/#/'
THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES
Cabinet €tittian.
THE
INVASION OF THE CEIMEA.
THE
INVASION OF THE CKIMEA
ITS ORIGIN, AND AN ACCOUNT OF ITS PROGRESS
DOWN TO THE DEATH OF LORD RAGLAN.
BY
A. W. KINGLAKE.
SIXTH EDITION".
VOL. II.
WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS,
EDINBURGH AND LONDON.
MDCCCLXXVII.
All nights reserved
DK
THE YEAE 1853 AND THE YEAE 1876.
A PREFACE TO THE PRESENT EDITION.
(COXTINDED FROil Vol. I. p. XV.)
Of all the impulsions which brought on the war of
1853, there was hardly any one more effective than
the fatal voice from this island, which invited the
Eussian assailant to take heart and cross the border
by causing him to imagine that he had nothing to fear
from England ; and now once more private citizens
boldly planting themselves athwart the path of their
own Government, have been cheering Eussia into
the mood for subversive enterprises. But there, the
parallel ends, and there, also, a wide contrast begins ;
for, though credulously listened to at St Petersburg,
the Peace Party men of 1853, who made bold to lay
England's abdication at the feet of the Czar, had no
following to support their pretensions; whereas the
denouncers of last autumn have not only proved their
strength, but perhaps, one may say, gained their
victory — a victory over their country, and in that
VI PREFACE.
sense, over themselves ; for at a moment when the
State was pursuing its accustomed policy, they inter-
posed vi^ith a mind to shackle it, and I think it is in
vain to deny that during a period of several months
the State was shackled accordingly.
The truth is, that from the time when observers,
unallured by the charm of the East, began to cast
critical glances at the polity of the Ottoman Empire,
no one well — without smiling — could say it was other-
wise than grievously bad, and not many could even
see in it the germs of a much better system ; so that,
when superadded to the spectacle of public bank-
ruptcy, and the other abundant proofs that there were
of Turkish misgovernment, the outrages committed
last May in a part of what some called ' Bulgaria,' *
gave such weight, power, and substance to indignant
denunciations of the Sultan's rule, that a mass of
opinion in this country was brought into harmony
with that of the great Eussian people ; the distant
multitudes of the East and of the West being thus,
as it were, 'made kin' by the touch of a human feeling.
Despite intervening distance, the two multitudes were
both alike moved by tlie same pity, the same anger,
the same longing to inflict retribution, the same scorn
of any cold policy or any unwelcome prudence that
seemed standing in the way of their vengeance.
The Eussian multitude, as I have shown, were not
without means of pressing their entreaties upon the
* The outrages occurred in villages occupied by Bulgarians, but
situate far south of the Balkan, in the country we call Rounielia.
PREFACE. VH
Czar, and pressing them, too, with great force ; * still
they necessarily uttered their prayer in general terms,
saying only, if so one may speak, that they were ready
and eager to begin and carry through a crusade. But
in England, the angry denouncers got a tighter grasp
of the subject. Including amongst them great num-
bers of gifted, well-informed men, with the prince of
all orators at their head, they really were not com-
mon throngs, but thousands and thousands of Foreign
Secretaries, free from any tough doubt about anything,
and they entered upon the duties of the invaded De-
partment with minds unhampered by the traditions
of Ofi&ce, nay even so unhampered by Policy that, if
reminded by some grey-headed clerk of the connec-
tion between Turkish ' independence ' and the burn-
ing question of ' the Straits,' they all said there was
nothing in that. They undertook a grave task.
To endeavour to govern the progress of domestic
legislation by loud utterances of the public voice —
this, we know, is a business familiar enough in our
islands ; but what the angry myriads last year
undertook to do was something of deeper moment.
Eoused by just indignation, and helped a little, it
seems, by an almost ' syn-orthodox ' section of our
Anglican Church, but without the least aid from their
temporal institutions, Queen or Parliament, or Army or
Navy, they undertook — undertook in a few autumn
weeks — to change, nay even reverse, the once settled
policy of England ; and, the time, as I have shown,
* Vol. I. p. xii. et scq.
Vlll PEEFACE.
being ripe, they did much towards achieving their
purpose. They certainly so far achieved it, that,
under the impulsion they gave, Lord Salisbury — side
by side with Ignatieff — was apparently busied for
weeks in assailing that very ' independence of the
' Ottoman Empire ' which England had long held to
be a blessing — a blessing so rich as to be worthy of
being fought for, and conquered at a huge cost of life
and treasure.
In the counsels of men numbered by myriads, there
could not but be a diversity of opinion. Some would
have liked that England should concur with Eussia,
or any other Power that might like such a service,
in putting force upon the Sultan, that is, making war
against him. Many more, however, desired that, in-
stead of helping to assail Turkey ourselves, we should
' leave her to destruction,' or in other words, stand by
approving, whilst Eussia destroyed or maimed the
victim. We were to form, with other like-minded
nations, what in the days of pugilism used to be called
a 'ring,' with the understanding, however, that, this
time, our vows were to be for the assailant against
the assailed — for the strong and against the weak.
There was a general impression in the assembled
crowds, that, when England engaged in the Crimean
war, she must have been yielding to the impulse of
some strange and misplaced affection which we bore
towards the Ottoman race, and accordingly the thou-
sands came forward with great zeal to protest that,
never, never, never again should this coimtry fight
PEEJB'ACE. IX
for the Turks. Certaiuly, if any statesmen had ever
engaged their country in war to please the Turks, or
were plotting to do so last autumn, it might have been
well to denounce a policy so romantic, or rather
grotesque ; but whoever may do me the honour to
read these pages, will see that our people were en-
gaged in the war of 1854, by what — whether rightly
or not — appeared to be the dictates of policy, rein-
forced, it is true, by their own warlike ardour, and
especially — as this volume shows — by their craving
for an adventurous enterprise. Of course, when under
those motives, our people had determined to fend off
Eussia from lands in which the Sultan held dominion,
they endeavoured to make the best of the mates with
whom simple Geography told them they must needs
be CO - operating ; but no one surely imagines that
Lord Palmerston, or the statesmen of his day, ever
dreamed of going to war for the sake of any Mah-
mouds, or Osmans, or Mustaphas. That there were
ways of maintaining the policy without resorting to
arms, I labour to show, and succeed, as I think, in
my effort ; but to decry the policy, because it in-
volved alliance with the ill-governed, ill-governing
Turks, is much like insisting that Wellington should
have abandoned Hougoumont to Napoleon, because
the owner of the farm was a Papist.
Still it is vain to deny that, whether wisely or other-
wise, a vast proportion of our citizens did in fact make
a public vow against all idea of going to war for the
sake of the Eastern Question ; and, since England can
X PREFACE.
scarce take up arms without the general concurrence
of her people, the effect of this protest was to place the
power of the country in a state of abeyance. Apart
from any logical or rhetorical merit it may have, the
cogency of any lecture inflicted by one State on
another must depend upon the supposition that it can,
if it will, at its own chosen time, adduce 'the last
' reason of kings,' and to send England into a great
diplomatic arena, after the scenes of last autumn, was
to send her disabled. If our Government, under the
stress of such circumstances, had consulted the dictates
of a seemingly becoming, though really perhaps false
dignity, it must needs have fallen back upon a policy
of inaction, and determined, though watchful reserve.
I have said that by the causes assigned, the feelings
of the two angry multitudes of the East and of the
West, were brought into harmony ; but in one respect
during the autumn, our English denouncers and their
gifted, impetuous leader struck deeper against the
cause of peace than Eussia up to that time had done,
for they were the first to contend that the country
of the Bulgarians — ground including a great part of
Roumelia — must be wrested from Turkish govern-
ance ; and, if it be true that agreement upon other
subjects of difference substantially lay within reach,
we shall have to confess that the single question which
has been threatening and still threatens to prove in-
soluble without a resort to arms was one furnished —
not by Eussia but — England.
It so happened, however, that, besides the policy or
PREFACE. XI
the freak of 'leaving the Turks to destruction,' the
English multitude had highly approved another and
less bloody expedient. They proposed in effect that
the Turks should be scolded out of their country, some
thinking that the victorious tongues should drive off
all the Ottomans bodily, others saying with a thought-
ful air of moderation that, if all the rulers, high and
low, were extirpated,* the Turks of private life might
perhaps be allowed to remain.
Whether in a spirit of grim cynicism, or to show
men the consequences of their interposition, our Prime
Minister heard the prayer of his people, consented to
try their expedient, and sent England into the Council
of assembled Europe with free scope to use her tongue,
but prevented from even seeming to be potentially
belligerent by the staring Neutrality badge which our
citizens had afi&xed to her shoulder. The Turks, see-
ing the badge, declined to be talked out of Europe ;
and, whatever be the effect of this resolve upon their
own destinies, they have at all events maintained
for the moment that ' independence of the Ottoman
' Empire ' which our statesmen were accustomed to
prize and to cherish with infinite care, and have done
this too at a time when the pressure which tried their
firmness was in part applied by Lord Salisbury.*
As a lever for wresting from the Sultan the govern-
• It was distinctly for the ' independence ' of the Ottoman Empire
that the Crimean war was waged. See ' Invasion of the Crimea,'
vol. i. cap. xvii. The integrity of the empire was effectual]}' vindi-
cated by Austrii.
Xll PREFACE.
ment of his own provinces, the Conference has failed ;
and yet in other and better ways it has perhaps done
much good. It has apparently brought about a better
understanding than before between the Powers repre-
sented at Constantinople, and more especially between
Eussia and England, has given a strong impulsion to
the minds of those Turkish statesmen who are intent
upon reforming the polity of the country, and then
also by the mere effect of delay, interposed at an
opportune time, it has averted war — averted war
for the moment, but perhaps for weeks, perhaps even
happily for a period much further prolonged.
CONTENTS.
CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND IN THE
WAR AGAINST RUSSIA.
CHAPTER I.
PAGE
The Czar announcing liis willingness to abstain from further
aggression, .......... 1
The negotiations apparently ripening towards a settlement ; but
ruined by the French Emperor and the English Government, 2
Movement at Constantinople, .2
The use made of this by the Turkish Ministers, ... 3
They succeed in alarming the French Ambassador, . . 4
Composure of Lord Stratford, ...... 4
His wise and guarded measures for preserving the peace of the
capital,
The French Emperor. His means of putting a pressure upon
the English Cabinet, .......
Violent urgency of the French Emperor for an advance of the
fleets to Constantinople, ......
Needlessness of the measure,
Its tendency to bring on war, .....
The English Government yields to the French Emperor,
Fleet ordered up to Constantinople, ....
AVant of firmness and discretion evinced in the adoption of the
measure, .......•â–
Baron Brunnow's remonstrance, .....
Effect of the measure at St Petersburg, ....
Count Nesselrode's sorrow, ......
XIV CONTENTS.
Chapter I. — continued.
The Czar's determination to retaliate with his Black Sea fleet, 12
Error of the notion that the disaster of Sinope was a surprise
achieved by stealth, ........ 13
Ostentatious publicity of the Russian operations in the Black
Sea, 13
Tidings of an impending attack by the Eussian fleet, . . 14
Inaction of the Ambassadors and the Admirals, ... 15
The disaster of Sinope, 18
CHAPTEE II.
Chasm in the instructions furnished to the Admirals of the
Western Powers, . . 19
Eeception of the tidings of Sinope by the French Government,
and by the people in England, ... . . 20
The anger of the English diverted from their own rulers and
unjustly brought to bear on the Czar, .... 21
First decision of the English Cabinet in regard to Sinope, . 22
Proposal of the French Emperor, 23
Danger of breaking down the old barriers between peace and
Avar, 23
Ambiguous character of the proposal, ..... 23
The French Emperor presses upon the English Cabinet, . . 24
The Cabinet yields, 26
Orders to execute the scheme and to announce it at St Peters-
burg, ........... 27
Lord Palmerston's exclusion from office at the time when this
decision took place, 27
CHAPTER III.
Terms agreed to by the four Powers ; and forced upon the
Turks by Lord Stratford, 33
Grounds for expecting an amicable solution, .... 34
Friendly view entertained by the Russian Government of the
English Cabinet's iirst decision, .34
Announcement at St Petersburg of the scheme iinally adopted
by the AVestern Powers, ....... 35
The negotiations are ruined, ....... 37
CONTENTS. XV
Chapter III. — continued.
Rupture of diplomatic relations, .37
The Czar prepares to invade Turkey, 38
Fleets enter the Euxine, .38
CHAPTER IV.
Military error of the Czar in occupying Wallachia, . . 39
Of this Omar Pasha takes skilful advantage, . . . .39
His autumn and winter campaigns, ... . .40
Embarrassment and distress of the Czar, .... 42
He resorts for aid to Paskievitch, . . . . . .42
Paskievitch's counsels, ........ 43
Movement of troops in the Eussian Empire, .... 45
CHAPTER V.
Sir John Burgoyne and Colonel Ardent despatched to the Levant, 46
Troops sent to Malta, ........ 47
Tendency of this measure, ....... 47
Ministers determine to propose but a small increase of the army, 48
Continuance of Lord Aberdeen's imprudent language, . . 48
CHAPTER VI.
The French Emperor's letter to the Czar, ... .50
Mission to St Petersburg from the English Peace Party, . 53
CHAPTER VII.
Temper of the English an obstacle to the maintenance of peace, 56
Their desire for war, ........ 56
Cau.ses of the apparent change in their feeling, . . .56
State of feeling in tlie spring of 1853, ..... 61
Effect of the Czar's aggi-ession upon the public mind, . 61
Still in foreign affairs the nation looks for guidance to public
men, ........... 62
Lord Aberdeen, ......... 62
Mr Gladstone, 65
h
XVI
CONTENTS.
Chapter VII. — continued.
Lord Aberdeen and Mr Gladstone remained in office, . . 66
Effect of this in paralysing the efforts of those who wished to
prevent a war, 67
It was not for want of ample grounds to stand upon, that their
cause was brought to ruin, ...... 68
Not for want of oratorical power, ...... 69
Mr Cobden and Mr Bright, 69
Reasons why they were able to make no stand, ... 71
CHAPTER VIII.
Meeting of Parliament, 76
The Queens Speech, 76
The erring policy which it indicated, . . . .77
Unswerving resolve of Austria (with the approval of Prussia)
to rid the Principalities of Russian troops, . . .77
Proofs of this drawn from transactions anterior to the Queen's
Speech 78
Proofs drawn from transactions subsequent to the Queen's Speech, 82
The time when the interests of Austria and Prussia began to
divide them from the Western Powers, .... 89
From first to last Austria and Prussia never swerved from their
resolve to secure the Czar's relinquishment of the Princi-
palities 90
CHAPTER IX.
Spirit of warlike adventure in England, .... 92
The bearing of this spirit upon the policy of the Government, 93
England was under engagements v/ith the French Emperor, . 94
Into this policy the bulk of the Cabinet drifted, ... 95
The Minister who went his own way, 95
His way of masking the tendency of the Government, . . 105
Debates upon the Address, . 106
Parliament still in the dark as to the real tendency of the Gov-
ernment, .... 107
Production of the Papers, -.108
Their effect, 108
The question on which the judgment of Parliament should
have been rested, . ' 110
CONTENTS.
xvn
CHAPTEE X.
Austria's proposal for a hostile summons to the Czar,
Importance of avoiding haste,
Pressure of the French Emperor,
Eagerness of the people in England,
The Government loses its composure,
The summons despatched by England,
Instructions to the messenger,
And to Lord Westmoreland, .
Austria not required to take part in the summons which she
had herself suggested,
The counter-proposals of Paissia reach Vienna at the same time
as the English messenger, .....
They are rejected by the Conference of the four Powers,
Austria and Prussia ' support ' the summons, but without tak
ing part in the step, .......
The French summons, .......
France and England brought into a state of war witli Paissia,
Message from the French Emperor to the Chambers,
Message from the Queen to Parliament, .
Declaration of "War, ....
Difficulty of framing it, ,
The Czar's declaration and War manifesto,
The Czar's invasion of Turkey is commenced,
Treaty between the Sultan and the Western Powers,
Treaty between France and England,
112
113
113
113
114
114
115
115
115
116
116
116
117
117
118
119
119
120
121
121
122
122
CHAPTER XL
Eecapitulation,
Standing causes of disturbance,
Effect of personal government by the Czar,
By the Emperor of Austria, .
By the King of Prussia,
By the French Emperor,
Share which Paissia had in bringing about the
Share which Turkey had in causing it, .
Share which Austria had,
In other respects Austria discharged her duty.
Share which Prussia had in causing the AVar,
War
124
124
124
125
126
126
127
131
133
135
135
XVlll CONTENTS.
Chapter XI. — continued.
In other respects Prussia discharged her duty, . . . 137
As did also tlie German Confederation, ..... 138
Share which the French Government had in causing the War, 139
Share which England had in causing it, . . . . .141
The volitions which governed events, . . . . . 149
CHAPTEE XII.
The commanders of tlie French and the English armies, . 152
Marshal St Arnaud, 152
Lord Raglan, . ........ 164
Marshal St Arnaud and Lord Raglan brought together at the
Tuileries, . 174
Conference at the Tuileries, . . . . . . .179
Lord Raglan's departure, ....... 183
The French and the English troops on the shores of the
Dardanelles, . . . . . . . . .183
Cordial- intercourse between the two armies, . . . .183
St Arnaud's scheme for obtaining the command of the Turkish
army, .......... 184
St Arnaud in the presence of Lord Stratford and Lord Raglan, 186
His scheme defeated, . . 189
His scheme for obtaining the command of English troops, . 189
This also defeated, 190
^Attempts of this kind checked by the French Emperor, . . 190
St Arnaud suddenly declines to move his army towards the
seat of war, ......... 190
Lord Raglan's disapproval of the proposed delay, . . .192
St Arnaud's sudden determination to take up a defensive posi-
tion in rear of the Balkan, 193
Lord Raglan's determined resistance to this plan, . . . 194
Lord Raglan refuses to place any part of his army behind the
Balkan, 198
St Arnaud gives way, abandons his plan of a position behind
the Balkan, and consents to move his army to Varna, . 198
The armies moved accordingly, . . . . . .199
Bosquet's overland march, . . . . . . .199
The way in which St Arnaud's schemes escaped publicity, . 200
CONTENTS.
XIX
CHAPTER XIII.
Tidings which kindled in England a zeal for the invasion of
the Ciimea, 202
Siege of Silistria, 202
The battle of Giurgevo, 210
Effect of the campaign of the Danube on the military ascen-
dancy of Russia, ........ 215
The agony of the Czar, . . . . . . . .217
Lord Raglan's dislike of undisciplined combatants, . . 218
Importance to England of native auxiliaries, . . . .219
CHAPTEE XIV.
The events on the Danube removed the grounds of the war,
Helplessness of the French people, .
Course taken by the French Emperor,
Desire of the English for an offensive war,
Sebastopol, ......
The longing of the English to attack it.
The Duke of Newcastle,
His zeal for the destruction of Sebastopol,
Commanding power of the people when of one mind,
ileans of forming and declaring the opinion of the nation,
EfiFect of political MTitings in saving men from the trouble of
thinking, . . . . • .
Want of proportion between the slcill of the public writer and
the judicial competence of his readers.
The task of ascertaining and declaring the opinion of the
country falls into the hands of a Company
The opinion of the nation, as declared by the Company, de
mands the destruction of Sebastopol, ....
The Government yields, ......
No good stand made in Parliament against the Invasion,
Preparation of the instructions addressed to Lord Raglan,
Extreme importance of the language in which they were to be
worded, ......
Instructions sent to the French commander,
221
222
222
223
224
224
22.T
227
223
229
230
230
233
241
245
246
247
247
250
XX CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XV.
The Allies at Varna. Their state of preparation in the middle
of July, 251
Their command of the sea, . 252
Information obtained by the Foreign Office as to the defences
of the Crimea, 253
No information obtained in the Levant, 253
Lord Raglan conceived that he was absolntelv without any
trustworthy information, 254
CHAPTEE XVI.
The instructions for the invasion of the Crimea reach the Allied
camp, .......... 255
The men who had to determine upon the effect to be given to
the instructions,
Marshal St Arnaud,
Admiral Hamelin, ....
Omar Pasha, .....
Admiral Dundas, ....
Lord Eaglan, .....
The instructions addressed to him by the
Extreme stringency of the insti'uctions,
Considerations tending to justify this str
The power of deciding for or against the expedition becomes
practically vested in Lord Eaglan alone,
Lord Raglan's deliberations, ....
He requests the opinion of Sir George Brown,
Lord Raglan's determination,
The grounds on which it rested.
His decision governed the counsels of the Allies
He announces it to the Home Government, .
Tlie Duke of Newcastle's reply,
The Queen's expression of feeling, .
Home Government,
mgency.
256
256
258
258
258
260
260
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
277
277
278
279
CHAPTEE XVII.
Conference at the French headquarters, 280
Lord Raglan's way of eluding objections, .... 281
Eeconnaissance of the coast, ....... 282
CONTENTS. XXI
Chapter XVII. — continued.
Sir Edmund Lyons, ........ 283
Rumoured change in the plans of the Czar, .... 285
Second conference, ........ 286
The French urge the abandonment of the expedition against
the Crimea, ......... 286
Lord Raglan's way of bending the French to the plans of the
English Government, . . . . . . .287
Preparations, ......... 287
Ineffectual attempts of the Allies to deceive the enemy, . . 289
Lord Raglan's appeal to our Home Government in favour of
the native Bulgarians, ....... 290
Fire at Varna, 291
Cholera, 291
Weakly condition of the English soldiery, .... 294
CHAPTEE XVIII.
Arrangements first made for the starting of the expedition, . 296
The embarkations, ........ 296
Failure of the French calculations in regard to their command
of steam-power, ......... 299