own ; they perceived that the war of independence was defi
nitely ended, and that the only dangers which America had
to fear were those which might result from the abuse of the
freedom she had won. They had the courage to say what
they believed to be true, because they were animated by a
warm and sincere love of liberty ; and they ventured to pro
pose restrictions, because they were resolutely opposed to de
struction.*

The greater number of the constitutions of the states assign
one year for the duration of the house of representatives, and
two years for that of the senate ; so that members of the
legislative body are constantly and narrowly tied down by the
slightest desires of their constituents. The legislators of the
Union were of opinion that this excessive dependence of the
legislature tended to alter the nature of the main conse
quences of the representative system, since it vested the
source not only of authority, but of government, in the peo-

* At this time ^ Alexander Hamilton, who was one of the principal
founders of the constitution, ventured to express the following senti
ments in the Federalist, No. 71 : " There are some who would be
inclined to regard the servile pliancy of the executive to a prevailing
current, either in the community or in the legislature, as its best re
commendation. But such men entertain very crude notions, as well
of the purpose for which government was instituted, as of the true
means by which the public happiness may be promoted. The repub
lican principle demands that the deliberative sense of the community
should govern the conduct of those to whom they intrust the manage
ments of their affairs ; but it does not require an unqualified complai
sance to every sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse
which the people may receive from the arts of men who flatter their
prejudices to betray their interests It is a just observation that the
people commonly inte nd the public good. This often applies to their
very errors. But their good sense would despise the adulator who
should pretend that they would always reason right about the means
of promoting it. They know from experience that they sometimes
err ; and the wonder is that they so seldom err as they do, beset, as
they continually are, by the wiles' of parasites and sycophants ; by the
snares of the ambitious, the avaricious, the desperate ; by the artifices
of men who possess their confidence more than they deserve it; and
of those who seek to possess rather than to deserve it. When occa
sions present themselves in which the interests of the people are at
variance with their inclinations, it is the duty of persons whom they
have appointed to be the guardians of those interests, to withstand
the temporary delusion, in order to give them time and opportunity for
more cool and sedate reflection. Instances might be cited in which a
conduct of this kind has saved the people from very fatal consequences
of their own mistakes, and has procured lasting monuments of their
gratitude to the men who had courage and magnan'mity enough to
serve at the peril of their displeasure."



THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 153

pie. They increased the length of the time for which the
representatives were returned, in order to give them freer
scope for the exercise of their own judgment.

The federal constitution, as well as the constitutions of the
different states, divided the legislative body into two branches.
But in the states these two branches were composed of the
same elements and elected in the same manner. The con
sequence was that the passions and inclinations of the popu
lace were as rapidly and as energetically represented in one
chamber as in the other, and that laws were made witli all
the characteristics of violence and precipitation. By the
federal constitution the two houses originate in like manner
in the choice of the people ; but the conditions of eligibility
and the mode of election were changed, to the end that if, as
is the case in certain nations, one branch of the legislature
represents the same interests as the other, it may at least re
present a superior degree of intelligence and discretion. A
mature age was made one of the conditions of the senatorial
dignity, and the upper house was chosen by an elected as
sembly of a limited number of members.

To concentrate the whols social force in the hands of the
legislative body is the natural tendency of democracies ; for
as this is the power which emanates the most directly from
the people, it is made to participate most fully in the prepon
derating authority of the multitude, and it is naturally led to
monopolise every species of influence. This concentration
is at once prejudicial to a well-conducted administration, and
favorable to the despotism of the majority. The legislators
of the states frequently yielded to these democratic propen
sities, which were invariably and courageously resisted by
the founders of the Union.

In the states the executive power is vested in the hands of
a magistrate, who is apparently placed upon a level with the
legislature, but who is in reality nothing more than the blind
agent and the passive instrument of its decisions. He can
derive no influence from the duration of his functions, which
terminate with the revolving year, or from the exercise of
prerogatives which can scarcely be said to exist. The legis
lature can condemn him to inaction by intrusting the execu
tion of the laws to special committees of its own members,
and can annul his temporary dignity by depriving him of his
salary. The federal constitution vests all the privileges and
all the responsibility of the executive power in a single indi
vidual. The duration of the presidency is fixed at four
years ; the salary of the individual who fills that office can-



154 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

not be altered during the term of his functions ; he is pro-
tected by a body of official dependents, and armed with a
suspensive veto. In short, every effort was made to confer
a strong and independent position upon the executive author
ity, within the limits which had been prescribed to it.

In the constitution of all the states the judicial power is
that which remains the most independent of the legislative
authority : nevertheless, in all the states the legislature has
reserved to itself the right of regulating the emoluments of
the judges, a practice which necessarily subjects these ma
gistrates to its immediate influence. In some states the
judges are only temporarily appointed, which deprives them
of a great portion of their power and their freedom. In
others the legislative and judicial powers are entirely con
founded : thus the senate of New York, for instance, consti
tutes in certain cases the superior court of the state. The
federal constitution, on the other hand, carefully separates
the judicial authority from all external influences : and it
provides for the independence of the judges, by declaring
that their salary shall not be altered, and that their functions
shall be inalienable.

[It is not universally correct, as supposed by the author, that the
state legislatures can deprive their governor of his salary at pleasure.
In the constitution of New York it is provided, that the governor
" shall receive for his services a compensation which shall neither be
increased nor diminished during the term for which he shall have been
elected ;" and similar provisions are believed to exist in other states.

Nor is the remark strictly correct, that the federal constitution
" provides for the independence of the judges, by declaring that their
salary shall not be altered" The provision of the cpnstitution is, that
they shall, "at stated times, receive for their services a compensation
which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office."
American Editor. ~\

The practical consequences of these different systems may
easily be perceived. An attentive observer will soon remark
that the business of the Union is incomparably better con
ducted than that of any individual state. The conduct of
the federal government is more fair and more temperate than
that of the states ; its designs are more fraught with wisdom,
its projects are more durable and more skilfully combined,
its measures are put into execution with more vigor and con
sistency.

I recapitulate the substance of this chapter in a few
words :

The existence of democracies is threatened by two dangeis,



THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 155

viz. : the complete subjection of the legislative body to the
caprices of the electoral body ; and the concentration of all
the powers of the government in the legislative authority.

The growth of these evils has been encouraged by the
policy of the legislators of the states ; but it has been resisted
by the legislators of the Union by every means which lay
within their control.



CHARACTERISTICS WHICH DISTINGUISH THE FEDERAL CONSTITU
TION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FROM ALL OTHER
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS.

American Union appears to resemble all other Confederations. Never
theless its Effects are different. Reason of this Distinctions be
tween the Union and all other Confederations. The American Gov
ernment not a Federal, but an imperfect National Government.

THE United States of America do not afford either the first or
the only instance of confederate states, several of which have
existed in modern Europe, without adverting to those of anti
quity. Switzerland, the Germanic empire, and the republic
of the United Provinces, either have been or still are confede
rations. In studying the constitutions of these different coun
tries, the politician is surprised to observe that the powers
with which they invested the federal government are nearly
identical with the privileges awarded by the American con
stitution to the government of the United States. They con
fer upon the central power the same rights of making peace
and war, of raising money and troops, and of providing for
the general exigencies and the common interests of the nation.
Nevertheless the federal government of these different people
has always been as remarkable for its weakness and ineffi
ciency as that of the Union is for its vigorous and enterprising
spirit. Again, the first American confederation perished
through the excessive weakness of its government ; and this
weak government was, notwithstanding, in possession of rights
even more extensive than those of the federal government of
the present day. But the more recent constitution of the
United States contains certain principles which exercise a
most important influence, although they do not at once strike
the observer.

This constitution, which may at first sight be confounded
with the federal constitutions which preceded it, rests upon a
novel theory, which may be considered as a great invention



156 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

in modern political science. In all the confederations which
had been formed before the American constitution of 1789,
the allied states agreed to obey the injunctions of a federal
government : but they reserved to themselves the right of or
daining and enforcing the- execution of the laws of the
Union. The American states which combined in 1789
agreed that the federal government should not only dictate
the laws, but it should execute its own enactments. In both
cases the right is the same, but the exercise of the right is
different ; and this alteration produced the most momentous
consequences.

In all the confederations which have been formed before
the American Union, the federal government demanded its
supplies at the hands of the separate governments ; and if the
measure it prescribed was onerous to any one of those bodies,
means were found to evade its claims : if the state was power
ful, it had recourse to arms ; if it was weak, it connived at
the resistance which 'the law of the Union, its sovereign, met
with, and resorted to inaction under the plea of inability.
Under these circumstances one of two alternatives has inva
riably occurred : either the most preponderant of the allied
peoples has assumed the privileges of the federal authority,
and ruled all the other states in its name,* or the federal gov
ernment has been abandoned by its natural supporters, anar
chy has arisen between the confederates, and the Union has
lost all power of action. f

In America the subjects of the Union are not states, but
private citizens : the national government levies a tax, not
upon the state of Massachusetts, but upon each inhabitant of
Massachusetts. All former confederate governments presided
over communities, but that of the Union rules individuals ; its
force is not borrowed, but self-derived ; and it is served by its
own civil and military officers, by its own army, and its own
courts of justice. It cannot be doubted that the spirit of the
nation, the passions of the multitude, and the provincial pre
judices of each state, tend singularly to diminish the author
ity of a federal authority thus constituted, and to facilitate
the means of resistance to its mandates ; but the comparative

* This was the case in Greece, when Philip undertook to execute
the decree of the Amphictyons ; in the Low Countries, where the
province of Holland always gave the law ; and in our time in the Ger
manic confederation, in which Austria and Prussia assume a great de
gree of influence over the whole country, in the name of the Diet.

f Such has always been the situation of the Swiss confederation,
which would have perished ages ago but for the mutual jealousies of
its neighbors.



THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 157

weakness of a restricted sovereignty is an evil inherent in
the federal system. In America, each state has fewer oppor
tunities of resistance, and fewer temptations to non-compli
ance ; nor can such a design be put in execution (if indeed
it be entertained), without an open violation of the laws of
the Union, a direct interruption of the ordinary course of
justice, and a bold declaration of revolt ; in a word, without
a decisive step, which men hesitate to adopt.

In all former confederations, the privileges of the Union
furnished more elements of discord than of power, since they
multiplied the claims of the nation without augmenting the
means of enforcing them : and in accordance with this fact it
may be remarked, that the real weakness of federal govern
ments has almost always been in the exact ratio of their nomi
nal power. Such is not the case with the American Union,
in which, as in ordinary governments, the federal government
has the means of enforcing all it is empowered to demand.

The human understanding more easily invents new things
than new words, and we arc thence constrained to employ a
multitude of improper and inadequate expressions. When
several nations form a permanent league, and establish' a
supreme authority, which, although it has not the same influ
ence over the members of the community as a national gov
ernment, acts upon each of the confederate states in a body,
this government, which is so essentially different from all
others, is denominated a federal one. Another form of so
ciety is afterward discovered, in which several peoples are
fused into one and the same nation with regard to certain
common interests, although they remain distinct, or at least
only confederate, with regard to all their other concerns. In
this case the central power acts directly upon those whom it
governs, whom it rules, and whom it judges, in the same
manner as, but in a more limited circle than, a national gov-
vernment. Here the term of federal government is clearly
no longer applicable to a state of things which must be styled
an incomplete national government : a form of government
has been found out which is neither exactly national nor fede
ral ; but no farther progress has been made, and the new word
which will one day designate this novel invention does not
yet exist.

The absence of this new species of confederation has been
the cause which has brought all unions to civil war, to sub
jection, or to a stagnant apathy ; and the peoples which form
ed these leagues have been either too dull to discern, or too



158 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

pusillanimous to apply this great remedy. The American
confederation perished by the same defects.

But the confederate states of America had been long
accustomed to form a portion of one empire before they had
won their independence : they had not contracted the habit
of governing themselves, and their national prejudices had
not taken deep root in their minds. Superior to the rest of
the world in political knowledge, and sharing that knowledge
equally among themselves, they were little agitated by the
passions which generally oppose the extension of federal
authority in a nation, and those passions were checked by the
wisdom* of the chief citizens.

The Americans applied the remedy with prudent firmness
as soon as they were conscious of the evil ; they amended
their laws, and they saved their country.



ADVANTAGES OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM IN GENERAL, AND ITS
SPECIAL UTILITY IN AMERICA.

Happiness and Freedom of small Nations. Power of Great Nations.
Great Empires favorable to the Growth of Civilisation. Strength
often the first Element of national Prosperity. Aim of the federal
System to unite the twofold Advantages resulting from a small and
from a large Territory. Advantages derived by the United States
from this System. The Law adapts itself to the Exigencies of the
Population ; Population does not conform to the Exigencies of the
Law. Activity, Melioration, Love, and Enjoyment of Freedom in
the American Communities. Public Spirit of the Union the abstract
of provincial Patriotism. Principles and Things circulate freely
over the Territory of the United States. The Union is happy and
free as a little Nation, and respected as a great Empire.

IN small nations the scrutiny of society penetrates into every
part, and the spirit of improvement enters into the most trifling
details ; as the ambition of the people is necessarily checked
by its weakness, all the efforts and resources of the citizens
are turned to the internal benefit of the community, and are
not likely to evaporate in the fleeting breath of glory. The
desires of every individual are limited, because extraordinary
faculties are rarely to be met with. The gifts of an equal
fortune render the various conditions of life uniform ; and
the manners of the inhabitants are orderly and simple.
Thus, if we estimate the gradations of popular morality and
enlightenment, we shall generally find that in small nations
there are more persons in easy circumstances, a more nu-



THL FEDfc^L CONSTITUTION. 159



merous population, and a more tranquil state of society than
in great empires.

When tyranny is established in the bosom of a small
nation, it is more galling than elsewhere, because, as it acts
within a narrow circle, every point of that circle is subject
to its direct influence. It supplies the place of those great
designs which it cannot entertain, by a violent or an exaspe
rating interference in a multitude of minute details ; and it
leaves the political world to which it properly belongs, to
meddle with the arrangements of domestic life. Tastes as
well as actions are to be regulated at its pleasure ; and the
families of the citizens as well as the affairs of the state are
to be governed by its decisions. This invasion of rights
occurs, however, but seldom, and freedom is in truth the
natural state of small communities. The temptations which
the government oilers to ambition are too weak, and the re
sources of private individuals are too slender, for the sove
reign power easily to fall within the grasp of a single citizen :
and should such an event have occurred, the subjects of the
state can without difficulty overthrow the tyrant and his
oppression by a simultaneous effort.

. Small nations have therefore ever been the cradles of poli
tical liberty : and the fact that many of them have lost their
immunities by extending their dominion, shows that the free
dom they enjoyed was more a consequence of their inferior
size than of the character of the people.

The history of the world affords no instance of a great
nation retaining the form of a republican government for a
long series of years,* and this had led to the conclusion that ,
such a state of things is impracticable. For my own part,
1 cannot hut censure the imprudence of attempting to limit
'Jie possible, and to judge the future, on the part of a being
who is hourly deceived by the most palpable realities of life,
and who is constantly taken by surprise in the circumstances
with which he is most familiar. But it may be advanced
with confidence that the existence of a great republic will
always be exposed to far greater perils than that of a small
one.

All the passions which are most fatal to republican institu
tions spread with an increasing territory, while the virtues \
which maintain their dignity do not augment in the same
proportion. The ambition of the citizens increases with the j

* I do not speak of a confederation of small republics, but, of a great
consolidated republic.



160 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

power of the state ; the strength of parties, with the import
ance of the ends they have in view ; but that devotion to the
common weal, which is the surest check on destructive pas
sions, is not stronger in a large than in a small republic. It
might, indeed, be proved without difficulty that it is less pow
erful and less sincere. The arrogance of wealth and the
dejection of wretchedness, capital cities of unwonted extent,
a lax morality, a vulgar egotism, and a great confusion of
interests, are the dangers which almost invariably arise from
the magnitude of states. But several of these evils are
scarcely prejudicial to a monarchy, and some of them con
tribute to maintain its existence. In monarchical states the
strength of the government is its own ; it may use, but it
does not depend on, the community : and the authority of the
prince is proportioned to the prosperity of the nation : but
the only security which a republican government possesses
against these evils lies in the support of the majority. This
support is not, however, proportionably greater in a large
'epublic than it is in a small one ; and thus while the means
)f attack perpetually increase both in number and in influ-
3nce, the power of resistance remains the same ; or it may
rather be said to diminish, since the propensities and interests
of the people are diversified by the increase of the popula
tion, and the difficulty of forming a compact majority is con
stantly augmented. It has been observed, moreover, that the
intensity of human passions is heightened, not only by the
importance of the end which they propose to attain, but by
the multitude of individuals who are animated by them at
the same time. Every one has had occasion to remark that
his emotions in the midst of a sympathizing crowd are far
greater than those which he would have felt in solitude. In
great republics the impetus of political passion is irresistible,
not only because it aims at gigantic purposes, but because it
is felt and shared by millions of men at the same time.

It may therefore be asserted as a general proposition, that
nothing is more opposed to the well-being and the freedom of
man than vast empires. Nevertheless it is important to ac
knowledge the peculiar advantages of great states. For the
very reason which renders the desire of power more intense
in these communities than among ordinary men, the love of
glory is also more prominent in the hearts of a class of citizens,
who regard the applause of a great people as a reward worthy
of their exertions, and an elevating encouragement to man.
If we would learn why it is that great nations contribute
more powerfully to the spread of human improvement than



THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 161

small states, we shall discover an adequate cause in the- rapid
and energetic circulation of ideas, and in those great cities
which are the intellectual centres where ail the rays of
human genius are reflected and combined. To this it may
be added that most important discoveries demand a display
of national power which the government of a small state is
unable to make ; in great nations the government entertains
a greater number of general notions, and is more completely
disengaged from the routine of precedent and the egotism of
local prejudice ; its designs are conceived with more talent,