mind [since it is the mind which perceives cognitions]. 4
Hence we conclude that the fourth or. remaining opinion
must be the true one, viz., that darkness is only the
absence of light. And it need not be objected that it is
very difficult to account for the attribution to non-exist-
ence of the qualities of existence, for we all see that the
quality happiness is attributed to the absence of pain, and
the idea of separation is connected with the absence of
conjunction. And you need not assert that "this absence
of light must be the object of a cognition produced by the.
eye in dependence on light, since it is the absence of an
object possessing colour, 5 as we see in the case of a jar's
1 Unless you see the rope you can- dhaka-kriyd. It has that meaning
not mistake it for a serpent. in Kavyapraka"sa, V. (p. 114, 1. i).
2 In p. 1 10, last line, read 'bMve. 4 The mind perceives dloka-jndna,
3 Read in p. 1 10, last line, anava- therefore it would perceive its ab-
dhdnddishu. Vidkipratyaya properly sence, i.e., darkness, but this last is
means an imperative or potential perceived by the eye.
affix implying " command ; " but the 5 I.e., light possesses colour, and we
pandit takes vidhi here as bkdvabo- cannot see a jar's absence in the dark.
THE VAISESHIKA OR AULUKYA DARSANA. 159
absence," because by the very rule on which you rely, viz.,
that that on which the eye depends to perceive an object,
it must also depend on to perceive that object's absence,
it follows that as there is no dependence of the eye on
light to perceive light, it need not depend thereon to per-
ceive this light's absence. Nor need our opponent retort
that " the cognition of dai'kness [as the absence of light]
necessitates the cognition of the place where the absence
resides [and this will require light]," as such an assertion
is quite untenable, for we cannot admit that in order to
have a conception of absence it is necessary to have a
conception of the place where the absence resides, else
we could not have the perception of the cessation of sound,
as is implied in such an expression as " the tumult has
ceased." l Hence, having all these difficulties in his mind,
the venerable Kanada uttered his aphorism [as an ipsc
dixit to settle the question] : " Dravya-guna-karma-nish-
patti-vaidharmydd abhdvas tamas" (Vai. Brit. v. 2, 19),
'' Darkness is really non-existence, since it is dissimilar to
the production of substances, qualities, or actions." The
same thing has been also established by the argument that
darkness is perceived by the eye 2 [without light, whereas
all substances, if perceptible at all, require the presence
of light as well as of the eye to be visible].
Non-existence (abhdva) is considered to be the seventh-
category, as established by negative proofs. It may be
concisely defined as that which, itself not having intimate
relation, is not intimate relation ; 3 and this is twofold,
"relative non-existence" 4 and "reciprocal non-existence."
1 Sound resides in the impercep- eva vd tamah sydt, vdhydlokapragra-
tible ether, and cessation is the ham antarena chakshushd no, grih-
dhvamsdbhdva, or " emergent non- yeta."
existence." 3 Intimate relation has also no
- The reading pratyayavedyatvena intimate relation.
seems supported by p. no, last line, 4 "Relative non-existence" (sam-
but it is difficult to trace the argu- sargdbhdra) is the negation of a
ment ; I have, therefore, ventured relation ; thus " the jar is not in the
hesitatingly to read pratyaksJiave- house" is ''absolute non-existence,"
dyatrena, and would refer to the " it was not in the house " is " ante-
commentary (Vais. Stit. p. 250), cedent," and "it will not ba in the
" yadi hi nila-rupavan nilam, nipam house "is "emergent," non-existence.
160 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
The former is again divided into " antecedent," " emer-
gent," and " absolute." " Antecedent " is that non-exist-
ence which, though without any beginning, is not ever-
lasting ; " emergent " is that which, though having a
beginning, is everlasting ; " absolute " is that non-existence
which abides in its own counter-entity ; l " reciprocal non-
existence " is that which, being different from " absolute,"
has yet no denned limit [i.e., no terminus ad quern nor ter-
minus a quo, as " antecedent " and " emergent " have].
If you raise the objection that " ' reciprocal non-exist-
ence ' is really the same as ' absolute non-existence/ " we
reply that this is indeed to lose one's way in the king's
highroad ; for " reciprocal non-existence " is that negation
whose opposite is held to be identity, as "ajar is not cloth;"
but " absolute non-existence " is that negation whose
opposite is connection, as " there is no colour in the air." 2
Nor need you here raise the objection that " dbhdva can
never be a means of producing any good to man," for we
maintain that it is his summum bonum, in the form of
final beatitude, which is only another term for the absolute
abolition of all pain [and therefore comes under the cate-
gory of abhdva]. E. B. C.
1 I.e., the absolute absence of the jdti gliatatva which resides in the
jar is found in the jar, as, of course, jar.
the jar does not reside in the jar, 2 The opposite is " there is colour
but in the spot of ground, it is the in the air."
THE AKSHAPADA (OR NY.AYA) DAR^ANA.
THE principle that final bliss, i.e., the absolute abolition of
pain, arises from the knowledge of the truth [though in a
certain sense universally accepted], is established in a
special sense as a particular tenet l of the Nyaya school,
as is declared by the author of the aphorisms in the words
" proof, that which is to be proved, &c., from knowledge
of the truth as to these things there is the attainment of
final bliss." This is the first aphorism of the Nyaya
Sastra. Now the Nyaya Sastra consists of five books,
and each book contains two "daily portions." In the
first daily portion of the first book the venerable Gotama
discusses the definitions of nine categories, beginning with
" proof," and in the second those of the remaining seven,
beginning with "discussion" (vdda). In the first daily
portion of the second book he examines " doubt," discusses
the four kinds of "proof," and refutes the suggested
objections to their being instruments of right knowledge ;
and in the second he shows that " presumption," &c., are
really included in the four kinds of " proof " already given
[and therefore need not be added by the Mimamsakas as
separate ones]. In the first daily portion of the third
book he examines the soul, the body, the senses, and their
objects; in the second, "understanding" (buddhi), and
" mind " (manas). In the first daily portion of the fourth
book he examines "volition" (pravritti}, the "faults,"
1 Cf. Nyaya Sutras, L 29.
1 62 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
<( transmigration," " fruit " [of actions], " pain," and " final
liberation ; " in the second he investigates the truth l as
to the causes of the " faults," and also " wholes " and
" parts." In the first daily portion of the fifth book he
discusses the various kinds of futility (jdti), and in the
second the various kinds of " occasion for rebuke " (nigra-
hasthdna, or " unfitness to be argued with ").
In accordance with the principle that " to know the
thing to be measured you must first know the measure,"
"proof" (pramdna) is first enunciated, and as this must
be done by defining it, we have first a definition of " proof."
"Proof" is that which is always accompanied by right
knowledge, and is at the same time not disjoined from
the proper instruments [as the eye, &c.], and from the
site of knowledge [i.e., the soul] ; 2 and this definition thus
includes the peculiar tenet of the Nyaya School that God
is a source of right knowledge, 3 as the author of the
aphorisms has expressly declared (ii. 68), " and the fact
of the Veda's being a cause of right knowledge, like spells
and the medical science, follows from the fact that the fit
one who gave the Yeda was a source of right knowledge."
And thus too hath the universally renowned teacher
Udayana, who saw to the farthest shore of the ocean of
logic, declared in the fourth chapter of the Kusumanjali :
" Eight knowledge is accurate comprehension, and right
knowing is the possession thereof; authoritativeness is,
according to Gotama's school, the being separated from all
"He in whose intuitive unerring perception, insepar-
ably united to Him and dependent on no foreign inlets,
the successipn of all the various existing objects is con-
tained, all the chaff of our suspicion being swept away
1 In p. 112, line 16, of the Cal- (vishayd), as these are, of course,
cutta edition, I read doshanimitta- connected with right knowledge.
tattva for doshanimittakatva (compare 3 fsvara is a cause of right know-
Nydya Sut. iv. 68). ledge (pramdna) according to the
* Without this last clause the definition, because he is }<ra7ndyd
definition might include the objects dsrayah.
THE AKSHAPADA-DARSANA. 163
by the removal of all possible faults as caused by the
slightest want of observation in Him, He, Siva, is my
authority; what have I to do with others, darkened as
their authority must ever be with rising doubts ? "
"Proof" is fourfold, as being divided into perception,
inference, analogy, and testimony. The " thing to be
proved" [or the "object of right notion"] is of twelve
kinds, viz., soul, body, the senses, their objects, under-
standing, mind, volition, faults, transmigrations, fruit, pain,
and final liberation. "Doubt" is a knowledge whose
nature is uncertainty; and this is threefold, as being
caused by the object's possessing only qualities which are
common to other things also, and therefore not distinctive,
or by its possessing only irrelevant qualities of its own,
which do not help us in determining the particular point
in question, 1 or by conflicting testimony. The thing which
one proposes to one's self before proceeding to act, is " a
motive ;> (prayojana) ; this is twofold, i.e., visible and
invisible. " An example " is a fact brought forward as a
ground for establishing a general principle, and it may
be either affirmative or negative. 2 A " tenet " (siddhdnta)
is something which is accepted as being authoritatively
settled as true ; it is of four kinds, as being " common to
all the schools," "peculiar to one school," "a pregnant
assumption " [leading, if conceded, to a further conclusion],
and "an implied dogma" (i. 26-31). The "member" (of
a demonstration) is a part of the sentence containing an
inference for the sake of another ; and these are five, the
proposition, the reason, the example, the application, and
the conclusion (i. 32-38). "Confutation" (tarka, i. 39) is
the showing that the admission of a false minor necessi-
tates the admission of a false major 3 (cf. Slit. i. 39, and
1 On this compare Siddhanta - the smoke, is the confutation of there
Muktavali, p. 115. being no fire in the hill" (BalZan-
2 On these compare my note to tyne). Or, in other words, "the
Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i. p. 315. mountain must have the absence-of-
3 " Our coming to the conclusion smoke (vyd.palca) if it has the ab-
that there can be no smoke in the sence-of-fire (the false vydpya").
hill if there be no fire, while we see
164 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
iv. 3) ; and this is of eleven kinds, as vydylidta, dtmdsraya,
" Ascertainment " (nirnaya, i. 40) is right knowledge or
a perception of the real state of the case. It is of four
kinds as produced by perception, inference, analogy, or
testimony. " Discussion " (vdda) is a particular kind of
conversation, having as its end the ascertainment of truth
(i. 41). "Wrangling" (jalpa) is the talk of a man only
wishing for victory, who is ready to employ arguments
for either side of the question (i. 42). " Cavilling " (vi-
tandd) is the talk of a man who does not attempt to
establish his own side of the question (i. 43). " Dialogue "
(Jcathd) is the taking of two opposite sides by two dis-
putants. A "fallacy" is an inconclusive reason which is
supposed to prove something, and this may be of five
kinds, the "erratic," the "contradictory," the "uncertain,"
the " unproved," and the " precluded " or " mistimed "
(Slit. i. 44-49). "Unfairness" (chhala) is the bringing
forward a contrary argument by using a term wilfully in
an ambiguous sense ; this is of three kinds, as there may
be fraud in respect of a term, the meaning, or a meta-
phorical phrase (i. 50-54). "Futility" (jdti) is a self-
destructive argument (i. 58). This is of twenty-four kinds
(as described in the fifth book of the Nyaya aphorisms
(1-38). "Occasion for rebuke" is where the disputant
loses his cause [by stupidity], and this is of twenty-two
kinds (as described in the fifth book of the aphorisms,
44-67). We do not insert here all the minute sub-divi-
sions through fear of being too prolix, they are fully
explained in the aphorisms.
But here an objector may say, " If these sixteen topics,
proof, &c., are all thus fully discussed, how is it that it has
received the name of the Nyaya ^astra, [as reasoning, i.e.,
Nydya,m logic, properly forms only a small part of the topics
which it treats of ? "] We allow the force of the objection;
still as names are proverbially said to be given for some
special reason, we maintain that the name Nyaya was
THE AKSHAPADA-DARSANA. 165
rightly applied to Gotama's system, since " reasoning," or
inference for the sake of another, is justly held to be a
predominant feature from its usefulness in all kinds of
knowledge, and from its being a necessary means for every
kind of pursuit. So it has been said by Sarvajiia, " This
is the pre-eminent science of Nyaya from its establishing
our doctrines against opponents, and from its producing
action ; " l and by Pakshila Swamin, " This is the science
of reasoning (dnmkskiki) divided into the different cate-
gories, 'proof,' &c. ; the lamp of all sciences, the means
for aiding all actions, the ultimate appeal of all religious
duties, well proved in the declarations of science." 2
But here an objector may say, " When you declare that
final liberation arises from the knowledge of the truth, do
you mean that liberation ensues immediately upon this
knowledge being attained ? " We reply, " No," for it is
said in the second Nyaya aphorism, " Pain, birth, activity,
faults, false notions, on the successive annihilation of
these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next
before it," by means of this knowledge of the truth. Now
false notions are the thinking the body, &c., which are
not the soul, to be the soul ; " faults " are a desire for those
things which seem agreeable to the soul, and a dislike to
those things which seem disagreeable to it, 3 though in
reality nothing is either agreeable or disagreeable to the
soul. And through the mutual reaction of these different
" faults " the stupid man desires and the desiring man is
stupid ; the stupid man is angry, and the angry man is
stupid. Moreover the man, impelled by these faults, does
those things which are forbidden: thus by the body he does
injury, theft, &c. ; by the voice, falsehood, &c. ; by the mind,
malevolence, &c. ; and this same sinful " activity " pro-
duces demerit. Or, again, he may do laudable actions by
1 Action (pravritti) follows after the 3 The printed text omits the third
ascertainment of the truth by nydya. fault, " a stupid indifference, moha,"
- Cp. Vatsyayana's Comment., p. which is however referred to pre-
6. The Calcutta edition reads pra- sently.
kirtitd for parikshitd.
1 66 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
his body, as alms, saving others, &c., truthful speaking,
upright counsel, &c., by his voice, and guilelessness, &c.,
by his mind ; and this same right activity produces merit.
But both are forms of activity, and each leads to a
similar laudable or blamable birth or bodily manifesta-
tion ; and while this birth lasts there arises the impression
of " pain," which we are conscious of as of something that
jars against us. Now this series, beginning with " false
notions" and ending with "pain," is continually going
on, and is what we mean by the words " mundane exist-
ence," which rolls on ceaselessly, like a waterwheel. And
whenever some pre-eminent man, by the force of his
previous good deeds, obtains through the teaching of a
great teacher the knowledge that all this present life is
only a scene of pain and bound up with pain, he -recognises
that it is all to be avoided, and desires to abolish the
ignorance, &c., which are the causes that produced it. 1
Then he learns that the one means to abolish it is the
knowledge of the truth; and as he meditates on- the
objects of right knowledge divided into the four sciences, 2
there arises in his mind the knowledge of the truth, or, in
other words, a right view of things as they are ; and from
this knowledge of the truth false notions disappear. When
false notions disappear, the " faults " pass away ; with
them ceases " activity ; " and with it ceases " birth ; " and
with the cessation of " birth " comes the entire abolition
of " pain," and this absolute abolition is final bliss. Its
absoluteness consists in this, that nothing similar to that
which is thus abolished can ever revive, as is expressly
said in the second aphorism of the Nyaya Sutras : " Pain,
birth, activity, faults, false notions, since, on the successive
annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of
1 In p. 1 1 6, line 3, I would read the causes of the stability of the
tannirvartakam for tannivartakam. world" (cf. Manu, vii. 43). It
3 This refers to the couplet so occurs in Kdmandaki's Nitisdra, ii.
often quoted in Hindu authors, 2, and seems to be referred to in
"Logic, the three Vedas, trade and Vatsyayana's Com. p. 3, from which
agriculture, and the eternal doctrine Madhava is here borrowing,
of polity, these four sciences are
THE AKSHAPADA-DARSANA. 167
the one next before it, there is [on the annihilation of the
last of them] final beatitude."
" But is not your definition of the summum bonum,
liberation, i.e., ' the absolute abolition of pain,' after all
as much beyond our reach as treacle on the elbow is to
the tongue ; l why then is this continually put forth as if
it were established beyond all dispute ? " We reply that
as all those who maintain liberation in any form do
include therein the absolute abolition of pain, our defini-
tion, as being thus a tenet accepted in all the schools,
may well be called the royal highway 2 of philosophy.
No one, in fact, maintains that pain is possible without
the individual's activity. Thus even the Madhyaniika's
opinion that "liberation consists in the abolition of soul,"
does not controvert our point, so far at any rate as that it
is the abolition of pain. But if you proceed to argue that
the soul, as being the cause of pain, is to be abolished just
like the body, &c., we reply that this does not hold, since
it fails under either alternative. For do you mean by
" the soul," (a.) the continued succession of cognitions, or
(&.) something different therefrom ? (a.) If the former, we
make no objection, [since we Naiyayikas allow that cogni-
tion is evanescent, 3 and we do desire to abolish cognition
as a cause of pravritti or action 4 ], for who would oppose
a view which makes for his own side ? (J.) But if the
latter, then, since it must be eternal, 5 its abolition is
impossible ; and, again, a second objection would be that
no one would try to gain your supposed "summum bonum;"
for surely no sensible person would strive to annihilate
the soul, which is always the dearest of all, on the prin-
1 Compare the English proverb, first moment, remains during the
" As soon as the cat can lick her second, and ceases in the third,
ear." 4 See Nydya Sut. i. 2.
2 Literally the "bell- road," i.e., 5 As otherwise why should we
" the chief road through a village, require liberation at all ? Or rather
or that by which elephants, &c., the author probably assumes that
decorated with tinkling ornaments, other Naiyayikas have sufficiently
proceed." Wilson's Diet. established this point against its.
3 The cognition is produced in the opponents, cf . p. 1 67, line 1 1 .
168 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
ciple that "everything else is dear for the soul's pleasure;"
and, again, everybody uses such a phrase as " liberated,"
[and this very term refutes the idea of annihilation or
" But why not say with those Bauddhas who hold the
doctrine of pure intelligence [i.e., the Yogacharas and the
Sautrantikas x ], that ' the summum bonurn ' is the rising of
pure intelligence consequent on the cessation of the con-
scious subject ? " To this view we object that there is an
absence of means ; and also it cannot be established that
the locus [or subject] of the two states is the same. For
the former, if it is replied that the well-known fourfold
set of Bauddha contemplations 2 are to be accepted as the
cause, we answer that, as [according to the Bauddha tenet
of the momentary existence of all things] there cannot be
one abiding subject of these contemplations, they will
necessarily exercise a languid power like studies pursued
at irregular intervals, and be thus ineffectual- to produce
any distinct recognition of the real nature of things.
And for the latter, since the continued series of cogni-
tions when accompanied by the natural obstacles 3 is said
to be " bound," and when freed from those obstacles is
said to be " liberated," you cannot establish an identity
of the subject in the two states so as to be able to say
that the very same being which was bound is now
Nor do we find the path of the Jainas, viz., that " Libera-
tion is the releasing from all ' obstructions,' " a path en-
tirely free from bars to impede the wayfarer. Pray, will our
Jaina friend kindly inform us what he means by " obstruc-
tion " ? 4 If he answers " merit, demerit, and error," we
readily grant what he says. But if he maintains that
" the body is the true obstruction, and hence Liberation is
the continual upspringing of the soul consequent on the
1 See supra, pp. 24-32. 3 In the form of the various Hesaa
2 All is momentary, all is pain, or "afflictions."
all is sui generis, all is unreal 4 Avarctna, cf. pp. 55, 58.
THE AKSHAPADA-DARSANA. 169
body's annihilation, as of a parrot released from its
cage," then we must inquire whether this said soul
possesses form or not. If it possesses form, then has it
parts or not ? If it has no parts, then, since the well-
known definition of an atom will apply here as "that
which has form without parts," it- will follow that the
attributes of the soul are, like those of an atom, impercep-
tible to the senses. 1 If you say that it has parts, then
the general maxim that " whatever has parts is non-
eternal," would necessitate that the soul is non-eternal ;
and if this were conceded, then two grand difficulties
[against the Providential course of the world] would burst
in unopposed, viz., that what the soul has done would, at
its cessation, perish with it [and thus fail of producing
the proper fruit], while it would have reaped during life
the effects of what it had not done [as the good and evil
which happened to it would not be the consequences of
its actions in a former birth]. If, on the other hand, the
Jaina maintains that the soul does not possess form at all,
then how can he talk of the soul's " upspringing," since
all such actions as motion necessarily involve an agent
possessing form ? 2
Again, if we take the Charvaka's view " that the only
bondage is dependence on another, and therefore indepen-
dence is the true liberation," if by " independence " he
means the cessation of pain, we have no need to controvert
it. But if he means autocratic power, then no sensible
man can concede it, as the very idea of earthly power
involves the idea of a capability of being increased and of
being equalled. 3
Again, the Sankhya opinion, which first lays down that
nature and soul are utterly distinct, and then holds that
1 But the Nytiya holds that the is difficult, but I believe that prati-
attributes of the soul, as happiness, bandha means here vydpti, as it does
desire, aversion, &c., are perceived in Sankhya Sutras, i. 100.
by the internal sense, mind (Bhashd, 3 The true summum bonum must
P. 83). be niratisaya, incapable of being
z The reading murtapratibandhdt added to.