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IIEPI *YXH2.
ARISTOTLE
ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE.
Crauslateb from % original
WITH NOTES BY
CHARLES COLLIER, M.D., F.R.S.
FELLOW OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS,
AND HONORARY FELLOW OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS.
ira'Aw iSia nev nva TOU AoyncoC <f>ri(rt TTJ? </o;x^S iftidr;, ISia
Se TOV erv^i^vovs xal a'Adyou tlvai, piTrrafdfiei'OS eirl mivra KOJ. )//r)Aa-
ifiiavTi TrpotreoiKois ras Sia<]iopds.
HKovTcipxov Acii/rara Trepi i
MACMILLAN & CO.
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PREFACE.
HAVING, after careful study of this Treatise, been led
to the conclusion that Aristotle's object, in its com-
position, was to put before the world his own opi-
nions as well as those of former and contemporaneous
writers upon the Vital Principle, I have been induced
to undertake a translation of it, in order to give the
general reader the theories, hypotheses, and opinions
which prevailed, at that early period of natural and
physiological knowledge, upon life and its manifes-
tations. The Treatise, indeed, records all the pre-
vailing opinions upon living beings and sentient
properties, which lie scattered through Aristotle's
other physiological writings; and it displays, per-
haps more than any other of his works, the extent
of his knowledge, and the perspicacity of his intel-
lect. Should it, however, be questioned whether a
work, composed at a time when the special sciences
pertaining to its subject were yet in their infancy,
can be now of any value, it might be answered that,
irrespective of any positive result, an interest must
ever be taken in the investigation, truthfully con-
ducted, of nature's operations; and that this, brief
1G76134
VI PREFACE.
as it is, comprises many of the dogmata, of an other-
wise enlightened age, upon the more abstruse topics
of natural philosophy and physiology.
It is scarcely necessary to observe, that several
versions of this Treatise are extant, but as they have
been written under an impression that its design is
rather psychological than physiological, this misap-
prehension has tended to vitiate, or render unintelli-
gible what otherwise, as literary productions, might
have done justice to the original. Some of the
translators, besides, seem to have been but imper-
fectly acquainted with physiology, and this want of
preliminary knowledge has sometimes led to a mis-
apprehension of the text, and sometimes to an inad-
equate appreciation of what could be only suggestive.
Thus, the causes which have contributed to make
the text abstruse, and even in places unintelligible,
have concurred in making the translations obscure,
and occasionally incomprehensible; for besides in-
dications of imperfect anatomical knowledge, the
arguments in the Treatise can be regarded but as
suggestions, and be elucidated only by reference to
the more matured science of modern times. It cannot
derogate from what is due to Aristotle, to admit that
physiology, in his age, was not only encumbered
with the hypotheses of earlier schools, but also
dwarfed and distorted by imperfect acquaintance with
those systems and organs of the living body, which
PREFACE. Vll
he perceived, intuitively, to be necessary to a full
comprehension of his subject. But although the
opinions and conjectures of this Treatise may, from
the advanced state of anatomy and physiology, have
but little intrinsic value, the method adopted by
Aristotle may not be undeserving the attention of
those who, with a wider range of special knowledge,
are better prepared for the undertaking; unless,
indeed, the Vital Principle is to be set down among
those final causes, which, lying beyond the human
comprehension, are to be admitted as ultimate facts.
Although this may be the case, however, some in-
terest must be taken in a Treatise which is, not only
indicative of Aristotle's style and mode of argument,
but pregnant also, by allusion, with collateral infor-
mation.
This version has been made with the inten-
tion of rendering it, in so far as the analogies of
language would allow, a faithful transcript of the
opinions and manner of Aristotle; and notes are
added for the elucidation of passages which by no
periphrasis could be made intelligible to the general
reader. It may be observed that the mind, (6 vovs),
although nowhere denned, appears, in this Treatise,
to represent the abstract immaterial principle usually
attributed to the ^vxn '> f r it alone is excluded from
all direct participation in corporeal functions or
changes.
Till PREFACE.
Although the title given to this version embodies,
as I believe, Aristotle's idea, yet it is not pretended
that the writers cited by him always employed the
term i/^xv m h* 8 sense ; or even that he, himself,
was always consistent in the use of it. Plato was
certainly not engaged upon material agencies or pro-
perties in his Phcedo, and in the Timceus, which
partakes of a physiological character, and as such
has been criticised in this Treatise, the animating
motor principle is treated of rather as an abstraction
than as the originating and natural cause of life,
through all its manifestations. The term Vital
Principle, however, has been retained throughout,
even where it may seem to be less apposite, as well
to avoid the misapprehension which might be occa-
sioned by the substitution of another term, (that of
soul I mean,) which might then to some appear to
be its synonym, as on account of the extreme dif-
ficulty of determining the point where the metonymy
might, without question, be adopted.
This Translation is from the Oxford edition, col-
lated with that of Trendelenburg ; and this allusion
to that eminent scholar affords me the opportunity
of acknowledging the assistance which has been
derived from his comments upon passages, which
require, for elucidation, all the light that can be
thrown upon them by tradition and learning.
INTEODUCTION.
As this treatise may interest some who have
never considered the subject for the elucidation of
which it was composed, it will be well to offer a
summary of that which Aristotle had undertaken to
delineate, and to give, at the same time, an epitome
of the opinions which, in modern times, have been
entertained concerning it.
It is then that principle, which, inherent in genial
matter, establishes functions distinctive of animated
beings ; and those functions are nutrition, and, through
nutrition, growth or development, within a certain
prescribed range, and absorption or rather change
wrought by absorption, that is, decay. These two
functions constitute, in fact, animated beings, and
distinguish them broadly from whatever is inanimate;
and as those functions are inherent in the simplest
1
2 INTRODUCTION.
forms of being, it is in such that we might expect to
find a clue to the nature of that something which,
whether entity or mere quality, confers upon living
matter its distinctive properties. But whether we
examine a seed before development, or watch the
rudimental forms of life, that something lies shrouded
in matter which, although to appearance inanimate,
is yet, through its influence, under genial conditions,
capable of developing into a perfect being; and of
resisting, for a stated time, the agency of surrounding
elements. Thus, growth and development with their
antagonisms absorption and decay, effected through
the actions of the material framework of living
beings, constitute, essentially, life; and the subject
of this essay is that something which gives to matter
those attributes. The processes, then, of reproduc-
tion, growth, and decay, that is, generation, life, and
death, are the essential characteristics of living
beings, and conferred upon them, as has been said,
by that something which is designated Vital Principle.
Now, to homogeneous forms and solitary functions
others of more complex nature are superadded, and
these give rise to that long chain of being of which
man may be regarded as the head ; but yet, amid all
the simplicity of organs, of action, and of reaction,
those two functions still prevail, and constitute life,
INTRODUCTION. 3
whatever the type of being, in its strictest significa-
tion. This is the teaching of Aristotle, as it is the
doctrine of modern physiologists ; and those functions
are always here referred to as the essential conditions
of whatever is animated, although, for higher forms
of being, other "organs and functions are required.
The nature, however, of the essence or principle
which originates and orders those living functions is
hitherto for us, as it was for Aristotle, inscrutable ;
and it may be that the wide survey which he took of
life, by complicating simple functions with sentient
and even intellectual faculties, tended only to disturb
and pervert the course of his inquiry. But whether
Aristotle's mode of inquiry was or not faulty, and
whether the principle which animates the world (it
may be the universe) is or not among those causes
which are inscrutable, it will be ever a topic of deep
interest to the learned and the thoughtful of every
age.
In an opening chapter, Aristotle has in so clear
and succinct a manner reviewed the prevailing doc-
trines and opinions as well of his own as of a pre-
ceding age, that that summary may be regarded as
the exposition of all that was then most authoritative;
and as, from that time, physiology may be said to
have declined, it would be almost supererogatory to
12
4 INTRODUCTION.
allude to any other writer before the rise of modern
science. It may be mentioned, however, in deference
to the name, that Cicero 1 has alluded, with a just
appreciation of Aristotle's superiority, to this treatise ;
but as the topic was foreign to his pursuits and little
in accordance with his talents, we cannot be sur-
prised if he mistook the scope of the design, and per-
verted thereby the tendency of the argument.
This treatise is, it may be added, both an intro-
duction and a sequel to the other physiological trea-
tises of Aristotle ; and, as it treats of all the charac-
teristics of living beings, it may contribute to a
clearer understanding of them, as they, in their turn,
may serve to elucidate it ; for they all proceed from
the same hand, maintain the same doctrines, and
emanate from the same laborious and original
intellect.
This topic engaged the attention of eminent ana-
tomists and physiologists towards the opening of the
present .century, and their writings will shew the
opinions entertained by the moderns concerning it;
but it has, generally, been made an incidental rather
than a special subject of inquiry, a prelude, aa it
were, to the teaching of anatomy and physiology.
The opinions entertained concerning vital principle
1 Tusc. Disp. Lib. I. i.
INTRODUCTION. 5
by the eminent men here alluded to (Hunter and
Barclay, Bichat and Cuvier) may well be collated
with those of Aristotle, who wrote at a time when
science was in its infancy, and when, for profitable
investigation, he had to depend almost exclusively,
amid so much hypothesis, upon his own laborious
and perspicacious intellect.
In quoting those writers, there is hardly occasion
for observing any order of precedence, as they
flourished about the same time, and contributed
equally to the present development of physiological
science.
According to Hunter 1 , "Animal matter is en-
dowed with a principle called, in common language,
life. This principle is perhaps conceived of with
more difficulty than any other in nature, which arises
from its being more complex in its effects than any
other; and it is, therefore, no wonder that it is the
least understood. But, although life may appear
compounded in its effects in a complicated animal
like man, it is as simple in him as in the most simple
animal, and is reducible to one simple property in
every animal." In another paragraph, he adds,
" the first and most simple idea of life is its being
the principle of self-preservation, by its preventing
1 On Vital Principle,
6 INTRODUCTION.
matter from falling into dissolution for dissolution
immediately takes place when matter is deprived of
it; the second is its being the principle of action.
These are two very different properties, though they
arise from the same principle."
Barclay 1 observes that, " in every living organized
structure there is plainly a power that preserves,
regulates, and controls the whole ; directing, at first,
the different processes in forming one part of the
organs, afterwards employing the assistance of the
organs which it has formed to produce more, till at
last it completes the whole of the system in such a
manner as to suit its future conveniences and wants.
This power, or rather this agent, physiologists have
named Vital Principle; though not a few are inclined
to suppose it to be the effect, rather than the cause,
of the organization. But in all operations that are
performed without either volition or consciousness, it
appears subordinate to a much higher power to that
Almighty and Omniscient Being, who dispenses his
laws to the boundless Universe, and whose laws, ex-
cept by himself, can never be improved, altered, or
abrogated."
Bichat 2 makes Vital Principle to be "the assem-
blage of the functions which resist death ;" and this
1 Introduction to Anatomical Nomenclature.
2 La Vie et la Mort,
INTRODUCTION. 7
definition was adopted substantively by Cuvier, who,
in his introductory lecture to the " Comparative Ana-
tomy," has illustrated the influences of this assumed
principle, by a : description, alike graphic and beauti-
ful, of what takes place when it has been withdrawn
or extinguished. "If 1 ," he observes, "in order to
have a correct idea of life, we consider it in simple
forms of being, we shall soon perceive that it consists
in the faculty possessed by particular corporeal com-
binations of lasting for a given time and under a
determined form; of attracting, incessantly, into their
composition a portion of the surrounding substances,
and in giving back to the elements portions of their
own substance. So long as this series of move-
ments is maintained, the body, in which it is mani-
fested, is a living body; and when it is irrecoverably
arrested it is dead."
But although the definition of Bichat involves a
great truth, and is a summary of all that has been
ever said upon the subject, it is open to the criticism
of M. Magendie, that, by its admitting the idea of
death, it presupposes life, and thus establishes a
vicious circle of reasoning. It is criticised also by
M. Comte 2 , as a fancied antagonism between animate
and inanimate matter, a chimerical struggle between
1 Regne Animal. z Science Bwlogique.
8 INTRODUCTION.
living beings and surrounding influences; for "the
idea of life," he observes, "presupposes something
able to live, and it requires no less a certain assem-
blage of external influences for its fulfilment."
The nature of Vital Principle, then, is still for us,
as it was for Aristotle, a great mystery; and as
opinions upon it are at best but speculations, we may
proceed, without further comment, to the text, which,
besides miscellaneous matter, will be found to contain
suggestions for reflexion and inquiry.
PRELUDE TO CHAPTER I.
THIS chapter is an elaborate statement of the subject as
well as the object of the inquiry. The term ^J/VXTJ,
here rendered "Vital Principle," has several signi-
fications, as was observed in the preface, in the
course of this and the other physiological treatises:
in one passage, it implies the life of an animal ; in
another, the nutritive function ; in another, a vital
part; in another, a motor force; and in another, the
visual power (rov o^a-ros ; ^v-^tj 1 ) ; some writers,
besides, derived the term ^v-^rj from -v^v^/ao? or
if/w^oi, coolness or cold, because respiration was held
to be a cooling process, and as such essential to life.
The object of Aristotle, then, in this treatise, was to
learn the nature of that essence or principle which,
under whatever denomination, is the innate source
of motion, and, consequently, of vital actions in all
bodies capable of being animated; for although, in the
more complicated forms of being, it is involved in
1 De Sensu et Sens. II. 16.
10 PKELUDE TO CHAP. I.
the manifestation of perceptions and passions, its
great office still is to originate, to maintain, and to
perpetuate life, through all its gradations. It may be
that, from some such conclusion, Aristotle was led to
regard the vital principle as inferior in destiny and
office to the faculty which he has designated 1 mind
(o i/ovc), and made to be impassive, homogeneous,
apart from, and independent of, the body. These
opinions have much in common with those adopted
by Plato in the Timaeus; as, while, in that most
beautiful and intellectual disquisition, the senses,
appetites, and passions, the mortal framework, that
is, of the sentient being, are located about the heart
and liver, the intellectual faculty, that which is
divine, and intended to direct and control the animal
powers, is placed in the head. The life is repre-
sented, in fact, by ^v^tj, which is bound up with
corporeal functions and appetites ; and reason by
i/ous, which, if any where, is, "as the divine seed of
wisdom," in the brain ; and, being homogeneous,
does not depend, for existence, upon the life of the
body. These few words will suffice to shew that
there is an analogy between the two systems of phy-
siology and psychology.
1 De An. i. 4 ; i. 5 ; in. 4, 6.
BOOK THE FIRST.
CHAPTER I.
IT may be assumed that all knowledge is beautiful
and estimable ; but as one branch may be more so
than another, either because of the exactness which
is requisite for its examination, or from its treating of
objects more exalted and wonderful than any others,
so, on both these accounts, we may reasonably assign
the first place to an inquiry into Vital Principle. For
the knowledge of it promises to contribute largely to
all truth, and most especially to truth in relation to
nature, since it is the origin, as it were, of living
beings. The object of our inquiry, then, is to study
and ascertain its nature and its essence, as well as its
accidents, of which some seem to be its own peculiar
affections, and some to belong to living beings, as
original properties, through it.
Let us premise, however, that the attempt to attain
to any certainty with respect to it is beset with almost
insuperable difficulties; for as this has much in
12 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. I.
common with many other inquiries, with every inquiry,
I mean, instituted for ascertaining the essence and
the thing itself, it might hastily be supposed that, as
demonstration is the method for studying particular
"bodies in their accidents, there may be some one special
method of investigation when our object is to learn
what is the essence of a thing, and that that method
ought to be sought for on this occasion. If, however,
there is no one common method for ascertaining what
any thing in itself is, the systematic treatment of
our subject is rendered still more difficult; for, in that
case, it will be necessary to adopt, for each particular
subject, some one particular method. Although it
may be manifest, besides, that the inquiry should be
by some kind of demonstration, or division, or other
method, there will still remain many difficulties and
many liabilities to error in fixing upon the principles
from which the inquiry should set out; for the princi-
ples of different subjects differ, as those of number
are not those of plane surfaces.
It may be well, perhaps, before proceeding fur-
ther, to distinguish the "genus" to which Vital Prin-
ciple belongs, and determine what it is determine, I
mean, whether it is a something and essence, or quan-
tity, or quality, or any other of the classified cate-
gories; as also, a distinction of no small importance,
whether it is among entities in potentiality, or whether
rather it is a reality. We have to consider too whether
CH. I.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 13
Vital Principle is divisible or without parts, and
whether every Vital Principle is or is not the same in
kind, and, if not the same, whether the difference is
generic or specific ; but they who now are engaged in
discussing and exploring Vital Principle seem to give
exclusive attention to that of man. We must be on
our guard against this, however, so that it may not
escape us whether there is but one definition for Vital
Principle as for animal, or whether it must be differ-
ent for each creature, as for a horse, a dog, or a man.
The term animal, besides, taken in an universal
sense, is either without meaning, or of very secondary
value; and so equally is every other common term
which might be predicated of this subject. If, on the
other hand, there are not several Vital Principles, but
parts only of a single Principle, we have to settle
whether we should commence the inquiry with the
Principle as a whole, or, contrariwise, with its parts;
and, with respect to the parts, it is difficult to deter-
mine which of them have been constituted differently
from others ; it is difficult also to say whether we
should study the parts before their functions, as the
mind before thought, or sensibility before sensation ;
and so for other faculties and functions. If it be ex-
pedient to commence the inquiry with functions, it
may be a question whether it would not be better
here also to study first their opposites ; as the object
of perception before that which perceives, and thought
14 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. I.
before that which thinks. Now, the knowledge of
any thing in itself seems to be useful towards a right
conception of the causes of the accidents in sub-
stances ; as, in mathematics, the knowledge of straight
and curve, line and surface, is requisite for perceiving
to how many right angles the angles of the triangle
are equal. But the knowledge of the accidents con-
tributes, largely, in its turn, towards knowing what
the thing, essentially, is ; for whenever we may be able,
from the appearance of any substance, to recount the
whole or the greater number of its accidents, we are
then best prepared to say what its essence is. Thus,
the essence is the proper beginning for every demon-
stration, so that all the definitions, which do not
make known, or make it easy to conjecture what
may be the accidents of any substance, are to be
regarded as dialectic and unprofitable subtleties.
It is difficult to determine whether all the emo-
tions of Vital Principle are common to it and its
recipient, or whether some one emotion belongs to it
exclusively ; and this is a question, which, although
not easily settled, it is necessary to entertain. There
is scarcely one of the many emotions which are de-
rived from the Vital Principle, (as anger, or courage,
desire, or feeling,) in the manifestation of which the
Vital Principle can be said to be affected, actively or
passively, without the body; the faculty of thought
seems to be the peculiar property of the Vital Prin-
CH. I.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 15
ciple, but whether thought be imagination of some
kind, or never unaccompanied by imagination, still
we must admit that it cannot be exercised without the
body. If, then, there is any one function or emotion
which is peculiar to the Vital Principle, we should
admit that it might be isolated from the body; but, if
no one belongs to it, exclusively, then we say that it
cannot be separate from one. But, just as many acci-
dents concur in the quality straightness, in so far as
straightness (as, for instance, among others, to touch
a brazen sphere at a point, which, were it apart from
some kind of body, it could not do), so straightness is
inseparable from a body, since it is ever found to-
gether with one. In the same way all the emotions
of the Vital Principle (such as courage, gentleness,
fear, pity, daring, joy, love and hatred,) seem to be
manifested together with the body; for the body is
affected, simultaneously, by them. As evidence of
which, there are times when we are neither excited
nor alarmed, although misfortunes may be trying
and palpable, while, at other times, when the body is