/. the difficulty of establishing a general constitutional
â– , rule, 586
i. the impropriety of its use in many cases, 587
i. those in which the foreign relations of the United
States are concerned, 587
ii. those which belong to the equity jurisdiction, . . 588
li. "tlie proposition of Massacliusetts " on this sub-
ject considered, 589
iii. the provision of the constitution of New York on
this subject considered, 591
iv. the proposition that it should be established in all
cases whatever, 592
V. concluding remarks, 592
O. other objections to the proposed Constitution considered
and answered, L XXXI V. 594
lii Contents.
Essay. Page
a. it contains no Bill of Rights, No. LXXXIV. 595
A. the constitution of New York contains none, consid-
ered, 595
a. it contains provisions in the body of the instrument,
which, in substance, amount to the same thing, . . 595
b. it adopts, in their full extent, the common and stat-
ute laws of Great Britain, 595
B. the proposed Constitution contains, in the body of the
instrument, similar equivalent provisions, 595
C. a Bill of Rights will be unnecessary, because the People
will surrender uothiny in the adoption of the proposed
Constitution, and the government will be administered
by their immediate representatives and servants, .... 598
D. a Bill of Rights would be dangerous, as implying the
grant of all powers not expressly withheld, 599
E. the liberty of the press considered, 599
F. the proposed Constitution itself a Bill of Rights, 600
b. " the seat of government will be too remote from many
of the States to admit of a proper knowledge, on the
part of the constituent, of the conduct of the represent-
ative," 601
c. there is no provision respecting debts due to the United
States, 603
d. the additional expense which will be imposed by the new
system, 603
A. the increase of offices under the new government con-
sidered, 604
a. in many cases the State officers will be diminished to
the same extent, 605
h. the judiciary will furnish the principal additions, ... . 605
H. the diminished sessions of the Congress will counter-
balance much of the increased expense, 605
C. the State legislatures, also, will hold shorter sessions,
at diminished cost, 606
D. concluding remarks, 606
VI. "ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR [the People of the State of New
York] OWN STATE CONSTITUTION," Lx'xXV. 607
Vn. " THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS ADOP-
TION WILL AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF
THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT, TO LIBERTY, AND
TO PROPERTY," 608
VIIL CONCLUDING REMARKS, 609
1. the manner in which Publics had discussed the subject con-
sidered, 609
A. an appeal to the reader to weigh the subject under discussion
carefully, and to act conscientiously, 609
Contents. liii
Essay. Page
B. the entire confidence of Publius in the arguments which
recommend the proposed system, No. LXXXV. 610
2. the conceded imperfections of the system no cause for delay in
adopting it, 61^
A. the extent of these concessions has heen greatly exagger-
ated, 610
A. " that it is radically defective " denied, 610
B. " that without material alterations the rights and interests
of the community cannot be safely confided to it " denied, 610
C. although not perfect, it is upon the whole a good plan, 611
B. the precarious state of the country forbids delay for the only
purpose of engaging in the chimerical pursuit of a perfect
plan of government, 611
A. the improbability of assembling a new convention with
the same success as that which attended the last, 611
B. more easy to obtain amendments subsequent to the adoption
of the Constitution than previous thereto, 612
c. no plan can be proposed which will be satisfactory to all
the States, in every respect, 612
D. supposed obstacles in the way of making subsequent amend-
ments considered, 612
E. the ease with which a Foederal convention may be called
for the amendment of the Constitution, under the provi-
sions of the proposed Constitution, 613
3. concluding remarks, 614
A COMPARATIVE EXHIBIT
OF THE
CLABIS TO THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE FCEDERALIST.
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No.
I.
I.
Ilam.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
II.
II.
J4y
J4y
J4y
J4y
jay
Jiy
J4y
ni.
ni.
J4y
J4y
J4y
Jay
Jiy
J4y
J4y
IV.
IV.
J4y
J4y
Jiy
J4y
J4y
J ay
J4y
V.
V.
J4y
J Ay
J4y
J4y
J4y
Jiy
jay
VI.
VI.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
VII.
VII.
Ham.
!lam.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
VIII.
vni.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
IX.
IX.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
X.
X.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
XI.
XI.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
1 Fide letter published in The Port Folio, Vol. IV. No. 20, ante, page xxviii.
2 Vide nnJf , pages xxvi. xxvii.
3 " I am a,ssured that Numbers 2. 3. 4. 5. & 64 were written by John Jay
" Numbers 10. 14. 37 to 49 both Inclusive & 53 by James Madison Jun —
" Numbers 18. 19. 20. by Messrs Madison & Hamilton jointly.
" All the rest by Mr Hamilton
"(( — M' Hamilton told me that M' Madison wrote 48 & 49 or from pa. 101 to 112
"of Vol.2'1 =))
[In much darker colored ink, and in a different style of the Chancellor'' s writing :] " NB —
" I showed the aboTe Memr to General Hamilton in my office in Albany, & he said it
" was correct, seeing the correction above made — " Chancellor Kent's MS. notes on the
first fly-page of his copy of M' Lean's edition of The Foederalist, now owned by his grand-
son, James Kent, Esc/., of Fishkill Landing, N. Y.
* Copied from the original MS. notes in Mr. Madison's copy of Tiebout's edition of The
Federalist, by William Q. Force, for his father, General Peter Force, of Washington,
D.C.
5 Vide letter of Benjamin Rdsh, Esq., ante, pages xxxix to xlv.
6 Copied from the original MS. notes in Mr. Ames"s copy of M'Lean's edition of The
Fcederalist, now owned by his grandson-in-Iaw, Francis Howland, Esq., of Englewood,
N. J.
7 " Me7nr I have no doubt Mr Jay wrote No 64 on the Treaty Power — He made a
"Speech on that Subject in the N Y Convention, & I am told he says he wrote it — I
" suspect therefore from iuterual Ev. the above to be the correct List, & not the one on
" the oppo.«ide Page — " CAanccZ/or Kent's MS. notes, appended to this list, and in his
copy of The Fcederalist, before referred to, inserted immediately opposite to the memoran-
dum approved by General Hamilton and copied into Note 3.
8 From the original MS. notes in Mr. Jeff-.rsin's copy of M'Lean's edition of The Fced-
eralist, now in the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.
9 From the understanding in Mr. Jay's family, from Chancellor Kent's MS. notes, and
from the biographical sketch of Mr. Jay's life in Dklapiaine'S Repository of the Lives and
Portraits of Distinguished American Characters.
Authorship of Tlie Faderalisi.
Iv
i
1
o
i
a
â– S
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Gen. Hamilton in his
own copy and in the
Benson manuscript.
Gen. Hamilton to
Chancellor Kent.
1 —
2.a .
all
III
alii
Mr. Ames's manu-
1 script notes.
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No.
No.
xn.
XII.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
XIII.
XIII.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
XIV.
XIV.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
XV.
XV.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
XVI.
XVI.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
XVII.
XVII.
Ham.
Ilam.
Ham.
Mad.
Mad.
XVIII.
XVIII.
H. & M.
H.& M.
Mad.
H. & M.
Mad.
Mad.
XIX.
XIX.
H. & M.
H. & M.
Mad.
U &M.
Mad.
Mad.
XX.
XX.
H. & M.
H. & M.
IMad.
H. & M.
Ilam.
Ham.
XXI.
XXI.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Mad.
Mad.
XXII.
XXII.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham .
Ham.
Ham.
XXIII.
XXIII.
Ham.
Ham.
ilam.
Ham.
Ham.
XXIV.
XXIV.
Ham.
Ham.
Ilani.
Ham.
Ham.
XXV.
XXV.
Ham.
Ham.
Ilam.
Ham.
Ham.
XXVI.
XXVI.
Ham.
Ham.
Ilam.
Ham.
Ham.
XXVII.
XXVII.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
XXVIII.
XXVIII.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
XXIX.
XXX.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
XXX.
XXXI.
Ham.
Ham.
Ilam.
Ham.
H.im.
XXXI.
j XXXII.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
(XXXIII.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Kam.
Ham.
XXXII.
XXXIV.
Ilam.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
XXXIII.
XXXV.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
XXXIV.
XXXVI.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
XXXV.
XXIX.
Ilam.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham .
Ham.
XXXVI.
XXXVII.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
XXXVII.
XXXVIII.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad,
XXXVIII.
XXXIX.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
XXXIX.
XL.
Mad.
Mad.
]\t.id.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
XL.
XLI.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
XLI
XLII.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
XLII.
XLIII.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
XLIII.
XLTV.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
XLIV.
XLV.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
XLV.
XLVI.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
JIad.
Mad.
XLVI
XLVII.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
XLVII.
XLVIII.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
XLVIII.
XLIX.
Ham.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
XLIX.
L.
Ham.
Ham.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
L.
LI.
Ham.
Ham.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
LI.
LII.
Ham.
Ham.
Mad.
Mad.
JIad.
LTI.
LIII.
Ham.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
LIII.
LIV.
J4y
Ham.
Mad.
J4y
Mad.
JIad.
LIV.
LV.
Ham.
Ham.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
LV.
LVI.
Ham.
Ham.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
LVI.
LVII.
Ham.
Ham.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
LVII.
LVIII.
Ham.
Ham.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
LVIII.
LIX.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
LIX.
LX.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
LX.
LXI.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
LXI.
LXII.
Ham.
Ham.
Mad
Mad.
Mad.
LXII.
LXIII.
Ham.
Ham.
Mad.
Mad.
Mad.
LXIII.
LXIV.
Ham.
J&y
JSy
.T4y
J4y
Jay
LXIV.
LXV.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
' LXV.
LXVI.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
LXVI.
LXVII.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
LXVII.
LXVIII.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
I>XVIII.
LXIX.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham
Ham.
Ham.
LXIX.
LXX.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
Ham.
LXX.
LXXI.
Ham.
> Ham.
Ham.
Ham
Ham.
Ivi
Authorship of The Fcederalist.
No.
LXXI.
LXXII.
LXXIII.
LXXIV.
LXXV.
LXXVI.
Lxxvni.
LXXIX.
LXXX.
LXXXI.
LXXXII.
LXXXIII.
LXXXIV.
LXXXV.
No.
LXXII.
LXXIII.
LXXIV.
LXXV.
LXXVI.
LXXVII.
LXXVIII.
LXXIX.
LXXX.
LXXXI.
LXXXII.
LXXXIII.
LXXXIV.
LXXXV.
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"<2
For the Independent Journal.
THE FGEDERALIST. No. I.
To THE People of the State of New Yoek:
AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy
of the subsisting Foederal Government, you are
called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the
United States of America. The subject speaks its own
importance ; comprehending in its consequences, noth-
ing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety
and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the
fate of an empire, in many respects, the most interesting
in the world. It has been frequently remarked, that it
seems to have been reserved to the people of this coun-
try, by their conduct and example, to decide the impor-
tant question, whether societies of men are really capable
or not, of establishing good government from reflection
and choice, or whether they are forever destined to de-
pend, for their political constitutions, on accident and
force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis, at
which we are arrived, may with propriety be regarded
as the aera in which that decision is to be made ; and a
wrong election of the part we shall act, may, in this
view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune
of mankind.
This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy
to those of patriotism to heighten the solicitude, which
all considerate and good men must feel for the event.
Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a
2 TJie Foederalist.
judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed
and unbiased by considerations not connected with the
public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be
wished, than seriously to be expected. The plan of-
fered to our deliberations, affects too many particular
interests, innovates upon too many local institutions,
not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects for-
eign to its merits, and of views, passions and preju-
dices little favorable to the discovery of truth.
Among the most formidable of the obstacles which
the new Constitution will have to encounter, may read-
ily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain
class of men in every State to resist all changes which
may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument and
consequence of the offices they hold under the State-
establishments — and the perverted ambition of another
class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize them-
selves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter
themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the
subdivision of the empire into several partial confeder-
acies, than from its union under one Government.
It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observa-
tions of this nature. I am well aware that it would be
disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the opposition
of any set of men (merely because their situations might
subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious
views : Candor will oblige us to admit, that even such
men may be actuated by upright intentions ; and it can-
not be doubted, that much of the opposition which has
made its appearance, or may hereafter make its appear-
ance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not
respectable ; the honest errors of minds led astray by pre-
conceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed
and so powerful are the causes, which serve to give a
false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many occa-
sions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as
TJie Federalist. 3
on the right side of questions, of the first magnitude to
society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would
furnish a lesson of moderation to those, who are ever so
much persuaded of their being in the right, in any con-
troversy. And a further reason for caution, in this re-
spect, might be drawn from the reflection, that we are
not always sure, that those who advocate the truth are
influenced by purer principles than their antagonists.
Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition,
and many other motives, not more laudable than these,
are apt to operate as well upon those who support, as
upon those who oppose, the right side of a question.
Were there not even these inducements to moderation,
nothing could be more ill-judged than that intolerant
spirit, which has, at all times, characterized political
parties. For, in politics as in religion, it is equally
absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword.
Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.
And yet however just these sentiments will be
allowed to be, we have ahready sufficient indications,
that it will happen in this as in all former cases of great
national discussion. A torrent of angry and malignant
passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct
of the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude, that
they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their
opinions, and to increase the number of their converts
by the loudness of their declamations, and the bitterness
of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy
and efficiency of government will be stigmatized, as the
offspring of a temper fond of despotic power, and
hostile to the principles of liberty. An over scrupulous
jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which is
more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart,
will be represented as mere pretence and artifice; the
stale bait for popularity at the expense of public good.
It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy ia
4 The Fcederalist.
the usual concomitant of violent love, and that the
noble enthusiasm of liberty is too apt to be infected
with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the
other hand, it will be eqtfally forgotten, that tlie vigor
of Government is essential to the security of liberty;
that, in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed
judgment, their interest can never be separated ; and
that a dangerous ambition more often Im'ks behind the
specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people, than
under the forbidding appearance of zeal for the firmness
and efficiency of Government. History will teach us,
that the former has been found a much more certain
road to the introduction of despotism, than the latter;
and that of those men who have overturned the liberties
of republics the greatest number have begun their career,
by paying an obsequious court to the people ; commen-
cing Demagogues, and ending Tyrants.
In the course of the preceding observations I have
had an eye, my Fellow-Citizens, to putting you upon
your guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter,
to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost
moment to your welfare by any impressions other than
those which may result from the evidence of truth. You
will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the
general scope of them that they proceed from a source
not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my
Countrymen, I own to you, that, after having given it
an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion, it is
your interest to adopt it. I am convinced, that this is
the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your
happiness, I affect not reserves, which I do not feel. I
will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation,
when I have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you
my convictions, and I will freely lay before you the
reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness
of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not
Tlie Fcederalist. 5
however multiply professions on this head. My motives
must remain in the depository of my own breast : My
arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by
all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will
not disgrace the cause of truth.
I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the follow-
ing interesting particulars. — The utility of the UNION
to your political prosperity — The insufficiency of the
present Confederation to preserve that Union — The
necessity of a Government at least equally energetic ivith
the one proposed, to the attainme7it of this object — The
conformity of the proposed Constitution to the true prin-
ciples of republican Government — Its analogy to your
own state constitution — and lastly, Tiie additional se-
curity , which its adoption will afford to the preservation
of that species of Government, to liberty, and to property.
In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to
give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which
shall have made their appearance, that may seem to
have any claim to your attention.
It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer argu-
ments to prove the utility of the UNION, a point, no
doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts of the great body
of the people in every State, and one, which it may be
imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we
already hear it whispered in the private circles of those
who oppose the new Constitution, that the Thirteen
States are of too great extent for any general system,
and that we must of necessity, resort to separate con-
federacies of distinct portions of the whole.* This doc-
trine will, in all probability, be gradually propagated,
till it has votaries enough to countenance an open
avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident, to
* The same idea, tracing the ar- lications against the new Consti-
guments to their consequences, is tution. — Publius.
held out in several of the late puh-
6 The Fasderalist.
those who are able to take an enlarged view of the
subject, than the alternative of an adoption of the new
Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union. It
will, therefore, be of use to begin by examining the
advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the
probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed
from its dissolution. This shall accordingly constitute
the subject of my next address.
PUBLIUS.
For the Independent Journal.
THE FCEDERALIST. No. II.
To THE People of the State of New Tokk:
WHEN the people of America reflect that they are
now called upon to decide a question, which, in its
consequences, must prove one of the most important,
that ever engaged their attention, the propriety of their
taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious,
view of it, will be evident.
Nothing is more certain than the indispensable neces-
sity of Government, and it is equally undeniable, that
whenever and however it is instituted, the people must
cede to it some of their natural rights, in order to vest it
with requisite powers. It is well worthy of considera-
tion, therefore, whether it would conduce more to the
interest of the people of America, that they should, to
all general purposes, be one nation, under one Fcederal
Government, or that they should divide themselves into
separate confederacies, and give to the head of each, the
same kind of powers which they are advised to place in
one national Government.
The Feeder alist. 7
It has mitil lately been a received and uncontradicted
opinion, that the prosperity of the people of America
depended on their continuing firmly united, and the
wishes, prayers, and efforts of our best and wisest Citi-
zens have been constantly directed to that object. But
Politicians now appear, who insist that this opinion is
erroneous, and that instead of looking for safety and
happiness in union, we ought to seek it in a division of
the States into distinct confederacies or sovereignties.
However extraordinary this new doctrine may appear, it
nevertheless has its advocates ; and certain characters
who were much opposed to it formerly, are at present
of the number. Whatever may be the arguments or
inducements which have wrought this change in the
sentiments and declarations of these Gentlemen, it cer-
tainly would not be wise in the people at large to adopt
these new political tenets without being fully convinced
that they are founded in truth and sound Policy.
It has often given me pleasure to observe, that Inde-
pendent America was not composed of detached and