icy has demanded, nor would public opinion have tol-
erated, a larger number of troops upon its domestic
establishment. There has been, for a long time past,
The Foederalist. 4'/
little room for the operation of the other causes, which
have been enumerated as the consequences of internal
war. This peculiar felicity of situation has, in a great
degi-ee, contributed to preserve the liberty which that
country to this day enjoys, in spite of the prevalent
venality and corruption. If, on the contrary, Britain had
been situated on the continent, and had been compelled,
as she would have been, by that situation, to make her
military establishments at home coextensive with those
of the other great powers of Europe, she, like them,
would in all probability be, at this day, a victim to the
absolute power of a single man. 'Tis possible, though
not easy, that the people of that island may be enslaved
from other causes ; but it cannot be by the prowess
of an army so inconsiderable as that which has been
usually kept up within that kingdom.
K we are wise enough to preserve the Union, we may
for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insu-
lated situation. Europe is at a great distance from us.
Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to continue
too much disproportioned in strength, to be able to give
us any dangerous annoyance. Extensive military estab-
lishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our
security. But if we should be disunited, and the inte-
gral parts should either remain separated, or, which is
most probable, should be thrown together into two or
three confederacies, we should be, in a short course of
time, in the predicament of the continental powers of
Europe — our liberties would be a prey to the means
of defending ourselves against the ambition and jeal-
ousy of each other.
This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and
weighty. It deserves the most serious and mature con-
sideration of every prudent and honest man, of what-
ever party. If such men will make a firm and solemn
pause, and meditate dispassionately on the importance
48 Tlie FoBderalist.
of this interesting idea ; if they will contemplate it, in
all its attitudes, and trace it to all its consequences, they
will not hesitate to part with trivial objections to a Con-
stitution, the rejection of which would in all probability
put a final period to the Union. The airy phantoms
that flit before the distempered imaginations of some ol
its adversaries, would quickly give place to the more
substantial forms of dangers, real, certain, and formi-
dable.
PUBLIUS.
For the Independent Journal.
THE FCEDERALIST. No. IX.
To THE People of the State of New Tork:
A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the
-'â– -^ peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against
doftiestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible to
read the history of the petty Republics of Greece and
Italy, without feeling sensations of horror and disgust,
at the disti-actions with which they were continually
agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions, by
which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration,
between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If they
exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived
contrasts to the furious storms, that are to succeed. If,
now and then, intervals of felicity open themselves to
view, we behold them with a mixture of regret, arising
from the reflection, that the pleasing scenes before us
are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves
of sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of glory
break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a
The Fcdderalist 49
transient and fleeting brilliancy, they, at the same time,
admonish us to lament, that the vices of Government
should pervert the direction, and tarnish the lustre of
those bright talents and exalted endowments, for which
the favored soils that produced them have been so justly
celebrated.
From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those
Republics, the advocates of despotism have drawn argu-
ments, not only against the forms of Republican Gov-
ernment, but against the very principles of civil liberty.
They have decried all free Government as inconsistent
with the order of society, and have indulged themselves
in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans.
Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the
basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in
a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms.
And, I trust, America will be the broad and solid founda-
tion of other edifices, not less magnificent, which will be
equally permanent monuments of their errors.
But it is not to be denied, that the portraits they have
sketched of Republican Government were too just cop-
ies of the originals from which they were taken. K it
had been found impracticable to have devised models
of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends to
liberty would have been obliged to abandon the cause
of that species of Government as indefensible. The
science of politics, however, like most other sciences,
has received great improvement. The eflicacy of vari-
ous principles is now well understood, which were either
not known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients.
The regular distribution of power into distinct depart-
ments ; the introduction of legislative balances and
checks ; the institution of Courts composed of Judges
holding their oflices during good behavior ; the repre-
sentation of the people in the Legislature, by Deputies
of their own election ; these are either wholly new dis-
50 Tlie Fcederalist.
coveries, or have made their principal progress towards
perfection in modern times. They are means, and pow-
erful means, by which the excellences of Republican
Government may be retained, and its imperfections les-
sened, or avoided. To this catalogue of circumstances,
that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil
Government, I shall venture, however novel it may ap-
pear to some, to add one more, on a principle which has
been made the foundation of an objection to the New
Constitution ; I mean the enlargement of the orbit
within which such systems are to revolve, either in
respect to tke dimensions of a single State, or to the
consolidation of several smaller States into one gi-eat
Confederacy. The latter is that which immediately
concerns the object under consideration. It will, how-
ever, be of use to examine the principle, in its appli-
cation to a single State, which shall be attended to in
another place.
The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress fac-
tion, and to guard the internal tranquillity of States, as
to increase their external force and security, is in reality
not a new idea. It has been practised upon, in different
countries and ages, and has received the sanction of the
most approved writers on the subjects of politics. The
opponents of the Plan proposed, have, with great assi-
duity, cited and circulated the observations of Montes-
quieu on the necessity of a contracted territory for a Re-
publican Government. But they seem not to have been
apprised of the sentiments of that great man, expressed
in another part of his work, nor to have adverted to the
consequences of the principle, to which they subscribe
with such ready acquiescence.
"When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for
Republics, the standards he had in view were of dimen-
sions far short of the limits of almost every one of these
States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Tlie Foederalist. 51
IVew-York, North Carolina, nor Georgia, can by any
means be compared with the models from which he
reasoned, and to which the terms of his description ap-
ply. If we therefore take his ideas on this point, as the
criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the alternative,
either of taking refuge at once in the arms of Mon-
archy, or of splitting om-selves into an infinity of lit-
tle, jealous, clashing, tumultuous Commonwealths, the
wretched nurseries of unceasing discord, and the miser-
able objects of universal pity or contempt. Some of
the writers, who have come forward on the other side of
the question, seem to have been aware of the dilemma;
and have even been bold enough to hint at the division
of the larger States, as a desirable thing. Such an in-
fatuated policy, such a desperate expedient, might, by
the multiplication of petty offices, answer the views of
men, who possess not qualifications to extend their in-
fluence beyond the narrow circles of personal intrigue ;
but it could never promote the greatness or happiness
of the people of America.
Referring the examination of the principle itself to
another place, as has been already mentioned, it will be
sufficient to remark here, that in the sense of the author
who has been most emphatically quoted upon the occa-
sion, it would only dictate a reduction of the size of
the more considerable members of the Union ; but would
not militate against their being all comprehended in one
Confederate Government. And this is the true ques-
tion, in the discussion of which we are at present inter-
ested.
So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from stand-
ing in opposition to a general Union of the States, that
he explicitly treats of a Confederate Republic as the
expedient for extending the sphere of popular Govern-
ment, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with
those of republicanism.
52 The Foederalist.
" It is very probable," (says he,*) "that mankind would
" have been obliged, at length, to live constantly under
" the Government of a single person, had they not
" contrived a kind of Constitution, that has all the inter-
" nal advantages of a Republican, together with the ex-
" ternal force of a Monarchical Government. I mean a
" Confederate Republic.
" This form of Government is a Convention by which
" several smaller States agree to become members of a
" larger one, which they intend to form. It is a kind of
" assemblage of societies, that constitute a new one, ca-
" pable of increasing by means of new associations, till
" they arrive to such a degree of power, as to be able to
" provide for the security of the united body.
" A Republic of this kind, able to withstand an exter-
" nal force, may support itself without any internal
" corruptions. The form of this society prevents all
" manner of inconveniences.
" If a single member should attempt to usurp the su-
" preme authority, he could not be supposed to have an
" equal authority and credit in all the Confederate
" States. Were he to have too great influence over one,
" this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part,
" that which would still remain free might oppose him
" with forces, independent of those which he had usurp-
" ed, and overpower him before he could be settled in his
" usurpation.
" Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the
" Confederate States, the others are able to quell it.
" Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed
" by those that remain sound. The State may be de-
" stroyed on one side, and not on the other ; the Confed-
" eracy may be dissolved, and the Confederates preserve
" their Sovereignty.
" As this Government is composed of small Repub-
* Spirit of Laws, Vol. I. Book IX. Chap. I. — Puhlius.
The Feeder alist. 53
" lies, it enjoys the internal happiness of each ; and with
" respect to its external situation, it is possessed, by
" means of the Association, of all the advantages of
" large Monarchies."
I have thought it proper to quote at length these in-
teresting passages, because they contain a luminous
abridgment of the principal arguments in favor of the
Union, and must effectually remove the false impres-
sions, which a misapplication of other parts of the work
was calculated to make. They have, at the same time,
an intimate connection with the more immediate design
of this Paper ; which is, to illustrate the tendency of the
Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection.
A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been
raised between a Confederacy and a consolidation of the
States. The essential characteristic of the first is said
to be, the restriction of its authority to the members in
their collective capacities, without reaching to the indi-
viduals of whom they are composed. It is contended,
that the National Council ought to have no concern
with any object of internal administration. An exact
equality of suffrage between the members has also been
insisted upon as a leading feature of a Confederate
Government, These positions are, in the main, arbitra-
ry ; they are supported neither by principle nor prece-
dent. It has indeed happened, that Governments of
this kind have generally operated in the manner which
the distinction, taken notice of, supposes to be inherent in
their nature ; but there have been in most of them ex-
tensive exceptions to the practice, which serve to prove,
as far as example will go, that there is no absolute tule
on the subject. And it will be clearly shown, in the
course of this investigation, that as far as the principle
contended for has prevailed, it has been the cause of in-
curable disorder and imbecility in the Government.
The definition of a Confederate Republic seems sim-
54 . The FcEderalist.
ply to be, " an assemblage of Societies," or an Associa-
tion of two or more States into one State. The extent,
modifications, and objects of the Foederal authority, are
mere matters of discretion. So long as the separate or-
ganization of the members be not abolished ; so long as
it exists, by a constitutional necessity, for local purposes ;
though it should be in perfect subordination to the
general authority of the Union, it would still be, in fact
and in theory, an Association of States, or a Confederacy.
The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an ab-
olition of the State Governments, makes them constit-
uent parts of the National Sovereignty, by allowing
them a direct representation in the Senate, and leaves
in theu- possession certain exclusive and very important
portions of Sovereign power. This fully corresponds,
in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a
Federal Government.
In the Lycian Confederacy, which consisted of twen-
ty-three CITIES, or Republics, the largest were entitled to
three votes in the common council, those of the middle
class to two^ and the smallest to one. The common
COUNCIL had the appointment of all the Judges and
Magistrates of the respective cities. This was certain-
ly the most delicate species of interference in their in-
ternal administration; for if there be anything that
seems exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions,
it is the appointment of their own officers. Yet Mon-
tesquieu, speaking of this Association, says, " Were I
" to give a model of an excellent Confederate Republic,
" it would be that of Lycia." Thus we perceive, that
the * distinctions insisted upon were not within the con-
templation of this enlightened civilian ; and we shall be
led to conclude, that they are the novel refinements of
an erroneous theory.
PUBLIUS.
The Feeder alls f. 55
IFrom the New York Packet, Friday, November 23, 1787.]
THE FCEDERALIST. No. X.
To THE People of the State of New York :
AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a
well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more
accurately developed than its tendency to break and
control the violence of faction. The friend of popular
Governments never finds himself so much alarmed for
their character and fate, as when he contemplates their
propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail,
therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without
violating the principles to which he is attached, provides
a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and con-
fusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth,
been the mortal diseases under which popular Govern-
ments have everywhere perished; as they continue to
be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adver-
saries to liberty derive their most specious declamations.
The valuable improvements made by the American
Constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and
modern, cannot certainly be too much admired ; but it
would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that
they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side,
as was wished and expected. Complaints are every-
where heard from our most considerate and virtuous
citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith,
and of public and personal liberty, that our Governments
are too unstable ; that the public good is disregarded in
the conflicts of rival parties ; and that measures are too
often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and
the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force
56 The Fcederalist.
of an interested and overbearing majority. However
anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no
foundation, the evidence of known facts will not permit
us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be
found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that
some of the distresses under which we labor have been
erroneously charged on the operation of our Govern-
ments ; but it will be found, at the same time, that other
causes will not alone account for many of om* heaviest
misfortunes ; and, particularly, for that prevailing and
increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm
for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the
continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not
wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice, with
which a factious spirit has tainted our public adminis-
tration a.
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens,
whether amounting to a majority or minority of the
whole, who are united and actuated by some common
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights
of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate in-
terests of the community.
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of fac-
tion : the one, by removing its causes ; the other, by con-
â– trolling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes
of faction : the one, by destroying the liberty which is
essential to its existence ; the other, by giving to every
citizen the same opinions, the' same passions, and the
same interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first
remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is
to faction, what air is to fire, an aliment without which
it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to
abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, be-
cause it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the
The Fcederalist. 57
annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, be-
cause it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
The second expedient is as impracticable, as the first
would be unwise. As long as the reason of man con-
tinues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, differ-
ent opinions will be formed. As long as the connection
subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opin-
ions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on
each other ; and the former will be objects to which the
latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the fac-
ulties of men, from which the rights of property origi-
nate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to an uniformity
of interests. The protection of these faculties is the
first object of Government. From the protection of
different and unequal faculties of acquiring property,
the possession of different degrees and kinds of prop-
erty immediately results ; and from the influence of
these on the sentiments and views of the respective pro-
prietors, ensues a division of the society into different
interests and parties.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the
nature of man ; and we see them everywhere brought
into different degrees of activity, according to the dif-
ferent circumstances of civil society. A zeal for differ-
ent opinions concerning religion, concerning Government,
and many other points, as well of speculation as of prac-
tice ; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously
contending for preeminence and power ; or to persons
of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interest-
ing to the human passions, have, in turn, divided man-
kind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity,
and rendered them much more disposed to vex and op-
press each other, than to cooperate for their common
good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall
into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occa-
sion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful dis-
58 The Fcederalist.
tinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly
passions, and excite their most violent conflicts. But
the most common and durable source of factions has
been the various and unequal distribution of property.
Those who hold, and those who are without property,
have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those
who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under
a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufactur-
ing interest, a mercantile interest, a naoneyed interest,
with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civ-
ilized nations, and divide them into different classes, ac-
tuated by different sentiments and views. The regula-
tion of these various and interfering interests forms the
principal task of modern Legislation, and involves the
spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary
operations of the Government.
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause;
because his interest would certainly bias his judgment,
and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal,
nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be
both judges and parties at the same time ; yet what are
many of the most important acts of legislation, but so
many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the
rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of
large bodies of citizens ? and what are the different
classes of Legislators, but advocates and parties to the
causes which they determine ? Is a law proposed con-
cerning private debts ? It is a question to which the
creditors are parties on one side, and the debtors on the
other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them.
Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges ;
and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the
most powerful faction, must be expected to prevail.
Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in
what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures ?
arc questions which would be differently decided by the
The Feeder alist. 59
landed and the manufacturing classes ; and probably by
neither, with a sole regard to justice and the public
good. The apportionment of taxes on the various de-
scriptions of property is an act which seems to require
the most exact impartiality ; yet there is, perhaps, no
legislative act in which greater opportunity and tempta-
tion are given to a predominant party, to trample on
the rules of justice. Every shilling, with which they
overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to
their own pockets.
It is in vain to say, that enlightened statesmen will
be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render
them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened
statesmen will not always be at the helm : Nor, in many
cases, can such an adjustment be made at all, without
taking into view indirect and remote considerations,
which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest
which one party may find in disregarding the rights of
another, or the good of the whole.
The inference to which we are brought is, that the
causes of faction cannot be removed ; and that relief
is only to be sought in the means of controlling its
effects.
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is
supplied by the republican principle, which enables the
majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It
may clog the administration, it may convulse the so-
ciety ; but it will be unable to execute and mask its
violence under the forms of the Constitution. When
a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular
Government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to
its ruling passion or interest both the public good and
the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good,
and private rights, against the danger of such a faction,
and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form