soldier, exhibits a more forbidding posture to foreign
ambition, than America, disunited, with a hundred
thousand veterans ready for combat. It was remarked,
on a former occasion, that the want of this pretext had
saved the liberties of one nation in Em-ope. Being
rendered by her insular situation and her maritime
resources impregnable to the armies of her neighbors,
the rulers of Great Britain have never been able, by
real or artificial dangers, to cheat the public into an
extensive peace establishment. The distance of the
United States from the powerful nations of the world,
gives them the same happy security. A dangerous es-
tablishment can never be necessary or plausible, so long
as they continue a united People. But let it never, for
a moment, be forgotten, that they are indebted for this
advantage to their Union alone. The moment of its
dissolution will be the date of a new order of things.
The fears of the weaker, or the ambition of the stronger
States, or Confederacies, will set the same example in
the New, as Charles VII. did in the Old World. The
example will be followed here, from the same motives
which produced universal imitation there. Instead of
deriving from our situation the precious advantage
which Great Britain has derived from hers, the face of



TJie FasderalisL 281

America will be but a copy of that of the Continent of
Europe. It will present liberty everywhere crushed
between standing armies and perpetual taxes. The
fortunes of disunited America will be even more disas-
trous than those of Europe. The sources of evil in the
latter are confined to her own limits. No superior pow-
ers of another quarter of the globe intrigue among her
rival nations, inflame their mutual animosities, and
render them the instruments of foreign ambition, jeal-
ousy, and revenge. In America, the miseries springing
from her internal jealousies, contentions, and wars,
would form a part only of her lot. A plentiful addition
of evils would have their source in that relation in
which Europe stands to this quarter of the earth, and
which no other quarter of the earth bears to Europe.

This picture of the consequences of disunion cannot
be too highly colored, or too often exhibited. Every
man who loves peace, every man who loves his coun-
try, every man who loves liberty, ought to have it
ever before his eyes, that he may cherish in his heart a
due attachment to the Union of America, and be able
to set a due value on the means of preserving it.

Next to the effectual establishment of the Union, the
best possible precaution against danger from standing
armies is a limitation of the term for which revenue
may be appropriated to their support. This precaution
the Constitution has prudently added. I will not repeat
here the observations, which I flatter myself have placed
this subject in a just and satisfactory light. Bat it may
not be improper to take notice of an argument against
this part of the Constitution, which has been drawn
from the policy and practice of Great Britain. It is said,
that the continuance of an army in that kingdom re-
quires an annual vote of the Legislature : whereas the
American Constitution has lengthened this critical period
to two years. This is the form in which the comparison



282 The Fcederalist.

is usually stated to the public : but is it a just form ?
Is it a fair comparison ? Does the British Constitution
restrain the Parliamentary discretion to one year ? Does
the American impose on the Congress appropriations
for two years ? On the contrary, it cannot be unknown
to the authors of the fallacy themselves, that the British
Constitution fixes no limit whatever to the discretion
of the Legislature, and that the American ties down
the Legislature to two years, as the longest admissible
term.

Had the argument from the British e:^ample been
truly stated, it would have stood thus : The term for
which supplies may be appropriated to the army estab-
lishment, though unlimited by the British Constitution,
has nevertheless, in practice, been limited by Parliamen-
tary discretion to a single year. Now, if in Great Brit-
ain, where the House of Commons is elected for seven
years ; where so great a proportion of the members are
elected by so small a proportion of the people ; where
the electors are so corrupted by the Representatives,
and the Representatives so corrupted by the Crown, the
Representative body can possess a power to make ap-
propriations to the army for an indefinite term, without
desiring, or without daring, to extend the term beyond
a single year, ought not suspicion herself to blush, in
pretending that the Representatives of the United
States, elected freely by the whole body of the Peo-
ple, every second year, cannot be safely intrusted with
a discretion over such appropriations, expressly limited
to the short period of trwo years ?

A bad cause seldom fails to betray itself. Of this
truth, the management of the opposition to the Fced-
eral Government is an unvaried exemplification. But
among all the blunders which have been committed,
none is more striking than the attempt to enlist on that
Bide the prudent jealousy entertained by the People, of



The Federalist. 283

standing armies. The attempt has awakened fully the
public attention to that important subject ; and has led
to investigations which must terminate in a thorough
and universal conviction, not only that the Constitution
has provided the most effectual guards against danger
from that quarter, but that nothing short of a Constitution
fully adequate to the National defence, and the preser-
vation of the Union, can save America from as many
standing armies as it may be split into States or Con-
federacies, and from such a progressive augmentation
of these establishments in each, as will render them as
burdensome to the properties and ominous to the liber-
ties of the People, as any establishment that can become
necessary, under a united and efficient Government,
must be tolerable to the former and safe to the latter.

The palpable necessity of the power to provide and
maintain a navy, has protected that part of the Consti-
tution against a spirit of censure, which has spared few
other parts. It must indeed be numbered among the
greatest blessings of America, that as her Union will
be the only source of her maritime strength, so this will
be a principal source of her security against danger
from abroad. In this respect, our situation bears
another likeness to the insular advantage of Great
Britain. The batteries most capable of repelling for-
eign enterprises on our safety, are happily such as can
never be turned by a perfidious Government against our
liberties.

The inhabitants of the Atlantic frontier are all of
them deeply interested in this provision for naval pro-
tection, and if they have hitherto been suffered to sleep
quietly in their beds ; if their property has remained
safe against the predatory spirit of licentious adventur-
ers ; if their maritime towns have not yet been com-
pelled to ransom themselves from the terrors of a con-
flagration, by yielding to the exactions of daring and



284 The Fcederalist.

sudden invaders, these instances of good fortune are not
to be ascribed to the capacity of the existing Govern-
ment for the protection of those from whom it claims
allegiance, but to causes that are fugitive and fallacious.
If we except perhaps Virginia and Maryland, which are
peculiarly vulnerable on their Eastern frontiers, no part
of the Union ought to feel more anxiety on this subject
than New York. Her sea-coast is extensive. A very
important district of the State is an island. The State
itself is penetrated by a large navigable river for more
than fifty leagues. The great emporium of its commerce,
the great 'reservoir of its wealth, lies every moment at
the mercy of events, and may almost be regarded as a
hostage for ignominious compliances with the dictates
of a foreign enemy, or even with the rapacious demands
of pirates and barbarians. Should a war be the result of
the precarious situation of European affairs, and all the
unruly passions attending it be let loose on the ocean,
our escape from insults and depredations, not only on
that element, but every part of the other bordering on
it, will be truly miraculous. In the present condition of
America, the States more immediately exposed to these
calamities have nothing to hope from the phantom of a
General Government which now exists ; and if their
single resources were equal to the task of fortifying
themselves against the danger, the object to be pro-
tected would be almost consumed by the means of pro-
tecting them.

The pow^er of regulating and calling forth the militia
has been already sufficiently vindicated and explained.

The power of levying and borrowing money, being
the sinew of that which is to be exerted in the National
defence, is properly thrown into the same class with it.
This power, also, has been examined already with much
attention, and has, I trust, been clearly shown to be ne-
cessary, both in the extent and form given to it by the



Tlie Fcederalist. 285

Constitution. I will address one additional reflection,
only, to those who contend that the power ought to
have been restrained to external taxation — by which
they mean, taxes on articles imported from other coun-
tries. It cannot be doubted, that this will always be a
valuable source of revenue ; that for a considerable time,
it must be a principal source ; that at this moment, it is
an essential one. But we may form very mistaken ideas
on this subject, if we do not call to mind in our calcu-
lations, that the extent of revenue drawn from foreign
commerce must vary with the variations, both in the ex-
tent and the kind of imports ; and that these variations
do not correspond with the progress of population,
which must be the general measure of the public wants.
As long as agriculture continues the sole field of labor,
the importation of manufactures must increase as the
consumers multiply. As soon as domestic manufactures
are begun by the hands not called for by agriculture, the
imported manufactures will decrease as the numbers of
people increase. In a more remote stage, the imports
may consist in a considerable part of raw materials,
which will be wrought into articles for exportation, and
will, therefore, require rather the encouragement of boun-
ties, than to be loaded with discouraging duties. A sys-
tem of Government, meant for duration, ought to con-
template these revolutions, and be able to accommodate
itself to them.

Some, who have not denied the necessity of the power
of taxation, have grounded a very fierce attack against
the Constitution, on the language in which it is defined.
It has been urged and echoed, that the power " to lay
" and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay
" the debts, and provide for the common defence and
" general welfare of the United States," amounts to an
unlimited commission to exercise every power, which
may be alleged to be necessary for the common defence



286 The Federalist.

or general welfare. No stronger proof could be given
of the distress under which these writers labor for objec-
tions, than their stooping to such a misconstruction.

Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers
of the Congress been found in the Constitution, than the
general expressions just cited, the authors of the objec-
tion might have had some color for it ; though it would
have been difficult to find a reason for so awkward a
form of describing an authority to legislate in all possi-
ble cases. A power to destroy the freedom of the press,
the trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of de-
scents, or the forms of conveyances, must be very singu-
larly expressed by the terms " to raise money for the
" general welfare."

But what color can the objection have, when a speci-
fication of the objects alluded to by these general terms
immediately follows, and is not even separated by a
longer pause than a semicolon ? If the different parts
of the same instrument ought to be so expounded, as to
give meaning to every part which will bear it, shall one
part of the same sentence be excluded altogether from a
share in the meaning ; and shall the more doubtful and
indefinite terms be retained in their full extent, and the
clear and precise expressions be denied any signification
whatsoever ? For what purpose could the enumeration
of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others
were meant to be included in the preceding general
power ? Nothing is more natural or common, than first
to use a general phrase, and then to explain and qualify
it by a recital of particulars. But the idea of an enu-
meration of particulars which neither explain nor qualify
the general meaning, and can have no other effect than
to confound and mislead, is an absurdity, which, as we
are reduced to the dilemma of charging either on the
authors of the objection or on the authors of the Consti-



The Faederalist, • 287

tution, we must take the liberty of supposing, had not
its origin with the latter.

The objection here is the more extraordinary, as it
appears that the language used by the Convention is a
copy from the Articles of Confederation. The objects
of the Union among the States, as described in Article
third, are, " their common defence, security of their lib-
" erties, and mutual and general welfare." The terms
of Article eighth are still more identical : " All charges
" of war, and all other expenses, that shall be incurred
" for the common defence or general welfare, and al-
" lowed by the United States in Congress, shall be
" defrayed out of a common treasury," &c. A similar
language again occurs in Article ninth. Construe either
of these Articles by the rules which would justify the
construction put on the new Constitution, and they vest
in the existing Congress a power to legislate in all cases
whatsoever. But what would have been thought of that
assembly, if, attaching themselves to these general
expressions, and disregarding the specifications which
ascertain and limit their import, they had exercised an
unlimited power of providing for the common defence
and general welfare ? I appeal to the objectors them-
selves, whether they would in that case have employed
the same reasoning in justification of Congress, hs they
now make use of against the Convention. How difficult
it is for error to escape its own condemnation !

PUBLIUS.



288 The Federalist.

\_From the New York Packet, Tuesday, January 22, 1788.]

THE FCEDERALIST. No. XLI.



To THE People of the State of New York :

THE second class of powers, lodged in the General
Government, consists of those which regulate the
intercourse with foreign nations, to wit : to make Trea-
ties ; to send and receive Ambassadors, other public
Ministers, and Consuls ; to define and punish piracies
and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences
against the law of nations ; to regulate foreign com-
merce, including a power to prohibit, after the year
1808, the importation of slaves, and to lay an interme-
diate duty of ten dollars per head, as a discouragement
to such importations.

This class of powers forms an obvious and essential
branch of the Fcederal administration. If we are to
be one Nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in
respect to other Nations.

The powers to make Treaties, and to send and receive
Ambassadors, speak their own propriety. Both of them
are comprised in the Articles of Confederation ; with
this difference only, that the former is disembarrassed by
the plan of the Convention of an exception, under which
Treaties might be substantially frustrated by regulations
of the States ; and that a power of appointing and re-
ceiving "other public Ministers and Consuls," is ex-
pressly and very properly added to the former provision
concerning Ambassadors. The term Ambassador, if
taken strictly, as seems to be required by the second of
the Articles of Confederation, comprehends the highest
grade only of public Ministers ; and excludes the grades



The Faederalist. * 289

which the United States will be most likely to prefer,
where foreign embassies may be necessary. And under
no latitude of construction will the term comprehend
Consuls. Yet it has been found expedient, and has
been the practice of Congress, to employ the inferior
grades of public Ministers ; and to send and receive
Consuls.

It is true, that where Treaties of commerce stipulate
for the mutual appointment of Consuls, whose functions
are connected with commerce, the admission of foreign
Consuls may fall within the power of making commer-
cial Treaties ; and that where no such Treaties exist,
the mission of American Consuls into foreign countries
may perhaps be covered under the authority, given by
the ninth Article of the Confederation, to appoint all
such civil ojfficers as may be necessary for managing the
general affairs of the United States. But the admission
of Consuls into the United States, where no previous
Treaty has stipulated it, seems to have been nowhere
provided for. A supply of the omission is one of the
lesser instances, in which the Convention have improved
on the model before them. But the most minute provi-
sions become important when they tend to obviate the
necessity or the pretext for gradual and unobserved
usurpations of power. A list of the cases in which
Congress have been betrayed, or forced by the defects
of the Confederation, into violations of their chartered
authorities, would not a little surprise those who have
paid no attention to the subject ; and would be no in-
considerable argument in favor of the new Constitution,
which seems to have provided no less studiously for the
lesser, than the more obvious and striking defects of the
old.

The power to define and punish piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas, and offences against the law
of nations, belongs with equal propriety to the General

VOL. I. 19



290 • The Fcederalist.

Government, and is a still greater improvement on the
Articles of Confederation. These Articles contain no
provision for the case of offences against the law of na-
tions ; and consequently leave it in the power of any
indiscreet member to embroil the Confederacy with for-
eign nations. The provision of the Foederal Articles on
the subject of piracies and felonies extends no further
than to the establishment of courts for the trial of these
offences. The dejfinition of piracies might, perhaps, with-
out inconveniency, be left to the law of nations ; though
a legislative definition of them is found in most muni-
cipal codes. A definition of felonies on the high seas
is evidently requisite. Felony is a term of loose signifi-
cation, even in the common law of England ; and of
various import in the statute law of that kingdom. But
neither the common, nor the statute law of that, or of
any other nation, ought to be a standard for the pro-
ceedings of this, unless previously made its own by legis-
lative adoption. The meaning of the term, as defined
in the codes of the several States, would be as imprac-
ticable as the former would be a dishonorable and ille-
gitimate guide. It is not precisely the same in any two
of the States ; and varies in each with every revision of
its criminal laws. For the sake of certainty and uni-
formity, therefore, the power of defining felonies in this
case was in every respect necessary and proper.

The regulation of foreign commerce, having fallen
within several views which have been taken of this
subject, has been too fully discussed to need additional
proofs here of its being properly submitted to the Foed-
eral administration.

It were doubtless to be wished, that the power of
prohibiting the importation of slaves had not been post-
poned until the year 1808, or rather, that it had been
suffered to have immediate operation. But it is not
difficult to account, either for this restriction on the Gen-



Tlie Fodderalist 291

eral Government, or for the manner in which the whole
clause is expressed. It ought to be considered as a
great point gained in favor of humanity, that a period of
twenty years may terminate forever, within these States,
a traffic which has so long and so loudly upbraided the
barbarism of modern policy ; that within that period, it
will receive a considerable discouragement from the
Foederal Government, and may be totally abolished, by
a concurrence of the few States which continue the un-
natural traffic, in the prohibitory example which has
been given by so great a majority of the Union. Happy
would it be for tlie unfortunate Africans, if an equal
prospect lay before them of being redeemed from the
oppressions of their European brethren !

Attempts havo been made to pervert this clause into
an objection against the Constitution, by representing it
on one side as a criminal toleration of an illicit practice,
and on another, as calculated to prevent voluntary and
beneficial emigrations from Europe to America. I men-
tion these misconstructions, not with a view to give
them an answer, for they deserve none ; but as speci-
mens of the manner and spirit, in which some have
thought fit to conduct their opposition to the proposed
Government.

The powers included in the third class are those
which provide for the harmony and proper intercourse
among the States. .

Under this head might be included the particular re-
straints imposed on the authority of the States, and cer-
tain powers of the Judicial department ; but the former
are reserved for a distinct class, and the latter will be
particularly examined, when we arrive at the structure
and organization of the Government. I shall confine
myself to a cursory review of the remaining powers
comprehended under this third description, to wit : to
regulate commerce among the several States and the



292 Tlie Fcdderalist.

Indian tribes; to coin money, regulate the value there-
of, and of foreign coin ; to provide for the punishment
of counterfeiting the current coin and securities of the
United States ; to fix the standard of weights and meas-
ures ; to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and
uniform laws of bankruptcy ; to prescribe the manner in
which the public Acts, records, and judicial proceedings
of each State shall be proved, and the effect they shall
have in other States ; and to establish post-offices and
post-roads.

The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to
regulate the commerce between its several members, is
in the number of those which have been clearly pointed
out by experience. To the proofs and remarks which
former papers have brought into view on this subject, it
may be added, that without this supplemental provision,
the great and essential power of regulating foreign com-
merce would have been incomplete and ineffectual. A
very material object of this power was the relief of the
States which import and export through other States,
from the improper contributions levied on them by the
latter. Were these at liberty to regulate the trade be-
tween State and State, it must be foreseen, that ways
would be found out to load the articles of import and
export, during the passage through their jurisdiction,
with duties which would fall on the makers of the lat-
ter, and the consumers of the former. We may be as-
sured, by past experience, that such a practice would be
introduced by future contrivances ; and both by that and
a common knowledge of human affairs, that it would
nourish unceasing animosities, and not improbably ter-
minate in serious interruptions of the public tranquillity.
To those who do not view the question through the
medium of passion, or of interest, the desire of the com-
mercial States to collect, in any form, an indirect rev-
enue from theii- uncommercial neighbors, must appear



V



The Faederalist. 293

not less. impolitic than it is unfair ; since it would stim-
ulate the injured party, by resentment as well as interest,
to resort to less convenient channels for their foreign
trade. But the mild voice of reason, pleading the cause
of an enlarged and permanent interest, is but too often
drowned before public bodies as well as individuals, by
the clamors of an impatient avidity for immediate and
immoderate gain.

The necessity of a superintending authority over the
reciprocal trade of Confederated States, has been illus-
trated by other examples as well as our own. In Switzer-
land, where the Union is so very slight, each Canton is