month to reach their destination, and it was thus impossible for
Castlereagh to keep pace with the rapidly changing situation on
the Continent. Nevertheless, the foundation of the Quadruple
Alliance was laid in this year and the policy of the subsequent
period can scarcely be fully understood without some knowledge
of its origin. In the correspondence of Castlereagh with
Cathcart, Stewart and Aberdeen, the British Ambassadors to the
Russian, Prussian, and Austrian Courts, there is a fairly complete
record of the hopes and fears of the British policy, though they
were only partially informed of the transactions between the
three Continental Powers.
The first necessity in the study of a collection of documents
such as is contained in this book is to know the relations that
exist between the writers. The position which the Foreign
xxx BRITISH DIPLOMACY, 1813-1815
Minister held in the Cabinet, and especially his relations with
the Prime Minister, are of fundamental importance, whatever
period of Modern History is being studied. It is also necessary
to know how far the Foreign Minister was inclined to trust his
subordinates and the character and achievements of each of these
are factors in determining the value of the reports for which they
are responsible. The student may determine many of these
points for himself by an intelligent study of the documents
themselves. The commanding position which Castlereagh held
in the Cabinet, the very tentative way in which the Prime Minis-
ter attempted to influence his work, the enormous responsibility
he was prepared to take upon himself at moments of crisis, are
clearly indicated on every page of his dispatches. His trust in
Wellington and the latter's confidence in him are also easily
discerned. The relations of Castlereagh to Alexander, Metter-
nich, Hardenberg, and Talleyrand are also defined by Castlereagh
himself in the course of his correspondence. Nevertheless it
may be of some assistance to point out some of the circumstances
which determine the scope and value of the records from which
this selection is made and to indicate the principles and methods
on which Castlereagh 's policy appears to have been founded.
Castlereagh had been brought into the Perceval Cabinet in
March, 1812. He succeeded Wellesley, whose wayward genius
had proved to be peculiarly unsuited to the difficulties of
the post of Foreign Secretary, and whose energy and ability
had both failed him. Liverpool, on his accession to the
Premiership in June, 1812, after the assassination of Perceval,
undoubtedly preferred Canning, and indeed made a great
effort to get him into the Ministry as Foreign Secretary.
Castlereagh was prepared to surrender this post, if he kept
the lead of the House. But Canning's own vanity and the
ill-advised flattery of his friends prevented this combination, and
Castlereagh was therefore left with the conduct of Foreign Affairs
as well as the lead of the House of Commons. Only two other
of his colleagues were commoners and these had neither ability
nor reputation. As a result, therefore, Castlereagh almost imme-
diately became the leading member of the Government ; and, down
to his death in 1822, he was more responsible for its decisions
than anv other member of it. His influence was consolidated
INTRODUCTION xxxi
by the energy and success with which he conducted his own
special department and managed the general policy of the Govern-
ment in the Commons. He was a first-class party manager, and
his dignity, good manners, and debating skill gave him an almost
complete ascendency over the House. The scurrility of writers
like Creevey and the jealousy of rivals like Brougham have per-
petuated a tradition that Castlereagh was an almost unintelligible
speaker and that his position rested entirely on a corrupt and
subservient House of Commons. Nothing could be further from
the truth. Though he had none of Canning's power of oratory,
yet Castlereagh was a clear and effective speaker, and, as Canning
himself has confessed, he was far the abler at an impromptu,
however inferior in a set speech. This power of argumentative
debate was to serve him in good stead in his round table confer-
ences in these years. He had, moreover, a considerable experience
of Foreign Affairs, and Pitt regarded him as one of his most promis-
ing pupils. As a member of the Cabinet and Secretary of State
for War in 1804-6 he had played an important part in deter-
mining Pitt's attitude and, above all, made himself thoroughly
conversant with Pitt's ideas on the reconstruction of Europe.
His later career as Secretary of State for War had been a chequered
one, and marred by the failure of the Walcheren expedition.
Nevertheless, he had learnt something of the limitations that
strategy lays down for politics, and in that period began his
association with Wellington which was to prove of such enormous
importance in the succeeding years.
British Foreign policy at this period was determined mainly by
Castlereagh himself. He had, indeed, to carry with him a Cabinet
which contained, besides the Prime Minister himself, such stal-
warts as Eldon and Harrowby, and an energetic War Minister in
Bathurst. Foreign Affairs were, however, but little known to
most of them and they never obtained a real comprehension of
the events and problems of their time . The acquisition of Colonies ,
the protection of the Sea Power and the " Maritime rights "
of their own country were objects which they could understand
and had at heart. They had, too, a passionate hatred of Napoleon,
which they shared with most of their countrymen. But they
were not much concerned with the construction of a new Europe.
Foreign policy was therefore left to Liverpool and Bathurst, who
xxxii BRITISH DIPLOMACY, 1813-1815
had both held the office of Foreign Minister, and it is to these
two that Castlereagh mainly addresses himself. His instructions
in 1814 were indeed debated with a full Cabinet, and in the
question of the first Restoration of the Bourbons and the policy
to be pursued after Waterloo the whole Cabinet appears to have
shewn a lively interest. But even so important a point as the
ratification of the Treaty of January 3rd, 181 5, was decided
without a full Cabinet being summoned, and, if Liverpool was in
agreement, Castlereagh seems to have been quite sure of his
ground. Nor did the Prime Minister generally do more than
give advice, leaving for the most part the final decisions to Castle-
reagh himself. Such a policy was, indeed, almost a necessity.
When Parliament was not sitting the Prime Minister was generally
at Bath and his colleagues scattered about in their country seats.
The exigencies of their offices kept Bathurst and Melville in
London, but the others could transact necessary business at a
distance ; and even Castlereagh himself wrote many of his dis-
patches from Cray Farm or other country seats following the
practice of his time, when a Minister and his private secretaries
made their office the place that best suited their personal predi-
lections. When the House was sitting, matters were rather
different ; but even then, when Castlereagh was on the Continent,
the safest course was to profess ignorance or the necessity of delay
until the Foreign Minister returned. Only on points like the
Slave Trade on which there was an organised body of public
opinion of which the Whigs could take advantage, did the
Ministry find it necessary to insist on something being done.
The Opposition was, indeed, like all oppositions when the
Ministry is conducting, or has just concluded a successful war,
pitifully weak. Apart from the hostility of the Prince Regent
and the corruption of the Commons, the Whigs were suffering
from the fact that the Tories had brought to a triumphant
conclusion the most deadly conflict in which the country had
ever been engaged. The Opposition had sometimes been unable
to resist the temptation of making party capital out of the
misfortunes of the previous years, and their ill-omened
prophecies could now be used with deadly effect against them.
In the final crisis in 18 14 they behaved with commendable re-
straint and the first peace of Paris was welcomed and approved by
INTRODUCTION xxxiii
them. But during the Congress of Vienna and the Hundred
Days, they made an attempt to advocate principles v/hich had been
forgotten under the stress of the conflict, with as much success
as such efforts usually attain. The people of this country were
wildly delighted with a period of victory after twenty years
of warfare. They knew little of the details of Foreign policy.
Their fierce hatred of the French and especially of " Boney "
was now given full play, and their only complaint was that the
terms inflicted on France were not half hard enough. To a
few educated people the questions of Poland, Saxony or Italy
appealed, but information was hard to obtain and matters were
decided before they knew much about them. Only on the ques-
tion of the Slave Trade, which the abundant energy and skilful
propaganda of Clarkson, Wilberforce, Macaulay, and others had
made a really popular subject, was there any considerable feeling.
Neither his colleagues, the Opposition, nor public opinion, were
therefore likely to affect Castlereagh very much. Over almost all
his subordinates, also, he had complete control, and, with the all-
important exception of Wellington, they had little influence on
his policy. Several of the most important of them were not
professional diplomatists but relations or friends of the Tory
Ministers. Others were soldiers who had the virtues and defects
of their profession. In this collection it is three especially whose
personalities are of importance since they were accredited to the
three other members of the Great Alliance, and in the critical
year 1813 Castlereagh could only attempt to put his plans into
action with their aid. These three, the Earl of Cathcart, Sir
Charles Stewart, and the Earl of Aberdeen, were none of them
diplomatists by profession. Cathcart was an eminent soldier
who had commanded the British forces at Copenhagen in 1807.
He had been attached to the Russian headquarters during the
year 1812, and he remained as Ambassador throughout this
period. He was a rather stupid man who lacked both insight and
energy and never grasped the problems with which he was con-
fronted. Alexander and his ministers found him complacent and
ignored him or used him as they chose. Nevertheless his military
profession and a decorous exterior made him a favourite of the
Tsar and he could sometimes get concessions from Alexander
when no one else could approach him. Sir Robert Wilson, a
xxxiv BRITISH DIPLOMACY, 1813-1815
wonderfully brave and foolish soldier, was also attached to Russian
headquarters in 18 12 and 18 13 in an unofficial position, but
Cathcart never trusted him, and with reason, for he was con-
stantly opposing the policy of his Government.
Stewart, Castlereagh's half-brother, was much more energetic
and much less discreet than Cathcart. He had been a dashing
cavalry leader, but Wellington distrusted his capacity for the more
extended command which he desired. Castlereagh therefore
gave him the Mission to the Prussian Court in 181 3, and he
played a big part in all the events of these years, being subse-
quently Ambassador at Vienna and a Plenipotentiary at the Con-
gress, where his vanity and pomp were a bye- word. Neverthe-
less, he was generally at the right place at the critical moment,
and his zeal and energy, as well as his intimate connection with the
Foreign Minister, who had a great affection for him, made him
a conspicuous figure in these years. George Jackson, who accom-
panied him as his principal subordinate, had acted in the same
capacity to his brother, F. J. Jackson, in 1806. He was a zealous
and well-intentioned official, but had not much influence.
Aberdeen was a man of quite a different stamp and con-
sorted ill with his colleagues. The future Foreign Minister
and Premier was then only 29 years of age and had rather
reluctantly accepted his diplomatic mission which had been
earnestly pressed by Liverpool and Castlereagh on the ward
of Pitt. He was a shy and inexperienced man, and it must
be confessed fell a victim to Metternich's wiles. His honesty
and desire for peace made him an awkward colleague in that
age, and perhaps all were as relieved as he certainly was
himself when he refused to continue after the first Peace of Paris.
The mistakes and rivalries of these three Ambassadors and their
laborious and utterly inadequate attempts to carry out Castle-
reagh's instructions in 18 13 furnish the theme of Part I. of this
collection. After that they drop out of the picture, for in 18 14
and 1 81 5 Castlereagh was himself with the Alliance during most
of the time and in his presence his subordinates played no
independent part.
More useful to Castlereagh than any of these three was the Earl
of Clancarty, Minister at the Hague in 1813-1814 and Castle-
reagh's principal subordinate at the Congress of Vienna, where he
INTRODUCTION xxxv
was left as First Plenipotentiary after the departure of Wellington.
Clancarty was a subordinate member of the Ministry and a devoted
admirer of Castlereagh . His outlook was a very limited one , but he
had industry, self-confidence, and administrative capacity, and
played a really important part at the Vienna Congress. He enjoyed
the full confidence of his chief and worked throughout this period
with unexampled diligence and on the whole with success.
Another personage of very considerable importance in these
years was Count Mtinster, who represented the Prince Regent
as ruler of Hanover in all the conferences of the time. His
influence on Castlereagh was considerable, since he had a great
knowledge of men and events and possessed the full confidence
of the Prince Regent. In purely German affairs he determined
to a large extent the course of British policy, and his advice
undoubtedly carried weight in other matters. But though Castle-
reagh had to take Hanoverian interests into account, he kept
them completely subordinate to British policy and sacrificed
them ruthlessly to larger issues. Miinster's chief role, indeed,
appears to have been to supply information, of which he had
always an ample supply, for he was a member of the inner circle
of European diplomatists.
Castlereagh had other important subordinates, but as they were
stationed at minor Courts their correspondence is not included
in this collection. Of these, Sir Henry Wellesley managed with
a fine restraint and immense prestige the complicated relations
between the British and the Spanish Junta and subsequently
the restored Spanish King. Lord William Bentinck, a violent
Whig, combined a military and diplomatic command in Sicily,
which island he really governed. He was a man of ideas, and
these bore little relation to the policy of the Ministry which he
was serving. They included the freeing of Italy from the
foreigner and the erection of Sicily, where in 1812 a Constitution
had been established, into a British protectorate, which was to
be a model for the peoples of Europe. Castlereagh had perforce
to tolerate these extravagances in 181 3 and 18 14, but he prevented
them from interfering in his own policy which he had inherited
from Pitt, namely, to exclude French influence from the Peninsula
by substituting Austrian in its stead. Edward Thornton had the
difficult task of looking after the ambitious and untrustworthy
xxxvi BRITISH DIPLOMACY, 1813-1815
Bernadotte, who had hopes of succeeding Napoleon on the throne
of France. He was a man of but moderate parts and was fooled
by the intriguing Charles Jean in 18 14, but it is doubtful whether
any one else could have done better. Amongst other Ministers
may be mentioned Stratford Canning, British representative
in Switzerland, whose affairs he helped to arrange at the
Vienna Congress, just then at the threshold of his great
career, though he had already concluded the Peace of Bucharest
in 1812 ; his successor at Constantinople, Sir Robert Liston,
a weak and feeble minister ; Lord Beresford, who prac-
tically controlled Portuguese policy, and Sir Charles Stuart, an
energetic and capable man who succeeded Wellington at Paris,
but whom Castlereagh did not trust very far.
Mention should also be made of Castlereagh's permanent
staff, William Hamilton and Edward Cooke, the Under Secretaries
of State, the latter accompanying Castlereagh to Vienna and
corresponding directly with Liverpool, and the discreet and able
private secretary, Joseph Planta, who accompanied his master in
most of his journeys.
These were Castlereagh's principal instruments, not a very
brilliant, but on the whole a zealous and trustworthy set of men.
With the exception of Bentinck and Sir Robert Wilson, Castle-
reagh could rely on their loyalty, and most of them were Tories
like himself. If they threw an immense burden on him personally,
his method of work was to rely on himself rather than to delegate
affairs to others. Only Wellington, whose services as a diploma-
tist were invaluable to him, had in any way a policy of his own,
and even with him Castlereagh was the dominating mind. The
Foreign policy of Great Britain was therefore imagined, inspired,
and largely carried out by the Foreign Minister himself.
This almost complete control of Foreign policy was essential
to Castlereagh, if he was to meet on anything like equal terms the
Sovereigns and statesmen of the Alliance. Of these he had
naturally but little knowledge when he took over his charge and
his policy in 181 3 betrays the fact that he knew little of the men
who were controlling events on the Continent. England had been
in a sense isolated for many years, and personalities like Metternich
and Hardenberg were quite unknown to most of her statesmen.
Alexander had, indeed, been the principal founder to the Third
INTRODUCTION xxxvii
Coalition, but since then the peace of Tilsit had intervened and
the suspicions which Pitt had always felt concerning Russia —
the main inspiration of the Armed Neutrality — had been inherited
by his disciples and especially by Castlereagh. The Austrian
Mediation was also viewed with deep distrust in England, and
Metternich was regarded as the founder of the Hapsburg connec-
tion with Napoleon. The resentment felt at Prussia's policy
towards Hanover in 1805-6 was still alive and entered into
the relations of these years. Throughout the year 1813,
therefore, Castlereagh was dealing at a distance with men
whom he had some reason to distrust, and it must be admitted
that his Ambassadors were none of them sufficiently able to
fathom the motives by which the three great Powers were
animated or to prevent agreements being made by which
British interests might possibly be gravely compromised. Yet
on the whole Castlereagh's policy was one of trust and con-
fidence. He had, as is seen in the dispatches, a plan of welding
the Alliance more closely together and constantly urged closer
co-operation, more courage in the face of the enemy, and greater
exertions on the part of all.
The Armistice, the Conference at Prague, and above all, the
" Frankfort Proposals," were none of them relished in London, and
British statesmen thought that they had a legitimate grievance
in the fact that their Allies neglected to give British commit-
ments to the Spaniards a due place in the propositions which
were made to Napoleon at various times. The methods by which
Metternich procured Aberdeen's adherence to the Frankfort pro-
posals not only caused grave misgivings to the British Cabinet but
also brought the three British Ambassadors to the verge of an open
quarrel. Castlereagh found it impossible to obtain a due influence
over these events from London, and it was this fact that made the
Cabinet send the Foreign Minister himself to the Allied head-
quarters. During 1814-1815, therefore, Castlereagh carried out
his own policy and negotiated in person.
The personal intervention of the Foreign Secretary was of
profound importance in Continental politics. By months of
close and constant intercourse Castlereagh came to know in-
timately all the principal Continental personalities and to obtain
a knowledge of men and affairs which no correspondence,
xxxviii BRITISH DIPLOMACY, 1813-1815
however skilfully conducted, could have produced. It gave him
a point of view which his colleagues never shared — a wider outlook
and a less rigorous insistence on a national policy. The
idea of an Alliance (the Alliance which subsequently
developed into the " Congress System ") had been adumbrated
in the State Paper of 1805 and put forward by Castlereagh in
1 81 3, yet his zeal for some new form of Continental diplomacy
and his conviction that only by round table conferences could
Continental problems be adequately solved, are undoubtedly
mainly a result of his experiences in 1 814-15.
It was in this period also that the close personal relations
between Castlereagh and Metternich were begun. Metternich's
temperament was undoubtedly the most congenial to Castlereagh
of all those with whom he had to deal. The Austrian minister
stood out as a cool and practical statesman, especially when com-
pared with the vacillating and mysterious Alexander and the
sluggish and rapidly ageing Hardenberg. "He is charged with
more faults than belong to him," wrote Castlereagh after his first
interviews in 1814, " but he has his full share, mixed up, however,
with considerable means for carrying forward the machine, more
than any other person I have met with at headquarters." • The
dispatches of 18 14, on the other hand, shew how antipathetic to
Castlereagh were Alexander's emotional outbursts, and though
he was from the first allowed by the Tsar a frankness of statement
of which he availed himself on many occasions, yet there was
always the difficulty of dealing with a Sovereign in person.
Until the visit of the Sovereigns to London in June, 18 14, Alexan-
der was, however, far more popular with the Prime Minister
(who always disliked Metternich) and the Cabinet than the Aus-
trians. But his mistaken and even ridiculous behaviour during
this visit mortally offended the Prince Regent, while his attempts
to establish close relations with the Whigs alienated the sym-
pathies of the Tory cabinet. Henceforth Alexander was dis-
trusted, and his attitude at the Congress of Vienna increased
these suspicions. This was one reason why Castlereagh found
it so hard to win his Cabinet over to his policy in the autumn of
1 81 5, when events made it necessary for him to work with Alex-
ander rather than with Metternich.
In spite of all the inevitable friction between the Allies during
1 Infra p. 160.
INTRODUCTION xxxix
the progress of the reconstruction of Europe, there can be no
doubt, however, as to the commanding influence which Castle-
reagh obtained on the councils of the Alliance. There were,
indeed, factors in the situation which gave him an irresistible
authority if he cared to exercise it. He was the paymaster of the
coalition and the Continental Powers were all of them almost
bankrupt. They relied, too, on Great Britain for much materiel
of war, as well as for the manufactured goods of which they had
been deprived so long. In spite of the American War the colonial
and maritime supremacy of the British Empire was overwhelming.
In the year 1813, moreover, by the victory of Vittoria, Wellington
had at last enabled Great Britain to assume a position as a mili-
tary as well as a naval Power.
These were great advantages. Nevertheless, in 18 14, Castle-
reagh was at the headquarters of a vast army in which were no
British troops. The political decisions had to be enforced at the
expense of the armies of his Allies, who, in spite of their immense
preponderance in numbers, were still daunted by the prestige of
Napoleon and the heroism of his handful of young conscripts.
Moreover, when Castlereagh arrived on the Continent the Allies
were hopelessly at variance. Sovereigns, statesmen, and soldiers
were full of suspicion, and though a great and elaborate campaign
had been planned, its ends were not defined, and its principles
had not been accepted by all the Allied armies. It was Castle-
reagh who infused energy and purpose into the halting counsels
of the Alliance and at last succeeded in obtaining the signature
of a common instrument which bound them together to resist
French aggression for twenty years. Even as it was, Castlereagh
failed to settle the future disposition of the conquered territories