moral character of an act depends upon the motive with which
it is done. This is so obviously true, that Eoid and Stewart,
and almost all other advocates of the liberty of indifference,
readily admit it. And so do the advocates of the theory on
which this objection is founded, with regard to all moral acts,
excepting the first. All acts of choice, to be holy, must proceed
from a holy motive, excepting the first holy choice which con-
stitutes regeneration ; that may be made from the mere desire
of happiness or self-love. We confess that this strikes us as very
much like a relinquishment of the whole system. For how is it
conceivable that anything should be essential to the very nature
of one act as holy, that is not necessary to another ? Is not this
saying that that on which the very nature of a thing depends
may be absent, and jet the thing remain the same .^ Is it not
saying that that which makes an act what it is, and gives it its
character, may be wanting or altered, and yet the character of
the act be unaffected ? It is the motive which gives the moral
character to the act. If the motive is good, the act is good ; if
the motive is bad, the act is bad ; if the motive is indifferent, so
is tlic act. The act has no character apart from the motive.
This, it seems, is admitted with regard to all moral acts except-



30 REGENERATION.

iug the first. But the first act of a holy kind is an act of
obedience, as well as all subsequent acts of the same kind. How
then is it conceivable that the first act of obedience performed
from the mere desire of happiness or self-love can be holy, when
no other act of the same kind, and performed from the same
motive, either is or can be ? How does its being first alter its
very nature '? It is still nothing more than an act done for self-
gratification, and cannot be a holy act. It is said we must admit
this, from the necessity of the case, or acknowledge that there
can be holiness before moral action. We prefer admitting the
latter, and believing that "God created man upright/' and not
that he made himself so. That there was a disposition, or relish,
or taste for holiness, before there was any holy act, which to us
is far more reasonable than that an act is holy because the first
of a series, which, if performed from the same motive at a differ-
ent point of the line, would have a different character. The
grand objection, we know, that is made to all tliis is, that holy
beings have fallen, which it is maintained would be impossible
if the ground here assumed is correct. If the character of an act
depends on its motive, a sinful act cannot be performed by a
being in whom sin does not already exist ; and, consequently,
neither the fallen angels, nor Adam, could ever have apostatized.
We think, however, that there is a broad difference between the
commencement of holiness and the commencement of sin, and
that more is necessary for the former than for the latter. An act
of obedience, if it is performed under the mere impulse of self-love,
is virtually no act of obedience. It is not performed with any
intention to obey, for that is holy, and cannot, according to the
theory, precede the act. But an act of disobedience j^erformed
from the desire of happiness is rebellion. The cases are surely
widely different. If to please myself I do what God commands,
it is not holiness ; but if to please myself I do what he forbids,
it is sin. Besides no creature is immutable. Though created
holy, the taste for holy enjoyments may be overcome by a temp-
tation sufficiently insidious and powerful, and a selfish motive or
feeling excited in the mind. Neither is a sinful character im-
mutable. By the power of the Holy Spirit the truth may be so
clearly presented, and so effectually applied, as to produce that
chansre which is called rea;encration : that is, as to call into



REGENERATION. 31

existence a taste for holiness, so that it is chosen for its own
sake, and not merely as a means of happiness.

It is evident, therefore, that the theory which denies the
possibility of moral distinctions being carried back of acts of
choice, forces its advocates to adopt the opinion that the first
holy act is specifically different from all others. That Adam was
not created holy, but by choosing God, made himself holy, an4
that this choice, though made with no holy motive or intention,
but merely from a desire of happiness,^ has a moral character.
This we think not only contradictory to the express declaration
of Scripture, which says that man was created in the image of
his Maker (which includes his moral as well as his natural image,
as we are taught in the New Testament), but is inconsistent with
the very first principles of morals, as it teaches that an act
performed without any good intention or motive, is yet holy. It
seems to us liable, also, to this further objection, that it repre-
sents man's obligation to love God, to rest upon the flict that it
vnW promote his happiness. This is involved in the principle,
that the choice made from this motive is a good choice ; for it
can only be good as it is in obedience to a moral obligation. If
the obligation fulfilled is to God, then to fulfil it must be the
motive. If the motive whicli prompts the choice have reference
to himself, then the only obligation which he fulfils, is to himself.
It is a wise decision, but it is no holy act. If it be said that the
excellence of the choice lies in the nature of the object chosen, it
is giving up the question. For if the excellence of the object
be the ground of the choice, it can act as a motive only by
exciting a desire for it as excellent, which must needs be a holy
desire, and if this determines the choice, then the man is holy
before he chooses God as his portion, and the choice is the result,
and not the cause of his holiness. Or, if we call the desire itself
the choice (which is an incorrect use of terms), still the case is
the same. For the best definition that can be given of a holy
being is, that holy objects excite in him desire as soon as they are
presented. If Adam, therefore, was filled with desire and pleas-
ure, as soon as his mind rested on the character of God, then he
was created holy. As we remarked above, this theory, that the
first moral act is not performed from a holy motive, but from
the constitutional desire of happiness, is not only inconsistent
with the nature of a holy act, but affords no relief in the case.



32 REGENERATION,

For the difficulty still remains, why the character of God should
appear desirable to one being, and not to another, if both are
called into existence in puris ndturaUhus.

That Adam was created holy, that is, with a holy disposition,
which existed prior to his first holy act, though necessarily de-
structive of the very first principle of the theory referred to, has
i)een considered as a fixed point among Calvinists. Yv'e have
already seen that Dr. Dwight did not think it necessary to prove
it. Because, he says, " every man who believes the mind to be
something more than ideas and exercises, and does not admit the
doctrine of causaUy, will acknowledge" it. President Edwards,
in his work on original sin, has a whole chapter, in which he
endeavors to prove that our first parents were created in right-
eousness, or, as he expresses it, " with holy principles and
dispositions." The grand objection against this doctrine, he
says, is this : "that it is utterly inconsistent with the nature of
virtue, that it should be concreated with any person : because,
if so, it must be by an act of God's absolute power, without our
knowledge or concurrence ; and that moral virtue, in its very
nature, imjJieth the choice and consent of the moral agent,
without which it cannot be virtue and holiness : that a necessary
holiness is no holiness ;" and he quotes from Dr. Taylor, of
N'orwich, the Avords, " Adam must exist, he must be created,
yea, he must exercise thought and reflection before he was right-
eous." To this he replies, " In the first place, I think it a
contradiction to the nature of things, as judged of by the
common sense of mankind. It is agreeable to the sense of the
minds of men in all ages, not only that the fruit or effect of a
good choice is virtuous, but the good choice itself, from which
that effect proceeds ; yea, and not only so, but also the antece-
dent good disj)osition, temper, or affection of the mind from
whence proceeds that good choice, is virtuous. This is the
general notion, not that principles derive their goodness from
actions, hut that actions derive their goodness from the principles
whence they proceed ; and so that the act of choosing tliat
which is good, is no further virtuous than it proceeds from a
good principle, or virtuous disposition of mind ; which supposes,
that a virtuous disposition of mind may be before a virtuous act
of choice ; and that, therefore, it is not necessary that there
sho^dd first he thoiigld, refection, and choice, hefore there can he



REG i^NE RATION. S3

anij virtuous disposiiion. If the choice be first, before the exist-
ence of a good disposition of heart, what signifies that choice ?
There can, according to our natural notions, be no virtue in a
choice which proceeds from no virtuous principle, but from mere
self-love, ambition, or some animal appetite." — P. 140. If there
was a holy disposition before there was " thought, reflection, or
choice," Edwards mcst assuredly carried moral distinctions back
of moral acts. That by so doing he carried them into the
"essential attributes of the soul," is an assertion founded on the
assumjjtion that Vv^hat is not an act must be an essential attribute,
which we believe few are prepared to admit. God has created
man with various susceptibilities, dispositions, or tendencies of
mind towards objects without himself; these tendencies are not
necessarily "real existences, entities," or essential attributes, for
tendencies or habits may, as before remarked, be acquired, as the
skill of an artist, or a proneness to any particular mental exercise.
They may result from the relative state of all the essential attri-
butes, and yet be "no part of the soul" themselves. Their nature,
however, is confessedly as inconceivable as the nature of the soul,
and no more so ; and they are as necessarily assumed to account
for the results which meet our view, as the soul or any of its
attributes. If a million of intelligent beings, the first moment
they think of the character of God, are filled with desire and
delight, it is as evident that they were created with a proneness
or disposition to take pleasure in holiness, as it is that the hearts
of mothers have an innate tendency to love their children,
because they glow with delight the first moment they are given
to them. Nothing, we think, but the inost determined adher-
ence to a speculative opinion, can prevent any man acknowledg-
ing that it is as possible for the mind to be created with this
"instinctive" love of holiness, as with a disposition for any
other specific class of objects. And we think, too, that the vast
body of men will agree with President Edwards in thinking that
" such a disposition being natural, or from a kind of instinct,
implanted in the mind in its creation," is no objection to its
being of a virtuous or moral character. Does the maternal
instinct cease to be amiable, because it is natural ? Does a
disposition to kindness and gentleness lose its character by being
innate ? Are not the instinctive love of justice, abhorrence of
cruelty, admiration of what is noble, which God has implanted



34 EEGENEEATION.

in our nature, objects of approbation ? If our feelings and tlio
general sense of mankind answer these questions in the atlirraa-
tive, they as certainly will decide that an innate disposition to
love God, existing in the mind of Adam at the moment of his
creation, does not lose its moral character by being innate. The
common feelings and judgment of men, therefore, do carry moral
distinctions back of acts of choice, and must do so unless we deny
that virtue ever can commence, for "there can, according to our
natural notions, be no virtue in a choice which proceeds from no
virtuous principle, but from mere self-love."

If this be so, the very foundation of the objection that the
common doctrine of regeneration destroys the responsibility of
the sinner is taken away. This responsibility rests upon the fact,
that he stands in the relation of a rational and moral creature to
God. He has all the attributes of a moral agent — understand-
ing, conscience, and will. He has unimpaired the liberty of
acting according to his own inclinations. His mind is not
subject to any law of causation, which determines his acts
independently of himself. Motives, as external to the mind,
have no influence, but as the mind itself, according to the laws
of all rational creaticn, is affected by them and voluntarily
admits their influence, and yields to it. The responsibility of
man, therefore, resting on the immutable obligations w^hich bind
him to love and obey God, and on the possession of all the
attributes of moral agency, is not destroyed by his moral deprav-
ity, of which the want of a disposition to holiness is an integral
part. He does not love God, not because there is any physical
defect in his constitution, but because his moral taste is perverted
by reason of sin. He is so corrupt that even infinite loveliness
appears hateful to him. There can, in the nature of things, be
no reason why an intelligent and moral being should be blind to
moral excellence, excepting moral corruption. And if this be an
excuse, then the more depraved, the less he is to blame. How
he became thus depraved is another question, — l)ut it has nothing
to do with the point before us, which is, the nature of the
inability which it involves to love God. He may have been born
so, or, he may have made himself so. It makes no difference as
to this point. So long as this depravity is his own, his own
moral character, it can furnish no excuse or palliation fur not
complying with the great command of the law and gospel. An



REGENERATION. 35

object worthy of all aiiection is presented to his view, viz., the
divine character ; he is capable of intellectually apprehending
this object. If blind to its loveliness, it is, in his own judgment
and tliat of all men, his sin ; it is the very height of corruption
to view as unlovely what is the perfection of moral beauty. That
men do labor under this moral blindness, is one of the most
frequently asserted doctrines of the Scriistures. " The natural
man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are
foolishness unto him ; neither can he know them, because they
are spiritually discerned." " These things," says our Saviour,
" will they do unto you because they have not known the Father
nor me." "To know God is eternal life." \Ve are said to be
saved through knowledge. The gospel is "hid to them that are
lost." Their eyes are blinded. Light has shined into the hearts
of those that believe. The saints of old prayed to have their
minds illuminated ; and Paul intercedes for his fellow Christians
earnestly and frequently for this blessing, as the only possible
means of their sanctiiication. This is so plain, that President
Edwards, in speaking on this subject, says, "There is such a
thing, if the Scriptures are of any use to teach us anything, as a
spiritual, supernatural understanding of divine things that is
peculiar to the saints, and which those wdio are not saints know
nothing of." — P. 298, On the Affections. The cause of this
blindness is sin, and therefore it is inexcusable. But if it exists,
there is an evident necessity for such a change in the soul, that
it shall be brought to see this beauty of holiness, and from the
constitution of our nature, this change must precede the exercise
of love. For how can we love that winch we do not see. The
afi'ections must have an object, and that object must be appre-
hended in its true nature, in order to be truly loved. It is
obvious, therefore, that regeneration, to be of a moral character
at all, must consist in such a change as brings the soul into a
state to see and love the beauty of holiness. It matters not what
the change be called — a "spiritual sense," or "a taste," or " dis-
position ;" it is as necessary as that an object should be seen in
order to be loved.

Now it is evddent that all this must be denied by those who
make regeneration to consist in the "act of loving God," who
deny that there is any change prior in the order of nature to the
exercise of love. For if the sinner is blind to God's loveliness,



86 REGENERATION.

it is absolutely impossible that he should love it, until he is
brought to see it. It may be said, that this is to render the
sinner's case absolutely hopeless. So it is. And they do but
delude and mock him, who represent it otherwise. It is thus
the Bible represents it. It tells him that th^ natural man can-
not know the things of the Spirit of God. And it is moreover
necessary, that the sinner should be brought to feel that his case,
as far as he himself is concerned, is absolutely hopeless ; that he
may be brought to fall, with his blind and wicked heart, at the
feet of sovereign mercy, and ciy. Lord save me ! or I perish.
But does this make the sinner excusable ? not unless his sin is
his excuse. It is this, and tliis alone, which prevents his percep-
tion of the loveliness of God, and therefore, the more complete
his blindness, the greater his loathsomeness and guilt. The two
sentiments of complete helplessness, and of entire blame-worthi-
ness, are perfectly consistent, and are ever united in Christian
experience. The believer feels them every day. He knows that
it is his duty, at once, to love God as purely, and fervently, and
constantly, as do the saints made perfect. Yet he feels that no
mere eflbrts of his own, no use of means, no presentation of
motives, no summoning of his powers, w'ill ever enable him to
raise his carnal heart to heaven. Does this free him from a
sense of guilt ? 'No. He covers his face with both his hands,
and bows down in the dust, and cries, Behold, I am vile. Have
mercy on me, Lord, and create within me a clean heart.

That the denial of the sinner's blindness to the holiness of
•God, is involved in the theory of regeneration under considera-
tion, is perfectly evident, and is not, we presume, denied. If the
mere choice of God, as the supreme portion of the soul, is re-
generation, and the performance of this act constitutes the
change, then of course no previous change is admitted to be
necessary to enable him to make the choice ; no opening of his
eyes to see the moral excellence of the object he is to choose, no
production of any sense of its loveliness ; the choice itself is all
that is demanded ; and for this, everything is present that the act
requires — the object, the capacity of viewing it in its true moral
excellence, and the motive whence the choice is to proceed. For
he need not choose God from any holy motive or intention (which
would be to make holiness precede moral action) : the simple de-
sire of happiness is all that is required. The character of this



REGENERATION. 37

first act does not depend on its motive. It is holy, though per-
formed merely from the desire of self-gratification. This is a
conclusion from which our minds instinctively revolt, and which,
Edwards says, is contrary to the notions of men. It is, however,
a conclusion which is legitimate and acknowledged, and bein"-, in
our view, a complete reducfio ad ahsm'dum, the system is faulv,
in our humble apprehension, felo de se.

Dr. Cox asks whether it is not " intrinsically absurd" that a
man should be regenerated before he does his duty ? We think
the absurdity is all the other way, that he should do his duty
without being regenerated. That he should love God without
having any proper perception of his character ; or that an unholy
soul should have this perception of the beauty of holiness. It ap-
pears to us a contradiction in terras to say, that a holy object can
be viewed as excellent and desirable by a carnal mind ; for a holy
mind is best defined by saying, that it perceives and relishes the
beauty of holiness. It is inconceivable to us, therefore, that any
sinner should love God, without this previous change, except on
one or the other of these two grounds ; that all his acts are created
in him, and he is really no agent at all, or tliat an act proceeding
from mere self-love is holy. Both which contradict what to us are
primary principles or intuitive truths. But how is it that regene-
ration precedes the exercise of love ? As the opening of the eyes
precedes sight ; as a sense of the beautiful precedes the emotion of
beauty ; as the maternal instinct precedes maternal love. As it
is impossible for a man to have his eyes open in the day-time
without seeing, so is it impossible for a man to be regenerated
without delighting in God. Yet opening the eyes is not seeing,
nor is regeneration delighting in God. What the metaphysical
nature of this change is, no one can tell. All the soul can say is,
Whereas I was blind, now I see. What once appeared repul-
sive and "foolishness," now appears supremely desirable and
excellent. What once excited enmity, now calls forth love.
What once was irksome and difficult, is now easy and delightful.
To say that these exercises themselves constitute the change,
and the whole change, is to say that a wicked man is suddenly
transformed in all his views, feelings, and conduct, Avithout
any reason for it. And to refer all to th'e immediate opera-
tions of the Spirit, is to make man a machine, or mere in-
strument, on which a mysterious hand plays what tune it



38 REGENERATION.

pleases, to the delight or torment of the conscious but passive
subject.

There is still another point. Dr. Cox speaks of this " certain
kind of principle," as " a mysterious gratuity," with vvhich the
receiver has nothing to do. A something inserted in the soul in
some magic manner to influence his exercises, but which forms
no part of his character. We are persuaded that a fundamental
difference, as to the nature of agency and human liberty, lies at
the foundation of all such objections. We are as yet only fight-
ing in the dark. The real turning point is yet in the background.
We do not mean that it is intentionally kept there, but that
these objections have not even the semblance of force, if (what is
yet considered common ground) the Calvinistic theory of the will
is retained. Was it a mere " mysterious gratuity," without
moral character for him, that Adam was created in the image
of God " with lioly principles and dispositions ?" Were these
not voluntary principles ? Was he not free in all his exercises
of love determined by them ? A disposition is not the less
voluntary because it is innate. The affections are all voluntary,
although concreated with us. Is a man less free in loving him-
self because self-love is a constitutional propensity ? Does a
mother love her child against her will, because she acts agreeably
to her nature ? Does not the disposition so to do enter into her
character ? If this be true with regard even to constitutional
propensities, it is still more obviously true with respect to moral
disposition, whether originally implanted or restored in regenera-
tion. There is a continual play upon the double sense of the
word voluntary. When the faculties of the soul are reduced to
understanding and will, it is evident that the latter includes all
the affections. In this sense, all liking or disliking, desiring or
being averse to, etc., are voluntary, or acts of the will. But
when we speak of the understanding, will, and affections, the
word " will" includes much less. It is the power of the soul to
come to a determination, to fix its choice on some object of desire.
These two meanings are distinct, though they may relate only
to different states of the same faculty. In the latter sense, will
and desire are not always coincident. A man may desire money
and not will to take it, or make it an object of pursuit ; he may
not fix his choice upon it. The Avill is here determined by some
other desire of greater force ; desire of doing right, for exami:)lo.



REGENERATION. 39

When we speak of a volition, of a choice, of a decision or deter-
mination of the will, the word " will" is used in the restricted
sense. A man may have many objects of desire before his mind ;
the decision which the will makes among them, or its selection