" Does not the smriti of Yajnavalkya say, ' Hiranyagarbha
is the promul gator of the Yoga, and no other ancient
sage ? ' how then is Patanjali the teacher thereof ? " We
reply that it was for this reason that the venerable Patan-
jali, 1 that ocean of compassion, considering how difficult
it was to grasp all the different forms of Yoga scattered up
and down in the Puranas, &c., and wishing to collect
together their essence, commenced his anusdsana, the
preposition anu implying that it was a teaching which
followed a primary revelation and was not itself the
immediate origin of the system.
Since this atha in the aphorism signifies " commence-
ment," the full meaning of the sentence comes out as
follows : " be it known that the institute for the exposi-
tion of the yoga is now commenced." In this institute
the " object-matter," as being that which is produced by
it, is yoga [or the " concentration of the mind "], with its
means and its fruit; the producing this is its inferior "end;"
supreme absorption (kaivalya) is the highest " end " of the
yoga when it is produced. The " connection " between
the institute and yoga is that of the producer and the
thing to be produced ; the " connection " between yoga
and supreme absorption is that of the means and the
end ; and this is well known from Sruti and Smriti,
as I have before shown. And it is established by the
general context that those who aim at liberation are the
duly qualified persons to hear this institute. Nor need
any one be alarmed lest a similar course should be
adopted with the opening aphorism of the Vedanta sutras,
" Now, therefore, there is a wish to know Brahman ; " and
1 He is here called phanipati, thor of the Mahdbhdshya, being re-
" lord of snakes/' Patanjali, the au- presented as a snake in mythology.
2 4 o THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
lest here, too, we should seek to establish by the general
context that all persons who aim at liberation are duly
qualified students of the Vedanta. For the word atha, as
there used, signifies " succession " [or " after "] ; and it is a
settled point that the doctrine can only be transmitted
through a regular channel to duly qualified students, and
consequently the question cannot arise as to whether any
other meaning is suggested by the context. Hence it has
been said, " When Sruti comes [as the determining autho-
rity] ' the subject-matter ' and the rest have no place." l
The full meaning of this is as follows : Where a thing is
not apprehended from the Veda itself, there the " subject-
matter" and the rest can establish the true meaning, not
otherwise ; but wherever we can attain the meaning by a
direct text, there the other modes of interpretation are
irrelevant. For when a thing is declared by a text of the
Veda which makes its meaning obvious at once, the " sub-
ject-matter " and the rest either establish a contrary con-
clusion or one not contrary. Now, in the former case, the
authority which would establish this contrary conclusion
is [by the very nature of " ruti "] already precluded from
having any force ; and in the latter it is useless. This is
all declared in Jaimini's aphorism [iii. 3, 14] ; " A definite
text, a ' sign,' the * sentence,' the ' subject-matter,' the
' relative position,' or ' the title,' when any of these come
into collision, the later in order is the weaker because its
meaning is more remote " 2 [and therefore less obvious].
It has been thus summed up
1 Cf. Sankara, Veddnta-Sut., iii. must be a liquid like ghee, since a
3, 49. ladle could not divide solid things
- This is the Mimamsd rule for like the baked flour cakes. 3.
settling the relative value of the Vdkya, "the being mentioned in
proofs that one thing is ancillary to one sentence," i.e., the context,
another. I. Sruti, "a definite text," as in the text " ' (I cut) thee for
as "let him offer with curds," where food,' thus saying, he cuts the
curds are clearly an ancillary part of branch;" here the words "(I cut)
the sacrifice. 2. Linga, " a sign," or thee for food " are ancillary to the
" the sense of the words, " as leading action of cutting ; or in the text, " I
to an inference, as in the text " he offer the welcome (oblation) to-
divides by the ladle ;" here we in- Agni," the words "the welcome
fer that the thing to be divided (oblation) to Agni," as they form
THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 241
" A text always precludes the rest ; the ' title ' is always
precluded by any of the preceding modes ;
"But whether any intervening one is precluded, or
itself precludes, depends on circumstances."
Therefore [after all this long discussion] it may be now
considered as settled that, since it has an "object," as well
as the other preliminaries, the study of the Sastra, which
teaches the Yoga, is to be commenced like that of the
Vedanta, which discusses the nature of Brahman. " But,"
it may be objected, " it is the Yoga which was said to be
the object-matter, since it is this which is to be produced,
not the Sastra." We grant that the Yoga is the principal
object, as that which is to be produced ; but since it is
produced by the Sastra, especially directed thereto, this
Sastra is the means for its production, and, as a general
rule, the agent's activity is directly concerned with the
means rather than with the end. Just as the operations
of Devadatta the woodcutter, i.e., his lifting his arm up
and down, &c., relate rather to the instrument, i.e., the
axe, than to the object, i.e., the tree, so here the speaker,
Patanjali, in his immediate action of speaking, means
the Yoga-Sastra as his primary object, while he intends
the Yoga itself in his ultimate action of "denotation."
In consequence of this distinction, the real meaning is
that the commencing the Yogasastra is that which primarily
one sentence with the words " I divine work," in connection with the
offer," are ancillary to the act of mention of the sdnndyya vessels,
offering. 4. Prakarana, " the sub- where this position proves that the
ject-matter viewed as a whole, with hymn is ancillary to the action of
an interdependence of its parts," as sprinkling those vessels. 6^ Samd-
in the darsa-purnamdsa sacrifice, khyd, " title ; " thus the Yajurveda
where the praydja ceremonies, which is called the special book for the
have no special fruit mentioned, adhvaryu priests ; hence in any rite
produce, as parts, a mystic influ- mentioned in it they are primd
ence (apiirva) which helps forward fade to be considered as the priests
that influence of the whole by which employed. The order in the aphor-
the worshippers obtain heaven, ism represents the relative weight
Here the prakarana proves them to to be attached to each ; the first,
be ancillary. 5. Sthdna (or krama), sruti, being the most important ; the
" relative position " or " order," as last, samdkhyd, the least. Cf. Jai-
the recital of the hymn Sundha- mini's Sutras, iii. 3, 14 ; Mimdmsd-
dhvam, &c., " Be ye purified for the paribJuishd, pp. 8, 9.
242 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
claims our attention ; while the " yoga," or the restraint of
the modifications of the mind, is what is to be expounded
in this Sas*tra. " But as we read in the lists of roots that
the root yuj is used in the sense of 'joining,' should not the
word yoga, its derivative, mean ' conjunction,' and not 're-
straint' ? And indeed this has been said by Yajnavalkya : l
'The conjunction of the individual and the supreme
souls is called yoga' "
This, however, is untenable, since there is no possibility
of any such action, 2 &c., in either as would produce this
conjunction of the two souls. [Nor, again, is such an
explanation needed in order to remove the opposition of
other philosophical schools]; for the notion of the con-
junction of two eternal things is opposed to the doctrines
of the Vais"eshika and Nyaya schools [and therefore they
would still oppose our theory]. And even if we accepted
the explanation in accordance with the Mi'mamsa [or
Vedanta], our Yogasastra would be rendered nugatory by
this concession [and the very ground cut from under our
feet] ; because the identity of the individual and supreme
souls being in that school something already accomplished,
it could not be regarded as something to be produced by
our Sastra. And lastly, as it is notorious that roots are
used in many different senses, the root yuj may very well
be used here in the sense of " contemplation." 3 Thus it
has been said
" Particles, prepositions, and roots these three are all
held to be of manifold meaning ; instances found in
reading are their evidence."
Therefore some authors expressly give yuj in this sense,
and insert in their lists " yuj in the sense of samddhi."
Nor does this contradict Yajnavalkya's declaration, as
the word yoga, used by him, may bear this meaning ; and
he has himself said
1 I.e., Yogi-Yd jnavalkya, the au- kriyd, which properly belongs only
thor of the Ydjnavalkya-gitd. See to the body, as the soul is drashtri.
Hall, Bibl. Index, p. 14 ; Aufrecht, 3 Scil. samddhi, or the restraining
odl. Catal., p. 87 6. the mind and senses to profound
- Karman seems here used for contemplation.
THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 243
" Samddhi is the state of identity of the individual and
supreme souls ; this abiding absolutely in Brahman
is the samddhi of the individual soul."
It has been also said by the venerable Vyasa [in his Com-
mentary on the Yoga-sutras, i. i], " Yoga is samddhi."
An objection, however, may be here raised that "the
term samddhi is used by Patanjali [in ii. 29] in the sense
of one of the eight ancillary parts 1 of the eightfold con-
centration (or yoga) ; and the whole cannot be thus itself
a part as well as a whole, since the principal and the
ancillary must be completely different from each other, as
all their attendant circumstances must be different, just as
we see in the darsaptirnamdsa sacrifices and their ancillary
rites the praydjas, and therefore samddhi cannot be the
meaning of yoga." We however reply that this objection
is incorrect ; for although the term samddhi is used for
etymological reasons 2 to express the ancillary part which
is really defined [in iii. 3] as " the contemplation which
assumes the form of the object, and is apparently devoid of
any nature of its own;" still the further use of this term to
describe the principal state is justified by the author's
wish to declare the ultimate oneness of the two states [as
the inferior ultimately merges into the superior]. Nor
can you hold that etymology alone can decide where a
word can be used ; because if so, as the word go, "a bull,"
is derived by all grammarians from the root gam, " to go,"
we ought never to use the phrase " a standing bull " [as
the two words would be contradictory], and the man
Devadatta, when going, would properly be called go, " a
bull ; " and, moreover, the Sutra, i. 2, distinctly gives us
a definite justification for employing the word in this
sense when it declares that " concentration (yoga) is the
suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle."
[The second or principal sense of samddhi will therefore
be quite distinct from the first or inferior.]
1 Soil. " forbearance, religious ob- plation, and meditation (samddki). "
servance, postures, suppression of the 2 See Bhoja, Comm. iii. 3, samifdg
breath, restraint, attention, contem- ddhiyate mano yatra sa samddhih.
244 THE SA R VA -DA RSA NA -SA NGRA HA .
" But surely if yoga is held to be the suppression of the
modifications of the thinking principle, then as these modi-
fications abide in the soul as themselves partaking of the
nature of knowledge, their suppression, or in other words
their ' destruction,' would also abide in the soul, since it is a
principle in logic that the antecedent non-existence and de-
struction abide in the same subject as the counter-entity to
these negations ; l and consequently in accordance with the
maxim, ' This newly produced character will affect the sub-
ject in which it resides,' the absolute independence of the
soul itself would be destroyed." This, however, we do not
allow; because we maintain that these various modifica-
tions which are to be hindered, 2 such as " right notion,"
" misconception," " fancy," " sleep," and " memory " (i. 6),
are attributes of the internal organ (chitta), since the power
of pure intelligence, which is unchangeable, cannot become
the site of this discriminative perception. Nor can you
object that this unchangeable nature of the intelligent
soul 3 has not been proved, since there is an argument to
establish it; for the intelligent soul must be unchange-
able from the fact that it always knows, while that
which is not always knowing is not unchangeable, as the
internal organ, &c. And so again, if this soul were sus-
ceptible of change, then, as this change would be occa-
sional, we could not predicate its always knowing these
modifications. But the true view is, that while the
intelligent soul always remains as the presiding witness,
there is another essentially pure substance 4 which abides
always the same ; and as it is this which is affected by
any given object, so it is this perceptible substance which
is reflected as a shadow on the soul, and so produces an
1 Thus, e.g., the antecedent non- 2 I read niroddhavydndm for niro-
existence and the destruction of the dhdndm.
pot are found in the two halves in 3 Chit - sakti and chiti - sakti
which the pot itself (the counter- soul.
entity to its own non-existence) re- 4 The sattva of the buddhi or the
sides by intimate relation (samavdya- internal organ.
THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 245
impression ; x and thus Soul itself is preserved in its own
proper independence, and it is maintained to be the
always knowing, and no suspicion of change alights upon
it. That object by which the understanding becomes
affected is known; that object by which it is not affected
is not known ; for the understanding is called "susceptible
of change," because it resembles the iron, as it is suscep-
tible of being affected or not by the influence or want of
influence of the object which resembles the magnet, this
influence or want of influence producing respectively
knowledge or the want of knowledge. " But inasmuch as
the understanding and the senses which spring from egoism
are all-pervading, are they not always connected witli
all objects, and thus would it not follow that there should
be a knowledge everywhere and always of all things ? "
We reply that even although we grant that they are all-
pervading, it is only where a given understanding has
certain modifications in a given body, and certain objects
are in a connection with that body, that the knowledge of
these objects only, and none other, is produced to that
understanding ; and therefore, as this limitation is abso-
lute, we hold that objects are just like magnets, and
affect the understanding just as these do iron, coming
in contact with it through the channels of the senses.
Therefore, the " modifications " belong to the understanding,
not to the soul ; and so says the Sruti, " Desire, volition,
doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness, want of firmness,
all this is only the mind." Moreover, the sage Panchasikha
declared the unchangeable nature of the intelligent soul,
" The power that enjoys is unchangeable ; " and so Pat-
anjali also (iv. 18), "The modifications of the under-
standing are always known, this arises from the un-
changeableness of the Euling Soul." The following is
the argument drawn out formally to establish the change-
1 This second substance, " mind " the image of the object on a second
or " understanding " (buddhi, chitta), looking-glass (sc. soul),
is like a looking-glass, which reflects
246 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
ableness of the understanding. The understanding is
susceptible of change because its various objects are now
known and now not known, just like the organ of hear-
ing and the other organs of sense. Now, this change is no-
toriously threefold, i.e., a change of "property," of "aspect," 1
and of " condition." When the subject, the understanding,
perceives the colour "blue," &c., there is a change of
" property" just as when the substance "gold" becomes a
bracelet, a diadem, or an armlet ; there is a change of " as-
pect" when the property becomes present, past, or future ;
and there is a change of " condition " when there is a mani-
festation or non-manifestation 2 of the perception, as of blue,
&c.; or, in the case of gold, the [relative] newness or oldness
[at two different moments] would be its change of condi-
tion. These three kinds of change must be traced out by
the reader for himself in different other cases. And thus
we conclude that there is nothing inconsistent in our
thesis that, since " right notion " and the other modifica-
tions are attributes of the understanding, their " suppres-
sion " will also have its site in the same organ.
[Our opponent now urges a fresh and long objection
to what we have said above.] " But if we accept your
definition that ' yoga is the suppression of the modifica-
tions of the chitta' this will apply also to ' sound sleep/
since there too we may find the suppression [or suspen-
sion] of the modifications found in kshipta, vikshipta,
mudha? &c. ; but this would be wrong, because it is im-
possible for the ' afflictions ' to be abolished so long as
those states called kshipta, &c., remain at all, and because
they only hinder the attainment of the summum bonum.
Let us examine this more closely. For the understand-
ing is called kshipta, ' restless/ when it is restless [with
1 Vrfchaspati explains lalcshana as of the lalshana-parindma. Cf. the
Tcalabhfda. Commentaries on iii. 13.
2 I take ddi as meaning asphu- 3 These are generally called the
tatva. The change of state takes five states of the thinking principle,
place between the several moments chittalhiimayas or atasthds. Cf. Com-
mentary, i. 2, 18.
THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 247
an excess of the quality rajas], as being tossed about
amidst various objects which engage it. It is called mtidha,
' blinded,' when it is possessed by the modification ' sleep '
and is sunk in a sea of darkness [owing to an excess of the
quality tamas\. It is called vikshipta, ' unrestless,' when
it is different from the first state 1 [as filled with the
quality sattvd\. We must here, however, note a distinction;,
for, in accordance with the line of the Bhagavad Gita (vi.
34), ' The mind, Krishna, is fickle, turbulent, violent,
and obstinate,' the mind, though naturally restless, may
occasionally become fixed by the transient fixedness of its
objects ; but restlessness is innate to it, or it is produced
in it by sickness, &c., or other consequences of former
actions ; as it is said [in the Yoga Sutras, i. 30], ' Sickness,
languor, doubt, carelessness, laziness, addiction to objects,
erroneous perception, failure to attain some stage, and
instability, these distractions of the mind are called
' obstacles V Here ' sickness ' means fever, &c., caused
by the want of equilibrium between the three humours ;
' languor ' is the mind's want of activity ; * doubt ' is a
sort of notion which embraces two opposite alternatives ;
' carelessness ' is a negligence of using the means for
producing meditation ; ' laziness ' is a want of exertion
from heaviness of body, speech, or mind; ' addiction to
objects ' is an attachment to objects of sense ; ' erroneous
perception' is a mistaken notion of one thing for another;
' failure to attain some stage ' is the failing for some
reason or other to arrive at the state of abstract medita-
tion ; ' instability ' is the mind's failure to continue there,
even when the state of abstract meditation has been
reached. Therefore we maintain that the suppression of
the mind's modifications cannot be laid down as the defi-
nition of yoga"
We reply, that even although we allow that, so far as
regards the three conditions of the mind called kshipta,
1 These three conditions respectively characterise men, demons, and goda.
248 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
mtidha, and vikshipta, which [as being connected with
the three qualities] are all to be avoided as faulty states,
the suppression of the modifications in these conditions is
itself something to be avoided [and so cannot be called
yoga], this does not apply to the other two conditions
called ekdgra and niruddha, which are to be pursued and
attained ; and therefore the suppression of the modifica-
tions in these two praiseworthy conditions is rightly to
be considered as yoga. Now by ekdgra we mean that
state when the mind, entirely filled with the sattva
quality, is devoted to the one object of meditation ; and
by niruddha we mean that state when all its develop-
ments are stopped, and only their latent impressions [or
Now this samddhi, " meditation " [in the highest sense],
is twofold: "that in which there is distinct recognition"
(samprajndta), and " that in which distinct recognition
is lost" (asamprajndta) [Yoga S., i. 17, iS]. 1 The former
is defined as that meditation where the thought is intent
on its own 'object, and all the "modifications," such
as "right notion," &c., so far as they depend on external
things, are suppressed, or, according to the etymology of the
term, it is where the intellect z is thoroughly recognised
(samyak prajndyate) as distinct from Nature. It has a four-
fold division, as savitarka, savichdra, sdnanda, and sdsmita.
Now this " meditation " is a kind of "pondering" (bTidvand),
which is the taking into the mind again and again, to the
exclusion of all other objects, that which is to be pon-
dered. And that which is thus to be pondered is of two
kinds, being either Is*wara or the twenty-five principles.
And these principles also are of two kinds senseless and
not senseless. Twenty-four, including nature, intellect,
egoism, &c., are senseless; that which is not senseless is Soul.
Now among these objects which are to be pondered, when,
having taken as the object the gross elements, as earth,
1 Much of this is taken from borrowed Ballantyne's translation.
Bhoja's Commentary, and I have - Can ckitta mean " soul " here ?
THE PATANJALI-DARSANA. 249
&c., pondering is pursued in the form of an investigation
as to which is antecedent and which consequent, 1 or in
the form of a union of the word, its meaning, and the
idea which is to be produced [cf. i. 42] ; then the medita-
tion is called "argumentative" (savitarka). When, having
taken as its object something subtile, as the five subtile
elements and the internal organ, pondering is pursued in
relation to space, time, &c., then the meditation is called
" deliberative " (savichdra). When the mind, commingled
with some "passion" and " darkness," is pondered, then the
meditation is called " beatific " (sdnanda), because " good-
ness " is then predominant, which consists in the mani-
festation of joy. 2 When pondering is pursued, having as
its object the pure element of " goodness," unaffected by
even a little of " passion " or " darkness," then that medita-
tion is called " egoistical " (sdsmitd), because here personal
existence 3 only remains, since the intellectual faculty
becomes now predominant, and the quality of " goodness "
has become quite subordinate [as a mere stepping-stone to
But the " meditation, where distinct recognition is lost,"
consists in the suppression of all " modifications " whatever.
" But " [it may be asked] " was not ' concentration '
defined as the suppression of all the modifications ? How,
then, can the ' meditation where there is distinct recogni-
tion ' be included in it at all, since we still find active in
it that modification of the mind, with the quality of goodness
predominant, which views the soul and the quality of good-
ness as distinct from each other?" This, however, is un-
tenable, because we maintain that concentration is the sup-
pression of the " modifications " of the thinking power, as
especially stopping the operation of the " afflictions," the
"actions," the "fructifications," and the "stock of deserts." 4
1 I.e., as, e. g., whether the senses 3 In p. 164, line 2 infra, read
produce the elements or the elements sattdmdtra for sattva-. Bhoja well
the senses, &c. distinguishes asmitd from ahamkdra.
2 In p. 164, line 4 infra, read 4 For these see infra, and cf. Yoga
tukhaprakdsamayasya. S.,ii. 3, 12, 13.
250 THE SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA.
The "afflictions" (klesa) are well known as five, viz.,