the absolute power of a single man, under the formid-
able title of Dictator, as well against the intrigues of
ambitious individuals, who aspired to the tyranny, and
the seditions of whole classes of the community, whose
conduct threatened the existence of all Government, as
against the invasions of external enemies, who menaced
the conquest and destruction of Rome.
There can be no need, however, to multiply argu-
ments or examples on this head. A feeble Executive
implies a feeble execution of the Government. A feeble
execution is but another phrase for a bad execution ;
and a Government ill executed, whatever it may be in
theory, must be, in practice, a bad Government.
Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense
will agree in the necessity of an energetic Executive, it
will only remain to inquire, what are the ingredients,
which constitute this energy ? How far can they be
combined with those other ingredients which constitute
safety in the republican sense ? And how far does this
combination characterize the plan which has been re-
ported by the Convention?
The ingredients which constitute energy in the Exec-
utive are, first, unity ; secondly, duration ; thirdly, an
adequate provision for its support; fourthly, competent
pov^a'rs.
The ingredients which constitute safety in the repub->
488 The Fcederalist.
lican sense are, first, a due dependence on the People ;
secondly, a due responsibility.
Those politicians and statesmen who have been the
most celebrated for the soundness of their principles,
and for the justness of their views, have declared in favor
of a single Executive, and a numerous Legislature.
They have, with great propriety, considered energy as
the most necessary qualification of the former, and have
regarded this as most applicable to power in a single
hand ; while they have, with equal propriety, considered
the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom,
and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the
People, and to secure their privileges and interests.
That unity is conducive to energy, will not be dis-
puted. Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch, will
generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a
much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any
greater number ; and in proportion as the number is in-
creased, these qualities will be diminished.
This unity may be destroyed in two ways : either by
vesting the power in two or more magistrates, of equal
dignity and authority ; or by vesting it ostensibly in one
man, subject, in whole or in part, to the control and
cooperation of others, in the capacity of Counsellors to
him. Of the first, the two Consuls of Rome may serve
as an example; of the last, we shall find examples in
the Constitutions of several of the States. New York
and New Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only States
which have intrusted the Executive authority wholly to
single men.* Both these methods of destroying the
unity of the Executive have their partisans ; but the
votaries of an Executive Council are the most numer-
ous. They are both liable, if not to equal, to similar
* New York has no Council ex- consult. But I think, from the
cept for the single purpose of ap- terms of the Constitution, tlieir res-
pointing to ofRces ; New Jersey has olutions do not bind him. — Publius.
a Council whom the Governor may
The Fasderalist. 489
objections, and may in most lights be examined in con-
junction.
The experience of other Nations will afford little in-
struction on this head. As far, however, as it teaches
anything, it teaches us not to be enamored of plurality
in the Executive. We have seen that the Achseans, on
an experiment of two Praetors, were induced to abolish
one. The Roman history records many instances of
mischiefs to the Republic from the dissensions between
the Consuls, and between the Military Tribunes, who
were at times substituted to the Consuls. But it gives
us no specimens of any peculiar advantages derived to
the State from the circumstance of the plurality of those
magistrates. That the dissensions between them were
not more frequent or more fatal, is matter of astonish-
ment, until we advert to the singular position in which
the Repubhc was almost continually placed, and to the
prudent policy pointed out by the circumstances of the
State, and pursued by the Consuls, of making a division
of the Government between them. The Patricians en-
gaged in a perpetual struggle with the Plebeians for the
presei-vation of their ancient authorities and dignities;
the Consuls, who were generally chosen out of the for-
mer body, were commonly united by the personal inter-
est they had in the defence of the privileges of their
order. In addition to this motive of union, after the
arms of the Republic had considerably expanded the
bounds of its empire, it became an established custom
with the Consuls to divide the administration between
themselves by lot ; one of them remaining at Rome to
govern the city and its environs; the other taking the
command in the more distant provinces. This expe-
dient must, no doubt, have had great influence in pre-
venting those collisions and rivalships which might oth-
erwise have embroiled the peace of the Republic.
But quitting the dirn light of historical research,
490 The Fcederalist.
attaching ourselves purely to the dictates of reason and
good sense, we shall discover much greater cause to
reject than to approve the idea of plurality in the Exec-
utive, under any modification whatever.
Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any
common enterprise or pursuit, there is always danger of
difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in
which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority,
there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even
animosity. From either, and especially from all these
causes, the most bitter dissensions are apt to spring.
Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability,
weaken the authority, and distract the plans and opera-
tions of those whom they divide. If they should unfor-
tunately assail the Supreme Executive Magistracy of a
country, consisting of a plurality of persons, they might
impede or frustrate the most important measures of the
Government, in the most critical emergencies of the
State. And what is still worse, they might split the
community into the most violent and irreconcilable fac-
tions, adhering differently to the different individuals who
composed the Magistracy.
Men often oppose a thing, merely because they have
had no agency in planning it, or because it may have
been planned by those whom they dislike. But if they
have been consulted, and have happened to disapprove,
opposition then becomes, in their estimation, an indis-
pensable duty of self-love. They seem to think them-
selves bound in honor, and by all the motives of per-
sonal infallibility, to defeat the success of what has been
resolved upon contrary to their sentiments. Men of up-
right, benevolent tempers have too many opportunities
of remarking, with horror, to what desperate lengths this
disposition is sometimes carried, and how often the great
interests of society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the
conceit, and to the obstinacy of individuals, who have
The Foederalist. 491
credit enough to make their passions and their caprices
interesting to mankind. Perhaps the question now be-
fore the public may, in its consequences, afford melan-
choly proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, or
rather detestable vice in the human character.
Upon the principles of a free Government, inconven-
iences from the source just mentioned must necessarily
be submitted to in the formation of the Legislature ; but
it is unnecessary, and therefore unwise, to introduce
them into the constitution of the Executive. It is here
too, that they may be most pernicious. In the Legisla-
ture, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a
benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of
parties in that department of the Government, though
they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often
promote deliberation and circumspection ; and serve to
check excesses in the majority. When a resolution too
is once taken, the opposition must be at an end. That
resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable. But
no favorable circumstances palliate, or atone for the dis-
advantages of dissension in the Executive department.
Here, they are pure and unmixed. There is no point at
which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass
and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to
which they relate, from the first step to the final conclu-
sion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities
in the Executive, which are the most necessary ingredi-
ents in its composition, — vigor and expedition; and
this without any counterbalancing good. In the con-
duct of war, in which the energy of the Executive is
the bulwark of the National security, everything would
be to be apprehended from its plurality.
It must be confessed, that these observations apply
with principal weight to the first case supposed, that
is, to a plurality of Magistrates of equal dignity and
authority ; a scheme, the advocates for which are not
492 The Foederalist.
(ikely to form a numerous sect ; but they apply, though
not with equal, yet with considerable weight to the proj-
ect of a Council, whose concurrence is made constitu-
tionally necessary to the operations of the ostensible
Executive. An artful cabal in that Council would be
able to distract and to enervate the whole system of ad-
ministration. If no such cabal should exist, the mere
diversity of views and opinions would alone be suffi-
cient to tincture the exercise of the Executive authority
with a spirit of habitual feebleness and dilatoriness.
But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality
in the Executive, and which lies as much against the
last as the first plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults,
and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two
kinds, to censure and to punishment. The first is the
most important of the two, especially in an elective
office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in
such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any
longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him
obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication
of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in
either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mut-
ual accusations, to determine, on whom the blame or
the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of per-
nicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from
one to another with so much dexterity, and under such
plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in
suspense about the real author. The circumstances
which may have led to any National miscarriage or mis-
fortune, are sometimes so complicated, that, where there
are a number of actors who may have had different
degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see
upon the whole that there has been mismanagement,
yet it may be impracticable to pronounce, to whose ac-
count the evil which may have been incurred is truly
chargeable.
The Federalist. 493
" I was overruled by my Council. The Council were
"so divided in their opinions, that it was impossible
" to obtain any better resolution on the point." These
and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true
or false. And who is there, that will either take the
trouble or incur the odium, of a strict scrutiny into the
secret springs of the transaction? Should there be found
a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising
task, if there happen to be collusion between the parties
concerned, how easy is it to clothe the circumstances
with so much ambiguity, as to render it uncertain what
was the precise conduct of any of those parties ?
In the single instance in which the Governor of this
State is coupled with a Council, that is, in the appoint-
ment to offices, we have seen the mischiefs of it in the
view now under consideration. Scandalous appoint-
ments to important offices have been made. Some
cases, indeed, have been so flagrant that all parties have
agreed in .the impropriety of the thing. When inquiry
has been made, the blame has been laid by the Governor
on the members of the Council ; who, on their part, have
charged it upon his nomination: while the People re-
main altogether at a loss to determine, by whose influ-
ence their interests have been committed to hands so
unqualified, and so manifestly improper. In tenderness
to individuals, I forbear to descend to particulars.
It is evident from these considerations, that the plu-
rality of the Executive tends to deprive the People of
the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful
exercise of any delegated power : — First, the restraints
of public opinion, which lose their efficacy as wefl on
account of the division of the censure attendant on bad
measures among a number, as on account of the uncer-
tainty on whom it ought to fall ; and, secondly, the op-
portunity of discovering with facility and clearness the
misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to
494 Tlie Feeder alist.
their removal from office, or to their actual punishment
in cases which admit of it.
In England, the King is a perpetual Magistrate ; and
it is a maxim which has obtained for the sake of the
public peace, that he is unaccountable for his adminis-
tration, and his person sacred. Nothing, therefore, can
be wiser in that Kingdom, than to annex to the King a
constitutional Council, who may be responsible to the
Nation for the advice they give. Without this, there
would be no responsibility whatever in the Executive
department, an idea inadmissible in a free Government.
But even there, the King is not bound by the resolutions
of his Council, though they are answerable for the ad-
vice they give. He is the absolute master of his own
conduct in the exercise of his office ; and may observe
or disregard the counsel given to him, at his sole discre-
tion.
But in a Republic, where every Magistrate ought to
be personally responsible for his behavior in office, the
reason, which in the British Constitution dictates the
propriety of a Council, not only ceases to apply, but
turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great
Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited re-
sponsibility of the Chief Magistrate ; which serves in
some degree as a hostage to the National justice for his
good behavior. In the American republic, it would serve
to destroy, or would greatly diminish the intended and
necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate him-
self.
The idea of a Council to the Executive, which has so
generally obtained in the State Constitutions, has been
derived from that maxim of republican jealousy which
considers power as safer in the hands of a number of
men than of a single man. If the maxim should be
admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend,
that the advantage on that side would not counterbal-
The Fcederalist. 495
ance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side.
But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the Ex-
ecutive power. I clearly concur in opinion, in this par-
ticular, with a writer whom the celebrated Junius pro-
nounces to be " deep, solid, and ingenious," that " the
" Executive power is more easily confined when it is
*' ONE ; " * that it is far more safe there should be a single
object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the People ;
and, in a word, that all multiplication of the Executive
is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty.
A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species
of security sought for in the multiplication of the
Executive, is unattainable. Numbers must be so great
as to render combination difficult, or they are rather a
source of danger than of security. The united credit
and influence of several individuals must be more
formidable to liberty, than the credit and influence of
either of them separately. When power, therefore, is
placed in the hands of so small a number of men, as to
^ admit of their interests and views being easily combined
in a common enterprise, by an artful leader, it becomes
more liable to abuse, and more dangerous when abused,
than if it be lodged in the hands of one man ; who,
from the very circumstance of his being alone, will be
more narrowly watched and more readily suspected,
and who cannot unite so great a mass of influence as
when he is associated with others. The Decemvirs of
Rome, whose name denotes their number,f were more
to be dreaded in their usurpation than any one of them
would have been. No person would think of proposing
an Executive rnuch more numerous than that body ;
from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number
of the Council. The extreme of these numbers, is not
too great for an easy combination ; and from such a
combination, America would have more to fear, than
* De Lolmb. — Publius. t Ten. — Publius,
496 The Feeder alist.
from the ambition of any single individual. A Council
to a Magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he
does, are generally nothing better than a clog upon his
good intentions ; are often the instruments and accom-
plices of his bad ; and are almost always a cloak to his
faults.
I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense;
though it be evident that if the Council should be
numerous enough to answer the principal end aimed at
by the institution, the salaries of the members, who
must be drau^n from their homes to reside at the seat of
Government, would form an item in the catalogue of
public expenditures, too serious to be incurred for an
object of equivocal utility. I will only add, that, prior
to the appearance of the Constitution, I rarely met
with an intelligent man from any of the States, wdio
did not admit, as the result of experience, that the
UNITY of the Executive of this State was one of the
best of the distinguishing features of our Constitution.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Tuesday/, March 18, 1788.]
THE FCEDERALIST. No. LXX.
To THE People of the State of New York;
,URATION in office has been mentioned as the
second requisite to the energy of the Executive
authority. This has relation to two objects: to the
personal firmness of the Executive Magistrate, in the
employment of his Constitutional powers ; and to the
stability of the system of administration, which may
have been adopted under his auspices. With regard to
The Fadercdist. 497
the first, it must be evident, that the longer the duration
in office, the greater will be the probability of obtaining
so imjjortant an advantage. It is a general principle of.
human nature that a man will be interested in what-
ever he possesses, in proportion to the firmness or
precariousness of the tenure by which he holds it ; will
be less attached to what he holds by a momentary or
uncertain title, than to what he enjoys by a durable or
certain title ; and, of course, will be willing to risk
more for the sake of the one, than for the sake of the
other. This remark is not less applicable to a political
privilege, or honor, or trust, than to any article of
ordinary property. The inference from it is, that a
man acting in the capacity of Chief Magistrate, under
a consciousness that in a very short time he must lay
down fiis office, will be apt to feel himself too little
interested in it, to hazard any material censure or per-
plexity, from the independent exertion of his powers, or
from encountering the ill-humors, however transient,
which may happen to prevail, either in a considerable
part of the society itself, or even in a predominant
faction in the Legislative body. If the case should
only be, that he mig;ht lay it down, unless continued by
a new choice, and if he should be desirous of being
continued, his wishes, conspiring with his fears, would
tend still more powerfully to corrupt his integrity, or
debase his fortitude. In either case, feebleness and
irresolution must be the characteristics of the station.
There are some, who would be inclined to regard the
servile pliancy of the Executive to a prevailing current,
either in the community, or in the Legislature, as its
best recommendation. But such men entertain very
crude notions, as well of the purposes for which Gov-
ernment was instituted, as of the true means by which
the public happiness may be promoted. The repub-
lican principle demands, that the deliberate sense of the
VOL. I. 32
498 The Fcederalist.
community should govern the conduct of those to
whom they intrust the management of their affairs ;
but it does not require an unqualified complaisance to
every sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient
impulse which the People may receive from the arts
of men, who flatter their prejudices to betray their
interests. It is a just observation, that the People
commonly intend the public good. This often applies
to their very errors. But their good sense would
despise the adulator who should pretend, that they
always reason right about the ?neans of promoting it.
They know from experience, that they sometimes err ;
and the wonder is, that they so seldom err as they do,
beset as they continually are, by the wiles of parasites
and sycophants ; by the snares of the ambitious, the
avaricious, the desperate ; by the artifices of men who
possess their confidence more than they deserve it ; and
of those who seek to possess, rather than to deserve it.
When occasions present themselves, in which the
interests of the People are at variance with their
inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they
have appointed to be the guardians of those interests,
to withstand the temporary delusion, in order to give
them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate
reflection. Instances might be cited, in which a con-
duct of this kind has saved the People from very fatal
consequences of their own mistakes, and has procured
lasting monuments of their gratitude to the men who
had courage and magnanimity enough to serve them at
the peril of their displeasure.
But however inclined we might be, to insist upon an
unbounded complaisance in the Executive to the irir
clinations of the People, we can with no propriety
contend for a like complaisance to the humors of the
Legislature. The latter may sometimes stand in
opposition to the former ; and at other times the People
The Fcederalist. 499
may be entirely neutral. In either supposition, it is
certainly desirable, that the Executive should be in a
situation to dare to act his own opinion with vigor and
decision.
The same rule which teaches the propriety of a
partition between the various branches of power,
teaches us likewise that this partition ought to be so
contrived as to render the one independent of the other.
To what purpose separate the Executive or the Judi-
ciary from the Legislative, if both the Executive and
the Judiciary are so constituted as to be at the absolute
devotion of the Legislative ? Such a separation must
be merely nominal, and incapable of producing the ends
for which it was established. It is one thing to be sub-
ordinate to the laws, and another to be dependent on the
Legislative body. The first comports wdth, the last vio-
lates, the fundamental principles of good Government;
and whatever may be the forms of the Constitution,
unites all power in the same hands. The tendency of
the Legislative authority to absorb every other, has
been fully displayed and illustrated by examples in
some preceding numbers. In Governments purely re-
publican, this tendency is almost irresistible. The
Representatives of the People, in a popular Assembly,
seem sometimes to fancy, that they are the People
themselves, and betray strong symptoms of impatience
and disgust at the least sign of opposition from any
other quarter ; as if the exercise of its rights, by either
the Executive or Judiciary, were a breach of their
privilege, and an outrage to their dignity. They often
appear disposed to exert an imperious control over the
other departments ; and as they commonly have the
People on their side, they always act with such mo-
mentum, as to make it very difficult for the other
members of the Government to maintain the balance
of the Constitution.
500 The Foederalist.
It may perhaps be asked, how the shortness of the
duration in office can affect the independence of the
Executive on the Legislature, unless the one were
possessed of the power of appointing or displacing the