assemblies elected by the People, to revise the preced-
ing administration of the Government, all persons who
should have been concerned in the Government within
the given period, the difficulties would not be obviated.
The important task would probably devolve on men,
who, with inferior capacities, would in other respects be
little better quaUfied. Although they might not have
been personally concerned in the administration, and
therefore not immediately agents in the measures to be
examined, they would probably have been involved in
the parties connected with these measures, and have
been elected under their auspices.

PUBLIUS.



\_From the Neio York Packet, Friday, February 8, 1788.]

THE FCEDERALIST. No. L.



To THE People. OF the State of New York:

'O what expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for
maintaining in practice the necessary partition of
power among the several departments, as laid down in
the Constitution ? The only answer that can be given
is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be
inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriv-
ing the interior structure of the Government as that its
several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations,
be the means of keeping each other in theip proper
places. Without presuming to undertake a full devel-
opment of this important idea, I will hazard a few gen-



The Fcederalist. 359

eral observations, which may perhaps place it in a
clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judg-
ment of the principles and structure of the Government
planned by the Convention.

In order to lay a due foundation for that separate
and distinct exercise of the different powers of Gov-
ernment, which to a certain extent is admitted on all
hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it
is evident that each department should have a will
of its own ; and consequently should be so constituted,
that the members of eacb should have as little agency
as possible in the appointment of the members of the
others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it
would require that all the appointments for the su-
preme Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary magistra-
cies should be drawn from the same fountain of author-
ity, the People, through channels having no communica-
tion whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan
of constructing the several departments would be less
difficult in practice, than it may in contemplation ap-
pear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional
expense would attend the execution of it. Some devi-
ations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted
In the constitution of the Judiciary department in par-
ticular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on
the principle : first, because peculiar qualifications being
essential in the members, the primary consideration
ought to be to select that mode of choice which best
secures these qualifications ; secondly, because the per-
manent tenure by which the appointments are held
in that department, must soon destroy all sense of de-
pendence on the authority conferring them.

It is equally evident, that the members of each de-
partment should be as little dependent as possible on
those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their
offices. Were the Executive magistrate, or the Judges,



360 The Fcederalist.

not independent of the Legislature in this particular,
their independence in every other would be merely
nominal.

But the great security against a gradual concentration
of the several powers in the same department, consists
in giving to those who administer each department the
necessary constitutional means, and personal motives,
to resist encroachments of the others. The provision
for defence must in this, as in all other cases, be
made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition
must be made to counteract ambition. The interest
of the man must be connected with the constitutional
rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human
nature, that such devices should be necessary to control
the abuses of Government. But what is Government
itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature ?
If men were angels, no Government would be necessary.
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor inter-
nal controls on Government would be necessary. In
framing a Government which is to be administered by
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you
must first enable the Government to control the
governed ; and in the next place oblige it to control
itself. A dependence on the People is, no doubt, the
primary control on the Government ; but experience
has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precau-
tions.

This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival in-
terests, the defect of better motives, might be traced
through the whole system of human affairs, private
as well as public. We see it particularly displayed
in all the subordinate distributions of power; where
the constant aim is, to divide and arrange the several
offices in such a manner as that each may be a check
on the other ; that the private interest of every individ-
ual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These



The Federalist. 361

inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the
distribution of the supreme powers of the State.

But it is not possible to give to each department an
equal power of self-defence. In republican Government,
the Legislative authority necessarily predominates. The
remedy for this inconveniency is, to divide the Legis-
lature into different branches; and to render them, by
different modes of election, and different principles
of action, as little connected with each other, as the
nature of their common functions, and their common
dependence on the society, wiU admit. It may even
be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments
by still further precautions. As the weight of the
Legislative authority requires that it should be thus
divided, the weakness of the Executive may require,
on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An ab-
solute negative on the Legislature appears, at first view,
to be the natural defence with which the Executive
magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would
be neither altogether safe, nor alone sufficient. On or-
dinary occasions, it might not be exerted with the
requisite firmness ; and on extraordinary occasions, it
might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect
of an absolute negative be sapplied by some qualified
connection between this weaker department and the
weaker branch of the stronger department, by which
the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights
of the former, without being too much detached from
the rights of its own department?

If the principles on which these observations are
founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they
be applied as a criterion to the several State Constitu-
tions, and to the Foederal Constitution, it will be found,
that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with
them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such
a test.



362 The Foederalist.

There are moreover two considerations particularly
applicable to the Fcederal system of America, which
place that system in a very interesting point of view.

First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered
by the People is submitted to the administration of
a single Government; and the usurpations are guarded
against, by a division of the Government into distinct
and separate departments. In the compound republic
of America, the power surrendered by the People is first
divided between two distinct Governments, and then
the portion allotted to each, subdivided among distinct
and separate departments. Hence a double security
arises to the rights of the People. The different Gov-
ernments will control each other, at the same time that
each will be controlled by itself.

Second, It is of great importance in a republic, not
only to guard the society against the oppression of its
rulers, but to guard one part of the society against
the injustice of the other part. Different interests ne-
cessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a ma-
jority be united by a common interest, the rights of the
minority will be insecure. There are but two methods
of providing against this evil : the one by creating
a will in the community independent of the majority,
that is, of the society itself; the other by comprehending
in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens
as will render an unjust combination of a majority of
the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The
first method prevails in all Governments possessing
an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best,
is but a precarious security; because a power indepen-
dent of the society may as well espouse the unjust
views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor
party, and may possibly be turned against both parties.
The second method will be exemplified in the Fcederal
republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in



The Faederalist. 363

it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the
society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests,
and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals,
or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested
combinations of the majority. In a free Government,
the security for civil rights must be the same as that for
religious rights. It consists in the one case in the mul-
tiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity
of sects. The degree of security in both cases, will
depend on the number of interests and sects ; and this
may be presumed to depend on the extent of country
and number of People comprehended under the same
Government. This view of the subject must partic-
ularly recommend a proper Foederal system to all the
sincere and considerate friends of republican Govern-
ment; since it shows, that in exact proportion as the
territory of the Union may be formed into more circum-
scribed Confederacies, or States, oppressive combina-
tions of a majority will be facilitated ; the best security,
under the republican forms, for the rights of every class
of citizens, will be diminished; and consequently, the
stability and independence of some member of the Gov-
ernment, the only other security, must be proportionally
increased. Justice is the end of Government. It is
the end of civil society. It ever has been, and ever will
be pursued, until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost
in the pursuit. In a society, under the forms of which
the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the
weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign, as in a
state of nature, where the weaker individual is not se-
cured against the violence of the stronger; and as in the
latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted,
by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a
Government which may protect the weak, as well
as themselves : so, in the former state, will the more
powerful factions or parties be gradually induced, by



364 The Fasderalist.

a like motive, to wish for a Government which will pro-
tect all parties, the weaker as well as the more power-
ful. It can be little doubted, that if the State of Rhode
Island was separated from the Confederacy, and left
to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form
of Government within such narrow limits would be
displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious
majorities, that some power altogether independent
of the People would soon be called for by the voice of
the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity
of it. In the extended republic of the United States,
and among the great variety of interests, parties, and
sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of
the whole society could seldom take place on any other
principles than those of justice and the general good;
whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the
will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also,
to provide for the security of the former, by introducing
into the Government a will not dependent on the latter :
or, in other words, a will independent of the society it-
self. It is no less certain than it is important, notwith-
standing the contrary opinions which have been enter-
tained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within
a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of
self-government. And happily for the republican cause,
the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great
extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the
Fwderal principle.

PUBLIUS.



The Feeder alist. 365

[From the New York Packet, Friday, Fehruanj 8, 1788.]

THE FCEDERALIST. No. LI.



To THE People of the State of Xew York :

Tj^K-OM the more general inquiries pursued in the four
-â– - last papers, I pass on to a more particular exam-
ination of the several parts of the Government. I shall
begin with the House of Representatives.

The first view to be taken of this part of the Govern-
ment relates to the qualifications of the electors and
the elected.

Those of the former are to be the same with those of
the electors of the most numerous branch of the State
Legislatures. The definition of the right of suffrage is
very justly regarded as a fundamental article of repub-
lican Government. It was incumbent on the Conven-
tion, therefore, to define and establish this right in the
Constitution. To have left it open for the occasional
regulation of the Congress, would have been improper
for the reason just mentioned. To have submitted it to
the Legislative discretion of the States, would have
been improper for the same reason ; and for the addi-
tional reason that it would have rendered too dependent
on the State Governments, that branch of the Fcederal
Government which ought to be dependent on the People
alone. To have reduced the different qualifications in
the different States to one .uniform rule, would prob-
ably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the States,
as it would have been difficult to the Convention. The
provision made by the Convention appears, therefore, to
be the best that lay within their option. It must be
satisfactory to every State ; because it is conformable



366 The Feeder alls t.

to the standard already established, or which may be
established by the State itself. It will be safe to the
United States ; because, being fixed by the State Con-
stitutions, it is not alterable by the State Governments,
and it cannot be feared that the People of the States
will alter this part of their Constitutions in such a
manner as to abridge the rights secured to them by the
Foederal Constitution.

The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully
and properly defined by the State Constitutions, and
being at the same time more susceptible pf uniformity,
have been very properly considered and regulated by the
Convention. A representative of the United States
must be of the age of twenty-five years ; must have
been seven years a citizen of the United States ; must,
at the time of his election, be an inhabitant of the State
he is to represent; and, during the time of his service,
must be in no office under the United States. Under
these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the
Foederal Government is open to merit of every descrip-
tion, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old,
and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any par-
ticular profession of religious faith.

The term for which the Representatives are to be
elected, falls under a second view which may be taken
of this branch. In order to decide on the propriety of
this Article, two questions must be considered : First,
whether biennial elections will, in this case, be safe ;
Secondly, whether they be necessary or useful.

First. As it is essential to liberty, that the Govern-
ment in general should have a common interest with
the People ; so it is particularly essential, that the
branch of it under consideration should have an imme-
diate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with
the People. Frequent elections are unquestionably the
only policy by which this dependence and sympathy



Tlie Fcederalist. 367

can be effectually secured. But what particular degree
of frequency may be absolutely necessary for the pur-
pose, does not appear to be susceptible of any precise
calculation, and must depend on a variety of circum-
stances with which it may be connected. Let us con-
sult experience, the guide that ought always to be
followed, whenever it can be found.

The scheme of representation, as a substitute for a
meeting of the citizens in person, being at most but
very imperfectly known to ancient polity, it is in more
modern times only, that we are to expect instructive ex-
amples. And even here, in order to avoid a research
too vague and diffusive, it will be proper to confine our-
selves to the few examples which are best known, and
which bear the greatest analogy to our particular case.
The first to which this character ought to be applied, is
the House of Commons in Great Britain. The history
of this branch of the English Constitution, anterior to
the date of Magna Charta, is too obscure to yield in-
struction. The very existence of it has been made a
question among political antiquaries. The earliest rec-
ords of subsequent date prove, that Parliaments were
to sit only every year ; not that they were to be elected
every year. And even these annual sessions were left
so much at the discretion of the monarch, that under
various pretexts, very long and dangerous intermissions
were often contrived by royal ambition. To remedy
this grievance, it was provided by a statute in the reign
of Charles IL, that the intermissions should not be
protracted beyond a period of three years. On the ac-
cession of "William III, when a revolution took place
in the Government, the subject was still more seriously
resumed, and it was declared to be among the funda-
mental rights of the People, that Parliaments ought to
be \\e\di frequently . By another statute, which passed a
few years later in the same reign, the term, "frequently,"



368 The Fcederalist.

which had alluded to the triennial period settled in the
time of Charles II., is reduced to a precise meaning, it
being expressly enacted, that a new Parliament shall be
called within three years after the determination of the
former. The last change, from three to seven years, is
well known to have been introduced pretty early in the
present century, under an alarm for the Hanoverian suc-
cession. From these facts it appears, that the greatest
frequency of elections which has been deemed necessary
in that kingdom, for binding the Representatives to their
constituents, does not exceed a triennial return of them.
And if we may argue from the degree of liberty retained
even under septennial elections, and all the other vicious
ingredients in the Parliamentary Constitution, we can-
not doubt that a reduction of the period from seven to
three years, with the other necessary reforms, would so
far extend the influence of the People over their Repre-
sentatives as to satisfy us, that biennial elections, under
the Foederal system, cannot possibly be dangerous to
the requisite dependence of the House of Representa-
tives on their constituents.

Elections in Ireland, till of late, were regulated en-
tirely by the discretion of the crown, and were seldom
repeated, except on the accession of a new Prince, or
some other contingent event. The Parliament which
commenced with George II. was continued throughout

* o

his whole reign, a period of about thirty-five years. The
only dependence of the Representatives on the People
consisted in the right of the latter to supply occasional
vacancies, by the election of new members, and in the
chance of some event which might produce a general
new election. The ability also of the Irish Parliament
to maintain the rights of their constituents, so far as the
disposition might exist, was extremely shackled by the
control of the crown over the subjects of their delibera-
tion. Of late, these shackles, if I mistake not, have



The Federalist. 369

been broken ; and octennial Parliaments have besides
been established. What effect may be produced by this
partial reform, must be left to further experience. The
example of Ireland, from this view of it, can throw but
little light on the subject. As far as we can draw any
conclusion from it, it must be that if the People of that
country have been able under all these disadvantages to
retain any liberty whatever, the advantage of biennial
elections would secure to them every degree of liberty,
which might depend on a due connection between their
Representatives and themselves.

Let us bring our inquiries nearer home. The exam-
ple of these States, when British colonies, claims par-
ticular attention, at the same time that it is so well
known as to require little to be said on it. The prin-
ciple of representation, in one branch of the Legislature
at least, v/as established in all of them. But the periods
of election were different. They varied from one to
seven years. Have we any reason to infer from the
spirit and conduct of the Representatives of the People,
prior to the Revolution, that biennial elections would
have been dangerous to the public liberties ? The spirit
which everywhere displayed itself, at the commence-
ment of the struggle, and which vanquished the ob-
stacles to Independence, is the best of proofs, that a
sufHcient portion of liberty had been everywhere en-
joyed, to inspire both a sense of its worth and a zeal
for its proper enlargement. This remark holds good, as
"well with regard to the then colonies whose elections
were least frequent, as to those whose elections were
most frequent. Virginia was the colony which stood
first in resisting the Parliamentary usurpations of Great
Britain ; it was the first also in espousing, by public
Act, the resolution of Independence. In Virginia, never-
theless, if I have not been misinformed, elections under
the former Government were septennial. This particu-

VOL. I. 24



370 The Fcederalist.

lar example is brought into view, not as a proof of any
peculiar merit, for the priority in those instances was
probably accidental ; and still less of any advantage in
septennial elections, for when compared with a greater
frequency they are inadmissible ; but merely as a proof,
and I conceive it to be a very substantia] proof, that the
liberties of the People can be in no danger from biennial
elections.

The conclusion resulting from these examples will be
not a little strengthened, by recollecting three circum-
stances. The first is, that the Foederal Legislature will
possess a part only of that supreme Legislative author-
ity which is vested completely in the British Parliament;
and which, with a few exceptions, was exercised by the
colonial Assemblies, and the Irish Legislature. It is a
received and well-founded maxim, that where no other
circumstances affect the case, the greater the power is,
the shorter ought to be its duration ; and conversely, the
smaller the power, the more safely may its duration be
protracted. In the second place, it has, on another occa-
sion, been shown, that the Foederal Legislature will not
only be restrained by its dependence on the People as
other Legislative bodies are, but that it will be more-
over watched and controlled by the several collateral
Legislatures, which other Legislative bodies are not.
And in the third place, no comparison can be made be-
tween the means that will be possessed by the more
permanent branches of the Foederal Government, for
seducing, if they should be disposed to seduce, the
House of Representatives from their duty to the People,
and the means of influence over the popular branch,
possessed by the other branches of the Government
above cited. With less power, therefore, to abuse, the
Foederal Representatives can be less tempted on one
side, and will be doubly watched on the other.

PUBLIUS.



The Fmderalist. 371

[From the Neio York Packet, Tuesday, February 12, 1788.]

THE FGEDERALIST. No. LII.



To THE People of the State of New Yuek :

SHALL here, perhaps, be remhided of a current ob-
servation, " that where annual elections end, tyran-
" ny begins." If it be true, -as has often been remarked,
that sayings which become proverbial are generally
founded in reason, it is not less true, that when once
established, they are often applied to cases to which the
reason of them does not extend. I need not look for a