ple ; and it may be pronounced with assurance, that the
People of this country, enlightened as they are, with
regard to the nature, and interested, as the gi-eat body
of them are, in the effects of good Government, will
never be satisfied, till some remedy be applied to the
vicissitudes and uncertainties, which characterize the
State administrations. On comparing, however, these
valuable ingredients with the vital principles of liberty,
we must perceive at once the difficulty of mingling them
VOL. 1. 16
242 The Fasderalilt.
together in their due proportions. The genius of repub-
lican liberty seems to demand on one side, not only that
all power should be derived from the People, but that
those intrusted with it should be kept in dependence on
the People, by a short duration of their appointments ;
and that even during this short period, the trust should
be placed not in a few, but in a number of hands. Sta-
bility, on the contrary, requires, that the hands in which
power is lodged should continue for a length of time
the same. A frequent change of men will result from a
frequent return of elections ; and a frequent change of
measures, from a frequent change of men: whilst energy
in Government requires not only a certain duration of
power, but the execution of it by a single hand.
How far the Convention may have succeeded in this
part of their work, will better appear on a more accurate
view of it. From the cursory view here taken, it must
clearly appear to have been. -an arduous part.
Not less arduous must have been the task of marking
the proper line of partition between the authority of the
General, and that of the State Governments. Every
man will be sensible of this difficulty, in proportion as
he has been accustomed to contemplate and discrimi-
nate objects, extensive and complicated in their nature.
The faculties of the rnind itself have never yet been
distinguished and defined, with satisfactory precision, by
all the efforts of the most acute and metaphysical phi-
losophers. Sense, perception, judgment, desire, volition,
memory, imagination, are found to be separated, by such
delicate shades and minute gradations, that their boun-
daries have eluded the most subtle investigations, and
remain a pregnant source of ingenious disquisition and
controversy. The boundaries between the great king-
doms of nature, and, still more, between the various prov-
inces, and lesser portions, into which they are subdivided,
afford another illustration of the same important truth.
Tlie Fcederalist. 243
The most sagacious and laborious naturalists have never
yet succeeded in tracing with certainty the line which
separates the district of vegetable life from the neigh-
boring region of unorganized matter, or which marks
the termination of the former, and the commencement
of the animal empire. A still greater obscurity lies in
the distinctive characters, by which the objects in each
of these great departments of nature have been arranged
and assorted.
When we pass from the works of nature, in which all
the delineations are perfectly accurate, and appear to be
otherwise only from the imperfection of the eye which
surveys them, to the institutions of man, in which the
obscurity arises as well from the object itself, as from
the organ by which it is contemplated; we must per-
ceive the necessity of moderating still farther our expec-
tations and hopes from the efforts of human sagacity.
Experience has instructed us, that no skill in the science
of Government has yet been able to discriminate and
define, with sufficient certainty, its three great prov-
inces, the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary ; or even
the privileges and powers of the different Legislative
branches. Questions daily occur in the course of prac-
tice, which prove the obscurity which reigns in these
subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in politi-
cal science.
The experience of ages, with the continued and com-
bined labors of the most enlightened legislators and
jurists, have been equally unsuccessful in delineating the
several objects and limits of different codes of laws, and
different tribunals of justice. Tlie precise extent of the
common law, and the statute law, the maritime law, the
ecclesiastical law, the law of corporations, and other local
laws and customs, remains still to be clearly and finally
established in Great Britain, where accuracy in such
Bubjects has been more industiiously pursued than in
244 The Federalist.
any other part of the world. The jurisdiction of her
several Courts, general and local, of law, of equity, of
admiralty, &c., is not less a source of frequent and intri-
cate discussions, sufficiently denoting the indeterminate
limits by which they are respectively circumscribed.
All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical
skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature deliber-
ation, are considered as more or less obscure and equiv-
ocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained
by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.
Besides the obscurity arising from the complexity of
objects, and the imperfection of the human faculties, the
medium through w^hich the conceptions of men are con-
veyed to each other adds a fresh embarrassment. The
use of words is to express ideas. Perspicuity therefore
requires, not only that the ideas should be distinctly
formed, but that they should be expressed by words dis-
tinctly and exclusively appropriated to them. But no
language is so copious as to supply words and phrases
for every complex idea, or so correct as not to include
many, equivocally denoting different ideas. Hence it
must happen, that however accurately objects may be
discriminated in themselves, and however accurately the
discrimination may be considered, the definition of them
may be rendered inaccurate, by the inaccuracy of the
terms in which it is delivered. And this unavoidable
inaccuracy must be greater or less, according to the
complexity and novelty of the objects defined. When
the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind
in their own language, his meaning, luminous as it must
be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy medium
through which it is communicated.
Here, then, are three softrces of vague and incorrect
definitions : indistinctness of the object, imperfection of
the organ of conception, inadequateness of the vehicle
of ideas. Any one of these must produce a certain
The Fcsderalist. 245
degree of obscurity. The Convention, in delineating the
boundary between the Foederal and State jurisdictions,
must have experienced the full effect of them all.
To the difficulties already mentioned, may be added
the interfering pretensions of the larger and smaller
States. We cannot err, in supposing that the former
would contend for a participation in the Government,
fully proportioned to their superior wealth and impor-
tance ; and that the latter would not be less tenacious
of the equality at present enjoyed by them. We may
well suppose, that neither side would entirely yield to
the other, and consequently that the struggle could be
terminated only by compromise. It is extremely proba-
ble, also, that after the ratio of representation had been
adjusted, this very compromise must have produced a
fresh struggle between the same parties, to give such a
turn to the organization of the Government, and to the
distribution of its powers, as would increase the impor-
tance of the branches, in forming which they had respec-
tively obtained the greatest share of influence. There
are features in the Constitution which warrant each of
these suppositions ; and as far as either of them is well
founded, it shows that the Convention must have been
compelled to sacrifice theoretical propriety, to the force
of extraneous considerations.
Nor could it have been the large and small States
only, which would marshal themselves in opposition to
each other on various points. Other combinations, re-
sulting from a difference of local position and policy,
must have created additional difficulties. As every
State may be divided into different districts, and its citi-
zens into different classes, which give birth to contending
interests and local jealousies; so the different parts of
the United States are distinguished from each other, by
a variety of circumstances, which produce a like effect
on a larger scale. And although this variety of inter-
246 The Fce.deralist.
ests, for reasons sufficiently explained in a former paper,
may have a salutary influence on the administration of
the Government when formed; yet every one must be
sensible of the contrary influence, which must have been
experienced in the task of forming it.
Would it be wonderful, if, under the pressure of all
these difficulties, the Convention should have been forced
into some deviations from that artificial structure and
regular symmetry, which an abstract view of the subject
might lead an ingenious theorist to bestow on a Consti-
tution planned in his closet, or in his imagination ? The
real wonder is, that so many difficulties should have
been surmounted ; and surmounted, with an unanimity
almost as unprecedented, as it must have been unex-
pected. It is impossible for any man of candor to reflect
on this circumstance, without partaking of the astonish-
ment. It is impossible for the man of pious reflection,
not to perceive in it a finger of that Almighty hand,
which has been so frequently and signally extended to
our relief in the critical stages of the Revolution.
We had occasion, in a former paper, to take notice of
the repeated trials which have been unsuccessfully made
in the United Netherlands, for reforming the baneful and
notorious vices of their Constitution. The history of
almost all the great councils and consultations held
among mankind for reconciling their discordant opin-
ions, assuaging their mutual jealousies, and adjusting
their respective interests, is a history of factions, conten-
tions, and disappointments ; and may be classed among
the most dark and degraded pictures, which display the
infirmities and depravities of the human character. If,
in a few scattered instances, a brighter aspect is pre-
sented, they serve only as exceptions to admonish us of
the general truth ; and by their lustre to darken the
gloom of the adverse prospect, to which they are con-
trasted. In revolvinsr the causes from which these ex-
The Foederalist 847
ceptions result, and applying them to the particular
instance before us, we are necessarily led to two impor-
tant conclusions. The first is, that the Convention must
have enjoyed, in a very singular degree, an exemption
from the pestilential influence of party animosities —
the diseases most incident to deliberative bodies, and
most apt to contaminate their proceedings. The second
conclusion is, that all the deputations composing the
Convention were either satisfactorily accommodated by
the final act, or were induced to accede to it by a deep
conviction of the necessity of sacrificing private opin-
ions and partial interests to the public good, and by a
despair of seeing this necessity diminished by delays, or
by new experiments.
PUBLIUS.
[From the Neio York Packet, Tuesday, January 15, 1788.]
THE FCEDERALIST. No. XXXYII.
• To THE People of the State of New York :
IT is not a little remarkable, that in every case reported
by ancient history, in which Government has been
established with deliberation and consent, the task of
framing it has not been committed to an assembly of
men, but has been performed by some individual citi-
zen, of preeminent wisdom and approved integrity.
Minos, we learn, was the primitive founder of the
Government of Crete ; as Zaleucus was of that of the
Locrians. Theseus first,' and after him Draco and
Solon, instituted the Government of Athens. Lycurgus
was the lawgiver of Sparta. The foundation of the
original Government of Rome was laid by Romulus;
248 The Foederahst.
and the work completed by two of his elective succes-
sors, NuiMA, and Tullius Hostilius. On the abolition
of royalty, the Consular administration was substituted
by Brutus, who stepped forward with a project for such
a reform, which, he alleged, had been prepared by Tul-
lius Hostilius, and to which his address obtained the
assent and ratification of the Senate and People. This
remark is applicable to Confederate Governments also.
Amphictyon, we are told, was the author of that which
bore his name. The Achsean league received its first
birth from Ach.eus, and its second from Aratus.
What degree of agency these reputed lawgivers might
have in their respective establishments, or how far they
might be clothed with the legitimate authority of the
People, cannot, in every instance, be ascertained. In
some, however, the proceeding was strictly regular. Dra-
co appears to have been intrusted by the People of
Athens with indefinite powers to reform its Government
and laws. And Solon, according to Plutarch, was in
a manner compelled, by the universal suffrage of his
fellow-citizens, to take upon hirri the sole and absolute
power of new-modelling the Constitution. The proceed-
ings under Lycurgus were less regular; but as far as
the advocates for a regular reform could prevail, they all'
turned their eyes towards the single efforts of that cele-
brated patriot and sage, instead of seeking to bring
about a revolution, by the intervention of a deliberative
body of citizens.
Whence could it have proceeded, that a People, jeal-
ous as the Greeks were of their liberty, should so far
abandon the rules of caution as to place their destiny in
the hands of a single citizen? Whence could it have
proceeded, that the Athenians, a People who would not
suffer an army to be commanded by fewer than ten Gen-
erals, and who required no other proof of danger to their
liberties than the illustrious merit of a fellow-citizen,
Tlie Fcederalist. 249
should consider one illustrious citizen as a more eligible
depositary of the fortunes of themselves and their pos-
terity, than a select body of citizens, from whose com-
mon deliberations more wisdom, as well as more safety,
might have been expected ? These questions cannot be
fully answered, without supposing that the fears of dis-
cord and disunion among a number of Counsellors,
exceeded the apprehension of ti^eachery or incapacity in
a single individual. History informs us, likewise, of the
difficulties with which these celebrated reformers had to
contend ; as well as of the expedients which they were
obliged to employ, in order to carry their reforms into
effect. Solon, who seems to have indulged a more
temporizing policy, confessed that he had not given to
his countrymen the Government best suited to their hap-
piness, but most tolerable to their prejudices. And Lt-
CURGUS, more true to his object, was under the necessity
of mixing a portion of violence with the authority of
superstition ; and of securing his final success, by a vol-
untary renunciation, first of his country, and then of his
life. If these lessons teach us, on one hand, to admire
the improvement made by America on the ancient mode
of preparing and establishing regular plans of Govern-
ment : they serve not less on the other, to admonish us
of the hazards and difficulties incident to such experi-
ments, and of the great imprudence of unnecessarily
multiplying them.
Is it an unreasonable conjecture, that the errors which
may be contained in the plan of the Convention are
such as have resulted rather from the defect of antece-
dent experience on this complicated and difficult subject,
than from a want of accuracy or care in the inves-
tigation of it; and, consequently, such as will not be
ascertained until an actual trial shall have pointed them
out? This conjecture is rendered probable, not only by
many considerations of a general nature, but by the
250 The Foederalist.
particular case of the Articles of Confederation. It is
observable that among the numerous objections and
amendments suggested by the several States, when these
Articles were submitted for their ratification, not one is
found, which alludes to the great and radical error,
which on actual trial has discovered itself. And if we
except the observations which New Jersey was led to
make, rather by her local situation, than by her peculiar
foresight, it may be questioned whether a single sugges-
tion was of sufficient moment to justify a revision of
the system. There is abundant reason, nevertheless, to
suppose that immaterial as these objections were, they
would have been adhered to w^ith a very dangerous
inflexibility, in some States, had not a zeal for their
opinions and supposed interests been stifled by the more
powerful sentiment of self-preservation. One State, we
may remember, persisted for several years in refusing
her concurrence, although the enemy remained the whole
period at our gates, or rather in the very bowels of our
country. Nor was her pliancy in the end effected by a
less motive, than the fear of being chargeable with pro-
tracting the public calamities, and endangering the event
of the contest. Every candid reader will make the
proper reflections on these important facts.
A patient who finds his disorder daily growing worse,
and that an efficacious remedy can no longer be delayed
without extreme danger, after coolly revolving his situ-
ation, and the characters of different physicians, selects
and calls in such of them as he judges most capable of
administering relief, and best entitled to his confidence.
The physicians attend : the case of the patient is care-
fully examined : a consultation is held \_ they are unani-
mously agreed that the symptoms are critical ; but that
the case, with proper and timely relief, is so far from
Deing desperate, that it may be made to issue in an im-
provement of his constitution. They are equally unan-
The Fosderalist. 251
imous in prescribing the remedy, by which this happy
effect is to be produced. The prescription is no soon-
er made known, however, than a number of persons in-
terpose, and, without denying the reality or danger of
the disorder, assure the patient that the prescription
will be poison to his constitution, and forbid him, under
pain of certain death, to make use of it. Might not
the patient reasonably demand, before he ventured to
follow this advice, that the authors of it should at
least agree among themselves on some other remedy
to be substituted ? And if he found them differing as
much from one another as from his first counsellors,
would he not act prudently in trying the experiment
unanimously recommended by the latter, rather than
be hearkening to those who could neither deny the
necessity of a speedy remedy, nor agree in proposing
one?
Such a patient, and in such a situation, is America at
this moment. She has been sensible of her malady.
She has obtained a regular and unanimous advice from
men of her own deliberate choice. And she is warned
by others against following this advice, under pain of
the most fatal consequences. Do the monitors deny the
reality of her danger ? No. Do they deny the necessity
of some speedy and powerful remedy? No. Are they
agreed, are any two of them agreed, in their objections
to the remedy proposed, or in the proper one to be sub-
stituted? Let them speak for themselves. This one
tells us, that the proposed Constitution ought to be re-
jected, because it is not a confederation of the States,
but a Government over individuals. Another admits,
that it ought to be a Government over individuals, to
a certain extent, but by no means to the extent pro-
posed. A third does not object to the Government over
individuals, or to the extent proposed, but to the want
of a Bill of Rights. A fourth concurs in the absolute
252 Tlie Federalist.
necessity of a Bill of Rights, but contends, that it ought
to be declaratory not of the personal rights of individ-
uals, but of the rights reserved to the States in their
political capacity. A fifth is of opinion, that a Bill o£
Rights of any sort would be superfluous and misplaced,
and that the plan would be unexceptionable, but for the
fatal power of regulating the times and places of elec-
tion. An objector in a large State exclaims loudly
against the unreasonable equality of representation in
the Senate. An objector in a small State is equally
loud against the dangerous inequality in the House of
Representatives. From this quarter, we are alarmed
with the amazing expense, from the number of persons
who are to administer the new Government. From
another quarter, and sometimes from the same quarter,
on another occasion, the cry is, that the Congress will
be but a shadow of a representation, and that the Gov-
ernment would be far less objectionable, if the number
and the expense were doubled. A patriot in a State
that does not import or export, discerns insuperable
objections against the power of direct taxation. The
patriotic adversary in a State of great exports and im-
ports is not less dissatisfied that the whole burden of
taxes may be thrown on consumption. This politician
discovers in the Constitution a direct and irresistible ten-
dency to monarchy : that is equally sure it will end in
aristocracy. Another is puzzled to say wliich of these
shapes it will ultimately assume, but sees clearly it must
be one or other of them; whilst a fourth is not wanting,
who with no less confidence affirms that the Constitu-
tion is so far from having a bias towards either of these
dangers, that the weight on that side will not be suffi-
cient to keep it upright and firm against its opposite
propensities. With another class of adversaries to the
Constitution, the language is, that the Legislative, Exr
ecutive, and Judiciary departments are intermixed in
The Fcederalist. 253
such a manner, as to contradict all the ideas of regular
Government, and all the requisite precautions in favor
of liberty. Whilst this objection circulates in vague and
general expressions, there are not a few who lend their
sanction to it. Let each one come forward with his
particular explanation, and scarce any two are exactly
agreed on the subject. In the eyes of one, the junction
of the Senate with the President, in the responsible func-
tion of appointing to offices, instead of vesting this Exec-
utive power in the Executive alone, is the vicious part of
the organization. To another, the exclusion of the House
of Representatives, whose numbers alone could be a due
secm'ity against coiTuption and partiality in the exercise
of such a power, is equally obnoxious. With another,
the admission of the President into any share of a power,
which must ever be a dangerous engine in the hands of
the Executive magistrate, is an unpardonable violation
of the maxims of republican jealousy. No part of the
arrangement, according to some, is more inadmissible
than the trial of impeachments by the Senate, which
is alternately a member both of the Legislative and
Executive departments, when this power so evidently
belonged to the Judiciary department. " We concur
" fully," reply others, " in the objection to this part of the
" plan, but we can never agree that a reference of im-
" peachments to the Judiciary authority would be an
" amendment of the error. Our principal dislike to the
" organization arises from the extensive powers already
" lodged in that department." Even among the zealous
patrons of a Council of State the most irreconcilable
variance is discovered, concerning the mode in which it
ought to be constituted. The demand of one gentle-
man is, that the Council should consist of a small num-
ber to be appointed by the most numerous branch of
the Legislature. Another would prefer a larger number,
and considers it as a fundamental condition, that the
254 The Feeder alist.
appointment should be made by the President him-
self.
As it can give no umbrage to the writers against the
plan of the Foederal Constitution, let us suppose, that
as they are the most zealous, so they are also the most
sagacious, of those who think the late Convention were
unequal to the task assigned them, and that a wiser and
better plan might and ought to be substituted. Let us
further suppose, that their country should concur, both
in this favorable opinion of their merits, and in their
unfavorable opinion of the Convention ; and should
accordingly proceed to form them into a second Con-
vention, v/ith full powers, and for the express purpose
of revising and remoulding the work of the first. Were