found in this passage. And it should be considered that this is
not a passing remark on the part of President Edwards, or the
statement of an isolated opinion, but it is a fundamental princi-
ple of his whole theology, as we understand it. Take this away,
and his whole theory of original righteousness, original sin, of
the nature of holiness, and the nature of sin, and of the liberty
• Treatise concerning Religious Affections, pp. 231, 232. ElLzabetbtown edition, 1787.
20 REGENERATION.
of the will, go "with it. Whether his %-iews on these subjects are
correct, although the main question, is one thing, but that he
really entertained the opinion here so clearly expressed, we won-
der that any man should ever have doubted. We trust that re-
spect for the memory of President Edwards, and the obligation
" to interpret language according to the known and declared
nature of the thing described," will prevent any one saying, that
he beheved that "this new sense" is an entity, or "this founda-
tion" for moral exercises is " something inserted in the soul,"
" an agent wdthin an agent," etc., etc.
Dr. Bellamy seems to teach the same doctrines as President
Edwards with regard to spiritual blindness, the necessity of
divine illumination prior to the exercise of any holy affections,
and the nature of regeneration. In the second volume of his
works, page 502, he says, " In regeneration there is a new, divine,
and holy taste begotten in the heart, by the immediate influences
of the Holy Spirit." And on the opposite page, " The idea of
a natural beauty supposes an internal sense, uuplanted by our
Creator, by which the mind is capacitated to discern such kind of
beauty." "And that the idea of spiritual beauty supposes
an internal spiritual sense, communicated to the soul by
the Spirit of Clod in the work of the new creation, is clearly
illustrated and proved by a late divine, whose praise is in all the
Churches." He here refers his readers to Edwards on Religious
Affections.
Dr. Dwight taught the same doctrine, and that clearly and
definitely. In his discourse on the nature of regeneration,' he
says, " This change of heart consists in a relish for spiritual ob-
jects, communicated to it by the power of the Holy Ghost."
That " this relish" was antecedent, according to his view, to all
holy acts, there can be no doubt, because he expressly asserts it,
and because his arguments go to prove it. What he calls " a
relish for spiritual objects," he elsewhere calls a holy disposition,
and refers to the case of Adam for an illustration of its nature.
" When Grod created Adam," he remarks, " there was a period
of his existence after he began to be, antecedent to that in which
he exercised the first vohtion. Every man who believes the
mind to be something besides ideas and exercises, and does not
admit the doctrine of casualty, will acknowledge that in this
' Worlis, Tol. ii., p. 418.
REGENERATION. 21
period the mind of Adam was in such a state, that he was pro-
pcnse to the exercise of virtuous vohtions rather than that of
sinful ones. This state of mind has hecn commonly styled dis-
j^osition, temper, inclination, heart, etc. In the Scriptures it
usually bears the last of these names. I shall take the liberty
to call it disposition. This disposition in Adam was the cause
whence his virtuous volitions proceeded ; the reason why they
were virtuous and not sinful. Of the metaphysical nature of this
cause I am ignorant ; but its existence is, in my view, certainly
proved by its effects." Again, on the same page, " In regenera-
tion, the very same thing is done by the Spirit of God for the
soul, which was done for Adam by the same Divine Agent at his
creation. The soul of Adam was created with a relish for spirit-
ual objects. The soul of every man who becomes a Christian is
renewed by the communication of the same relish. In Adam
this disposition produced virtuous volitions. In every child of
Adam, who becomes the subject of virtue, it produces the same
effects." Tlie same idea is expressed, if possible, even more
formally in the same volume, page 451, where, among other
things equally explicit, he says that by this disposition he in-
tends " the cause, which in the mind of man produces all vir-
tuous affections and volitions." The same doctrine is repeatedly
taught in other passages of his works, as in the sermons on the
Probation of Man, vol. i., 394, on the Fall, 410, 413, on Deprav-
ity as derived from Adam, etc.
From various passages which occur in the pamphlet of Dr.
Tyler, already mentioned, we infer that he holds the same doc-
trine. The same principle (that moral disposition may exist an-
tecedently to all moral acts) is also frequently and clearly
asserted by Dr. Woods, of Andover, in his controversy with Dr.
Ware. We refer to the opinions of these distinguished men, to
show how united Calvinists, old and new, are in their views on
this point, and that if the charge of believing in physical de-
pravity and physical regeneration be sustained, it lies on almost
the whole Calvinistic, and indeed on the whole Christian world.
Still the main question recurs — is the charge well founded ?
The main principle, as before stated, which is assumed by
those who make this charge is, that we can only regard the soul
as to its substance on the one hand, and its actions on the other.
If, therefore, there be any change wrought in tlie soul other than
22 EEGENERATION.
of its acts, it must be a physical change. And if any tendency,
either to sin or holiness, exist prior to choice, it is a positive ex-
istence, a real entity. Thus the charge of physical depravity
and physical regeneration is fairly made out. We are constrained
to confess, that if the premises are correct, the conclusions, re-
volting as they are, and affecting, as they do, the fair names of
so large a portion of the Christian church, are valid. The prin-
ciple itself, however, we believe to be a gratuitous assumption.
It is inconsistent with the common, and as we believe, correct
idea of habits, both connatural and acquired. The word habit
(habitus) Avas used by the old writers precisely in the same sense
as " principle" by President Edwards, as explained above, or
disposition, as used and exj^lained by President Dwight. That
there are such habits or dispositions which can be resolved neither
into " essential attributes" nor " acts," we maintain to be the
common judgment of mankind. Let us take for illustration an
instance of an acquired habit of the lowest kind, the skill of an
artist. He has a soul with the same essential attributes as other
men ; his body is composed of the same materials ; and the same
law regulates the obedience of his muscular actions to his mind.
By constant practice he has acquired what is usually denomi-
nated skill ; an ability to go through the processes of his art,
with greater facility, exactness, and success than ordinary men.
Take this man while asleep or engaged in any indifferent occupa-
tion, you have a soul and body not differing in any of their
essential attributes from those of other men. Still there is a
difference. What is it .^ Must it be either "a real existence,
an entity," an act or nothing ? It cannot be " an entity," for it
is acquired, and it will hardly be maintained that a man can
acquire a new essential attribute. Neither is it an act, for the
man has his skill when it is not exercised. Yet there is certainly
" something" which is the ground of certainty, that when called
to go through the peculiar business of his art, he will do it with an
ease and rapidity impossible for common men. It is as impos-
sible not to admit that this ground or reason exists, in order to
account for the effect, as it is not to admit the existence of the
soul to account for its exercises. By constant practice, a state
of mind and body has been produced adapted to secure these re-
sults, and which accounts for their character. But this is the
definition of principle or habit as given above. A single circum-
REGENERATION. S§
stance is here wanting which is found in other " hahits/' and
that is, there is not the tendency or proneness to those particular
acts to which tliis state of mind is adapted. This difterence,
however, arises not from any difference in the "hahits" them-
selves, but from the nature of the faculties in which, so to speak,
they inhere. A principle in the will (in its largest sense, includ-
ing all the active powers), is not only a state of mind adapted
to certain acts, but prone to produce them. This is not the
case, at least to the same degree, with intellectual habits. Both
classes, however, come within the definition given by President
Edwards and Dr. Dwight — " a state of mind," or " foundation
for'any particular kind of exercise of the faculties of the soul."
The same remarks may be made with regard to habits of a
more purely intellectual character, A man, by devoting him-
self to any particular pursuit, gradually acquires a facility in
putting forth the mental exercises which it requires. This im-
plies no change of essence in the soul ; and it is not merely an
act, which is the result of this practice. The result, whatever
it is, is an attribute of the man under all circumstances, and
not merely Avhen engaged in the exercises whence the habit was
acquired.
But to come nearer to the case in hand. We say a man has a
malignant disposition, or an amiable disposition. What is to be
understood by these expressions ? Is it merely that he often in-
dulges malignant or amiable feelings ? or is it not rather that
there is an habitual proneness or tendency to their indulgence ^
Surely the latter. But, if so, the principle stated above, that
we can regard the soul only as to its substance or its actions,
cannot be correct. For the result of a repetition of acts of the
same kind is an abiding tendency, which is itself neither an act
(emmanent or immanent) nor an " entity." Here, then, is the
soul with its essential attributes, and habitual tendency to cer-
tain exercises, and the exercises themselves. The tendency is
not an act, nor an active state of the feelings in question ; for it
would be a contradiction to say tliat a man whoso heart was
glowing with parental aifection, or filled for the time with any
other amiable feeh'ng, had at the same moment the malignant
feelings in an active state, although there might exist the great-
est proneness to their exercise. We have seen no analysis of
such dispositions which satisfies us that they can be reduced to
24 EEGENERATION.
acts. For it is essential to the nature of an act that it should
be a matter of consciousness. This is true of those which are im-
manent acts of the will, or ultimate choices (by which a fixed
state of the affections is meant to be expressed), as well as of all
others. But a disposition or principle, as explained above, is not
a matter of consciousness. A man may be aware that he has a
certain disposition, as he is aware of the existence of his soul,
from the consciousness of its acts, but the disposition itself is
not a subject of direct consciousness. It exists when the man is
asleep or in a swoon, and unconscious of anything. Neither can
these habits be with any pro])riety called a choice, or permanent
affection. For in many cases they are a mere proneness to acts
which have their foundation in a constitutional principle of the
mind. Our object at present is merely to show, that we must
admit that there are mental habits which cannot be resolved
either into essential attributes of the soul, fixed preferences, or
subordinate acts ; and consequently, that those who believe in
dispositions, prior to all acts, do not necessarily maintain that
such dispositions are of the essence of the soul itself. If it be
within the compass of the divine power to produce in us that,
which by constant exercise we can produce in ourselves, then a
holy principle or habit may be the result of the Spirit's in-
fluence in regeneration, without any physical change having been
wrought.
But it is not only objected, that regeneration is a physical
change, if anything beyond a change in the exercises of the soul
is effected ; but it is said, that the thing contended for is utterly
unintelligible, incapable of definition or explanation. We are
ready to acknowledge that it admits of no other explanation
than that which is derived from stating its effects, and referring
to cases of analogous kind. There is in all men a social princi-
ple, as it is called, which is something else than a desire to live
in society, because it is connatural, as may be inferred from its
universality ; there is a tendency in all men to love their chil-
dren, which is something besides loving them ; there is a tendency
in man also to sympathize in the sufi'erings of others, etc. It
may be said these are all constitutional tendencies implanted in
our nature. This is very true ; but does saying this enable us to
understand their nature ? May it not be objected to those who
employ this language. You arc using words without meaning ;
REGENERATION. 25
what do you know of a social principle distinct from the actual
desire to live in society, or prior to its exercise ? What idea can
you form of a principle of self-love, excepting actually loving
one's-self ? Are we then to deny that there are any such orig-
inal propensities or tendencies as these implanted in our nature,
because we cannot directly conceive of them ? Yet Dr. Cox
says, in reference to this subject, " By holy principle, / mean
love to God, and by love to God I mean actually loving him."
On the same principle, he might deny the existence of any of the
original dispositions or tendencies of the soul. For they are as
incapable of being defined, as the holy principle which is pro-
duced in regeneration. The soul itself is in the same predica-
ment. We know nothing of it but from our consciousness of its
acts. And if the objection which we are now considering be
valid against the existence of principles prior to acts, then it is
valid against the existence of the soul. We are conscious only
of its exercises ; and therefore some philosophers and theologians
tell us we are not authorized to go any further. The existence
of a substance apart from the exercises is not necessary to ac-
count for their existence, and therefore is a gratuitous assump-
tion. An assumption, too, of the being of something which we
are incapable of defining, explaining, or even conceiving. Tlie
reply which Dr. Cox would make to this reasoning, is probably
the same that we should be disposed to make to his objection
against the existence of holy principles prior to holy acts. For
the mind as instinctively seeks a reason for the choice which the
soul makes in loving God, as it does for the various ideas and ex-
ercises of which it is constantly conscious. And we should pro-
bably be as little satisfied with the reasons which Dr. Cox could
assign to account for this choice, as he would be with those of
the defenders of the exercise scheme to account for these exer-
cises without resorting to a thinking substance. If he were to
say, that the effect is produced by the Holy Spirit, we should
answer that this can only be done in one of three ways that we
can conceive of. First, either by his direct agency producing the
choice, in which case it would be no act of ours ; or, secondly, by
addressing such motives to our constitutional and natural princi-
ple of self-love as should induce us to make the choice, in which
case there would be no morality in the act ; or, thirdly, by pro-
ducing such a relish for the divine character, that the soul as
26 REGENERATION.
spontaneously and immediately embraces God as its portion, as
it rejoices in the perception of beauty. The thing contended for
is not more unintelligible than a hundred things of like nature.
Taste is the ready perception and quick feeling of natural beauty.
That is, these are its efi'ects. But no one can directly conceive
of it, as it is an attribute of the mind, either original or acquired.
It is absolutely certain, however, that the man who does thus
readily perceive and feel the beauty of natural objects, has a
qualit}^ of mind which a clown does not possess. And we should
be astonished to hear any one maintain that there was no such
thing as taste, but the exercise. " By taste I mean the love of
beauty, and by love of beauty I mean actually loving it, and
that is an act and not a principle." But why does one man see
and feel a beauty in certain objects, wiien others do not ? Is
there no difference between the clown and the man of refinement,
but in their acts ? Is any man satisfied by being told that one
delights in beauty, and the other does not ; that it is in vain to
ask why ; the fact is enough, and the fact is all ; there is no dif-
ference in the state of tlieir minds antecedent to their acts ;
there can be no such thing as a principle of taste, or sense of
beauty, distinct from the actual love of beauty ? We are dis-
posed to think that no man can believe this : that the constitu-
tion of our nature forces us to admit, that if one man, under all
circumstances, and at all times, manifest this quick sensibility
to natural beauty, and another does not, tliere is some difference
between the two besides their acts ; that there is some reason
why, when standing before the same picture, one is filled with
pleasure, and the other is utterly insensible. We cannot help
believing that one has taste (a quality, principle, " or inward
sense") which the other does not possess. It matters not what
it may be called. It is the ground or reason of the diversity of
their exercises, which lies back of the exercises themselves, and
must be assumed to account for the difference of their nature.
Now, there is moral, as well as natural beauty, and it is no more
unintelligible that there should be a " sense," or taste, for the
one than for the other. The perfect character of God, when ex-
hibited to different men, produces delight and desire in some,
repugnance in others. We instinctively ask why ? Why do
some perceive and delight in his moral beauty, while others do
not ? The answer, some love, and others do not, is no answer at
REGENERATION. 27
all. It is merely saying the same thing, in other words. There
must be some reason why one perceives this kind of beauty, to
which others are blind ; why one is filled with love the moment
it is presented, and the other with repugnance. And this reason
must lie back of the mere exercise of this affection, must be
something besides the act itself, and such as can account for its
nature.
It may be said, however, that the cases are not analogous ;
that the emotion excited by beauty is involuntary, while moral
objects address themselves to the voluntary affections ; and that
it is admitted, that there is not only " something" back of each
exercise of love, but we are told distinctly what it is, viz., the
soul with its essential attributes, its ultimate or supreme choice,
or dominant affection, and the object in view of the mind. Ac-
cordingly, it is easily accounted for, that, when the character of
God is presented, one man is filled with love, another with re-
pugnance. The reason of the difference in these acts does indeed
lie back of the acts themselves ; for it is found in the ultimate
or supreme choice of the different individuals. But how is this
to be accounted for ? If there is no necessity for accounting for
the particular character of the first or ultimate choice (if so it
must needs be called), there is no need of accounting for the
others. The difficulty is not at all met by this statement. It is
only pushed back, from the secondary and subordinate, to the
primary and dominant preference. There it returns. The ques-
tion still is, why does the soul of one man make this supreme
choice of God, or, in other words, love him, while another sets
his affection on the world ? There is precisely the same neces-
sity for assuming some ground or reason for the nature of the
first choice, as for any acts subordinate and subsequent to it.
Let us suppose two individuals called into existence, in the full
maturity of their faculties ; each has a soul with the same con-
stitutional powers, or essential attributes ; the one is filled with
delight the moment the character of God is presented, and the
other is not ; or the one loves his Maker as soon as the idea of
his excellence is presented, the other does not. According to
this theory, there is no reason for this difference. There is noth-
ing back of the first act of choice that is not common to both.
If, instead of two individuals, we suppose two millions, one por-
tion having their affections spontaneously called forth on their
28 REGENERATION.
first view of tlieir Maimer, the other unaffected ; we have only a
greater numher of effects without a cause, but the case is the
same. It will not do to answer, that the choice is made under
the influence of the desire of happiness, for this being common
to all, is no reason for the ditference of the result, which is the
very thing to be accounted for. To say that the choice is made
under the influence of the desire of happiness, is only to say, that
when the character of Grod is presented it gives pleasure. But
the same character is presented in both cases, the same desire
exists in both, yet in one it gives pleasure, is an object of desire ;
in the other not. This is the fact which is left entirely unac-
counted for on the theory in question, and for which the mind as
instinctively seeks a cause, as it does for any other effect. To
account for the difference from the nature of agency, is to assume
the liberty of indifference. For if the choice be made prior to
the rising of desire towards the object, then it is made in indiffer-
ence, and is of no moral character. If the desire rise, it is love ;
which is the very thing to be accounted for. We are at a loss to
see how this theory is to be reconciled with the Calvinists' doc-
trine on the will, which is not jDeculiar to Edwards, but consti-
tuted the great dividing line between Calvinists and Arminians
from the beginning. We feel, therefore, a necessity for assum-
ing that there is " something" back of the first moral act, be-
sides the soul and its essential attributes, which will account for
the nature of that act, which constitutes the reason why, in the
case supposed, the soul of the one individual rose immediately to
God, and the other did not ; and the " something" assumed in
this case is no more indefinite and undefineable, than the con-
stitutional propensity to live in society, to love our children, or
the mental quality called taste, all whicb are assumed from a
necessity not more imperative than that which requires a holy
principle to account for the delight experienced in view of the
character of God. And if our Maker can endow us not only with
the general susceptibility of love, but also with a si:)ecific dispo-
sition to love our children ; if he can give us a discernment and
susceptibility of natural beauty, he may give us a taste for spirit-
ual loveliness. And if that taste, by reason of sin, is vitiated and
perverted, he may restore it by the influences of his Spirit in re-
generation. Neither, therefore, the objection, that what is not
an act, must be an essential attribute ; nor the unintelligible
REGENERATION. 29
nature of a " principle of nature/' is, in our view, any valid ob-
jection to tlie common doctrine on regeneration.
There is a third objection, however, to this doctrine, and that
is, that it renders the sinner excusable, because it makes regen-
eration to consist in something else than the sinner's own act.
This objection, as it seems to us, can only be valid on one or the
other of two grounds ; the first is, that the common doctrine
supposes sin to be a physical defect, and regeneration physical
change ; and the second is, that a man is responsible solely for
his acts, or that there can be no moral principle anterior to
moral action. With regard to the first, it is enough to say, that
no physical change, according to the constant declaration of
Calvinistic writers, is held to take jDlace in regeneration, and that
no such change is implied in the production of a holy principle,
as we have already endeavored to show.
The second ground is inconsistent with the common notions of
men on the nature of virtue, and, if true, would render the com-
mencement of holiness or regeneration impossible. It is accord-
ing to the universal feeling and judgment of men, that the