Anaxagoras to some of his followers, that "beings will
be to them such as they may suppose them to be." These
writers attribute the same opinion to Homer, (but it was
shewn in a former note that this reference is faulty,)
because he made " Hector, as if beside himself under the
blow, to lie thinking differently," (d\\o<f)poveovTa). But
it was incumbent upon these writers, as is observed in the
text, to have dwelt upon the liability to error to which
we are all ever subject through the senses; for if all
appearances are to be held as true, then the same impres-
sion may be at once true and false ; which is to admit an
impossibility. The doctrine, in fine, of this school, as
given in the text was, that the power by which animals
move is corporeal, and like to the faculty which thinks,



302 NOTES. [BK. in.

as also that the faculty of conclusions (judgment) is
some form of sensibility ; and thus, it reduced, so to
say, the faculties of thought to sensual impressions and
conditions.

Note 2, p. 142. On which account, eitJier all appear-
ances, <fec.] This is a dilemma, as an objection to their
doctrine, in that, " either all appearances are, as they
maintain, necessarily true, or else (in opposition to their
dogma, that like is recognised by like,) there is recognition
by unlike;" and thus the error from contraries is made
identical with the knowledge of contraries. The objection
is then placed upon the obvious ground that, while
sensation is allotted to all creatures, reflection, which
implies reason, belongs but to few ; and next, as a general
argument, it shews that mental faculties, being derived
from other sources than feeling, cannot be identical with
sentient perceptions.

Note 3, p. 143. But it is manifest that imagination,
<kc.] The argument next proceeds to the subject of
imagination, and as has been well observed, it is thus
appropriately placed between sentient perceptions and
thoughts, " as imagination cannot be without senses,
or the mind without imagination." For " imagination
is not identical with sensation," Aristotle 1 observes,
and yet " it is called up either through thought or
through sensation." Imagination then, is neither sensa-
tion nor conception, as the former depends upon external
1 Metaphysica, in. 5. 23. De Motu Animalm, 8. 5.



CH. III.] NOTES. 303

influences, and the latter, which is a result from reason-
ing, being true or false, is removed from the will ; but
imagination on the contrary, can be exercised how and
when we please. It is difficult either to represent
graphically the process here alluded to, or to determine
the precise import of the text ; and other versions seem
to be equally indefinite. The Latin is, "licet Hamque,
cum libet, fingere quicquid volumus, atque ante oculos
ponere, perinde atque ii faciunt qui, in artificiosse memorise
comparatis atque dispositis locis, imaginis fingunt atque
simulacra collocant," and the French, " et Ton peut s'en
mettre 1'objet devant les yeux, comme le pratiquent ceux
qui traduisent les choses en signes mnemoniques, et
inventent des symboles." Hence, an opinion, arrived at
by a chain of reasoning drawn from particulars which we
hold to be true, cannot but affect us differently from
imaginings which are of our own coining, and which we
know to be fictitious. A succeeding passage, which shews
that imagination cannot be opinion, is to the same purport
for, being derived from particulars, its issue is, so to
say, independent of us ; but imagination may be exercised
upon any combinations which the will may choose to
recalL

Note 4, p. 147. But the motion produced by the act,
&c.] The wording, by the act, is but an indifferent
representative of the original VTTO rfj<: cvepyeias, and yet
its exact signification, or its relation to the eWe/Ve^ia is
by no means obvious ; the phrase, besides, notwithstanding



304 NOTES. [BK. in.

its repetitions, is still vague and obscure. It seems,
however, to embody former assertions that a single sen-
sation from a special organ, that is, must be true ; and
that there is room for fallacy when other qualities are added
to that sensation, and still more so when common pro-
perties, as motion, magnitude, or number, are, for ex-
planation, to be taken into the account.

Note 5, p. 147. And since vision is a sense, &c.] It
will be apparent that this passage depends, for its mean-
ing, upon etymology (j)avTa<ria. (fancy or imagination)
may be derived, if not from <a'oe, yet, from the same
root as 0a'o?, which probably is 0w? (light), as light is
essential to vision ; and 0a'oe may have formed (palvio,
which is an approximation to (pavraa-ia. The Latin
version is, " cum autem visus maxime sit sensus, hinc est
quod nomen imaginatio ab ipso lumine sumpsit, phan-
tasiaque dicitur, quia sine lumine visio fieri nequit."
Imagination or the mental perception of images, that is,
being regarded as an inward sight, and sight as the most
precious of the senses, was derived from the same root as
light, because light is essential to sight.



CH. IV.] NOTES. 305



CHAPTER IV.

Note 1, p. 153. T/wre is a distinction between posi-
tive, &c.] All the passages, under this head, are obscure,
if not incomprehensible ; their purport seems to be whe-
ther the mind judges, by one and the same faculty, of
realities, (qualities, that is, perceived through the senses)
and realities viewed, abstractedly, in their essence. Thus,
the inquiry seems to be whether the mind is sensibility
or associated, so to say, with sensibility, or altogether
distinct from it ; whether the sentient perception which
is engaged upon particulars, can ever be capable of the
abstract reasoning which detects the essence of things,
and so generalises and groups them for universal laws.
This does not, however, apply, it is said, to all subjects,
as, with some, "the two states are identical;" and this
is the case with abstractions or immaterialities, which fall
within the province of the mind apart from sense.

Note 2, p. 153. Now, it is by tfte sensibility that we
judge, &c.] This phrase seems to allude to the then
admitted doctrine that the sense of Touch either is flesh or
in the flesh, and that it, therefore, directly or indirectly, is
perceptive of hot and cold, and other such qualities ; and
this assumed sentient property may have led to this com-

20



306 NOTES. [BK. in.

plicated argument, which makes flesh to be rather an
abstract than a positive substance. Trendelenburg, in the
allusion to curved and straight lines, sees a reference to
Plato's opinions upon intellectual processes : " Sane Plato
actiones intellectus circulis primum recto, mox circinato
recurrentique interius comparat : Aristoteles linese expli-
catse et replicatse, sive porrectse et curvatse." It may,
however, be assumed that, whatever the figures or analo-
gies employed, the operations of the mind will still remain
as mysterious as those of the sensibility ; and, thus, that
all such inquiries are, as final causes, beyond our research
and, so far, unprofitable.

The Latin version of the phrase is, " Sensitiva igitur
parte calidum discernit et frigidum, quorum qusedam est
ratio caro, alia vero esse carnis discernit, aut separabile
aut se habente ad se ipsam perinde atque se habet cum
extensa fuerit linea flexa." That of the French, " Mais
c'est certainement par une autre faculte qui est separee, ou
qui du moins devient a elle-meme ce que la ligne brisee
est elle-mfeme aussi quand on la redresse, que nous
jugeons ce que signifie etre la chair."

Note 3, p. 154. But we have to consider why the
mind, <fec.] The chapter is closed rather abruptly with
this passage, which, by some, is said to be spurious ; but,
although obscure in its wording, it is in keeping with the
general tone of the inquiry and argument. The main
purpose of the inquiry is why, as every subject of thought,
in potentiality, is among material substances, the mind is



CH. V.] NOTES. 307

not constantly thinking, just as it has been asked why
the sensibility, which is ever acted upon by external in-
fluences, is not constantly made percipient. The answer
seems to be, that the sensibility, being in potentiality, is
incapable of perception without the agency of external
influences, while the mind, being immaterial, is able to
judge of the relations of things, without being identified
with them; and thus, that, although every object, as a
subject of thought, may be said to belong to the mind, it
cannot belong to any one of them. It may well, however,
be said, with respect to this, among other passages of
this chapter, " est enim Aristotelis, liberum cogitationis
cursum sequi neque anxia perspicuitatis causa deflecti"



CHAPTER V.

Note 1, p. 156. As if it were a virtuality like light.'] The
original '? ef is TIC is ill represented by virtuality, and
yet neither habit, state, nor condition would represent
the agency of the mind as a realising principle ; as that
which can collect, compare, and so give reality, in gene-
ralisations, to perceptions received through the senses.
" Sicut colores expectant, ut appareant, (i. e. ut colorum
vice vere fungantur) ita sensuum notitiae et quidquid ad
intellectum patientem pertinet mentem agentem requirunt,

202



308 _ NOTES. [BK. in.

ut omnes veritatis numeros habeant, et verse notioiiis vim
consequantur."

Note 2, p. 156. Knowledge in activity is identical
with, &c.] This passage seems to be the complement of
what had just been asserted, that the agent is ever more
influential than the subject, and the originating cause
than the matter ; for the intellect, in activity, may be
said to create, to identify with itself that is, the know-
ledge which it acquires concerning external things through
abstract reasoning. Knowledge pre-exists, however, as
has been said, in every well-constituted individual, be-
cause each is furnished, at birth, with faculties for
acquiring knowledge ; but yet it cannot strictly be said to
pre-exist, since it may, or may not be developed by edu-
cation or reflection ; as the mind, moreover, is impassive,
it is not impressionable, and cannot, therefore, be the seat
of memory. But what means the impressionable mind
which is perishable ? may it not be again said that,
suggestively, the brain is here implied ; since this organ
is the sensorium, the seat of memory, and dependent,
besides, like all other organs, upon life, for its functions
and its continuance.



CE. VI.] NOTES. 309



CHAPTER VI.

Note 1, p. 159. In the way that Empedocles, &c.] The
passage cited in support of the above opinion is not very
apposite; for Empeclocles 1 , who had made "nature to be
nothing more than the combination of (yu <"<?) and change
among commingled particles," (attraction and repulsion,
in other words), is quoted by Aristotle * in the words,
" many heads of creatures without necks budded forth ;"
and, as if to turn against him, as it were, his own doc-
trine, it is added, " they were by affinity joined together."
This led Aristotle to the simile in the text, as Empedo-
cles 3 formed things in nature by the combination of
individual particles, so may the mind eliminate new by
the association of former or admitted ideas ; and as, in
the verse cited, head and neck lie dissevered, so, in the
idea of quantity, there is nothing in common between
the measure of the diagonal and the side of the square.
Thus, as there is no common measure for the diagonal
and the side of the square, they are, in so far, distinct ;
but although, in themselves, distinct, they can, in thought,
be combined and made one. " By diameter may be

1 De Gen. et Corr. i. i. 7. * De Ccdo, in. 2. 7.

3 Vide Trendel. Comment.



310 NOTES. [BK. in.

understood the diagonal which divides the square into
two equal triangles ; or it may mean the diameter of the
circle which is incommensurate with the circumference."
In a word, it is by combination that error creeps into our
judgments, and falsifies our perceptions.

Note 2, p. 159. It is the mind, &c.] The question
of a fact, such as that in the example, is dependent
upon the brain rather than the mind, as that organ can
combine the individual notices obtained through the
senses ; but when the mind intervenes, so to say, and
judges from what is, of what was or is to be, there is
room for error. It is almost puerile to explain that the
assertion " something is not white " is not, necessarily,
fallacious ; and that, if the object be white, the fallacy
comes from the addition of the negative. The double
sense of indivisibility is to the same purport ; extension
is clearly divisible, and, therefore, divisibility is made,
actually, apparent as a fact ; but the mind can realise to
itself extension without parts, as indivisible, that is, and
in potentiality.

Note 3, p. 160. It may not then be said, &c.] In
this version, the term mind is used, and in another, " in-
telligence," (which is its synonym), as that which thinks,
(rl woei), but the text does not so specify it ; and any
allusion to halves would but ill-accord with the notion of
homogeneity and impassibility assigned to the thinking
principle. But no theory which could be framed of the
mind would aid in explaining the train of reasoning



CH. VII.] NOTES. 311

here ; for, independently of the abstruse nature of all
mental processes, there is, evidently about it, confusion,
arising from the assumption of a something associated
with sensibility, which the brain only could rectify.

Note 4, p. 160. The point and every analogous divi-
sion, &c.] With respect to quantity l , in relation to indi-
visibility, "a point which has position, (KO! Qiaiv e%ov
<rT7/ui;') is indivisible, but a line is divisible in one, surface
in two, and body in several directions;" and by privation
is implied that the point is without length, depth, or
breadth ; the line without either breadth or depth ; and
the surface without depth. It is obvious, from what has
been said, that every affirmation or negation must, as
depending upon sentient impressions, be either true or
false ; but that the judgment, when deciding upon essen-
tial or abiding qualities, may be true, and that, when
drawing its inferences from accidental qualities or rela-
tions of bodies, it may be erroneous.



CHAPTER YIL

Note 1, p. 165. Images belong, naturally, to the think-
ing principle, <kc.] This very suggestive comparison
between intellectual and sentient perceptions, seems, even
in the absence of knowledge of the brain, to assume that
1 Metaphysica, iv. 6. 24.



312 NOTES. [BK. in.

practical thoughts must be derived from the senses, and,
therefore, through a sensorium ; and as impressions may
be genial or otherwise, the faculties suggest pursuit or
flight. The practical mind, in fact, never thinks without
an image which acts, in its turn, so to say, upon it, as the
air, which has been impressed by colour, does upon the
pupil and the pupil upon something else (that is, the
retina), and so sound upon the hearing ; but the last
term, that is, the visual or auditory sense, is one, as the
mean or medium, however modified in condition, is one.
It will be evident, with but little consideration, that the
obscurity which is palpable in the succeeding passages is
occasioned by the absence of the brain, and can be cleared
away only by its introduction; and that, with it, the
analogies of unit and limit acquire some kind of signifi-
cation.

Note 2, p. 166. Thus tlie cogitative faculty dwells,
&c.] Aristotle seems here to consider images or thoughts,
present in memory, as necessary to ratiocination, and he
has elsewhere said that an individual without senses
could neither learn nor understand ; but he is evidently
alluding to a higher faculty than the sensibility, and
which is able, by abstract reasoning, to draw, from present
appearances or images, conclusions as to future occur-
rences, and, by that prevision, to determine what should
or should not be done.

Note 3, p. 166. And with respect to all which, &c.]
This passage seems, although obscure from its brevity, to



CH. VII. NOTES. 313

imply that without action, when thoughts are not carried
out that is, there can for us be neither good nor bad, as
these are relations pertaining to individuals, and dependent,
not upon any universal law but, upon social institutions ;
but that tmth, being the same for ever, is, even when not
exercised, in an absolute relation to all men, and in oppo-
sition to all falsehood.

Note 4, p. 166. The mind dwells upon abstractions,
&c.] The term abstractions here, as in an earlier passage,
signifies mathematical questions, which, from not being
referrible to any particular body, admit of being treated as
such ; and so a snub- nose, as the realisation of a particular
form, may, by that form apart from matter, be regarded
as an abstraction. The argument is then resumed that
the mind, when thinking, is, wJien active or in act, the
subject thought upon. The closing passage, by its ques-
tioning whether " the mind, witliout being itself imma-
terial, can comprehend abstractions," seems to militate
against the arguments adduced to prove that it is impassive
and homogeneous, freed, that is, from all the conditions of
matter ; but it is yet doubtful where (whether or not in
"the metaphysics") this argument may, according to
promise, have been continued.



314 NOTES. [BK. m.



CHAPTER VIII.



Note 1, p. 169. But tJie question here must necessarily
refer, &c.] This argument, while maintaining the opinion
that sensibility is receptive of form without matter, is an
objection to the doctrine of Empedocles and others, who,
having derived the Vital Principle from material elements,
made perception to be material also, in the relation of
like by like. But here it is said that, as the hand is the
instrument for making instruments, so the mind is the
archetype of forms, and sensibility the recipient of the
forms of things without their matter, perceived through
the senses. Aristotle, however, does make imagery, the
power that is, of recalling forms, to be essential to cogi-
tation, and, consequently, to reflection ; although doubting
whether there may not be thoughts which cannot have a
sentient origin.

Note 2, p. 170. Imagination, on the other hand,
&c.] Imagination, or the faculty which calls up images
is, necessarily, different from that which determines the
truth or falsehood of any proposition, and which affirms
or denies ; for affirmation or negation, as the predicant
of something held to be true or erroneous, is, as was said,
a combination of thoughts ; and thoughts, being made up



CH. IX.] NOTES. 315

of simple ideas, are not, like the imagination, under our
own control. Thus, while the former may be regarded as
a single faculty, and, in some sense, independent of the
judgment, the latter involves many and opposing ideas
and perceptions. But what is here meant by primal
thoughts (TO. 2e -n-pw-ra vo^aTa)1 Do the words imply
innate ideas, or conceptions of pure abstraction, such as
creation, virtue, responsibility, and others'? Or must it
be admitted that no definite sense can be attached to
them 1 If primal mean innate thoughts, (thoughts, that
is, no way dependent upon sentient properties,) then such
are distinguishable at once from those which are derived
from images, although these are not, themselves, images
in reality.



CHAPTER IX.

Note 1, p. 173. But a difficulty at once presents itself,
&c.] There is an apparent want of discrimination here
between the faculties which are the privilege and dis-
tinction of higher creatures and the functions which are
essential to life, and without which there can be neither
animal nor living being. In a subsequent paragraph the
rational faculty or mind (al o KaXov/jLevus i/oi/s) is ex-
cluded from all participation in corporeal movements,
and held to have no part in sentient perception. It is



316 NOTES. [BK. in,

supposed, in fact, never to be engaged upon what is prac-
tical as its office is contemplation, so that, " when dwelling
upon what may be fearful, or otherwise, it does not, at
once, suggest, flight or pursuit ; " although, independently
of its influence, "the heart or some other organ of the
body maybe accelerated or depressed." But in all this, as
no allusion is made to a moving force, whether the
motive be imagination or the stimulus of appetite, the
inquiry may be said to be defective.

Note 2, p. 173. But to resume the more especial, &c.]
Although these passages, which allude both to physical
and moral causes of motion, are sufficiently obvious, yet, as
they do not explain how locomotion is effected, they fail
in the object of the inquiry ; and then the motion con-
cerned in nutrition, growth and decay, is almost in the
same category, so to say, with that of progression. It
may be mentioned that the " motion and progression of
animals," " breathing and expiration," " sleep and watch-
ing," "youth and age," are special treatises, and probably
composed for the elucidation of this particular work upon
" life." The comparison between the intemperate man
who, although rational, acts against his reason, and the
physician who, although versed in medical science, does
not cure, seems to exemplify the adage, that to advise is
one thing, to do, another ; or to confirm the solemn words
of Johnson, "that teachers of morality discourse like
angels, but they live like men."



CH. X.] NOTES. 317



CHAPTER X.

Note 1, p. 178. Thus it is the object longed for alone,
&c.] Food, that is, being necessary both for stilling the
appetite and preserving the body, is the first motor ; for,
were there, as the text says, two motors, then, as the
practical mind never impels to move without appetite,
appetite could not impel to move without the mind,
which is not the case. This is the argument ; but it is
less distinct than might be wished for owing to the
nature of the practical mind not having been defined,
and to insufficient knowledge concerning both muscular
agency and the brain and nervous system.

Note 2, p. 178. The mind then is always right, &c.]
The intellect, that is, when neither moved by appetite
nor perverted by imagination, (for both may be wrong) is,
when freed from those influences, always right ; but food
incites to move because it is either good or appears to be
a good, in the sense, not of a moral but, of a practical
good, and, as such, it may, by abuse, be the opposite of
good.

Note 3, p. 179. The, appetites admit of being opposed,
&c.] "Appetite and reason are not always in accord-
ance," Aristotle 1 observes, and as, when any one desire is
1 Eih. End. n. 8. 5.



318 NOTES. [BK. in.

subdued another may arise and strive for the mastery, so
appetite may well be opposed to appetite. But resistance
to desire can be manifested only in such beings as have a
sense of time, have, that is, powers of abstraction, by
which, withdrawing themselves from what is present, and
foreseeing consequences in the future, they are enabled to
resist the immediate compliance which desire or passion
is urging upon them. For "the 1 portion of time now
present, is a portion of that which is future and indi-
visible."

Note 4, p. 179. For loithout having been itself -moved,
&c.] Owing to the wording there is obscurity about
this passage, but yet it may be elucidated the object
desired, food, that is, although at rest, may, acting
upon the appetitive sense, incite to move, and so be
regarded as a motor; and there are, of course, as many
such motors as there are kinds of food. These then are
the three terms first, the motor or food; then the
muscular agency by which locomotion is effected ; and
lastly, that which is moved, or the animal.

Note 5, p. 180. ut to speak summarily, &c.] The
passage has, in this version, been rendered with a bias
that the analogy was drawn from the structure of the
knee-joint, which, in all times, has been likened to a
hinge, and hence termed " ginglymoid ; " and concholo-
gists, following Aristotle 1 , have so termed the hinge of

1 Nat. Ausc. rv. ro.

3 Hist. Animalm, IV. 4. 11.



CH. XI.] NOTES. 319

the bivalves. The Latin is, " nunc ut in summa dicamus,
id quod movet ut instrumentum, ibi est collocandum ubi
idem piincipii rationem finisve subit ut in cardine fit
hinc enim convexum et concavum est ; quorum alterum
finis, alterum principium est ; quapropter alienum quiescit
alterum movetur." The closing paragraph seems to con-
firm what has been assumed, that sentient imagination is