sees, must have been already imbued with colour, since
each sentient organ must be receptive of the object of



136 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. III.

perception without its matter ; and this accounts for
impressions and images being still present in the sen-
tient organs, after objects have been withdrawn.

The action of the object of perception is one and
the same with that of the sense, although they differ
in mode of being I mean, for example, sound in
action and hearing in action ; for it may be that an
individual, endowed with hearing, does not hear, as
that a sonorous body does not give out sound. But
when an individual, capable of hearing, listens, and
when that which is sonorous gives out sound, then
hearing in action coincides with sound in action, and
the one may strictly be termed hearing, the other
sound. If motion, production, and impression, are in
the product, it follows that sound and hearing, in an
active state, must pre-exist in hearing in a potential
state; for the action of the creative and the motive
exists, naturally, in that which is to be acted upon.
It is, therefore, no way necessary that the motor
should be itself in motion. The action, then, of the
sonorous body is sound or sounding, that of the audi-
tory sense is hearing or audition; for hearing is
double as sound is double, and the same applies to
other senses and perceptions. Since production and
impression are, not in that which acts but, in that
which is impressed, so the action of the object of per-
ception and the sensibility is in the sentient being.
But, while for some senses these two states have



CH. II.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 137

been specially distinguished by names, as sound and
hearing, there are others for which one or other state
is without appellation the action of vision, for in-
stance, is called sight, but the action of colour is
unnamed ; the action of the sapid sense is called taste,
while that of savour is without appellation.

Since the action of the object of perception and
that of the sentient being is one and the same,
although different in mode of acting, it follows that
hearing and sound, in this sense, must together be lost,
or together be preserved; and this is true of taste
and savour, and other senses and functions ; but yet it
does not hold good of those relations in potentiality.

The earlier physiologists have expressed them-
selves ill upon the subject, as they thought that there
can be neither black nor white without sight, nor
savour without Taste. And yet what they said was
in part right and in part wrong; for as senses and
sentient impressions have a twofold acceptation, ac-
cording to their state of potentiality or activity, so
what was advanced by them may be applicable to
the one state, and inapplicable to the other. The fact
is, those writers reasoned absolutely upon conditions,
which do not admit of being so dealt with. If a voice
of any kind is harmony, and if voice and hearing are,
in one sense, the same, and, in another sense, not the
same, then, as harmony is proportion, it follows that
hearing must be proportion also. And hence it comes



138 ABISTOTLE ON THE [BK. III.

that every sound in excess, whether acute or grave,
perverts the hearing, as every savour in excess does
the taste ; and every colour over-bright or dark dulls
the sight, as every odour excessively pungent, whether
grateful or offensive, does the smell, as if shewing
that sensibility is a kind of proportion. Thus, quali-
ties, as acid or sweet or saline, are agreeable when-
ever they are reduced, pure and unmixed, to a due
proportion ; for it is this only which renders them
grateful. To speak generally, harmony is a combi-
nation of tones rather than the acute or the grave
singly, as for the Touch, the warmed or cooled is
genial, rather than the hot or cold, simply; for, as
sensibility is proportion, so qualities, in excess, pain
or pervert the senses.

Each sense is perceptive of its own appointed
subjects, is innate in its own organ, as a opnal
organ, and judges of the distinctions of qualities, as
sight judges of white and black ; taste of bitter and
sweet, and so as to other senses and qualities. But
since we judge of white, sweet, and each other
quality by its relation to each sense, by what do we
perceive that qualities differ ? Now, it is evident that
it must be by some sense, as the impressions are all
sentient ; and equally so that the flesh cannot be that
final organism, as in order to judge of qualities it
must, of necessity, first touch bodies. Neither is it
admissible that, by different senses, we judge sweet



CH. II.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 139

to be different from white, as both qualities must be
apparent to some single faculty; for, otherwise, it would
be as if I should perceive one quality and you perceive
another, and thus make it evident that they are dif-
ferent from one another. But it is here required that
the same individual should perceive that they are
different, for the sweet is different from the white,
and what he perceives that he says ; and thus, what
he says that he thinks and perceives. It is then evi-
dent that we cannot, by different senses, judge of
different qualities, as also, from what follows, that we
cannot judge of them in a separate portion of time.
Neither can an opinion be in a separate portion of
time ; for just as it is the same individual who says
that good is other than bad, so when he says that the
one is different from the other, he implies that the
other is equally so, and does not employ the term
when loosely he does not use it, I mean, in the
sense of now, in the phrase, "now I say that the object
is different," without implying that it is different now.
But, here, it is the same individual who employs the
term now, and says that objects are different now and
because now; for the impressions are coincident, as
they are inseparable, and as the time is indivisible. It
cannot, however, be, that the same individual, in so
far as indivisible, should be subject to contrary im-
pulses in time which is indivisible ; yet if sweetness
move sensation or thought in one way, bitterness



140 ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. [BK. III.

must move them in an opposite, and whiteness in
some other direction. Can, then, that which judges
be, numerically, indivisible and inseparable, yet sepa-
rable in its mode of being ? If so, then, in some way,
as divisible, it may perceive divisible, and, in some
way, as indivisible, it may perceive indivisible quali-
ties ; for in its mode of being it is separable, but,
locally and numerically, it is inseparable. But is not
this impossible ? The same may, in potentiality, be
indivisible and divisible and be the contraries; but
not so in mode of being, as it is divisible in action,
and cannot possibly be at once white and black, nor
be simultaneously impressed by the forms of those
colours, provided sensation and thought are such as
we have said they are. But it is with this, as with
that which some call a point, and which, in so far as
it is one or dual, is indivisible or divisible. Thus, in
so far as that which judges is one, it is indivisible,
and its perceptions are simultaneous ; and in so far as
it is divisible, it employs the same point twice, simul-
taneously. In so far, then, as it employs the boun-
dary as two, it judges of two things by it and per-
ceives that they are distinct, as the boundaries of the
line are distinct ; but in so far as it is one, it judges
by one act, and judges simultaneously.

Let what has been said then suffice for the defi-
nition of that principle, by which we maintain that
an animal is made a sentient being.



PRELUDE TO CHAPTER III.



THIS chapter may be regarded as a metaphysical disquisi-
tion, since its purport is to distinguish mental facul-
ties from corporeal sensations as well as to examine
the opinions of earlier writers who had maintained
that cogitation is some kind of sensation; and,
finally, the nature of imagination, as lying inter-
mediately between faculties and sensations, is investi-
gated and defined. It treats, too, although but
incidentally, of the understanding, knowledge, opi-
nion, and other topics which border on abstractions ;
and closes with etymology to shew the sentient
origin of imagination.



CHAPTER III.



As writers, for the most part, define Vital Principle
by two different faculties, by locomotion and thought,
judgment and sensibility, it would seem as though
thought and reflexion are by them considered to be
some kind of sensation ; for, in both cases, the Vital
Principle both discerns and recognises something.
Thus, the ancients affirm that reflexion is identical
with feeling; and Empedocles has said, "man's in-
telligence is enlarged by what is present," and, else-
where, " hence, man derives his power of reflecting
upon different subjects;" so Homer's words, "such is
the mind" do but express the same idea. All these
writers assume, in fact, that thinking, like feeling, is
corporeal, and that Like is perceived and compre-
hended by Like, as was explained in our opening
chapters. But yet it was incumbent upon them to
have spoken, at the same time, upon the liability to
error through the senses ; for this belongs, more pe-
culiarly, to animals, and Vital Principle remains sub-
ject to it during the greater portion of existence. On
which account, either all appearances are, as some of



CH. III.] AEISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. 143

those writers maintain, necessarily, true, or else error
is caused by contact of the unlike, which is the oppo-
site of the opinion, that like is recognised by like; and
the error from contraries seems to be identical with
the knowledge of contraries. It is manifest that feel-
ing is not identical with reflexion; for, while the
former belongs to all creatures, the latter has been
imparted only to a few. Neither is thinking, that
faculty to which belongs the sense of right and wrong,
(the right comprehending judgment, knowledge, and
sound opinion, the wrong comprehending their con-
traries,) to be confounded with feeling for sensation,
being derived from particulars, is ever true, and
belongs to all animals; but the judgment may be
wrong, and is imparted only to such as have reason.
Imagination, in fact, is neither sensation nor judg-
ment, and yet it is not called up without sensation,
just as, without sensation, there can be no conception ;
but it is manifest that imagination is not conception.
Imagination depends, in fact, but upon ourselves, as we
can, at will, call it up (since it is in our own power
to place images before the eyes, as do they who, for
mnemonic aids, by laying down objects, form sym-
bols) ; but to form an opinion does not depend upon
ourselves, and then every opinion is, of necessity,
either true or false. Whenever, besides, we may have
an opinion upon any terrible and fearful incident, we
are straightway affected as if it were a reality, just as



144 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. III.

we are when we think upon any desperate deed ; but,
under imagination, we become simple spectators, as it
were, of a pictorial representation of terrible or daring
achievements. There are, in conception itself, the
distinctions of knowledge, opinion, reflexion, and their
contraries, of which we shall speak elsewhere. With
respect to thinking, since it is different from feeling,
and feeling seems, in part, to be imagination and, in
part, conception, let us here define imagination, and
then proceed to the consideration of the other faculty.

If imagination be a faculty by which we say that
an image of some kind, and that not merely in the
sense of a metaphor, is called up within us, then it is
to be ranged among those faculties or powers, such as
feeling, opinion, knowledge, mind, by which we form
judgments and determine what may be true or false.

It is clear from what follows, that imagination is
not sensation ; for sensation is either a faculty or an
act, such as sight, and seeing, but an image is some-
times apparent to us without either faculty or act, as
phantoms in dreams for instance ; and then sensation
is ever present, which is not the case with the imagi-
nation. If, moreover, imagination were in act identical
with sensation, we should have to admit that it must
belong to all irrational creatures, but this does not seem
to be the case with the ant, bee, or worm; and then
sensations are always true, but imaginings are for the
most part false. Hence, we do not say, when accurately



CH. III.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 145

examining any object, that we imagine to be so or
so, a man for instance, but we so express ourselves
rather when we do not clearly perceive what the
object is, and when the perception may be true or
false; when, to use a former expression, the object
appears to us as landscapes do to the purblind.

Neither can imagination be regarded as one ot
those faculties, such as knowledge and mind, which are
always true, for it admits of being false as well ; and
it remains for us to consider whether it is opinion,
since opinion may be both true and false. But belief
follows upon opinion, (as it is not admissible that an
individual should not believe in that upon which he
has an opinion,) and belief belongs to no irrational
creature although imagination is imparted to many.
Belief, besides, is an attendant upon every opinion,
as persuasion is upon belief, and reason alone can
persuade ; but although imagination belongs to some
irrational creatures, reason has been given to none.
It is manifest, then, that imagination can neither be
opinion with or through sensation, nor a combination
of opinion with sensation ; and for the same reasons
evident, that opinion is from nothing else but that
from which sensation is derived. By which I mean,
if imagination be the combination of an opinion of
whiteness and a sensation of whiteness, and not of an
opinion of goodness with a sensation of whiteness, then
to imagine is to think upon what has been sensually '

10



146 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. III.

perceived, and that not accidentally. But there are
appearances which are fallacious, although our concep-
tion of them at the time may be true, as the sun, for
instance, appears to be a foot in diameter, and yet we
are satisfied that it is larger than the earth ; and in
such a case it happens either that the true opinion of
the sun's dimension must have been cast aside, or
else, while the sun remains as it was and the true
opinion has neither been forgotten nor changed, that
the opinion is at once both true and false. But the
opinion is simply false when it escapes us that the
thing seen is altered. It is evident, then, that ima-
gination can neither be any one, nor be derived from
any one of those faculties.

Since one object having been set in motion can
communicate motion to another, and since imagination
seems to be a kind of motion, and never to be produced
without sensation, or in other than sentient creatures,
or without the objects of sentient perception, and since,
on the other hand, motion can be produced by the act
of sensation, and this motion must of necessity be
equal to the impression, it may be admitted that the
motion of imagination can neither be produced with-
out sensation, nor in other than sentient beings ; that
beings endowed with it act and are acted upon in
many ways, and that its manifestations are both true
and false. This latter alternative happens thus: the
sensation which is derived from the objects peculiar



CH. III.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 147

to each sense is true, or it involves the smallest
amount of error ; but when, in the second place, such
objects are perceived in their accidents, there is room
for fallacy; when for instance, something is said to
be white, there is no fallacy, but when that object is
particularised and said to be this or that, the percep-
tion may be fallacious. There is, in the third place,
liability to error in our perception of common proper-
ties, and sequences in the accidents referrible to parti-
cular bodies accidents, I mean, such as motion and
magnitude, which are referrible to all bodies, and
from which there is peculiar liability to error through
the senses. But the motion produced by the act of sen-
sation will differ from the sensation derived from these
three modes of sensation the first, while sensation is
yet present, must be true; but the others, whether sen-
sation be present or not, may be fallacious, and more
especially, when the objects causative of sensation may
have been withdrawn. If, then, imagination alone
fulfil all the conditions indicated, and if it be all that
has been said, it may be defined as motion produced
by sensation in action. And since vision is a sense
above all others, imagination has derived its appella-
tion from light, because without light there is no
vision; and owing to its being an abiding faculty
and like sensations, animals perform many of their
actions through it. Some animals are so influenced from
being irrational; and others, as man, from having

102



148 ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. [BK. III.

their understanding eclipsed, at times, by passion,
disorder, or sleep.

Let this much, however, suffice for the inquiry
into imagination, for shewing what it is, and for what
purposes it has been imparted.



PRELUDE TO CHAPTER IV.

THIS chapter is upon the mind (o uous) and Aristotle's
inquiry is, whether it is part of that principle which
gives life to the body, or altogether distinct from
corporeal relations. It seems to be at once deter-
mined that there is no affinity between the mind
and sensibility, the ministrations of which trench so
closely upon cogitation ; and that the mind, there-
fore, existing independently of the body, is related to
subjects of thought, abstractions that is, as is sensi-
bility to sensism and sensation. Anaxagoras re-
garded all things as combinations save mind, which
alone he held to be homogeneous and pure. Aris-
totle 1 makes the mind to be receptive of the subject,
and the essence of the subject of thought ; to be
something divine, and to confer upon us contempla-
tion, which is our sweetest, best enjoyment. " If this
faculty, in its occasional exercise, as by ourselves, is
happiness, it is, as the eternal attribute of the Deity,

1 Metaphys. I. 8, 13 ; XI. 7, 8 ; I. 3, 10 ; m. 5, 12.



150 PRELUDE TO CHAP. IV.

wonderful, and more wonderful in proportion as
more enduring." But yet Aristotle quotes, without
objection, that the mind is innate in animals., and
the cause, in nature, of the world and its order ; and
he cites the verses of Parmenides, which seem to
imply that the mind is present in the limbs of man
as if it were a corporeal agent. To judge, however,
from observations in the course of this treatise, he
may be said, although, perhaps, not always consist-
ently, to have considered this great principle as
impassive, indiscerptible, and freed from all corporeal
ties ; and as being itself, only when withdrawn from
matter and its influences. Thus, as matter must
tend to preclude its offices, its existence, while asso-
ciated with mortal beings, can be only that of poten-
tiality.



CHAPTEK IV.

WITH respect to the part of Vital Principle by which
it both knows and reflects, whether that part be sepa-
rate, or separate, not substantively but, in an abstract
sense only, let us now consider in what it is distin-
guished from other parts, and how thinking is at any
time exercised. If thinking be such as is feeling,
then it may be some kind of impression by the subject
of thought, or other analogous agency. But then
that which thinks must be impassive, receptive of the
form of objects, and, in potentiality, the same as the
object, without actually being so. The mind, in fine,
must be related to subjects of thought as the sensi-
bility is to objects of perception. It is, then, necessary
since the mind thinks upon all subjects, that it should
be homogeneous, in order, as Anaxagoras expresses
himself, that it should domine, that is, recognise
things ; and as whatever is foreign to it precludes
and eclipses its inward light, so it can have no other
nature than that of potentiality. Thus, the so-called
mind of Vital Principle (and by mind I mean that part
by which Vital Principle judges and compares), is
not actually any one of the subjects of thought before



152 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. III.

thinking upon it. It is very improbable, therefore,
that the mind should have been commingled with the
body; for were this the case, it would be a quality of
some kind, as hot or cold, or it would have some kind
of organ as there is for the sensibility, but no such
organ is to be found. It is well said by some that
Vital Principle is the place of forms, only this is to
be understood of Vital Principle, not as a whole but
as a cogitative faculty, and of forms, not in reality
but, in potentiality.

It is manifest, from the nature of the sentient
organs and sensation, that the quiescent state of the
sentient is not the same as that of the cogitative part.
For the sensibility is unable to distinguish impressions
in excess, as a sound amid loud sounds, or a colour or
odour among brilliant colours or pungent odours, but
the mind, on the contrary, when thinking intensely
upon any subject, can still think and with increased
rather than diminished intensity upon the subordinate
details ; the sensibility, besides, cannot be without a
body, but the mind is separable. When thus situated,
the mind can become each of the subjects of thought,
as an individual is said to be learned actually (and
this may be said when he is able at will to employ
his learning,) because he is at the same time equally
learned in potentiality, although not as he was before
he had learned or invented something ; for when so
learned he is able to reflect upon his learning.



CH. IV.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 153

There is a distinction between positive magnitude
and ideal magnitude, water and ideal water, and so
between many but yet not all substances, as with
some the two states are identical, but the mind judges
of flesh and ideal flesh either by some different faculty
or by being itself differently disposed ; for flesh cannot
be without matter, but, as is a snub nose, it is some-
thing in something. Now, it is by the sensibility
that we judge of hot and cold and other properties of
which flesh is the standard ; but it is either by some
distinct faculty or as a curved is to an extended line,
that we judge of ideal flesh. Straightness, on the
other hand, as well as the snub nose we place among
abstractions, for each is associated with continuity;
but the difference, if there be a difference, between
positive straightness and ideal straightness, the mind
judges of by some other, perhaps a dual faculty ;
by some other faculty, at least, or by being itself
differently disposed. To use a general expression,
as are things abstracted from matter so are subjects
of thought with respect to the mind.

It is difficult to determine how the mind, if it be
as Anaxagoras supposes, homogeneous, impassive
and without any thing in common with aught else,
is to think, if thinking be some kind of impression ;
for it is only in so far as there is something in com-
mon between two substances, that the one seems to
act and the other to be acted upon. And there is



154 ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. [BK. III.

the same difficulty if the mind itself is intelligible ;
for it will be present in other things, unless it is
itself, intelligible in some other way than they are,
and unless the subject of thought is some one
specific subject ; or else the mind will be some
kind of combination, and this reduces thought to the
nature of other things. But to suffer impression
according to some common relation implies, as has
been just explained, that the mind, in potentiality, is
as the subjects thought upon, and yet that, in reality,
it is no one of them before thinking upon it; and
thus the mind is to be regarded as a tablet on which
nothing may have been actually inscribed. The mind
is a subject of thought to itself as is any other topic,
since that which thinks and the subject of thought
are among immaterialities ; for speculative knowledge
is the same as the subject which is so known. But
we have to consider why the mind is not always
thinking, as each subject of thought, in potentiality,
is among materialities ; so that the mind will not be
present in any one of them (for the mind is the
immaterial faculty which judges of them), although
each of them will be subject to the mind.