in the preservation of its
own power, coincides with a proper distribution of the
public burdens, and tends to guard the least wealthy
part of the community from oppression !
As to poll-taxes, I, without scruple, confess my dis-
approbation of them ; and though they have prevailed
from an early period in those States,* which have uni-
formly been the most tenacious of their rights, I should
lament to see them introduced into practice under th
National Government. But does it follow because there
* The New England States. — Publins.
230 The Fasderalist.
is a power to lay them, that they will actually be laid ?
Every State in the Union has power to impose taxes of
this kind ; and yet in several of them they are unknown
in practice. Are the State Governments to be stig-
matized as tyrannies, because they possess this power ?
If they are not, with what propriety can the like power
justify such a charge against the National Government,
or even be urged as an obstacle to its adoption ? As
little friendly as I am to the species of imposition, I still
feel a thorough conviction, that the power of having re-
course to it ought to exist in the Foederal Government.
There are certain emergencies of nations, in which ex-
pedients, th-at in the ordinary state of things ought to
be forborne, become essential to the public weal. And
the Government, from the possibility of such emergen-
cies, ought ever to have the option of making use of
them. The real scarcity of objects in this country,
which may be considered as productive sources of rev-
enue, is a reason peculiar to itself, for not abridging
the discretion of the National councils in this respect.
There may exist certain critical and tempestuous con-
junctures of the State, in which a poll-tax may become
an inestimable resource. And as I know nothing to
exempt this portion of the globe from the common
calamities that have befallen other parts of it, I ac-
knowledge my aversion to every project that is calcu-
lated to disarm the Government of a single weapon,
which in any possible contingency might be usefully
employed for the general defence and security.
PUBLICS.
The Fcederalist. 233
\_From the Daily Advertiser, Thursday, January 10, 1788.]
THE FCEDERALIST. No. XXXV.
To THE People of the State of New York :
THE power of regulating the militia, and of com-
manding its services in times of insurrection and
invasion, are natural incidents to the duties of superin-
tending the common defence, and of watching over the
internal peace of the Confederacy.
It requires no skill in the science of war to discern,
that uniformity in the organization and discipline of the
militia would be attended with the most beneficial ef-
fects, whenever they were called into service for the
public defence. It would enable them to discharge the
duties of the camp and of the field, with mutual inte!.
ligence and concert — an advantage of peculiar mo-
ment in the operations of an army : and it would fit
them much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency
in military functions, which would be essential to their
usefulness. This desirable uniformity can only be ac-
complished by confiding the regulation of the militia
to the direction of the National authority. It is, there-
fore, with the most evident propriety, that the plan of the
Convention proposes to empower the Union " to provide
" for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia,
" and for governing such part of them as may be em-
" ployed in the service of the United States, reserving
" to the States respectively the appointment of the officers^
" and the authority of training the militia according to
" the discipline prescribed by Congress^
Of the different grounds which have been taken in
opposition to the plan of the Convention, there is none
232 The Foederalist.
that was so little to have been expected, or is so unten
able in itself, as the one from which this particular pro-
vision has been attacked. If a well-regulated militia
be the most natural defence of a free country, it ought
certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal
of that body, which is constituted the guardian of the
National security. If standing armies are dangerous to
liberty, an efficacious power over the militia, in the body
to whose care the protection of the State is committed,
ought, as far as possible, to take away the inducement
and the pretext to such unfriendly institutions. If the
Foederal Government can command the aid of the mili-
tia in those emergencies, which call for the military arm
in support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dis-
pense with the employment of a different kind of force.
If it cannot avail itself of the former, it will be obliged
to recur to the latter. To render an army unnecessary,
.will be a more certain method of preventing its exist-
C.nce, than a thousand prohibitions upon paper.
In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling
forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, it
has been remarked that there is nowhere any provision
in the proposed Constitution for calling out the posse
COMITATUS, to assist the magistrate in the execution of
his duty ; whence it has been inferred, that military
force was intended to be his only auxiliary. There is
a striking incoherence in the objections which have ap-
peared, and sometimes even from the same quarter, not
much calculated to inspire a very favorable opinion of
the sincerity or fair dealing of their authors. The same
persons who tell us in one breath, that the powers of
the Fcederal Government will be despotic and unlim-
ited, inform us in the next, that it has not authority suf-
ficient even to call out the posse comitatus. The lat-
ter, fortunately, is as much short of the truth as the
former exceeds it. It would be as absurd to doubt, that
TJie Fcederalist. 233
a right to pass all laws neoessary and proper to execute
its declared powers, would include that of requiring the
assistance of the citizens to the officers who may be in
trusted with the execution of those laws, as it would
be to believe, that a right to enact laws necessary and
proper for the imposition and collection of taxes, would
involve that of varying the rules of descent and of the
alienation of landed property, or of abolishing the trial
by jury in cases relating to it. It being therefore evi-
dent, that the supposition of a want of power to require
the aid of the posse comitatus is entirely destitute of
color, it will follow, that the conclusion which has been
drawn from it, in its application to the authority of the
Foederal Government over the militia, is as uncandid as
it is illogical. What reason could there be to infer, that
force was intended to be the sole instrument of author-
ity, merely because there is a power to make use of it
when necessary ? What shall we think of the motives,
which could induce men of sense to reason in this man-
ner ? How shall we prevent a conflict between charity
and judgment ?
By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican
jealousy, we are even taught to apprehend danger from
the militia itself, in the hands of the Foederal Govern-
ment. It is observed, that select corps may be formed,
composed of the young and ardent, who may be
rendered subservient to the views of arbitrary power.
What plan for the regulation of the militia may be pur-
sued by the National Government, is impossible to be
foreseen. But so far from viewing the matter in the
same light with those who object to select corps as dan-
gerous, were the Constitution ratified, and were I to
deliver my sentiments to a member of the Foederal
Legislature from this State on the subject of a militia
establishment, I should hold to him, in substance, the
following discourse : —
234 The Foederalist.
" The project of disciplining all the militia of the
" United States is as futile as it would be injurious,
" if it were capable of being carried into execution. A
" tolerable expertness in military movements, is a busi-
« ness that requires time and practice. It is not a day,
« or even a week, that will suffice for the attainment of
" it. To oblige the great body of the yeomanry, and
" of the other classes of the citizens, to be under arms
" for the purpose of going through military exercises
" and evolutions, as often as might be necessary to ac-
" quire the degree of perfection which would entitle
" them to the character of a well-regulated militia,
" would be a real grievance to the People, and a seri-
" ous public inconvenience and loss. It would form an
" annual deduction from the productive labor of the
" country, to an amount, which, calculating upon the
" present numbers of the People, would not fall far short
" of the whole expense of the civil establishments of aU
" the States. To attempt a thing which would abridge
"the mass of labor and industry to so considerable an
" extent, would be unwise : and the experiment, if made,
" could not succeed, because it would not long be en-
" dured. Little more can reasonably be aimed at, with
" respect to the People at large, than to have them prop-
" erly armed and equipped ; and in order to see that this
" be not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them
" once or twice in the course of a year.
" But though the scheme of disciplining the whole
" Nation must be abandoned as mischievous or imprac-
" ticable ; yet it is a matter of the utmost importance,
" that a well-digested plan should, as soon as possible,
" be adopted for the proper establishment of the militia.
" The attention of the Government ought particularly to
" be directed to the formation of a select corps of mod-
" erate extent, upon such principles as will really fit them
" for service in case of need. By thus circumscribing the
The Fcederalist. 235
" plan, it will be possible to have an excellent body of
" well-trained militia, ready to take the field whenever
" the defence of the State shall require it. This will
" not only lessen the call for military establishments,
" but if circumstances should at any time oblige the
" Government to form an army of any magnitude,
" that army can never be formidable to the liberties of
" the People, while there is a large body of citizens, lit-
" tie, if at all, inferior to them in discipline and the use
" of arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights,
" and those of their fellow-citizens. This appears to
" me the only substitute that can be devised for a stand-
" ing army, and the best possible security against it, if
" it should exist."
Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed
Constitution should I reason on the same subject ; de-
ducing arguments of safety from the very sources which
they represent as fraught with danger and perdition.
But how the National Legislature may reason on the
point, is a thing which neither they nor I can foresee.
There is something so far fetched, and so extravagant,
in the idea of danger to liberty from the militia, that
one is at a loss, whether to treat it with gravity or with
raillery ; whether to consider it as a mere trial of skill,
like the paradoxes of rhetoricians ; as a disingenuous
artifice, to instil prejudices at any price ; or as the se-
rious offspring of political fanaticism. Where, in the
name of common sense, are our fears to end, if we may
not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fel-
low-citizens ? What shadow of danger can there be
from men who are daily mingling with the rest of their
countrymen ; and who participate with them in the same
feelings, sentiments, habits, and interests ? What rea-
sonable cause of apprehension can be inferred from a
power in the Union to prescribe regulations for the
militia, and to command its services when necessary.
236 The Fosderalist.
while the particular States are to have the sole and ex-
clusive appointment of the officers ? If it were possible
seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia, upon any
conceivable establishment under the Foederal Govern-
ment, the circumstance of the officers being in the ap-
pointment of the States ought at once to extinguish it.
There can be no doubt, that this circumstance will al-
ways secure to them a preponderating influence over
the militia.
In reading many of the publications against the Con-
stitution, a man is apt to imagine that he is perusing
some ill-written tale or romance, which, instead of nat-
ural and agreeable images, exhibits to the mind nothing
but frightful and distorted shapes —
" Gorgons, Hydras, and Chimeras dire ; "
discoloring and disfiguring whatever it represents, and
transforming everything it touches into a monster.
A sample of this is to be observed in the exaggerated
and improbable suggestions which have taken place re-
specting the power of calling for the services of the
militia. That of New Hampshire is to be marched to
Georgia, of Georgia to New Hampshire, of New York to
Kentucky, and of Kentucky to Lake Champlain^ Nay,
the debts due to the French and Dutch are to be paid in
militia-men instead of Louis d'ors and ducats. At one
moment, there is to be a large army to lay prostrate the
liberties of the People ; at another moment, the militia
of Virginia are to be dragged from their homes, five or
six hundred miles, to tame the republican contumacy
of Massachusetts ; and that of Massachusetts is to be
transported an equal distance, to subdue the refractory
haughtiness of the aristocratic Virginians. Do the per-
sons who rave at this rate, imagine that their art or
their eloquence can impose any conceits or absurdities
upon the People of America for infallible truths ?
The FoBderalist. . 237
If there should be an army to be made use of as the
engine of despotism, what need of the militia ? If there
should be no army, whither would the militia, irritated
by being called upon to undertake a distant and hope-
less expedition, for the purpose of riveting the chains of
slavery upon a part of their countrymen, direct their
course, but to the seat of the tyrants, who had medi-
tated so foolish as well as so wicked a project, to crush
them in their imagined intrenchments of power, and to
make them an example of the just vengeance of an
abused and incensed People ? Is this the way in which
usurpers stride to dominion over a numerous and en-
lightened Nation ? Do they begin by exciting the detes-
tation of the very instruments of their intended usurpa-
tions ? Do they usually commence their career by wan-
ton and disgustful acts of power, calculated to answer
no end, but to draw upon themselves universal hatred
and execration ? Are suppositions of this sort the sober
admonitions of discerning patriots to a discerning Peo-
ple ? Or are they the inflammatory ravings of chagrined
incendiaries, or distempered enthusiasts ? If we were
even to suppose the National rulers actuated by the most
ungovernable ambition, it is impossible to believe that
they would employ such preposterous means to accom-
plish their designs.
In times of insurrection, or invasion," it would be
natural and proper, that the militia of a neighboring
State should be marched into another, to resist a com-
mon enemy, or to guard the republic against the vio-
lence of faction or sedition. This was frequently the
case, in respect to the first object, in the course of the
late war ; and this mutual succor is, indeed, a principal
end of our political association. If the power of afford-
ing it be placed under the direction of the Union, there
will be no danger of a supine and listless inattention to
the dangers of a neighbor, till its near approach had
238 The Fcederalist.
superadded the incitements of self-preservation, to the
too feeble impulses of duty and sympathy.
I have now gone through the examination of such of
the powers proposed to be vested in the United States,
which may be considered as having an immediate rela-
tion to the energy of the Government ; and have endeav-
ored to answer the principal objections which have been
made to them. I have passed over in silence those
minor authorities which are either too inconsiderable to
have been thought worthy of the hostilities of the oppo-
nents of the Constitution, or of too manifest propriety
to admit of controversy. The mass of Judiciary power,
however, might have claimed an investigation under
this head, had it not been for the consideration that its
organization and its extent may be more advantageously
considered in connection. This has determined me to
refer it to the branch of our inquiries, upon which we
shall next enter.
PUBLIUS.
\_From, the Daily Advertiser^ Friday, January 11, 1788.]
THE FCEDERALIST. No. XXXYI.
To THE People of the State of New York :
IN reviewing the defects of the existing Confederation,
and showing that they cannot be supplied by a Gov-
ernment of less energy than that before the public, several
of the most important principles of the latter fell of
course under consideration. But as the ultimate object
of these papers is, to determine clearly and fully the
merits of this Constitution, and the expediency of adopt-
ing it, our plan cannot be completed without taking a
The FGederalist. 239
more critical and thorough survey of the work of the
Convention ; without examining it on all its sides ;
comparing it in all its parts ; and calculating its proba-
ble effects.
That this remaining task may be executed under
impressions conducive to a just and fair result, some
reflections must in this place be indulged, which candor
previously suggests.
It is a misfortune, inseparable from human affairs,
that public measures are rarely investigated with that
spirit of moderation which is essential to a just estimate
of their real tendency to advance or obstruct the public
good ; and that this spirit is more apt to be diminished
than promoted, by those occasions which require an
unusual exercise of it. To those who have been led by
experience to attend to this consideration, it could not
appear surprising, that the act of the Convention, which
recommends so many important changes and innova-
tions, which may be viewed in so many lights and rela-
tions, and which touches the springs of so many pas-
sions and interests, should find or excite dispositions
unfriendly, both on one side and on the other, to a fair
discussion and accurate judgment of its merits. In
some, it has been too evident from their own publica-
tions, that they have scanned the proposed Constitution,
not only with a predisposition to censure, but with a
predetermination to condemn ; as the language held by
others betrays an opposite predetermination or bias,
which must render their opinions also of little moment
in the question. In placing, however, these different
characters on a level, with respect to the weight of their
opinions, I wish not to insinuate that there may not be
a material difference in the purity of their intentions.
It is but just to remark in favor of the latter description,
that as our situation is universally admitted to be pecu-
liarly critical, and to require indispensably, that some-
240 Tlie Foederalist.
thing should be done for our relief, the predetermined
patron of what has been actually done may have taken
his bias from the weight of these considerations, as well
as from considerations of a sinister nature. The prede-
termined adversary, on the other hand, can have been
governed by no venial motive whatever. The intentions
of the first may be upright, as they may on the contrary
be culpable. The views of the last cannot be upright,
and must be culpable. But the truth is, that these
papers are not addressed to persons falling under either
of these characters. They solicit the attention of those
only, who add to a sincere zeal for the happiness of their
country, a temper favorable to a just estimate of the
means of promoting it.
Persons of this character will proceed to an examina-
tion of the Plan submitted by the Convention, not only
without a disposition to find or to magnify faults ; but
will see the propriety of reflecting, that a faultless plan
was not to be expected. Nor will they barely make
allowances for the errors which may be chargeable on
the fallibility to which the Convention, as a body of
men, were liable ; but will keep, in mind, that they them-
selves also are but men, and ought not to assume an
infallibility in rejudging the fallible opinions of others.
With equal readiness will it be perceived, that besides
these inducements to candor, many allowances ought to
be made, for the difficulties inherent in the very nature
of the undertaking referred to the Convention.
The novelty of the undertaking immediately strikes
us. It has been shown in the course of these papers,
that the existing Confederation is founded on principles
which are fallacious ; that we must consequently change
this first foundation, and with it the superstructure rest-
ing upon it. It has been shown, that the other Confed-
eracies which could be consulted as precedents have been
vitiated by the same erroneous principles, and can there-
The Fmderalist. 241
fore furnish no other light than that of beacons, which
give warning of the course to be shunned, without
pointing out that which ought to be pursued. The
most that the Convention could do in such a situation,
was to avoid the errors suggested by the past experience
of other countries, as well as of our own ; and to pro-
vide a convenient mode of rectifying their oxsn\ errors,
as future experience may unfold them.
Among the difficulties encountered by the Conven-
tion, a very important one must have lain, in combining
the requisite stability and energy in Government, with
the inviolable attention due to liberty, and to the repub-
lican form. Without substantially accomplishing this
part of their undertaking, they would have very imper-
fectly fulfilled the object of their appointment, or the
expectation of the public; yet that it could not be easily
accomplished, will be denied by no one Avho is unwilling
to beti'ay his ignorance of the subject. Energy in Gov-
ernment is essential to that security against external and
internal danger, and to that prompt and salutary execu-
tion of the laws, which enter into the very definition of
good Government. Stability in Government is essential
to National character, and to the advantages annexed to
it, as well as to that repose and confidence in the minds
of the People, which are among the chief blessings of
civil society. An in*egular and mutable legislation is
not more an evil in itself, than it is odious to the Peo-