class or nature of sound only resid-
ing in sound, and that of a jar only
in a jar), while, at the same time,



wherever the class of jar is found
there is also found non-eternity.
Lastly, if we defined the up<ldhi as
"not constantly accompanying the
middle term, and constantly accom-
panying the major," we might have
as a Mimarnsaka upaclhi "the not
causing audition," i.e., the not being
apprehended by the organs of hear-
ing ; but this is excluded, as non-eter-
nity is not always found where this
is, ether being inaudible and yet
eternal.

3 This refers to an obscure sloka
of TJdayandcharya, " where a recip-
rocal and a non-reciprocal universal
connection (i.e., universal proposi-
tions which severally do and do not
distribute their predicates) relate to
the same argument (as e.g., to prove
the existence of smoke), there that
non-reciprocating term of the second
will be a fallacious middle, which is
not invariably accompanied by the
other reciprocal of the first." Thus
" the mountain has smoke because it
has fire " (here fire and smoke are
non-reciprocating, as fire is not found
invariably accompanied by smoke



THE CHARVAKA SYSTEM. 9

But since the knowledge of the condition must here
precede the knowledge of the condition's absence, it is
only when there is the knowledge of the condition, that
the knowledge of the universality of the proposition is
possible, i.e., a knowledge in the form of such a connection
between the middle term and major term as is distinguished
by the absence of any such condition ; and on the other
hand, the knowledge of the condition depends upon the
knowledge of the invariable connection. Thus we fasten
on our opponents as with adamantine glue the thunder-
bolt-like fallacy of reasoning in a circle. Hence by the
impossibility of knowing the universality of a proposition
it becomes impossible to establish inference, &C. 1

The step which the mind takes from the knowledge of
smoke, &c., to the knowledge of fire, &c., can be accounted
for by its being based on a former perception or by its
being an error ; and that in some cases this step is justified
by the result, is accidental just like the coincidence of
effects observed in the employment of gems, charms,
drugs, &c.

From this it follows that fate, &c., 2 do not exist, since
these can only be proved by inference. But an opponent
will say, if you thus do not allow adrishta, the various
phenomena of the world become destitute of any cause.

though smoke is by fire), or "because which is the reciprocal of fire. I

it has fire from wet fuel " (smoke and wish to add here, once for all, that

fire from wet fuel being reciprocal I own my explanation of this, as

and always accompanying each well as many another, difficulty

other) ; the non-reciprocating term in the Sarva-darsana-sangraha to

of the former (fire) will give a falla- my old friend and teacher, Pandit

cious inference, because it is also, of Mahesa Chandra Nydyaratna, of the

course, not invariably accompanied Calcutta Sanskrit College,
by the special kind of fire, that pro- l Cf. Sextus Empiricus, P. Hyp.

duced from wet fuel. But this will ii. In the chapter on the Buddhist

not be the case where the non-re- system infra, we have an attempt

ciprocating term is thus invariably to establish the authority of the

accompanied by the other reciprocal, universal proposition from the rela-

as " the mountain has fire because it tion of cause and effect or genus and

has smoke ; " here, though fire and species.

smoke do not reciprocate, yet smoke 2 Adrishta, i.e., the merit and de-
will be a true middle, because it is merit in our actions which produce
invariably accompanied by heat, their effects in future births.



io THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since
these phenomena can all be produced spontaneously
from the inherent nature of things. Thus it has been
said

I The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn ;
By whom came this variety 1 from their own nature was it born.

And all this has been also said by Brihaspati

There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another
world,

Nor do the actions of the four castes, orders, &c., produce any real
effect.

The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smear-
ing one's self with ashes,

Were made by Nature as the livelihood of those destitute of know-
ledge and manliness.

If a beast slain in the Jyotishtoma rite will itself go to heaven,

Why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father I 1
\ If the Sraddha produces gratification to beings who are dead,

Then here, too, in the case of travellers when they start, it is needless
to give provisions for the journey.

If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the Sraddha here,

Then why not give the food down below to those who are standing

on the housetop ?

\ While life remains let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even
though he runs in debt ;

When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again ?
> If he who departs from the body goes to another world,

How is it that he comes not back again, restless for love of his
kindred 1

Hence it is only as a means of livelihood that Brahmans have estab-
lished here

All these ceremonies for the dead, there is no other fruit any-
where.
\ The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves, and demon?.

All the well-known formulae of the pandits, jarphari, turphari, &c."

And all the obscene rites for the queen commanded in the Aswa-
medha,

1 This is an old Buddhist retort. Aswamedha rites, see Wilson's Rig-
See Burnouf, Introd., p. 209. Veda, Preface, vol. ii. p. xiii.

2 Rig -Veda, x. 106. For the



THE CHARVAKA SYSTEM. n

These were invented by buffoons, and so all the various kinds of pre-
sents to the priests, 1

While the eating of flesh was similarly commanded by night-prowling
demons.

Hence in kindness to the mass of living beings must we
fly for refuge to the doctrine of Charvaka. Such is the
pleasant consummation. E. B. C.

1 Or this may mean " and all the various other things to be handled in
the rites."



CHAPTER II.

THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM.

AT this point the Buddhists remark: As for what you
(Charvakas) laid down as to the difficulty of ascertaining
invariable concomitance, your position is unacceptable,
inasmuch as invariable concomitance is easily cognisable
by means of identity and causality. It has accordingly
been said

" From the relation of cause and effect, or from identity
as a determinant, results a law of invariable con-
comitance not through the mere observation of
the desired result in similar cases, nor through the
non-observation of it in dissimilar cases." 1
On the hypothesis (of the Naiyayikas) that it is con-
comitance and non-concomitance (e.g., A is where B is,
A is not where B is not) that determine an invariable
connection, the unconditional attendance of the major
or the middle term would be unascertainable, it being
impossible to exclude all doubt with regard to in-
stances past and future, and present but unperceived.
If one (a Naiyayika) rejoin that uncertainty in regard to
such instances is eqtially inevitable on our system, we
reply : Say not so, for such a supposition as that an effect
may be produced without any cause would destroy itself
by putting a stop to activity of any kind ; for such doubts

1 This sloka is quoted in the the second line is there read more
" Benares Pandit," vol. i. p. 89, with correctly, 'darisandn na na darsandt.
a commentary, and the latter part of



THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM. 13

alone are to be entertained, the entertainment of which
does not implicate us in practical absurdity and the like,
as it has been said, " Doubt terminates where there is a
practical absurdity." 1

1. By ascertainment of an effectuation, then, of that (viz.,
of the designate of the middle) is ascertained the invariable
concomitance (of the major) ; and the ascertainment of
such effectuation may arise from the well-known series of
five causes, in the perceptive cognition or non-cognition of
cause and effect. That fire and smoke, for instance, stand
in the relation of cause and effect is ascertained by five
indications, viz., (i.) That an effect is not cognised prior
to its effectuation, that (2.) the cause being perceived (3.)
the effect is perceived, and that after the effect is cognised
(4.) there is its non-cognition, (5.) when the (material)
cause is no longer cognised.

2. In like manner an invariable concomitance is ascer-
tained by the ascertainment of identity (e.g., a sisu-tree is
a tree, or wherever we observe the attributes of a sisu we
observe also the attribute arboreity), an absurdity attach-
ing to the contrary opinion, inasmuch as if a sisu-tree
should lose its arboreity it would lose its own self. But,
on the other hand, where there exists no absurdity, and
where a (mere) concomitance is again and again observed,
who can exclude all doubt of failure in the concomitance ?
An ascertainment of the identity of sisu and tree is com-
petent in virtue of the reference to the same object (i.e.,
predication), This tree is a sisu. For reference to the
same object (predication) is not competent where there is
no difference whatever (e.g., to say, " A jar is a jar," is no
combination of diverse attributes in a common subject),
because the two terms cannot, as being synonymous, be
simultaneously employed ; nor can reference to the same
object take place where there is a reciprocal exclusion (of
the two terms), inasmuch as we never find, for instance,
horse and cow predicated the one of the other.

1 Kusumanjali, iii. 7



I 4 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

It has thus been evinced that an effect or a self-same
supposes a cause or a self-same (as invariable concomi-
tants).

If a man does not allow that inference is a form of
e vide nee, pramdna, one may reply : You merely assert thus
much, that inference is not a form of evidence : do you
allege no proof of this, or do you allege any ? The former
alternative is not allowable according to the maxim that
bare assertion is no proof of the matter asserted. Nor is
the latter alternative any better, for if while you assert
that inference is no form of evidence, you produce some
truncated argument (to prove, i.e., infer, that it is none),
you will be involved in an absurdity, just as if you asserted
your own mother to be barren. Besides, when you affirm
that the establishment of a form of evidence and of the
corresponding fallacious evidence results from their homo-
geneity, you yourself admit induction by identity. Again,
when you affirm that the dissentiency of others is known
by the symbolism of words, you yourself allow induction
by causality. When you deny the existence of any object
on the ground of its not being perceived, you yourself
admit an inference of which non-perception is the middle
term. Conformably it has been said by Tathagata

" The admission of a form of evidence in general results
from its being present to the understanding of
others.

" The existence of a form of evidence also follows from
its negation by a certain person."

All this has been fully handled by great authorities;
and we desist for fear of an undue enlargement of our
treatise.

These same Bauddhas discuss the highest end of man
from four standpoints. Celebrated under the designations
of Madhyamika, Yogachara, Sautrantika, and Vaibhashika,
these Buddhists adopt respectively the doctrines of a
universal void (nihilism), an external void (subjective
idealism), the inferribility of external objects (representa-



THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM. 15

tionism), and the perceptibility of external objects (pre-
sentationism). 1 Though the venerated Buddha be the only
one teacher (his disciples) are fourfold in consequence of
this diversity of views ; just as when one has said, " The
sun has set," the adulterer, the thief, the divinity student,
and others understand that it is time to set about their
assignations, their theft, their religious duties, and so forth,
according to their several inclinations.

It is to be borne in mind that four points of view have
been laid out, viz., (i.) All is momentary, momentary; (2.)
all is pain, pain; (3.) all is like itself alone; (4.) all is
void, void.

Of these points of view, the momentariness of fleeting
things, blue and so forth (i.e., whatever be their quality),
is to be inferred from their existence ; thus, whatever is
is momentary (or fluxional) like a bank of clouds, and all
these things are. 2 Nor may any one object that the
middle term (existence) is unestablished ; for an existence
consisting of practical efficiency is established by percep-
tion to belong to the blue and other momentary things ;
and the exclusion of existence from that which is not
momentary is established, provided that we exclude from

1 The Bauddhas are thus divided is that ? That conclusion is that
into you never, even for the shortest time

(l.) Mddhyamikas or Nihilists. that can be named or conceived, see

(2.) Yogdcharas or Subjective any abiding colour, any colour which

Idealists. truly is. Within the millionth part

(3.) Sautrantikas or Representa- of a second the whole glory of the

tionists. painted heavens has undergone an

(4.) Vaibhashikas or Presenta- incalculable series of mutations. One

tionists. shade is supplanted by another with

2 Cf. Ferrier's Lectures and Re- a rapidity which sets all measure-
mains, vol. i. p. 119. ment at defiance, but because the

" Suppose yourself gazing on a process is one to which no measure-
gorgeous sunset. The whole western ment applies, . . . reason refuses
heavens are glowing with roseate tc lay an arrestment on any period
hues, but you are aware that with- of the passing scene, or to declare
in half an hour all these glorious that it is, because in the very act of
tints will have faded away into a being it is not ; it has given place to
dull ashen grey. You see them even something else. It is a series of
now melting away before your eyes, fleeting colours, no one of which is,
although your eyes cannot place be- because each of them continually
fore you the conclusion which your vanishes in another."
reason draws. And what conclusion



1 6 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

it the non-momentary succession and simultaneity, accord-
ing to the rule that exclusion of the continent is exclusion
of the contained. Now this practical efficiency (here
identified with existence) is contained under succession
and simultaneity, and no medium is possible between
succession and non-succession (or simultaneity); there
being a manifest absurdity in thinking otherwise, accord-
ing to the rule

" In a reciprocal contradiction there exists no ulterior
alternative ;

"Nor is their unity in contradictories, there being a
repugnance in the very statement." l

And this succession and simultaneity being excluded
from the permanent, and also excluding from the per-
manent all practical efficiency, determine existence of the
alternative of momentariness. Q.E.D.

Perhaps some one may ask : Why may not practical
efficiency reside in the non-fluxional (or permanent) ? If
so, this is wrong, as obnoxious to the following dilemma.
Has your "permanent" a power of past and future practical
efficiency during its exertion of present practical efficiency
or no ? On the former alternative (if it has such power),
it cannot evacuate such past and future efficiency, because
we cannot deny that it has power, and because we infer
the consequence, that which can at any time do anything
does not fail to do that at that time, as, for instance, a com-
plement of causes, and this entity is thus powerful. On the
latter alternative (if the permanent has no such power of
past and future agency), it will never do anything, because
practical efficiency results from power only ; what at any
time does not do anything, that at that time is unable to
do it, as, for instance, a piece of stone does not produce a
germ ; and this entity while exerting its present practical
efficiency, does not exert its past and future practical
efficiency. Such is the contradiction.

You will perhaps rejoin : By assuming successive sub-

1 Principium exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria.



THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM. 17

sidiaries, there is competent to the permanent entity a
successive exertion of past and future practical efficiency.
If so, we would ask you to explain : Do the subsidiaries
assist the entity or not? If they do not, they are not
required ; for if they do nothing, they can have nothing
to do with the successive exertion. If they do assist the
thing, is this assistance (or supplementation) other than
the thing or not ? If it is other than the thing, then this
adscititious (assistance) is the cause, and the non-momen-
tary entity is not the cause : for the effect will then follow,
by concomitance and non-concomitance, the adventitious
supplementation. Thus it has been said :

" What have rain and shine to do with the soul ? Their
effect is on the skin of man ;

" If the soul were like the skin, it would be non-perma-
nent ; and if the skin were like the soul, there could
be no effect produced upon it."

Perhaps you will say: The entity produces its effect,
together with its subsidiaries. Well, then (we reply), let
the entity not give up its subsidiaries, but rather tie them
lest they fly with a rope round their neck, and so produce
the effect which it has to produce, and without forfeiting
its own proper nature. Besides (we continue), does the
additament (or supplementation) constituted by the sub-
sidiaries give rise to another additament or not ? In
either case the afore-mentioned objections will come down
upon you like a shower of stones. On the alternative
that the additament takes on another additament, you will
be embarrassed by a many-sided regress in infinitum. If
when the additament is to be generated another auxiliary
(or additament) be required, there will ensue an endless
series of such additaments : this must be confessed to be
one infinite regress. For example, let a seed be granted
to be productive when an additament is given, consisting
of a complement of objects such as water, wind, and the
like, as subsidiaries ; otherwise an additament would be
manifested without subsidiaries. Now the seed in taking

B



1 8 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

on the additament takes it on with the need of (ulterior)
subsidiaries; otherwise, as there would always be sub-
sidiaries, it would follow that a germ would always be
arising from the seed. We shall now have to add to the
seed another supplementation by subsidiaries themselves
requiring an additament. If when this additament is
given, the seed be productive only on condition of sub-
sidiaries as before, there will be established an infinite
regression of additaments to (or supplementations of) the
seed, to be afforded by the subsidiaries.

Again, we ask, does the supplementation required for
the production of the effect produce its effect independently
of the seed and the like, or does it require the seed and
the like ? On the first alternative (if the supplementation
works independently), it would ensue that the seed is in
no way a cause. On the second (if the supplementation
require the seed), the seed, or whatever it may be that is
thus required, must take on a supplementation or addita-
ment, and thus there will be over and over again an end-
less series of additaments added to the additament con-
stituted by the seed ; and thus a second infinite regression
is firmly set up.

In like manner the subsidiary which is required will
add another subsidiary to the seed, or whatever it may be
that is the subject of the additions, and thus there will be
an endless succession of additaments added to the addita-
ments to the seed which is supplemented by the sub-
sidiaries; and so a third infinite regression will add to
your embarrassment.

Now (or the other grand alternative), let it be granted
that a supplementation identical with the entity (the seed,
or whatever it may be) is taken on. If so, the former
entity, that minus the supplementation, is no more, and a
new entity identical with the supplementation, and desig-
nated (in the technology of Buddhism) kurvad rtipa (or
effect-producing object), comes into being : and thus the



THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM. 19

tree of my desires (my doctrine of a universal flux) has
borne its fruit.

Practical efficiency, therefore, in the non-momentary is
inadmissible. NOT is practical efficiency possible apart
from succession in time ; for such a possibility is redargued
by the following dilemma. Is this (permanent) entity
(which you contend for) able to produce all its effects
simultaneously, or does it continue to exist after produc-
tion of effects ? On the former alternative, it will result
that the entity will produce its effects just as much at one
time as at another ; on the second alternative, the expecta-
tion of its permanency is as reasonable as expecting seed
eaten by a mouse to germinate.

That to which contrary determinations are attributed is
diverse, as heat and cold ; but this thing is determined by
contrary attributions. Such is the argumentation applied
to the cloud (to prove that it has not a permanent but a
fluxional existence). Nor is the middle term disallowable,
for possession and privation of power and impotence are
allowed in regard to the permanent (which you assert) at
different times. The concomitance and non-concomitance
already described (viz., That which can at any time do
anything does not fail to do that at that time, and What
at any time does not do anything, that at that time is
unable to do it) are affirmed (by us) to prove the existence
of such power. The negative rule is : "What at any time
is unable to produce anything, that at that time does not
produce it, as a piece of stone, for example, does not pro-
duce a germ; and this entity (the seed, or whatever it
may be), while exerting a present practical efficiency, is
incapable of past and future practical efficiencies. The
contradiction violating this rule is : What at any time
does anything, that at that time is able to do that
thing, as a complement of causes is able to produce its
effect; and this (permanent) entity exerts at time past
and time future the practical efficiencies proper to those
times.



20 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.

(To recapitulate.) Existence is restricted to the momen-
tary ; there being observed in regard to existence a nega-
tive rule, that in regard to permanent succession and
simultaneity being excluded, existence which contains
succession and simultaneity is not cognisable ; and there
being observed in regard to existence a positive rule, in
virtue of a concomitance observed (viz., that the existent
is accompanied or "pervaded" by the momentary), and
in virtue of a non-concomitance observed (viz., that the
non-momentary is accompanied or "pervaded" by the
non-existent). Therefore it has been said by Jnana-sri
" What is is momentary, as a cloud, and as these existent

things ;

" The power of existence is relative to practical efficiency,
and belongs to the ideal ;. but this power exists not
as eternal in things eternal (ether, &c.) ;
" Nor is there only one form, otherwise one thing could

do the work of another ;

" For two reasons, therefore (viz., succession and simul-
taneity), a momentary flux is congruous and re-
mains true in regard to that which we have to
prove."

Nor is it to be held, in acceptance of the hypothesis
of the Vais*eshikas and Naiyayikas, that existence is a
participation in the universal form existence ; for were
this the case, universality, particularity, and co-inhesion
(which do not participate in the universal) could have no
existence.

Nor is the ascription of existence to universality, par-
ticularity, and co-inhesion dependent on any sui generis
existence of their own ; for such an hypothesis is operose,
requiring too many sui generis existences. Moreover, the
existence of any universal is disproved by a dilemma
regarding the presence or non-presence (of the one in the
many) ; and there is not presented to us any one form
running through all the diverse momentary things, mustard-
seeds, mountains, and so forth, like the string running



THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM. 21

through the gems strung upon it. Moreover (we would
ask), is the universal omnipresent or present everywhere in
its subjicible subjects ? If it is everywhere, all things in