plethoric, or in a state akin to that of anger, we are
moved by incidents which are trivial and unim-
portant. And what makes this yet more apparent is,
that, at times, without the occurrence of aught to
occasion alarm, we are thrown into the state of
persons under terror; and if this be true, it is clear
that all such emotions are material conditions. So



16 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. I.

that the definition of any one of them, as that of
anger for example, may be said to be the motion of a
body of particular nature, or part or function of a
body, by such a cause, and for such an end.

Thus, for these reasons, it is for the physiologist
to study the Vital Principle, either as a whole, or
under some particular manifestation. But the phy-
siologist and the metaphysician would differ widely
in their definition of any one of those emotions, as
that of anger, for example ; which, while the latter
would hold to be desire for retaliation, or some such
motive, the former would maintain to be ebullition of
blood, or excess of heat about the heart. The one of
these, in fact, accounts for the passion by the matter,
and the other by the form and cause ; for the form is
the cause of the thing, which, if it is to be, must, of
necessity, be in a special matter. Thus, the cause of
a house, for instance, is such as this " to be a shelter
to avert injury from rain, wind, and heat;" and here
the physiologist will speak of stones, bricks, and
rafters, while the metaphysician will, in these mate-
rials, only behold the form to be adopted for those
purposes. Which, then, of these is the physiologist?
Is it he who studies only the matter without refer-
ence to the cause, or he who is occupied with the
cause only? Or is it rather he who judges both from
cause and matter ; and which of the two is he ? May
we not however rather say that there is one who is



CH. I.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 17

engaged upon the properties which are inseparable
and only in so far as they are inseparable from matter,
while to the physiologist it belongs to judge of such
emotions and functions as emanate from particular
bodies and peculiar matter ? Properties different from
these belong to another ; and some of them to an
artisan, a physician or builder, as the case may be,
while the mathematician has to do with properties
which are not inseparable from matter, but which, as
they do not belong to any particular body, admit of
being treated as abstractions ; and abstract qualities,
as abstractions, belong to the transcendental philo-
sopher.

Let us, however, return to the point where our
discussion broke off, and repeat that the emotions of
Vital Principle, such as anger and fear, for instance,
in so far as they are innate, are inseparable from the
material frame-work of animals; and that they are
not to be regarded as a line or a surface.



PRELUDE TO CHAPTER II.

THIS chapter is a review of the opinions of earlier and
contemporaneous writers upon the Vital Principle,
and as Aristotle has never failed at the outset of each
subject of inquiry to record the principal writers upon
it, he may be regarded as the founder of tradition in
science. The writers here cited may be divided into
those who made motion, and those who supposed
feeling to be the essential characteristic of that which
imparts life to matter ; although there were some
who attributed to it both motion and feeling.



CHAPTER II.

As we are now entering upon the study of Vital
Principle, and are encompassed with doubts which
ought to be resolved, it will be incumbent upon us to
gather the opinions of such of the earlier writers as
have suggested any thing concerning it, in order that
we may be able as well to adopt their happier concep-
tions as to be on our guard against their errors.



CH. II.] ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. 19

The suitable opening for this inquiry into the
Vital Principle is to lay down the properties which
appear, most especially, to belong to it. The ani-
mated being, then, seems to be especially distinguished
from whatever is inanimate by the two properties of
motion and feeling; and these two are almost the
only distinctions which have been transmitted to us
by the earlier writers upon the subject. Thus, some
of them maintain that the Vital Principle is in the
largest, fullest sense a motor power; and as they
believed that nothing can impart motion unless it be
self-motive, they assumed that the Vital Principle
must be among beings which are self-moved. Hence
Democritus says that it is a kind of fire and heat, and
as forms and atoms are, according to him, infinite, he
speaks of those which are spherical and apparent in
the sun's beams, while passing through chinks in
doors, as fire and Vital Principle ; and further says,
that those atoms, collectively, are the elements of
universal nature. Leucippus, in like manner, is dis-
posed to regard the spherical atoms as Vital Prin-
ciple, both on account of those forms being best
adapted for penetrating every where, and best able,
from being self-motive, to give motion to other things ;
and thus they both assume that it is Vital Principle
which imparts motion to living beings. Hence, too,
they make breathing to be the boundary of life for
they maintain that the envelopment of animal bodies

22



20 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. I.

crushes by its contraction those forms of atoms which,
from never being at rest, give motion, and that com-
pensation is afforded for their exit by the entrance of
other like forms, during inspiration; and that these
forms, while entering, resist the contracting and
solidifying power, and preclude the expulsion of all
the atoms which are essential to life. They further
maintain that animals can live only so long as they
can support this process. The opinion adopted by
the Pythagoreans seems to be to the same purport
for some of them have maintained that Vital Principle
is the motes in the air, and others that it is that which
gives motion to the motes ; and it has thus been said
of those corpuscles, because of their appearing to be
constantly moving, although the air may be quite
still.

To the same point do they also come who say that
the Vital Principle is self-motive ; for all these philo-
sophers seem to have assumed that motion is the most
characteristic property of the Vital Principle ; and
that, while all other things are moved by it, it is self-
moved, and the more so, as they do not see any motor
which is not self-moved.

Anaxagoras, in like manner, says that the Vital
Principle is a motive force, and the same opinion may
be attributed to any one who, with him, may have
maintained that the mind has given motion to the
universe; and yet his opinion is not altogether in



CH. II.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 21

accordance with that of Democritus. Democritus, in
fact, maintains that Vital Principle and mind are
absolutely identical ; that the apparent is the true ;
and that Homer, therefore, has done well in repre-
senting Hector as "changing his mind while he lay."
Thus he does not employ the term mind as a faculty
for the attainment of truth, but makes mind to be
identical with the Vital Principle. Anaxagoras is
less explicit upon these points ; for, in many places,
he speaks of mind as the source of the beautiful and
the true, while, elsewhere, he says that it is identical
with the Vital Principle, and innate in all creatures,
larger or smaller, higher or lower, in the scale of
being ; but it is manifest that mind, in the sense of
intellect, is not equally allotted to all animals, nor
even to all men.

Thus they who have looked upon living beings
with respect to motion, have assumed that the Vital
Principle is the most motive of entities, and so many
as have looked upon them with respect to knowledge
and sentient perception, have said that the Vital
Principle comprises all first causes ; of which, while
some admit of several, others maintain that there is
only this one. Empedocles, for instance, seems to
maintain that the Vital Principle is derived from
all the elements, and that each element is Vital
Principle, as he says that " by earth we perceive
earth, by water water, by air air, by fire destructive



22 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. I.

fire, by attraction attraction, and by repulsion dire
repulsion."

Plato, in a like manner, in the Timaeus, derives
the Vital Principle from the elements for like, there-
in, is known by like, and things are derived from
first causes ; and so, likewise, have things been denned
by him in the treatises " upon philosophy." Accord-
ing to them, animal, in itself, is derived from the
abstract idea of unity, and primal length, and breadth,
and depth ; and other things in a somewhat similar
manner. It is besides maintained, but in a different
sense, that the mind is unity, and knowledge duality,
although, as one branch, it is unity ; and that the
number of the surface is opinion, that of the solid
sensation, for numbers were spoken of by him as
forms and first causes, and as derivatives from the
elements. Thus, some things are discriminated by
mind, some by knowledge, some by opinion, and
others by sensation ; as the numbers which represent
those faculties are the forms of things.

Since the Vital Principle has to some appeared to
be both motive and capable of knowing, there are
writers who have combined motion and intelligence,
and then represented the Vital Principle as a number
endowed with self-motion.

Philosophers differ with respect to first causes,
both as to their nature and number ; but they who
make them corporeal differ most from those who hold



CH. II.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 23

them to be incorporeal; and from these again they
differ who make them to be a combination both of
corporeal and incorporeal molecules. They differ
also with respect to the number of such causes, as
some adopt only one while others admit of several ;
and, in accordance with these conclusions, they form
their estimate of the Vital Principle ; but yet they
have all assumed, and not unreasonably, that it is of
the nature of first causes to be motive. Hence, the
Vital Principle has to some appeared to be fire, as
fire, besides being the most attenuated and most
incorporeal of the elements, is both self-motive and
a primal cause of motion in other things.

Democritus has expressed himself more clearly
than any other writer in specifying the causes of each
of those properties : for he says that the Vital Prin-
ciple is identical with the mind, and to be placed
among primal and indivisible bodies ; that it is motive,
owing to the tenuity of its parts and its form ; that
of forms the spherical is the most mobile, and that
this is the form both of mind and fire.

Anaxagoras seems, as we have already said, to
distinguish the mind from the Vital Principle, although
he employs both terms as if synonymous ; excepting
that he sets down the mind as being, in the fullest
sense, the origin of all things. Thus he says that the
mind alone of all entities is homogeneous, unmixed,
and pure ; and to the same principle he attributes



24 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. I.

the properties both of knowing and imparting motion,
as he maintains that it is the mind which has given
motion to the universe.

Thales, too, from what has been recorded of him,
seems to have assumed that the Vital Principle is
something motive, since he said that the loadstone
must have a Vital Principle because it gives motion
to iron.

Diogenes, together with some other writers, held
the Vital Principle to be air, because air was believed
to be the most attenuated of the elements, as well as
an originating cause ; and that, through these proper-
ties, the vital principle is able both to recognise things
and to impart motion to them. They argued that
Vital Principle, as being a first cause and the origin
of other things, is able to recognise them ; and that,
as being the most attenuated of entities, it is motive.

Heraclitus also maintains that the Vital Principle
is a first cause, since, in his system, it is the exhala-
tion out of which he constitutes every thing else ; he
regards it too as the most incorporeal of entities, and
as being "in a constant state of flux;" and further
says, that the moved must be known to the motor.
He agreed, in fact, with most others in believing all
things to be in motion.

The opinions of Alcmaeon upon the Vital Principle
seem to be very like those just cited for he says that
it is immortal, on account of its resemblance to the



CH. II.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 25

immortals, and that this resemblance is manifested by
its being continuously in motion ; for all divine bodies,
he argues, the moon, sun, stars, and heavens, are con-
tinuously moving.

Some writers of smaller pretension and Hippo
was one of them have ventured to represent the Vital
Principle as water ; and they seem to have been led
to this persuasion by the nature of semen, which, in
all creatures, is fluid. Hippo, indeed, reproves those
who assert that the Vital Principle is blood, because
blood is not semen ; and semen is, according to him,
the first principle of life.

Others have maintained, as did Critias, that the
Vital Principle is blood, from their assuming that
the most peculiar property of blood is feeling, and
that feeling is imparted to us through the nature of
blood. All the elements, in fact, have had their
partisans, excepting earth; and no one has adopted
it, unless such an opinion may be attributed to those
who have derived the Vital Principle from all, or
made it to be all the elements.

Thus, all these philosophers define Vital Principle
by the three properties, motion, feeling, and incorpo-
reity, each of which is referrible to first causes. Such
of them, therefore, as define it by the faculty of
knowing, make it to be an element or a derivative
from the elements, and, with one exception, their
opinions coincide ; for they all maintain that like is



26 ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. [BK. I.

known to like, and, since the Vital Principle recog-
nises all things, they constitute it out of all first
causes. But such as admit of only one cause and
one element, set down Vital Principle as being that
one, be it fire or air ; and such as admit of several
first causes, set down Vital Principle as being multi-
ple also. Anaxagoras stands alone in maintaining
that mind is impassive and without anything in com-
mon with aught else ; but, even were it so, he has
not explained, nor is it easy from what he has said to
explain, how or for what purpose it is to recognise
anything. So many writers as admit contraries
among first causes, constitute the Vital Principle
out of contraries, and so many as admit only one
contrary, whether hot or cold, or other analogous
contrast, make the Vital Principle to be that one.
Hence, led by the terms, some maintain that Vital
Principle is heat, because from heat the term life has
been adopted; and others affirm that it is cold, because
from cold, through respiration, the term Vital Prin-
ciple has been derived.

Such, then, the opinions which have been trans-
mitted to us upon Vital Principle, and such the
reasons upon which those opinions have been
grounded.



PRELUDE TO CHAPTER III.

THIS chapter is upon motion, and its purport is to learn
whether the Vital Principle is in motion or at rest,
and if in motion, whether self-moved or in motion
imparted to it ; its object is also to inquire whether
motion proceeds directly from Vital Principle,
whether, that is, it impels to move while it is itself
at rest, or whether it imparts to the body the
motions which it first communicates to itself. Aris-
totle * admits of the six following modes of motion :
generation, corruption, growth, decay, change and
locomotion, which are all vital processes ; but as, in
a succeeding passage of this chapter, he speaks of
only four modes, he may have supposed that the two
first are included in the four last. There is an
incidental allusion to movement by conveyance, to
movement, that is, without progression. The inquiry
proceeds to the question whether Vital Principle is
self-motive, and, if so, whether it is or not still

1 Metaphys. ill. 7.



28 ARISTOTLE ON THE [fiK. I.

subject to motion by impulse from without, which
seems to be answered in the negative ; for it can
scarcely be admitted that this Principle can be
subject to external impulse, since its movements, if it
do move, must result from sensual impressions.



CHAPTER III.

BEFORE proceeding farther, let us consider the nature
of motion ; for it may not only be untrue that Vital
Principle is, as some affirm, essentially self-motive or
capable of producing motion ; but it may be one of
those entities to which motion cannot possibly be-
long ; and it lias already been said that the motor is
not necessarily itself in motion.

Everything moved admits of being moved in two
ways : either by itself or by something else ; and by
something else we mean whatever is moved from
being in something which is moving, as sailors for
instance, for they are not moved as is the vessel,
since it is moved by itself, but they are moved from
being in that which is moved. This is clear by
reference to their limbs a particular movement of
the feet is walking, and walking is man's progression;
but the sailors do not at that time move by walking.
Since then motion may be spoken of in this two-fold



CH. III.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 29

sense, let us consider whether the Vital Principle
moves by itself, and whether it partakes also of
motion communicated to it. As there are four kinds
of movement, tram I ition, change, growth, decay, it
follows that the Vital Principle should move accord-
ing to one, or more than one, or all of them ; and
if it do not move by chance, then motion must be
natural to it; and if so, then locality, for all the
movements above alluded to are local.

But if Vital Principle be essentially self-motive,
then accidental movement will not belong to it as to
a white colour or a length of three cubits ; for these
properties do move, but then it is by accident, and
owing to the bodies to which they belong happening
to be in motion. Thus, there cannot be for them any
locality as there will be for the Vital Principle, if it
partakes of motion by its own nature. Although,
however, it may be in motion by its own nature, it
may still be moved by force, and if by force, still by
nature; and the same holds good for the state of
rest. Thus, the point towards which anything is by
its nature moved, serves also by nature for its point
of rest, as equally the point to which anything is
moved by force serves also, by force, for its point of rest.
It is not easy, however, even conjecturally to deter-
mine what will be the forced movements and forced
states of rest of the Vital Principle if its motion be
upwards it will be fire, if downwards, earth, for such



30 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. I.

are the tendencies of those elements ; and this conclu-
sion applies equally to the intermediate movements.
Since the Vital Principle besides appears to give
motion to the body, it is probable that it communi-
cates to the body the motions which it imparts to
itself, and, if so, the converse may be true that it
communicates to itself the motions which it imparts
to the body. Now, the body is moved by translation,
so that the Vital Principle should change with the
body and be set free from it, either wholly or in its
parts ; and if this is admitted, it should follow that
the Vital Principle, having gone forth from the body,
might re-enter, and the consequence of this would be
that the dead bodies of animals rise again. . Could
the Vital Principle be subject to casual motion com-
municated by some other power than its own, then
an animal might be impelled to move by impulse
from without; but it is noway necessary that that
which is essentially self-motive should be moved by
something else, unless by mere chance, any more
than that which is good, in and for itself, should be
so by or for the sake of something else. It may be
confidently affirmed besides, that the Vital Principle,
if it do move, is moved by objects which act upon
the senses. Although, however, Vital Principle
should be self-motive, it would still be in motion,
and thus, as all motion is displacement of that which
moved, as being moved, the Vital Principle might



CH. III.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 31

be displaced from its essence, unless its self-motion
were a casual property ; but self-motion is of its very
essence.

Some philosophers maintain that the Vital Prin-
ciple moves the body in which it is, as it is itself
moving, and this is the opinion of Democritus, who
expresses himself almost in the words of the comic
poet Philippus, who charges " Daedalus with having
made a wooden Venus to become movable, when
quicksilver was poured into it." Democritus, in feet,
says much the same thing when he maintains that
indivisible spheres are in motion, from their having
been by nature constituted never to remain at rest,
and that these spheres drag along with them and give
motion to all things. But we will ask Democritus
whether it is those self-same spheres which produce
the state of rest, and it will be difficult or rather im-
possible for him to explain how they are to do so. It
is not thus, besides, that the Vital Principle appears
to give motion to an animal, as it acts, generally
speaking, by some kind of election and thought.

It is in this same manner, however, that Timseus
physiologically explains how the body is moved by
the Vital Principle that, from its being in motion,
the body, with which it has been interwoven, is
moved also ; and having constituted it out of the ele-
ments, and divided it according to harmonic numbers,
in order that it may have an innate sense of harmony,



32 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. I.

and that the universe may move in accordant orbits,
he bent the straight line into a circle, and dividing
that circle into two united in two parts, he again di-
vided the single circle into seven others, as if to indi-
cate that the orbits of the sky are the movements of
the Vital Principle.

But, in the first place, it is not correct to say that
the Vital Principle is magnitude, for Timaeus evi-
dently means that this Principle of the universe is
such as is the so-called mind ; and, then, that Principle
of the universe can resemble neither the sentient nor
the concupiscent faculty, as neither of these moves in
a circle. The mind is one and continuous as is cogi-
tation, and cogitation as are thoughts, and thoughts are,
by concatenation, one, in the sense, not of magnitude,
but of number ; and, therefore, the mind is not con-
tinuous in the sense of magnitude, but either it is
without parts, or, at all events, not continuous as
magnitude. How, indeed, were it magnitude, is it to
think as a whole, or by some one of its parts ? But
parts must be regarded either as magnitude, or as
points, if, indeed, a point may be regarded as a part;
and, if parts be considered as points, then, as points
are innumerable, the mind, clearly, will never be able
to recount them all, and if, as magnitude, the mind
will have to dwell very often, or rather continuously,
upon the same subject. But it is manifest that think-
ing may be exercised once for all. If, besides, it



GH. III.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 33

suffice for thinking, that there should be contact by
some one of its parts, why should it move in a circle,
or why be magnitude? And if necessary for thinking
that there should be contact by the whole circle, then
what means contact by its parts? How, besides,
shall that which has parts think by that which is
without parts, or that which is without by that which
has parts ? Thus, it follows that the mind must be
that circle: for thinking is the movement of the mind,
as the periphery is the movement of the circle ; and,
if thinking be the periphery of the mind, the mind
may be regarded as the circle, of which thinking is
the periphery. But then the mind will be ever
thinking, and necessarily so, since the peripheral
movement is unceasing. Now, there are limits to
practical thoughts, (as all such are for the sake of
something else,) and so equally there are to specu-
lative thoughts, in their reasons ; and every reason is
either a definition or a demonstration. Thus, demon-
strations set out from a principle, and are, in some
way, terminated by a syllogism or a conclusion; and
even though not concluded, they do not revert to
their principle, but, taking up another mean and ex-
treme, they proceed on ward ; but the periphery, on