i. the powers and rights of majorities and minori-
ties of the several States discussed, 302
ii. the probability of a general, overpowering in-
surrection within all the States considered,... 304
ix. to assume the payment of outstanding debts of
the United States, 305
i, its purpose, 305
ii. objection, that it does not assert the continued
validity of debts due to the United States, an-
swered, 305
X. to provide for amendments to the Constitution,.. . 306
xi. the establishment of the new system, when nine
States shall have approved it 306
i. the violation, by this provision, of the Articles of
Confederation considered, 307
it. the relations which will exist between the as-
senting and the dissenting States of the Union
considered, 308
Contents. xxvii
... Essay. Paga
e. restrictions on the authority of the several States,"
No.XLIII. 308
i. forbidding tlie cstabHshment of treaties and alli-
ances between them, 309
ii. forbidding the issue of letters of marque and re-
prisal, 30&
iii. forbidding the coinage of money by them, 309
iv. forbidding the issue of bills of credit by them,. . . 309
V. forbidding the establishment of any other legal
tender than gold and silver, 310
vi. forbidding the passage of bills of attainder, 310
vii. forbidding the passage of ex post facto laws, 310
viil. forbidding the passage of laws impairing con-
tracts, 310
ix. forbidding the establishment of titles of nobility,. 311
X. forbidding the imposition of duties on exports or
imports, 312
/. "the several powers and provisions by which eflS-
cacy is given to all the rest," 312
i. the power to make all necessary and proper laws for
carrying the preceding powers into execution,. . 312
i. the necessity of such authority in the United
States,
312
ii. other methods considered, 312
A. prohibiting the exercise of any power not
expressly delegated to the Union, 813
B. a positive enumeration of the general powers
so delegated, 3I3
C. a negative enumeration of them, by a specifi-
cation of the reserved powers, 314
D. entire silence on the subject, 314
iii. the remedy for an abuse of this authority, 315
ii. the supremacy of the Constitution and constitu-
tional laws of the United States, and of their
treaties with other powers, 315
i. the effect of reserving the supremacy of the
State constitutions therefrom, considered, 316
iii. the various officers, State and Foederal, to be
bound by oatli to support it, 3I7
i. why State officers are to be thus obligated, 317
C. conclusion, that no part of the powers delegated to the
Fcederal government is unnecessary or improper, 317
b. will the aggregated powers of the Union be dangerous
to the reserved authority of the several States, . .XLI V. 318
A. if the objects of the Union can be attained only through
the proposed Constitution, it is not a valid objection
xxviii Contents.
Essay. Page
that it abridges the authority of the State govern-
ments, No. XLI V. 318
B. the new Constitution will not prove fatal to the State
governments 319
a. because of the tendency, in confederacies, to despoil
the General government of its delegated powers, . . 319
b. because the State governments will possess more in-
fluence among the People, 321
c. because the State governments are constituent and
essential parts of the Fcederal government, 321
d. because the employees of the United States Avill be
less numerous than those of the States, 321
e. because the powers reserved by the States are rel-
atively greater and more numerous than those
which are delegated to the Union, 323
y. because the proposed change consists less in the addi-
tion of neiv powers to the Union, than in the invig-
oration of its old ones, 324
g, because the State governments will possess more in-
fluence among the People, resumed, XLV. 325
i. the State and the Fcederal governments are in fact
only different agents for the People, with differ-
ent powers and for different purposes, 325
ii. they both depend on the sentiments and sanction of
common constituents for their respective powers, 325
iii. the first and most natural attachment of the Peo-
ple will be to their respective State governments, 326
i. from the greater number of othces in the latter, 326
ii. from the character of the interests which they
provide for, 326
iii. from the greater familiarity of the People with
them, 326
iv. from the history of the country during the war, 326
iv. if the popular favor should rest on the Fcederal
government, it will be only because that will be
better administered than the others, 327
h. because the prepossessions of the members of the
Fcederal government will be in favor of their States, 327
i. because the respective States possess the means of
defeating Fcederal encroachments, 329
j. because other States would sympathize with the suf-
fering State, and combine for its support, 330
k. the objection, that the military power will be in the
Fcederal government, answered, 330
i. the impossibility of collecting a force for such a pur-
pose, 381
Contents.
XXIX
Essay. Page
ii. the superior power of the militia to resist and over-
come it, No. XLV. 331
I. concluding remarks on this particular branch of the
subject, 332
C. concluding remarks, on the danger that the Foederal
powers will be formidable to reserved powers of indi-
vidual Sutes, 333
. " the particular structure of the Foederal government
and the distribution of its powers among its constituent
parts," XL VI. 333
a. " its supposed violation of the maxim, that the legis-
lative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to
be separate and distinct," considered, 333
A. the truth of the maxim conceded, 334
B. the proposed Constitution does not violate it, 334
a. the meaning of the maxim discussed, 334
i. the views of Montesquieu examined, 334
i. the British Constitution, as his standard of gov-
ernment, referred to, 334
ii. his own expressed reasons referred to, 335
ii. the provisions of the State constitutions, rela-
tive thereto, examined, 337
i. New Hampshire, 337
ii. Massachusetts, 338
Hi. New York, 339
iv. New Jersey, 339
V. Pennsylvania, 339
vi. Delaware, 340
vii. Maryland, 340
via. Virginia, 340
ix. North Carolina, 341
X. South Carolina, 341
xi. Georgia, 341
xii. general remarks on the State constitutions, .... 342
b. the necessity tliat "these departments shall be so
far connected and blended as to give to each a con-
stitutional control over the others," considered,.. . .
XL VII. 342
i. " the powers belonging to one department ought not
to be directly and completely administered by
either of the others," conceded 343
ii. "neither of them ought to possess an Overruling
influence over the others in the administration
of their powers," conceded, 343
iii. what practical security can be provided for each,
against the invasion of the others, considered,. . . 343
XXX Contents.
Essay. Page
I. the insuflSciency of naked constitutional restric-
tions, No. XLVII. 343
A. the tendency of the legislature to absorb
the others, 343
a. from the nature of our political organiza-
tion, 344
b. from " an intrepid confidence in its own
strength," 344
C. from necessary extent of its powers 345
d. from its control of the pecuniary resources
of the country, and the indefiniteness of its
authority in many cases, 345
e. from the examples presented in history, . . . 345
B. an instance of executive encroachment ac-
counted for, 348
C. concluding remarks, 348
ii. Mr. Jefferson's proposition, that, two thirds of the
members of each of two of the departments
concurring, an appeal to the People may be
taken, considered, XL VIII. 349
A. the People the only source of authority, .... 349
B. the propriety of a well-defined mode of ap-
pealing to the People considered, 350
C. it does reach the case of an improper com-
bination of two departments of the govern-
ment, 350
D. by frequent applications it might impair the
respect with which the People would regard
the government, 350
E. the public tranquillit}' might be disturbed by
a too frequent recurrence to the decision of
the society, 351
F. the decisions thus obtained would not answer
the purpose of maintaining the constitutional
equilibrium of the government, 352
a. the legislature will still control the decision, 352
b. members of the legislature will probably
be the members of the conventions to re-
vise the form of government, 353
C. when such appeals to the People, against
the legislature, will be useful, 353
G. concluding remarks on occasional appeals to
the People, 354
Hi. periodical appeals to the People considered,
XLIX. 354
A. the disadvantage of short intervals discussed, 355
Contents. xxxi
Essay. Page
B. the disadvantage of lovg intervals discussed,
No. XLIX. 355
C. the example of Pennsylvania referred to, 355
iv. the interior structure of the government should
be so arranged that its several constituent
departments, by tlieir mutual relations, may
keep each other in their proper places, L. 358
A. the members of each should have little to do
in the appointment of members of the others, 359
B. the members of each department should be
as little dependent as possible on those of the
others for their emoluments, 359
C. the members of each should possess the con-
stitutional means and personal motives to
resist invasions by the members of other
departments, 360
a. this policy not unfrequently resorted to, . . . 3G0
b. an equal power of self-defence cannot be
granted to each department, 361
C. a division of the power of the legislature
necessary, in order to guard against its en-
croachments, 361
d. an increase of the power of the executive,
that of the veto, for its protection, neces-
sary, 361
r, the advantages afforded by the Foederal system
of America, in securing the rights of the Peo-
ple, 362
A. the division of the delegated powers between
two distinct governments, and its subse-
quent subdivision, in each, among distinct
and separate departments, 362
B. the multitude of different and distinct inter-
ests among the People, 362
b. " the House of Representatives," LI. 365
A. the qualifications of the electors thereof, 365
a. why not subject to regulation by the Congress, 365
h. why not subject to regulation by the State legisla-
tures, 365
c. why not made uniform throughout the several States, 365
d. the advantages derived from the constitutional pro-
vision, 365
B. the qualifications of the members, 366
C. the term of office of its members, 366
a. "whether biennial elections, in this case, will be
safe," considered, 866
xxxii Contents.
Essay. Page
i. frequent elections the only effectual security for an
immediate dependence on, and sympathy with,
the People, No. LI. 366
ii. the length of terms of service in other govern-
ments, 367
I. Britisli House of Commons, at different periods, 367
ii. Irish Parliament, 368
Hi. the American colonies, 369
iii. conclusion, that biennial elections will not be dan-
gerous, 370
iv. this conclusion strengthened by other circum-
stances, 370
t. the Foederal Congress will possess less power
than the British or Irish Parliaments, or the
colonial Assemblies, 370
ii. it will be resti^ained by its dependence on the
People, while it will be watched, also, by the
several State governments, 370
iii. the other departments of the Foederal govern-
ment will possess fewer means to seduce the
House than are possessed by the governments
referred to, 370
V. objection, that " where annual elections end, tyr-
anny begins," considered, LII. 371
t. no adequate reason for the opinion, 371
n. the practice of different States in the choice of
their legislators, 371
iii. the practice of the British Parliament, by sim-
ple statute, to change fundamental principles
of government not applicable, in this case, as
a reason, 872
h, are " biennial elections necessary or useful," 373
i. short terms of office prevent members from ac-
quiring the practical knowledge requisite to the
due performance of their duties, 373
i. greater scope of information necessary in the
Foederal than in the State governments, 374
ii. the necessity of acquiring a knowledge of for-
eign affairs, 376
ii. short terms will be inconvenient to members who
reside at a distance from the capitol, 376
iii. short terms will be more dangerous from the
greater number of inexperienced members,.... 377
iv. short terms will prevent the correction of spurious
elections, 377
V. conclusion, that " biennial elections will be as use-
Contents. xxxiii
Essay. Page
ful to the public, as they will be safe to the lib-
erty of the People," No. LII. 377
D. " the apportionment of its members to the several
States," LIII. 378
a. numbers in each State the proper standard for reg-
ulating the representation of each State, 378
i. objection against representation of slaves, consid-
ered, 378
i. slaves not merely property, 379
ii. slaves are also persons, 379
in. the Constitution recognizes this mixed charac-
ter in slaves, 379
iv. the apportionment is governed by the same rule
as that for the levy of direct taxes, 380
V. they are not considered as property merely, in
the laws of the States which possess them, . . . 380
A. reply, that they do not form a basis of local
representation, considered, 380
m, the right of representation of property as well
as of persons, considered, ' 381
vii. the votes in the Congress which are allowed
to the several States should be proportioned
to the comparative wealth of those States, . . . 382
b. there will be no inducement for falsifying the cen-
sus, as the measure for representation is also the
measure for taxation, 383
E. "the number of which the House is to consist" con-
sidered, LI V. 384
a. the importance which is attached to this subject, ... 384
b. the difficulty of determining the proper number, 385
c. the small States require smaller ratios of representa-
tion than the large States, 386
d. with the limited powers which are delegated to the
Congress the necessity for a numerous representa-
tion is diminislied, 386
e. objections considered and answered, 387
i. " so small a number of members cannot be safely
trusted with so much power," 387
z. a rapid increase of population may be expect-
ed, and a corresponding increase of represen-
tation will ensue, 387
n. "whether the smallness of the number, as a tem-
porary refjulation, be dangerous to the public lib-
erty," considered, 387
Hi. from whence can danger ultimately proceed,
considered, g88
xxxiv Contents.
Essay. Page
A. from foreign gold, .No. LIV. 388
B. from other branches of the Fcederal govern-
ment, 389
ii. "it will be too small to possess a due knowledge
of the interests of its constituents," considered,
LV. 391
i. " the representative ought to be acquainted with
the interests and circumstances of his constitu-
ents," considered, 391
a. the objects of Foederal legislation considered, . . . 391
A. " a very few representatives will be very suf-
ficient vehicles of information concerning
commerce to the Foederal councils," 392
B. the same observations will apply to matters
concerning taxation, 393
C. they " will apply also with greater force to
the case of the militia," 393
D. nothing in tlie above reasons will conflict
with the necessity, before referred to, for
general information in the representative,. . . 393
Hi. the experience of Great Britain referred to, . . . 394
iii. it will tend to the aggrandizement of the few at
the expense of the many, LVI. 396
i. this objection strikes at the root of representa-
tive government, 396
ii. the members of the House will be elected by all
classes and conditions of citizens, 397
iii. they will be taken from all classes and condi-
tions of citizens, 397
iv. securities to insure their fidelity to their con-
stituents, 397
A. their personal character, 397
B. the honorable position to which they will be
called 398
C. the opportunity which will be afforded to se-
cure honor and distinction, 398
D. the frequent election compelling them to
remember their dependence on the Peo-
ple, 398
E. the measures adopted must operate on them-
selves as well as on the great mass of the
society, 399
V. the provisions for electing members, and'their
qualifications for office, similar to those of the
State constitutions for State officers, 400
vi. the relative numbers of the constituencies no
Contents. • xxxv
Essay. Page
justification for approval of tbe State system
and disapproval of the Foederal system,
No. LVI. 400
A. the doctrine is not reasonable, 400
B- the doctrine is not admissible in its conse-
quences, 401
C. the doctrine is not warranted by facts, 401
a. the British House of Commons 401
b. the State senators of New Hampshire, 401
C. the State senators of Massachusetts, 402
d. the State senators of New York, 402
e. members of Assembly in the cities of New-
York and Albany, 402
f. State representatives in Pennsylvania, 402
g. the upper house of the Assembly of Con-
necticut, 403
h.. the Governor of Connecticut, 403
i. the Governor of Massachusetts, 403
j . the Governor of New York, 403
k. the President of New Hampshire, 408
r. " the number of its members will not be augment-
ed from time to time as the progress of popula-
tion may demand," LVII. 403
t. the provisions of the State constitutions compared
with those of the proposed Constitution, 403
ii. the practice of the State governments consid-
ered, 404
tit. the peculiar organization of the Congress will
induce watchfulness on this subject, 404
A- the large States, in the House, can control
the small ones, and compel their acquies-
cence, 404
a. objection, that the Senate may object and
prevent such an augmentation, answered, 405
1. there is no probability that the House,
representing the majority of the People,
could be successfully resisted, 405
2. the consciousness of the House being sup-
ported by right, reason, and the Consti-
tution, will check the Senate, 405
3. it is not certain that a majority of the
Senate would oppose such an augmen-
tation, 406
4. senators from the new States will, proba-
bly, favor such an augmentation, 406
5. " a constitutional and infallible resource "
xxxvi Contents.
Essay. Page
will be a refusal by the House to vote
the suppHes, No. LVII. 406
6. the Senate will be more ready to yield,
in such a contest, than the House, 407
iv. considerations against a numerous House of
Representatives, 408
V. objection that a majority of tlie members of each
House shall form quorums, and majorities of
quorums enact laws, considered, 409
F. the authority vested in the Congress to regulate, in
the last resort, the election of tlie members of the
House of Representatives, considered, LVIII. 410
a. introductory remarks, 410
b. "every government ought to contain in itself the
means of its own preservation," , 411
i. the different depositaries of power to control the
elections, considered, 411
ii. the exact cliaracter and extent of the delegated
power considered, 411
c. " the existence of the Union would be entirely at the
mercy of the State governments," if the regulation
of elections for the Foederal government is left en-
tirely in their hands, 411
i. the right of self-preservation in the State govern-
ments is unimpaired, 412
ii. objection, that the retention of authority in the
State governments to control the election of
senators is equally dangerous, considered,. :. . . . 413
i. it is necessary from the character of the States,
as constituent bodies, 413
ii. it is less hazardous, from the peculiar organiza-
tion of the Senate, 414
iii. objection, that the interest of each State to be
represented in the House will be sufficient secu-
rity against an abuse of power by its govern-
ment, considered, 415
d. objection, the Congress may thereby " promote the
election of some favorite class of men in exclusion
of others," considered, LIX. 416
i. the improbability that such a purpose would be
carried out through this channel, discussed 416
ii. the certainty that, if attempted, it would be cor-
rected by " an immediate revolt of the great
body of the People, headed and directed by the
State governments," averred and discussed, .... 417
iii. the dissimilarity of the organization of the Senate
Contents. xxxvii
Essay Page
and the House a security against an improper
exercise of this authority, No. LIX. 417
iv. there can be no conceivable motive for such an
attempt on the part of Congress, 418
V. inquiry concerning the relative weight of influ-
ence possessed by different classes of the Peo-
ple, 419
vi. the qualifications, both of the electors and the
elected, being controlled exclusively by the State
governments, no favor can be extended to any
particular class by the Congress, 421
vii. the certainty of a general revolt against such an
assumption of authority further discussed, and
the necessity of a military power to insure suc-
cess to the attempt considered, 422
e. objection, that this provision should have been ac-
companied by a provision that all elections shall be
held within the counties where the electors reside,
considered, LX. 423
L such a provision would be harmless, 423
ii. it would afford no security from the danger appre-
hended, 423
iii. the provision compared with provisions concern-
ing elections in the State constitutions, 424
t. those in the constitution of New York partic-
ularly examined, 424
ii. defects in the State constitutions no apology for
defects in the proposed Constitution, consid-
ered, 425
/ the probability that such authority in the Congress,
to fix uniform days of election, may be very im-
portant to the public welfare, 426
i. the want of any provision in the proposed Consti-
tution, fixing a particular day for the election,
considered, 427
ii. concluding remarks, 427
C. the Senate, LXI. 428
A. " the qualifications of senators " considered, 428
B. "the appointment of senators by the State legisla-
tures " considered, 429
C. " the equality of representation in the Senate " con-
sidered, 429
a. the mixed character of the Foederal government re-
quires a mixed representation, 429
6. the equal representation in the Senate a recognition
of sovereignty in the States, 430
xxxviii Contents.
Essay. Page
c. it furnishes a security against improper acts of legis-
lation, No. LXI. 4SU
D. " the number of senators, and the term for which they
are to be elected," considered 431
a. "the inconveniences which a republic must suffer
from the want of such an institution," 431
i. the security which it furnishes against improper
legislation will be wanting, 431
ii. there will be less security against the "infirmity"
of faction, 432
iii. there will be less wisdom in the legislation of such
a republic, 432
I. the importance of a knowledge of the proper
mode of legislation, 433
ii. the little attention paid thereto in America, 433
iv. mutability in its councils from frequent changes
in its members, 433
i. the mischievous effects of such mutability, 433
A. it forfeits the respect and confidence of other
nations, 434
B. by multiplying laws " it poisons the blessings
of Hberty," 434
C. by affecting the market-price of property it
gives the sagacious and the rich an undue
, advantage over the industrious and unin-
formed poor, 435
J), it checks extended improvements and enter-
prise, 435
E. it diminishes the attachment and reverence
of the People, 436
V. " the want of a due sense of National character,"
LXII. 436
vi. "the want of a due responsibility in the govern-
ment to the People," 437
vii. the want of a defence to the People against their
own temporary errors and delusions, 438
i. objection, that a widely spread People is not sub-
ject to such errors and delusions, answered,. . . 439
6. "history informs us of no long-lived republic which
had not a senate," - 439
i. the difference between the ancient republics and
the United States, 440
i. Athens referred to, 441
ii. Carthage referred to, 441
iii. Sparta referred to, 441
iv. Rome referred to, 441
Contents. xxxix
Essay. Pagp
V. Crete referred to, No. LXII. 442
c. objection, that the Senate will " gradually acquire a
dangerous preeminence in the government and