proof beyond the case before us. What is the reason
on whixjh this proverbial observation is founded? No
man will subject himself to the ridicule of pretending
that any natural connection subsists between the sun or
the seasons, and the period within which human virtue
can bear the temptations of power. Happily for man-
kind, liberty is not, in this respect, confined to any single
point of time; but lies within extremes, which afford
sufficient latitude for all the variations which may be
required by the various situations and circumstances of
civil society. The election of magistrates might be, if
it were found expedient, as in some instances it actually
has been, daily, weekly, or monthly, as well as annual;
and if circumstances may require a deviation from the
rule on one side, why not also on the other side ? Turn-
ing our attention to the periods established among our-
selves, for the election of the most numerous branches
of the State Legislatures, we find them by no means
coinciding any more in this instance, than in the elec-
tions of other civil magistrates. In Connecticut and
Rhode Island, the periods are half-yearly. In the other
372 The Foederalist.
States, South Carolina excepted, they are annual. In
South Carolina they are biennial ; as is proposed in the
FcEderal Government. Here is a difference, as four to
one, between the longest and shortest periods ; and yet
it would be not easy to show, that Connecticut or
Rhode Island is better governed, or enjoys a greater
share of rational liberty, than South Carolina; or that
either the one or the other of these States are distin-
guished in these respects, and by these causes, from the
States whose elections are different from both.
In searching for the grounds of this doctrine, I can
discover but one, and that is wholly inapplicable to our
case. The important distinction so well understood in
America, between a Constitution established by the
People, and unalterable by the Government, and a law
established by the Government and alterable by the
Government, seems to have been little understood, and
less observed in any other country. Wherever the su-
preme power of legislation has resided, has been sup-
posed to reside also a fall power to change the form of
the Government. Even in Great Britain, where the
principles of political and civil liberty have been most
discussed, and where we hear most of the rights of the
Constitution, it is maintained, that the authority of the
Parliament is transcendent, and uncontrollable, as well
with regard to the Constitution, as the ordinary objects
of Legislative provision. They have accordingly, in
several instances, actually changed by Legislative Acts,
some of the most fundamental Articles of the Govern-
ment. They have in particular, on several occasions,
changed the period of election; and, on the last occa-
sion, not only introduced septennial in place of triennial
elections, but by the same Act, continued themselves in
place four years beyond the term for which they were
elected by the People. An attention to these dangerous
practices has produced a very natural alarm in the vota-
The Federalist. 373
ries of free Government, of which frequency of elections
is the corner-stone ; and has led them to seek for some
security to liberty, against the danger to which it is
exposed. Where no Constitution, paramount to the
Government, either existed or could be obtained, no
constitutional security, similar to that established in the
United States, was to be attempted. Some other secur-
ity, therefore, was to be sought for; and what better
security would the case admit, than that of selecting
and appealing to some simple and familiar portion of
time, as a standard for measuring the danger of innova-
tions, for fixing the National sentiment, and for uniting
the patriotic exertions ? The most simple and familiar
portion of time, applicable to the subject, was that of a
year; and hence the doctrine has been inculcated by a
laudable zeal, to erect some barrier against the gradual
innovations of an unlimited Government, that the ad-
vance towards tyranny was to be calculated by the
distance of departure from the fixed point of annual
elections. But what necessity can there be of applying
this expedient to a Government, limited as the Foederal
Government will be, by the authority of a paramount
Constitution ? Or who will pretend that the liberties of
the People of America will not be more secure under
biennial elections, unalterably fixed by such a Constitu-
tion, than those of any other Nation would be, where
elections were annual, or even more frequent, but sub-
ject to alterations by the ordinary power of the Govern-
ment ?
The second question stated is, whether biennial elec-
tions be necessary or useful ? The propriety of answer-
ing this question in the affirmative, will appear from
several very obvious considerations.
No man can be a competent Legislator, who does not
add, to an upright intention and a sound judgment, a
certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which
374 Tlie Federalist.
he is to legislate. A part of this knowledge may be ac-
quired by means of information which lie within the
compass of men in private, as well as public stations.
Another part can only be attained, or at least thoroughly
attained, by actual experience in the station which re-
quires the use of it. The period of service, ought, there-
fore, in all such cases, to bear some proportion to the
extent of practical knowledge, requisite to the due per-
formance of the service. The period of Legislative ser-
vice established in most of the States for the more
numerous branch is, as we have seen, one year. The
question then may be put into this simple form : does
the period of two j^ears bear no greater proportion to
the knowledge requisite for Foederal Legislation than
one year does to the knowledge requisite for State
Legislation ? The very statement of the question, in
this form, suggests the answer that ought to be given
to it.
In a single State, the requisite knowledge relates to
the existing laws, which are uniform throughout the
State, and with which all the citizens are more or less
conversant ; and to the general affairs of the State,
which lie within a small compass, are not very diver-
sified, and occupy much of the attention and conver-
sation of every class of people. The great theatre of
the United States presents a very different scene. The
laws are so far from being uniform, that they vary in
every State ; whilst the public affairs of the Union are
spread throughout a very extensive region, and are ex-
tremely diversified by the local affairs connected with
them, and can with difficulty be correctly learnt in any
other place, than in the central councils, to which a
knowledge of them will be brought by the Representa-
tives of every part of the empire. Yet some knowledge
of the affairs, and even of the laws of all the States,
ought to be possessed by the members from each of the
The Fcederalist. 875
States. How can foreign trade be properly regulated
by uniform laws, without some acquaintance with the
commerce, the ports, the usages, and the regulations of
the different States? How can the trade between the
different States be duly regulated, without some knowl-
edge of their relative situations in these and other re-
spects ? How can taxes be judiciously imposed, and
effectually collected, if they be not accommodated to
the different laws and local circumstances relating to
these objects in the different States ? How can uniform
regulations for the militia be duly provided, without a
similar knowledge of many internal circumstances by
which the States are distinguished from each other?
These are the principal objects of Foederal Legislation,
and suggest, most forcibly, the extensive information
which the Representatives ought to acquire. The other
interior objects will require a proportional degree of in-
formation with regard to them.
It is true, that all these difficulties will, by degrees, be
very much diminished. The most laborious task will
be the proper inauguration of the Government, and the
primeval formation of a Foederal code. Improvements
on the first draughts will every year become both easier
and fewer. Past transactions of the Government will
be a ready and accurate source of information to new
members. The affairs of the Union will become more
and more objects of curiosity and conversation among
the citizens at large. And the increased intercourse
among those of different States will contribute not a
little to diffuse a mutual knowledge of their affairs, as
this again will contribute to a general assimilation of
their manners and laws. But with all these abatements,
the business of Foederal Legislation must continue so
far to exceed, both in novelty and difficulty, the Legis-
lative business of a single State, as to justify the longer
oeriod of service assigned to those who are to trans-
act it.
376 The Fcederaiist.
A branch of knowledge, which belongs to the acquire-
ments of a Fosderal Representative, and which has not
been mentioned, is that of foreign affairs. In regulating
our own commerce, he ought to be not only acquainted
with the treaties between the United States and other
nations, but also with the commercial policy and laws
of other nations. He ought not to be altogether igno-
rant of the law of nations ; for that, as far as it is
a proper object of municipal Legislation, is submitted
to the Foederal Government. And although the House
of Representatives is not immediately to participate in
foreign negotiations and arrangements, yet from the
necessary connection between the several branches of
public affairs, those particular branches will frequently
deserve attention in the ordinary course of Legislation,
and will sometimes demand particular Legislative sanc-
tion and cooperation. Some portion of this knowl-
edge may, no doubt, be acquired in a man's closet ; but
some of it also can only be derived from the public
sources of information ; and all of it will be acquired
to best effect, by a practical attention to the subject,
during the period of actual service in the Legislature.
There are other considerations, of less importance,
perhaps, but which are not unworthy of notice. The
distance which many of the Representatives will be
obliged to travel, and the arrangements rendered neces-
sary by that circumstance, might be much more serious
objections with fit men to this service, if limited to a
single year, than if extended to two years. No argu-
ment can be drawn on this subject, from the case of the
delegates to the existing Congress. They are elected
annually, it is true ; but their reelection is considered by
the Legislative assemblies almost as a matter of course.
The election of the Representatives by the People would
not be governed by the same principle.
A few of the members, as happens in all such assem-
The Fcederalist. 377
blies, will possess superior talents; will, by frequent
reelections, become members of long standing ; will be
thoroughly masters of the public business, and perhaps
not unwilling to avail themselves of those advantages.
The greater the proportion of new members, and the less
the information of the bulk of the members, the more
apt will they be to fall into the snares that may be laid
for them. This remark is no less applicable to the re-
lation which wilt subsist between the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate.
It is an inconvenience mingled with the advantages
of our frequent elections, even in single States, where
they are large, and hold but one Legislative session in a
, year, that spurious elections cannot be investigated and
annulled in time for the decision to have its due effect.
If a return can be obtained, no matter by what unlaw-
ful means, the irregular member, who takes his seat of
course, is sure of holding it a sufficient time to answer
his purposes. Hence, a very pernicious encouragement
is given to the use of unlawful means, for obtaining
irregular returns. Were elections for the Foederal Leg-
islature to be annual, this practice might become a very
serious abuse, particularly in the more distant States.
Each House is, as it necessarily must be, the judge of
the elections, qualifications, and returns of its members ;
and whatever improvements may be suggested by ex-
perience, for simplifying and accelerating the process in
disputed cases, so great a portion of a year would una-
voidably elapse, before an illegitimate member could be
dispossessed of his seat, that the prospect of such an
event would be little check to unfair and illicit means
of obtaining a seat.
All these considerations taken together warrant us
in affirming, that biennial elections will be as useful
to the affairs of the public, as we have seen that they
will be safe to the liberty of the People.
PUBLIUS.
378 The Fcederalist.
lFro7n the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 12, 1788.]
THE FCEDERALIST. No. LIU.
To THE People of the State of New York :
THE next view which I shall take of the House of
Representatives, relates to the apportionment of its
members to the several States, which is to be determined
by the same rule with that of direct taxes.
It is not contended, that the number of People in
each State ought not to be the standard for regulating
the proportion of those who are to represent the People
of each State. The establishment of the same rule for
the apportionment of taxes will probably be as little
contested ; though the rule itself, in this case, is by no
means founded on the same principle. In the former
case, the rule is understood to refer to the personal rights
of the People, with which it has a natural and universal
connection. In the latter, it has reference to the propor-
tion of wealth, of which it is in no case a precise meas-
ure, and in ordinary cases a very unfit one. But not-
withstanding the imperfection of the rule as applied
to the relative wealth and contributions of the States,
it is evidently the least exceptionable among the prac-
ticable rules ; and had too recently obtained the gen-
eral sanction of America, not to have found a ready
preference with the Convention.
All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said : but does
it follow, from an admission of numbers for the measure
of representation, or of slaves combined with free citi-
zens as a ratio of taxation, that slaves ought to be
included in the numerical rule of representation ? Slaves
are considered as property, not as persons. They ought,
therefore, to be comprehended in estimates of taxation,
The Feeder alist. 379
which are founded on property, and to be excluded from
representation, which is regulated by a census of per-
sons. This is the objection, as I understand it, stated
in its full force. I shall be equally candid in stating
the reasoning which may be offered on the opposite side.
" We subscribe to the doctrine," might one of our
Southern brethren observe, " that representation relates
" more immediately to persons, and taxation more im-
" mediately to property, and we join in the application of
" this distinction to the case of our slaves. But we must
" deny the fact, that slaves are considered merely as
" property, and in no respect whatever as persons. The
" true state of the case is, that they partake of both
" these qualities : being considered by our laws, in some
" respects, as persons, and in other respects as property.
" In being compelled to labor, not for himself, but for
" a master ; in being vendible by one master to another
"master; and in being subject at all times to be re-
" strained in his liberty and chastised in his body, by the
"capricious will of another, — the slave may appear to
" be degraded from the human rank, and classed with
" those irrational animals which fall under the legal
" denomination of property. In being protected, on the
" other hand, in his life and in his limbs, against the vio-
" lence of all others, even the master of his labor and
" his liberty ; and in being punishable himself for all
"violence committed against others, — the slave is no
" less evidently regarded by the law as a member of the
" society, not as a part of the irrational creation ; as a
" moral person, not as a mere article of property. The
" Foederal Constitution, therefore, decides with great
" propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them
" in the mixed character of persons and of property. This
" is in fact their true character. It is the character
" bestowed on them by the laws under which they live ;
" and it will not be denied, that these are the proper
380 The Foederalist.
" criterion ; because it is only under the pretext that the
" laws have transformed the negroes into subjects of
"property, that a place is disputed them in the compu-
" tation of numbers ; and it is admitted, that if the laws
" were to restore the rights which have been taken away,
" the negroes could no longer be refused an equal share
" of Representation with the other inhabitants.
" This question may be placed in another light. It
" is agreed on all sides, that numbers are the best scale
" of wealth and taxation, as they are the only proper
" scale of Representation. Would the Convention have
" been impartial or consistent, if they had rejected
" the slaves from the list of inhabitants, when the shares
" of Representation were to be calculated, and inserted
" them on the lists when the tariff of contributions was
"to be adjusted? Could it be reasonably expected,
" that the Southern States would concur in a system,
" which considered their slaves in some degree as men,
" when burdens were to be imposed, but refused to con-
" sider them in the same light, when advantages were
" to be conferred ? Might not some surprise also be
" expressed, that those who reproach the Southern States
" with the barbarous policy of considering as property
" a part of their human brethren, should themselves
" contend, that the Government to which all the States
" are to be parties, ought to consider this unfortunate
" race more completely in the unnatural light of property,
" than the very laws of which they complain ?
" It may be replied, perhaps, that slaves are not includ-
" ed in the estimate of Representatives in any of the
" States possessing them. They neither vote themselves,
" nor increase the votes of their masters. Upon what
" principle, then, ought they to be taken into the Foed-
" eral estimate of representation ? In rejecting them
" altogether, the Constitution would, in this respect,
" have followed the very laws which have been appealed
" to, as the proper guide.
Tlie Fcederalist. 381
" This objection is repelled by a single observation.
" It is a fundamental principle of the proposed Consti-
" tiition, that as the aggregate number of Representatives
'• allotted to the several States is to be determined by
" a Foederal rule, founded on the aggregate number of
" inhabitants, so the right of choosing this allotted
" number in each State, is to be exercised by such part
" of the inhabitants, as the State itself may designate.
" The qualifications on which the right of suffrage
" depend, are not perhaps the same in any two States.
" In some of the States, the difference is very material.
" In every State, a certain proportion of inhabitants are
" deprived of this right by the Constitution of the State,
" who will be included in the census by which the Foed-
" eral Constitution apportions the Representatives. In
" this point of view, the Southern States might retort
" the complaint, by insisting that the principle laid down
" by the Convention required that no regard should be
" had to the policy of particular States towards their
" own inhabitants ; and consequently, that the slaves,
" as inhabitants, should have been admitted into the
" census according to their full number, in like manner
" with other inhabitants, who, by the policy of other
" States, are not admitted to all the rights of citizens.
" A rigorous adherence, however, to this principle, is
" waived by those who would be gainers by it. All
" that they ask is, that equal moderation be shown on
" the other side. Let the case of the slaves be consid-
" ered, as it is in truth, a peculiar one. Let the com-
" promising expedient of the Constitution be mutually
" adopted, which regards them as inhabitants, but as
" debased by servitude below the equal level of free
" inhabitants ; which regards the slave as divested of
" two fifths of the man.
" After all, may not another ground be taken on which
" this Article of the Constitution will admit of a still
382 The Federalist.
" more ready defence ? We have hitherto proceeded
" on the idea, that representation related to persons
" only, and not at all to property. But is it a just idea?
" Government is instituted no less for protection of
" the property, than of the persons, of individuals.
" The one as well as the other, therefore, may be con-
" sidered as represented by those who are charged with
" the Government. Upon this principle it is, that in
" several of the States, and particularly in the State
" of New York, one branch of the Government is in-
" tended more especially to be the guardian of property,
" and is accordingly elected by that part of the society
" which is most interested in this object of Government.
" In the Foederal Constitution, this policy does not pre-
" vail. The rights of property are committed into the
" same hands, with the personal rights. Some attention
" ought, therefore, to be paid to property, in the choice
" of those hands.
" For another reason, the votes allowed in the Fced-
" eral Legislature to the People of each State, ought
" to bear some proportion to the comparative wealth
" of the States. States have not, like individuals, an
" influence over each other, arising from superior advan-
" tages of fortune. If the law allows an opulent citizen
" but a single vote in the choice of his Representative,
" the respect and consequence which he derives from
" his fortunate situation very frequently guide the votes
" of others to the objects of his choice ; and through this
" imperceptible channel, the rights of property are con-
" veyed into the public representation. A State pos-
" sesses no such influence over other States. It is not
" probable, that the richest State in the Confederacy
" will ever influence the choice of a single Representa-
" tive, in any other State. Nor will the Representatives
" of the larger and richer States possess any other
" advantage in the Fcederal Legislature, over the Repre-
TJie Foederalist. 383
" sentatives of other States, than what may result from
" their superior number alone. As far, therefore, as their
" superior wealth and weight may justly entitle them
" to any advantage, it ought to be secured to them by
" a superior share of representation. The new Consti-
" tution is, in this respect, materially different from the
" existing Confederation, as well as from that of the
" United Netherlands, and other similar Confederacies.
" In each of the latter, the efficacy of the Foederal res-
" olutions depends on the subsequent and voluntary
" resolutions of the States composing the Union. Hence
" the States, though possessing an equal vote in the
" public councils, have an unequal influence, coiTespond-
" ing with the unequal importance of these subsequent
" and voluntary resolutions. Under the proposed Consti-
" tution, the Fcederal Acts Vv^ill take effect without the
" necessary intervention of the individual States. They
" will depend merely on the majority of votes in the
" Foederal Legislature ; and consequently each vote,
" whether proceeding fi-om a larger or smaller State,
" or a State more or less wealthy or powerful, will have
" an equal w^eight and efficacy ; in the same manner
" as the votes individually given in a State Legislature,
'^ by the Representatives of unequal counties or other dis-
" tricts, have each a precise equality of value and effect ;
" or if there be any difference in the case, it proceeds
" from the difference in the personal character of the
" individual Representative, rather than from any regard
" to the extent of the district from which he comes."
Such is the reasoning wliich an advocate for the
Southern interests might employ on this subject ; and
although it may appear to be a little strained in some
points, yet on the whole, I must confess, that it fully
reconciles me to the scale of representation which the