to set it down among them.
Note 4, p. 12. Some kind of demonstration or division,
&c.] Demonstration is, according to Aristotle 1 , a sci-
entific syllogism, and by scientific is meant, he says, the
method, through which we learn, with certainty, what a
subject may be ; and, 11 the knowledge be such, it follows
that demonstrative knowledge must be derived from con-
ditions which are original, immediate, and more appre-
hensible and causative, than the conclusion sought for.
Those conditions are, in fact, the suitable principles for
ascertaining that which is to be demonstrated ; as, without
them, the result will be, not demonstration but, a syllogism,
which cannot, with certainty, eliminate truth. Thus,
while demonstration* is a kind of syllogism, every syllo-
gism is not demonstration. Division is said by Aristotle 8
to be an imperfect syllogism, for it assumes what ought to
be demonstrated, and draws conclusions from a priori
reasonings. In this allusion to division, Aristotle may
be supposed to have had Plato in view, " as it was by
a process of dividing and subdividing that that emi-
nent man conducted his inquiries after truth ;" as, how-
ever, this method was considered by him to be a faulty or
imperfect syllogism, it may be that he alluded to it as
one which might be adopted, without altogether approving
of it as a mental process.
1 Analytic, b. I. i. 2. B Ibid. a. I. 4. i.
3 Ibid. a. i. 31.
202 NOTES. [BK. i.
Note 5, p. 12. As those of number are not those of
plane surfaces, &c.] That is, the science of number dif-
fers, generically, from that of Geometry. The nature, so
to say, of numbers had been a subject of deep and curious
speculation long before and during the age of Aristotle,
and there lie scattered through his works notices of
writers and systems which, although in themselves inter-
esting to scholars, would, even were it possible to give a
clear summary of them, be foreign to the present inquiry.
Aristotle 1 , before entering upon number, denned "quan-
tity" as being, partly definite, and partly continuous
and the former. he constituted of parts which have no
mutual local relation to each other; the latter of parts
which have that relation. The "definite" quantity is
represented " by number and by a word ; the continuous
by line, surface, solid, and time and place, besides." In
order to shew that number is definite or discontinuous, he
observes, " there is no common boundary whereon the
parts of any number conjoin ; as if, for instance, five or
three be parts of ten, there is no common boundary
whereon five or seven can conjoin to make the whole
number, but each part is, for ever, a distinct number,
and thus number is among definite quantities." " Words
are, in like manner, among definite quantities ; and it is
manifest that words, uttered by the voice, are quantity,
in that they are measurable by long and short syllables,
and manifest too that there is no common boundary
1 Categ. 6. i.
CH. I.] NOTES. 203
whereon the parts of a word, that is syllables, conjoin to
make the whole sound, and thus that each is for ever a
distinct sound. But a line, on the contrary, is continuous,
as there is no common boundary whereon its parts, that is
points, conjoin, as lines, to make a superficies, whereon
all parts of the solid conjoin ; so too time is con-
tinuous, for that which is present is conjoined with that
which is past, as it is with that which is future." Aris-
totle 1 , having shewn that there are these opposite con-
ditions of quantity, in a positive as in an abstract sense,
defines an unit (tj /xoVac) as being, in direct opposition to a
point, without position or place ; a line as being divisible
only in one way; a superficies as divisible in two, and a
solid, quantitatively considered, as divisible in three, and,
indeed, in all ways. Number is still regarded, of course,
as a collection of units ; the superficies as that which has
only length and breadth ; and the solid as that which has
length, breadth, and depth.
Note 6, p. 12. Among entities in potentiality or whether,
&c.] These terms run, like a golden thread, through all
the physiological works of Aristotle, and were adopted by
him in order to distinguish virtual from actual condition
or existence, the capability, that is, of becoming, by in-
nate force or power, an entelechy or reality, which is the
purport of the last term. They may be briefly exempli-
fied thus: an egg, e.g. is alive in potentiality it has
within it, that is, a principle, whereby, under genial
1 Metaphys. IV. 5. 24.
204 NOTES. [BK. i.
circumstances, it can develope into a living being ; and
so a seed, while alive, is capable of becoming a perfect
living plant, as the egg or the caterpillar or the chrysalis
is, in potentiality, the future perfect insect or butterfly.
The terms comprehend, in fact, all the metamorphic con-
ditions of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, and have
a range of application wide enough to include life under
all degrees and forms. This was the first great idea in
their adoption, and although Aristotle made them to sig-
nify an analogous transition in moral or mental faculties,
(as when he speaks of a boy as a general, in potentiality,)
yet their real purport is to distinguish those two universal
conditions of living and sentient beings. Cicero 1 has al-
luded to these terms or rather to the entelechy, (as was
noted in the preface,) but, from not having contrasted it
with the potentiality, he seems to have mistaken its gene-
ral import ; and he may thus have been led to suppose
that Aristotle's intention, in this novel term, was to desig-
nate a special fifth nature, to be the source of motion and
the originating cause of mental faculties and natural
emotions. Montaigne*, also, in modern times, following
Cicero, speaks of the entelechy only, which he regards,
erroneously, as the motor power of the body "ce qui
naturellement fait mouvoir le corps." A hot dispute
prevailed among scholars, it may be added, before and
during the age of Rabelais 8 , (and which he has alluded to
1 Tusc. Disp. I. 10. a Essai, Lib. n. ch. xii.
3 La, Vie de Gargantua, Lib. v. ch. xix.
CH. I.] NOTES. 205
with all his wonted wit and learning,) whether the term
should be eWeAe'^eia or eVSeAe'^eia ', he was, evidently
himself, one of the entelechists, as he says that the Lady
Quint-essence, who had had Aristotle, "that paragon of
all philosophy," for god-father, had been truly and cor-
rectly named Entelechy by him.
Note 7, p. 13. Wliether t/te difference is generic or
specific.] " The term Genus 1 implies a continuous series
of individuals having a like species or form, so that genus
may be predicated of man, so long as there may be a
continuous generation of human beings ; the term again
may be applied to the source whence individuals may
have descended, and thus some Greeks are of the Hellenic,
others of the Ionic genus, on account of their direct de-
scent from Hellenus or from Ion. And this applies so
much more to the progenitor than to external conditions,
that the descendants from a female constitute a genus.
Species 8 implies the mode of being of the individual, to-
gether with the primal essence ; and as the matter con-
stitutive of the genus is in the species, so species may be
regarded as parts of the genus. In modern classification,
genus signifies " a distinct but subordinate group, which
gives its name as a prefix to that of all the species of
which it is composed." The physical sciences have been
so widely developed, however, that, as those terms no
longer suffice for grouping the myriads of beings which
have been observed since Aristotle's time, naturalists
1 Metaphys. iv. 25. 28, * Ibid. vi. 75.
206 NOTES. [BK. i.
have, in addition, adopted kingdom or class, order, sub-
genus, individual, and variety.
Note 8, p. 13. T/ie term animal, however, in an uni-
versal sense, &c.] This passage, which, in the original, is
even more elliptical than its version, has engaged much of
the attention of commentators without having been satis-
factorily elucidated some have explained it as a criticism
of the ideas or archetypes of Plato ; and others as an
objection to every universal term, which, although an
abstraction, is to typify actual beings; and this is, pro-
bably, the purport of the criticism. Thus 1 , "the origin
of the controversy, during the middle ages, between the
nominalists and realists, may be traced down to Aristotle
and his followers." Wording so elliptical must, of course,
be subject, according to the bias of opinions, to different
interpretations ; but if it imply objection to every abstract
term which is to embody, so to say, realities, this version
may be accepted as its interpretation. The Latin version*,
however, is, "Animal autem universale aut nihil est aut
posterius est, et quicquid itidem aliud communiter prasdi-
catur;" and the French 3 , "C'est que 1'animal pris en un
sens universel ou n'est rien, ou bien n'est que quelque
chose de tres ulterieur."
Note 9, p. 13. The mind before thought, <fcc.] Aris-
totle* says that among the philosophers who were engaged
1 Trendel. Comment. * Ed. Acad. Borriaica.
3 J. P. Saint Hilaire.
4 Metaphys. I. 3. 16 ; xin. 3. 5 ; xi. 7. 7.
CH. I.] NOTES. 207
upon first causes, Anaxagoras and his predecessor Her-
moticus had maintained that, as in animals there is a
motor principle, so in nature there is mind, and that it is
the cause as well of the universe as of universal order ;
and thus " they assumed at once that mind is the cause of
the beautiful, the origin of being, and the source whence
motion is derived for every thing living." Anaxagoras,
in fact, regarded mind as the first cause of things (which
Ernpedocles was rather disposed to assign to the principle
of attraction, which he designated 0iAa, and held to be an
universal element), and maintained that, while all else is
but a combination of particles, it is homogeneous, impas-
sive, isolated, and pure. We are incapable, Aristotle
observes, in his comment upon these opinions, of continu-
ous thought and reflexion, because these are recreations too
lofty to be continuously maintained ; but, on this account,
watching (not being asleep, that is), feeling and thinking
are our most genial conditions, because from and through
them, we derive our hopes and recollections. Notwith-
standing, however, this acknowledgement, so to say, of
mind, as a sovereign principle, and its attributes, there is
no attempt to define its nature and its relations, or to
shew in what it was identified with or different from the
vital principle ; and this want of critical distinction be-
tween them is the more apparent as several epithets
(trpoyevea-TaTo^ 0eu)prjTino<: irpanTtKos 7ra0/TiKo?) are
introduced in the course of these physiological treatises,
which cannot but have modified the parent term.
208 NOTES. [BK. i.
Note 10, p. 15. Whetfier all tJie emotions of Vital Prin-
ciple, &c.] These passages shew clearly the suggestive power
and perspicacity of Aristotle's intellect, and they point so
clearly to doctrines which had yet to be developed, that they
cannot be studied without feelings of surprise as well as
admiration. The brain 1 was, in that age, supposed to be
merely a supplementary organ to respiration ; and, from
its not giving out sensation when touched, and from im-
perfect anatomy, it was supposed to have no relation
whatever with the sentient organs or spinal cord. The
nerves, as cords of sensation, were unknown ; the very
term (yevpov), which has been transferred to them as nerve,
meant then tendon or sinew. Hence it is that, in modern
languages, a man is said to be nervous in the one sense,
and a delicate female to be nervous in the other. It was
thus, from intuition and study, that Aristotle drew this
train of suggestive reasoning upon the influences exercised
over our passions and emotions by the organs of the body ;
that he discerned, that is, the seat and source of the tem-
peraments. Bichat*, having a far wider range of anato-
mical knowledge, was able, by assigning to the brain and
ganglionic system their proper offices, to distinguish in-
tellectual faculties from passions and emotions, which
although human, still are temperamental and functional
to distinguish, that is, the animal from the organic life.
Note 11, p. 15. In tlie same, way all the emotions, &c.]
These passages are quite in accordance with all that phy-
1 De Part. Animcdm, n. 7. 4. 2 Recherches physiologiqnes.
CH. i.] NOTES. 209
siology now teaches ; for although but repetition, it may
be said that Aristotle places the passions and emotions in
the organic life, and shews " that every individual must be
influenced by his particular temperament." Thus, as organs
predominate, or may be more or less active, individuals
are affected and modified, so to say, in temper as in cha-
racter. The temperaments ought to be subordinated, of
course, to the higher faculties ; but those organs are abiding
powers, and they are ever exercising an influence which
it is for reason to control or subdue. Plato, in the Timceus,
has discerned this great truth a 'mortal principle (ore TO
6injTov eVeo-rcAAe yevoi) is there assigned to the body, as
the seat of the passions and coarser appetites, while the
brain is represented as a soil fit for the divine seed of
wisdom ; and this will suffice to shew that this most gifted
man, although but imperfectly acquainted with physiology,
had perceived the co-existence in the human being of an
intellectual and, so to say, a functional existence. Des-
cartes 1 seems to have adopted opinions concerning the
" passions of the soul," which have much in common with
those of Aristotle ; but although so well acquainted with
his writings, he does not appear to have studied this
treatise.
Note 12, p. 16. But the physiologist and t/te metaphy-
sician would, &c.] The difference here dwelt ^ upon in
the mode of accounting for the same phenomena, accord-
ing to the bias given by studies or pursuits, will, it may
1 Les Passions de Fame.
14
210 NOTES. [Ex. i.
be assumed, be of constant recurrence ; foi", as physical
science advances, it will become more and more difficult
for the same party to attain to a large and solid acquaint-
ance with the attributes of mind (abstractions, that is),
and the knowledge of " external nature." The self-same
differences, in fact, which were delineated so graphically
by Aristotle, are still to be traced in our almost exclusive
attention to the physical sciences, and our disinclination
to admit, in our inquiries, of any proof but such as can be
tested through and by the senses and observation. The
terms here rendered physiologist and metaphysician (terms
unknown, by the way, to Aristotle) in the Latin version
are naturalis, and disserendi artifex ; that of artisan is
faber ; builder, artifex ; and transcendental philosopher is
primus philosophus.
CHAPTER II.
Note 1, p. 19. Hence Democritus, &c.] None of the
works of this eminent man have come down to us ; but
notices of his opinions lie scattered through the writings
of Aristotle, and these may suffice for the elucidation of
this and other allusions to him. Following his master
Leucippus, Democritus 1 , abandoning metaphysical subtle-
ties, looked into the constitution of the external world for
1 Metaphys. I. 4. 9.
CH. ii.] NOTES. 211
the knowledge of natural causes ; and he was thus led to
adopt the hypothesis of indivisible and moving corpuscles,
in order to account for the universal law of motion.
" Several other philosophers l had, before their time, con-
sidered matter as divisible into indefinitely small particles,
but as they were the first who taught that these particles
were originally destitute of all qualities except figure and
motion, they may well be regarded as the founders of the
atomic system of philosophy." Democritus 8 maintained
that nothing can ever be produced from nothing, and that
" indivisible atoms (elementary corpuscles, that is) consti-
tute the essence of bodies." He adopted, as elements, the
plenum and vacuum, making the former, in contradistinc-
tion to the latter, to be entity, and the two to be, as
matter, the causes of things ; he maintained too, that they
are equally distributed through all bodies. He agreed
with Anaxagoras in believing that throughout all nature
there is a principle of combination ; and with his master
Leucippus, in regarding form arrangement and position of
particles, as causes of elementary distinctions among bodies.
But in some of this reasoning he was mistaken, Aristotle
observes, from not distinguishing the condition of poten-
tiality from reality, since the same object may simultane-
ously, when in potentiality, be and not be, although this
cannot hold good of the same when in reality. Democritus
also thought that, owing to the difference of sensation
1 Enfield's Hist, of PhOos. Vol. I. 4 .
3 Mctaphys.Vl. 13. 9 ; m. 5. 5 ; I. 4. 9.
142
212 NOTES. [Ex. i.
produced by the same object upon the same individual,
truth either has no existence, or else it can hardly ever be
attained to by mortal beings. To return, however, to the
doctrine of atoms, Leucippus and Democritus maintained
that, as bodies are distinguished by forms, and forms are
infinite, elementary bodies must be infinite also ; but then,
with the exception of fire, which was said to be spherical,
they forgot to specify what the forms are ; and they denned
elementary bodies by greatness and smallness as well as
form. Thus, form motion and size are, according to
them, the constituents of these formative atoms, and,
accordingly, the larger atoms which are said to go to the
formation of bodies, are distinguished from the smaller
ones or motes (held to be visible only in the sun-beams),
which, as being endowed with vital properties, are alluded
to, in a succeeding passage, as supporting, through respi-
ration, the life of the animal. In fine, this doctrine of
atoms varying in form and size, constantly moving, and,
through attraction and repulsion, combining with and
separating from one another, prevailed in all the schools
of antiquity; and there may perhaps be traced in it a
faint outline of the present matured theory of atomic
proportion.
Note 2, p. 19. Hence, too, they make breathing,
&c.] This description conveys, under a rude exterior, so
to say, a description of the process of breathing or respi-
ration, as well as the purposes which it has to fulfil in the
animal economy " the contraction of the chest (expiration)
CH. ii.] NOTES. 213
expels particles rendered effete, and these are supplied by
others from without, during inspiration ; and this alter-
nation continues so long as life endures." It emanates
from an early stage of physiology, no doubt, but yet it
does clearly intimate that without such an alternation life
could not be maintained that a renewing power from
without, and an expulsion of something prejudicial from
within, are necessary to animal existence. Democritus
(of Abdera), Anaxagoras and Diogenes are cited by Aris-
totle 1 as believing respiration to be necessary for all crea-
tures (in opposition to himself, who limited the process to
air-breathing animals), and he has given their account of
the process in fishes and oysters (molluscs). " Anaxagoras
says that fishes, during respiration, discharge the water
through the branchise, and that then, as there may not be
a vacuum, they draw in air which is in the mouth ; and
Diogenes maintains that, when fishes discharge the water
through the branchise, they draw in, by means of the void
created in the mouth, the air which is ever present in
water and encircling the mouth." Democritus advanced
a step nearer to modern teaching, in accounting for fishes
dying when out of the water by their then taking in too
much air ; as, when in the water, they can take in only
a moderate quantity." But all this was objected to, abso-
lutely, by Aristotle, both because of his own more restricted
views of respiration, and of the apparent discrepance of
the theories with common sense, and thus was he led, in
1 De Eespirat. i. i.
214 NOTES. [BK. i.
this instance, to oppose theories pregnant with suggestion,
and advantageous to the progress of science.
Jfoie 3, p. 20. To the same point do they aho come, <fcc.]
The writers here alluded to are said by Philoponus to be
Plato, Xenophanes and Alcmaeon. Aristotle 1 observes
that, as nature is the origin of motion and change, it is
necessary, in order to comprehend motion, to understand
what nature is. Motion seems to be the property only of
continuity, and the infinite is displayed, first of all, in
what is continuous ; and, therefore, in definitions of con-
tinuity, there is frequent reference to the infinite, as if all
continuity were infinitely divisibla Besides these reasons,
without place void and time, there cannot be motion.
But whatever is in motion, must have been moved by its
own or by some other power, and this motor may be the
second or third of a series, as the staff, for instance, which
moves the stone is moved itself by the hand, which is
moved by the man ; and although the last of these may
be spoken of as the motor, yet the term is applicable rather
to the man, as being the first link in the chain. Thus,
the man who communicates motion by bis will is, himself
at rest ; and, therefore, it by no means follows, Aristotle
contends, that the motor should itself be in motion.
Note 4, p. 21. Homer has icell represented, <kc.] The
term a\Xo<ppoveu>v, rendered " changing his mind," occurs
but once in the Iliad, and there it refers, not to Hector,
but to Euryalus vanquished in the funeral games; and
1 Nat. Auscutt. m. i. vm. 5.
CH. ii.] NOTES. 215
signifies stupefaction of the faculties rather than what is
here attributed to it. Thus, either Democritus must
hare misquoted, or the Iliad, since Aristotle's time, have
suffered, as is commonly believed, more than one mutila-
tion. The purport of the passage, however, is sufficiently
obvious.
Note 5, p. 21. Thus Democritus does not employ tfa
term mind, &c.] He made mind, that is, to be a sentient
principle and identified with those filings and emotions,
which Aristotle held, as has been shewn, to be but
emanations from the corporeal organs and functions,
to be manifestations, that is, of the temperament. An
apology has been offered for this attribution of mind
to all creatures, in that such a principle may seem to be
represented by the consummate order which prevails
in their constitution j and thus that Anaxagoras mav
have meant that, while it may be present, objectively,
in all beings, it can be present, subjectively, (as mind,
that is) only, in a few. Plato 1 seems to imply something
like this when adopting one essence or faculty which is
eternal and unbegotten, and another which has no
abiding and is perishable the one capable, by intellect
with cogitation, of comprehending unchangeable natures :
and the latter capable, by opinion with sensual percep-
tions, of comprehending whatever is casual and ephemeral.
Note 6, p. 21. Have said that the Vital Principle
comprises alljirst causes, <fca] Aristotle* observes that, a<?
1 Timceus, 27. D. 8 Nat. Avscult. n. 3.
216 NOTES. [Bx. i.
every investigation is for the purpose of knowing some-
thing, and as we cannot be said to know before we can
comprehend wherefore a thing is what it is, (comprehend,
that is, its first cause,) so it is evident that we must thus
study the laws of reproduction destruction and change,
throughout nature, in order to be enabled to refer, for
each subject of investigation, to the first causes of the
phsenomena. This argument seems to confine causation
to natural operations in particular, that is, living bodies ;
but cause had then, as it has now, a far wider significa-
tion besides essence, individual being, elements, and
other admitted first causes, that of which anything is
made, was said to be its cause, as bronze of a statue,
silver of a goblet, and, in a general sense the maker is
the cause of the production, and he who alters, of the
change, &c. Thus, there was great latitude in the
enumeration of first causes. Thales 1 , the founder of
this branch of philosophy, maintains that water is a
first cause, because the earth rose from water. Anaxi-
meues and Democritus contend that, as air was before
water, so it is rather to be regarded as the first cause of
everything.
Hippasus and Heraclitus set it down as being fire ;