transaction of life, his mind a mass of doubts."
(6.) "But [the Naiyayikas will ask] does not this recog-
nition of g and other letters [as the same which we heard
before] refer to the species which exists the same in each,
and not to the several individual letters, since, in fact, we
perceive that they are different as uttered by different
persons, otherwise we could not make such distinctions
as we do when we say ' SomaSarman is reading ' ? " This
objection, however, has as little brilliancy as its prede-
cessors, for as there is no proof of any distinction between
the individual #'s, there is no proof that we ought to
assume any such thing as a species g; and we maintain
that, just as to the man who does not understand [the
Naiyayika doctrine of] the species g, the one species [in
the Naiyayika view] will by the influence of distinction of
place, magnitude, form, and individual sounds, appear as
if it were variously modified as itself distinct in place, as
small, as great, as long, as short; so to the man who does
not understand our [Mimamsaka doctrine of] one individual



THE JAIMINI-DARSANA. 193

g, the one g (in our view) will by the diversity of " mani-
festers," 1 appear to him associated with their respective
peculiarities ; and as contrary characters are in this way
ascribed [to the letter g], there is a fallacious appearance
of distinction [between different g's]. But does this ascrip-
tion of contrary characters, which is thus regarded as
creating a difference [between the gs], result (i.) from the
nature of the thing, or (2.) from our imagination ? There
is no proof of the former alternative ; for, if it were true,
as an inherent difference would have to be admitted be-
tween different g's, we should have to say, " Chaitra has
uttered ten g's," and not " Chaitra has uttered the same
g ten times." On the latter supposition, there is no proof
of any inherent distinction between g's, for inherent one-
ness is not destroyed by a difference of external disguises.
Thus we must not conceive, from the apparent distinction
caused by such external disguises as jars, &c., that there
is any inherent distinction, as of parts, in the one indivi-
sible ether. The current use of the rejected phrase [i.e.,
" different " as applied to the g's] is really caused by the
noise, which in each case is different. This has been said
by the great teacher

" The object which the Naiyayikas seek by supposing a
species is, in fact, gained from the letter itself ;
and the object which they aim at by supposing an
individuality in letters, is attained from audible
noises; 2 so that the assumption of species is
useless."
And again

" Since in regard to sounds such an irresistible instinct
of recognition is always awake within us, it pre-
cludes by its superior evidence all the inferences to
prove sound's non-eternity."
This at once refutes the argument given in the [Naiya-

1 Jaimini maintains that the vibra- is these ' conjunctions' and 'disjunc-
tions of the air " manifest " the al- tions,' occasioned by the vibrations
ways existing sound. of the air." Battantyne, Mimdmsd.

- "What is meant by 'noise' (ndda) Aphorisms,!. 17.



194



THE SARVA-DARSANA-SAKGRAHA.



yika] treatise by Vagiswara, entitled Mdna-manohara,
"sound is non-eternal from the fact of its being a special
quality belonging to an organ of sense l (sc. the ear), just
as colour is to the eye."

We can also refute it in the following ways : (a.) If we
follow the [Sankhya and Vedanta] view that sound is a
substance, it is evidently overthrown 2 [as in that case
sound cannot be a quality] ; (Z>.) if we take it as referring
to the noise, not the sound, we have no dispute, as it only
establishes what we ourselves allow; and (c.) the infer-
ence is overthrown by the " limiting condition " [upddhi]
of asrdvanatva, or " the not causing audition." 3 So Uda-
yana tries at great length to establish that, although ether,
the site of sound, is imperceptible, the non-existence of
that which abides in this site is perceptible ; and he then
brings forward as an evidence for the non-eternity of
sound, that sense perception which causes the use of such
common expressions as " The tumult is stopped," " The
sound has arisen." 4 But he is sufficiently answered 5 by
our old reply [in p. 193], that the fallacious appearance of



1 The Nyaya holds that colour and
sound are respectively special quali-
ties of the elements light and ether ;
and as the organs of seeing and
hearing are composed of light and
ether, each will, of course, have its
corresponding special quality.

3 In p. 131, line 7, I read pra-
tyakshdsiddheh.

3 Cf . my note pp. 7, 8, (on the Chdr-
vdka-darsana) for the upddhi. The
upddhi or " condition " limits a too
general middle term ; it is defined
as "that which always accompanies
the major term, but does not always
accompany the middle." Thus if
the condition "produced from wet
fuel " is added to " fire," the argu-
ment "the mountain has smoke be-
cause it has fire " is no longer a false
one. Here, in answer to the Nyaya
argument in the text, our author
objects that its middle term (" from
the fact of its being a special quality
belonging to an organ of sense ")



is too wide, i.e., it is sometimes found
where the major term "non-eternal "
is not found, as, e.g., in sound itself,
according to the Mimamsa doctrine.
To obviate this he proposes to add the
" condition," " not causing audition,"
as he will readily concede that all
those things are non-eternal which,
while not causing audition, are special
qualities belonging to an oi-gan of
sense, as, e.g., colour. But I need
scarcely add that this addition would
make the whole argument nugatory.
In fact, the Ptirva Mimamsd and the
Nydya can never argue together on
this question of the eternity of sound,
as their points of view are so totally
different.

4 In the former case we have the
dhwamsa of sound, in the latter its
prdgabhdva.

e In p. 131, line 12, I read sama-
pauhi for samdpohi, i.e., the passive
aorist of sam + apa + uh.



THE JAIMINI-DARSANA. 195

distinction arises from contrary characters being errone-
ously ascribed, just as, in the story, the demon Tala went
away [as well as Betala] when the offering of blood was
given to the latter. 1 And as for the objection raised by the
author of the Nydyabhitehana, 2 that, if sound were eternal,
the conclusion must follow that it would be either always
perceptible or always imperceptible, this also is obviated
by our allowing that we only perceive that sound which
is manifested by our articulate noise. 3 And as for the
(Naiyayika) argument against the existence 4 of such a
constant relation as this which is supposed between the
manifested " sound " and the manifesting " noise," since
they both come simultaneously in contact with the sense
of hearing, this is invalid, as it will indisputably apply
with equal force in the case of the soul. 5

Therefore as the Veda is thus proved to have not
originated from any personal author, and as the minutest
germ of suspicion against it is thus absolutely destroyed,
we hold it as satisfactorily demonstrated that it has a
self - established authority in all matters relating to
duty.

" Well " 6 [say our opponents], " let this question rest ;

1 I do not know this legend. Tala The Naiydyika argument would
and Betala are the two demons who seem to be something as follows :
carry Vikram iditya on their shoulders Sound is not thus manifested by
in the Simhasan-battisi. It appears noise, since both are simultaneously
to be referred to here as illustrating perceived by the senses, just as we see
how one answer can suffice for two in the parallel case of the individual
opponents. and its species ; these are both per-

2 This is probably a work by Bhd- ceived together, but the individual is
sarvajna (see Dr. Hall's Bibl. Index, not manifested by the species. But
p. 26). the Mimamsjl rejoins that this would

3 JJhrani, or our " articulate equally apply to the soul and know-
noise," produces the vibrations of ledge ; as the internal sense perceives
air which render manifest the ever- both simultaneously, and therefore
existing sound. There is always an knowledge ought not to be inani-
eternal but inaudible hum going on, fested by the soul, which is contrary
which we modify into a definite to experience. But I am not sure
speech by our various articulations, that I rightly understand the argu-
I take samskrita here as equivalent ment.

to abhivyakta. 6 Here begins a long ptirvapaksha,

4 I read in p. 131, line 15, samskd- from p. 131, line 18, down to p. 133,
rakasamskdryabhdvdbhdvdnumdnam. line 9 ; seep. 198. infra.

5 It would be a case of vyabhichdra.



196 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

but how about another well-known controversy ? It is
said

" ' The Sankhyas hold that both authoritativeness and
non-authoritativeness are self- proved; the followers of
the Nyaya hold that both are proved by something else
[as inference, &c.] ; the Buddhists hold that the latter is
self-proved and the former proved by something else ; the
teachers of the Veda maintain that authoritativeness is
self-proved and non-authoritativeness proved by some-
thing else.' Now we ask, amidst all this discussion, how
do the Mimamsakas accept as established their tenet that
the authoritativeness of duty is self-proved ? And what
is the meaning of this so-called self-proved authoritative-
ness ? Is it (a.) that authoritativeness springs from itself ?
or (&.) that it springs from the right knowledge in which
it resides ? or (c.) that it springs from the instrumental
causes [as the eye, &c.] which produced the right know-
ledge in which it resides ? or (of.) that it resides in a par-
ticular knowledge produced by the instrumental causes
which produced the right knowledge ? l or (e.~) that it
resides in a particular knowledge produced by the instru-
mental causes only which produced the right knowledge ?

" (a.) It cannot be the first, because wherever the relation
of cause and effect is found there must be a difference,
and therefore these two cannot reside in the same subject
[i.e., authoritativeness cannot cause itself], (Z>.) It cannot
be the second, because if knowledge, which is a quality,
were the cause of authoritativeness, it would have to be a
substance, as being an intimate cause. 2 (c.) It cannot be
the third, because ' authoritativeness ' cannot properly be

1 This is Prabhdkara's view (see 2 Substances are "intimate causes"
Siddh. Muktdv., p. 118). The first to their qualities, and only substances
knowledge is in the form "This is a have qualities ; now if authoritative-
jar ;" the second knowledge is the ness, which is a characteristic of right
cognition of this perception in the knowledge, were caused by it, it
form "I perceive the jar;" and this would be a quality of it, that is,
latter produces authoritativeness right knowledge would be its inti-
(prdm&nya), which resides in it as mate cause and therefore a sub-
its characteristic. stance.



THE JA I MINI -DA RSA NA . 1 97

' produced ' at all, 1 whether we call it a general character-
istic (upddhi) or a species (jdti) ; 2 for if we call it an
upddhi, it is defined as the absolute non-existence of any
contradiction to a certain kind of knowledge which does
not possess the nature of recollection ; 3 and this cannot be
produced, for we all allow that absolute non-existence is
eternal ; and still less can we speak of its being produced,
if we regard it as a species, (d.) Nor can it be the fourth,
for wrong knowledge [as well as right knowledge] is a par-
ticular kind of knowledge, and the instrumental causes
which produce the general are included in those which pro-
duce the particular, 4 just as the general idea 'seed/ as applied
to ' tree/ is included in the particular seed of any special
tree, as, e.g., the Dalbergia Sisu ; otherwise we might sup-
pose that the particular had no instrumental cause at all.
Your definition would therefore extend too far [and include
erroneous as well as true knowledge] ; for non-authoritative-
ness, which Vedantists and most Mimamsakas allow to be
produced by something external, must also be considered
as residing in a particular knowledge [i.e., a wrong know-
ledge] produced [in part] by the instrumental causes which
produced the right knowledge. (e.) As for your fifth
view, we ask whether by being produced by the instru-
mental causes only which produced right knowledge, you
mean to include or exclude the absence of a ' defect ' ? It
cannot be the former alternative ; because the followers of
the Nyaya who hold that authoritativeness is proved by
something external [as inference, &c.], would at once grant
that authoritativeness is produced by the instrumental
causes of knowledge combined with the absence of a 'defect/



1 The eye, &a, would be its in- 3 The Purva Mimamsa' denies that
fitrumental causes. recollection is right knowledge.

2 The first three categories " sub- 4 Wrong knowledge is produced
stance," "quality," and "action," by the same instrumental causes (as
are called jdtis or species ; the last the eye, &c.) which produced right
four, '"genus," "vises/ia," "intimate knowledge, but by these together with,
relation," and "non-existence," are a "defect," as biliousness, distance,
called upddhis or "general charac- &c.

teristics."



198 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

Neither can it be the latter alternative ; for, inasmuch as
it is certain that the absence of a ' defect ' is found com-
bined with the various instrumental causes, this absence of
a ' defect ' is fixed as by adamantine glue to be a cause of
right knowledge, since right knowledge will always ac-
company its presence, and be absent if it is absent, 1 and
it will at the same time be not an unimportant condition. 2
If you object that non-existence (or absence) cannot be a
cause, we reply by asking you whether non-existence can
be an effect or not ? If it cannot, then we should have to
allow that cloth is eternal, as its " emergent non-existence"
or destruction would be impossible. If it can be an effect,
then why should it not be a cause also? So this rope
binds you at both ends. This has also been said by Uda-
yana [in his Kusumanjali, i. 10]

" ' As existence, so too non-existence is held to be a cause
as well as an effect.'

" The argument, in my opinion, runs as follows : Eight
knowledge depends on some cause 3 other than the common
causes of knowledge, from the very fact that, while it is an
effect, it is also knowledge, just as wrong knowledge does. 4
Authoritativeness is known through something external to
itself [e.g., inference], because doubt arises in regard to it in
an unfamiliar case, as we also see in non-authoritativeness.

"Therefore, as we can prove that authoritativeness is
both produced and recognised by means of something
external, the Mimamsa tenet that ' authoritativeness is
self-proved ' is like a gourd overripe and rotten."

This long harangue of our opponent, however, is but a
vain attempt to strike the sky with his fist ; for (a.) we
mean by our phrase " self-proved " that while right know-
ledge is produced by the instrumental causes of know-

1 Soil, if there be doshdbMva there 3 Soil, or the absence of " defect,"
ispramd; if not, not. In p. 132, line doshdbhdva.

2O, I read doshdbhdvatvena for do- 4 Wrong knowledge has dosha-

shtibhdvasahakritatvena. bhdva or the presence of a " defect "

2 Anyaihdsiddhatvam means ni- as its cause, in addition to the com-
yatapurvavartitve sati andvasyakat- mon causes.

vam.



THE JAIMINI-DARSANA. 199

ledge, it is not produced by any other cause (as " defect,"
&c.) The following is our argument as drawn out in
full: Right knowledge is not produced by any other
instrumental causes than those of knowledge, while, at
the same time, it is produced by these, because it is not
the site of wrongness of knowledge, just like a jar. 1 Nor
can Udayana's 2 argument be brought forward as establish-
ing the dependence of authoritativeness on something
external, for it is swallowed up by the dragon of the
equally potent contradictory argument. " Right know-
ledge is not produced by any cause which is other than
the causes of knowledge and is also other than ' defect,' a
from the very fact of its being knowledge like wrong
knowledge." Again, since right knowledge can arise from
the causes of knowledge per se, it would be a needless com-
plexity to suppose that anything else is a cause, whether
you call it a guiia or the absence of a " defect " (dosha).*

" But surely if the presence of a defect is the cause of
wrong knowledge, it is difficult to deny that its absence
must be a cause of right knowledge ? " We meet this,
however, by maintaining that the absence of defect is only
an indirect and remote cause, as it only acts negatively by
preventing wrong knowledge. As it has been said

1 Wrongness of knowledge (apra- 2 I suppose this is the argument

mdtva) can only reside in knowledge given at the close of the previous

as a characteristic or quality thereof ; long purva-paksha.

it cannot reside in a jar. The jar 3 These words " and is other than

is, of course, produced by other in- defect " (dosha - vyatirikta) are, of

strumental causes than those of course, meaningless as far as right

knowledge (as, e.g., the potter's stick, knowledge is concerned; they are

&c.), but it is not produced by these simply added to enable the author

other causes in combination with to bring in " wrong knowledge " as

being also produced by the instru- an example. Wrong knowledge is

mental causes of knowledge (with caused by the causes of knowledge

which it has nothing directly to do) ; plus " defect ; " right knowledge by

and so by a quibble, which is less the former alone,

obvious in Sanskrit than in English, 4 The Nydya holds that wrong

this wretched sophism is allowed to knowledge is produced by a "defect,"

pass muster. The jar is not produced- as jaundice, &c., in the eye, and

by -any- other -instrumental -causes- right knowledge by a guna or "vir-

than-those-of-knowledge,-while-at- tue" (as the direct contact of the

the - same - lime - it - is - produced - by- healthy organ with a true object), or

these. by the absence of a "defect."



200 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

"Therefore we reasonably conclude from the presence
of gunas the absence of ' defects/ l from their absence
the non-existence of the two kinds of non-authori-
tativeness, 2 and from this the general conclusion." 3

(&.)"We maintain that the recognition of right know-
ledge is produced by the same causes only which make
us perceive the first knowledge 4 [se. the eye, mind, &c.]
Nor can you object that this view is precluded, because it
would imply that there could be no such thing as doubt ;
for we answer that doubt arises in cases where, although
all the causes which produce knowledge are present, there
is also the simultaneous presence of some opposing cause,
as a " defect," &c.

As for your argument [0 Naiyayika ! given supra, in p.
198, lines 17-24], I ask, Is your own argument an authori-
tative proof by itself or not ? If it is, it proves too much
[for it would properly apply to itself and lead us to infer its
own dependence on external proof, whereas you hold it to
be independent of such] ; and if it is not, we should have a
case of regressus in infinitum, for it will want some other
proof to confirm its authoritativeness, and this too in its
turn will want some fresh proof, and so on for ever.

As for the argument urged by Udayana 5 in the Kusu-
manjali, when he tries to establish that immediate and
vehement action does not depend on the agent's certainty
as to the authoritativeness of the speech which sets him
acting : " Action depends on wish, its vehemence on that

1 The guna (or /SeXrfon; ?) of a jar, "the second knowledge is the

an organ is not properly a cause of cognition of this perception in the

pramd but rather doskdbkdva-bod- form "I perceive the jar;" and

halu. simultaneously with it arises the

* Soil, "doubtful" (sandiydha) and cognition of the truth of the percep-

" ascertained non-authoritativeness " tion, i.e., its authoritativeness or

(nUchitdprdmdnya). prdmdnya.

3 Utsarga is a general conclusion 5 This seems to be a quotation of
which is not necessarily true in every TJdayana's own words, and no doubt
particular case ; but here it means is taken from his very rare prose
the conclusion that "right knowledge commentar}' on the Kusumanjali, a
has no special causes but the common specimen of which I printed in the
causes of knowledge, the eye," &c. preface to my edition. This passage

4 The first knowledge is " This is must come from the fifth book (v. 6 ?)



THE JAIMINI-DARSANA. 201

of the wish, 1 wish on the knowledge that the thing wished
for is a means to attain some wished-for end, and this is
only ascertained by an inference based on some 'sign' which
proves that the thing is closely connected with the wished-
for end, and this inference depends on the things being
in direct contact with the agent's senses ; but throughout
the whole series of antecedent steps the Mimamsa idea of
the perception of authoritativeness is never once found as
a cause of action." All this appears to us simple bluster,
like that of the thief who ostentatiously throws open all
his limbs before me, when I had actually found the gold
under his armpit. It is only the knowledge that the thing
is a means to attain the desired end, and this knowledge
recognised as authoritative and right knowledge, which
causes the definite volition to arise at all ; and in this we
can distinctly trace the influence of that very perception
of authoritativeness [whose existence he so vehemently
pretended to deny]. If unhesitating action ever arose in
any case from doubt, then, as it might always arise so in
every given case, all ascertainment of authoritativeness
would be useless ; and as the very existence of what is
unascertained is rendered uncertain, poor authoritative-
ness would have to be considered as dead and buried!
But enough of this prolix controversy ; since it has been
said

" Therefore the authoritativeness of a cognition, which
(authoritativeness) presented itself as representing
a real fact, may be overthrown by the perception
of a ' defect,' which perception is produced by some
sign that proves the discrepancy between the cog-
nition and the fact." 2

Now with regard to the Veda, which is the self-proved
and authoritative criterion in regard to duty, [we have the
following divergency between the two great Mimamsa

1 I read tat-prdchuryam for tat- authoritativeness is self -proved, non-

prdchurye in p. 134, line 7. authoritativeness is proved from

- This stanza affirms that accord- something else (as inference, &c.)
ing to the Mimdinsd school, while



202



THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.



schools] : The Veda is composed of three portions, respec-
tively called "hymns" (mantra), "explanatory passages"
(arthavdda), and " injunctions " (vidhi) ; and by "injunc-
tion " we mean such sentences as " Let him who desires
heaven sacrifice with the jyotishtoma." Here ta, the affix
of the third person singular, denotes an enjoining power,
which is " coloured " [or rendered definite] by the meaning
of the root, according to the opinion of the followers of
Bhatta Kumarila, who maintain that words signify 1 some-
thing definite by themselves [apart from the sentence].
The followers of Guru Prabhakara, on the contrary, hold
that the whole sentence is a command relating to the
sacrifice, as they maintain that words only signify an
action or something to be done. 2 Thus all has been made
plain. E. B. C.

1 I take vyutpatti here as used for
sakti ; siddlie means ghatddau.

- These are the two great Mim-
amsd schools. The former, called
abhihUdnvaya-vddinah, hold (like
the Naiyayika school) that words by
themselves can express their sepa-
rate meaning by the function abhidhd
or " denotation ; " these are subse-
quently combined into a sentence
expressing one connected idea. The
latter, called aniritdbhidhdna.vddinah,
hold that words only express a mean-
ing as parts of a sentence and gram-
matically connected with each other ;
they only mean an action or some-
thing connected with an action. In
gam dnaya, gam does not properly
mean yotva, but dnayandnvita-gotva.



i.e., the bovine genus as connected
with " bringing." We cannot have
a case of a noun without some
governing verb, and vice versa. Cf.