NOTE ON P. 237, LAST LINE.
For the word vydkopa in the original here (see also p. 242, 1. 3
infra), cf. Kusumanjali, p. 6, 1. 7.
1 This probably refers to the Pan- tadhya"ya-brdhmana, p. x), but, if
chadaSi. A Calcutta Pandit told this is the same as the vivarana-
me that it referred to the Prameya- prameya-sangraha, it is by Bhara-
vivarana-sangraha (cf. Dr. Burnell's titirthavidya"ranya (see Dr. Burnell's
preface to his edition of the Deva- Cat. of Tanjore MSS. p. 88).
APPENDIX.
ON THE UPA'DHI (cf. supra, pp. 7, 8, 174, 194).
[As the upddhi or " condition " is a peculiarity of
Hindu logic which is little known in Europe, I have
added the following translation of the sections in the
Bhasha-parichchheda and the Siddhanta-muktavali, which
treat of it.]
cxxxvii. That which always accompanies the major term-
(sddhya), but does not always accompany the -middle
(hetu), is called the condition (upddhi) ; its eacamina-
tion is now set forth.
Our author now proceeds to define the upddhi or
condition, 1 which is used to stop our acquiescence in a
universal proposition as laid down by another person ;
" that which always accompanies," &c. The meaning of
this is that the so-called condition, while it invariably
1 The'upddhi is the "condition" smoke. Similarly, the alleged ar-
which must be supplied to restrict gument that "B is dark because he
a too general middle term. If the is Mitrd's son " fails, if we can estab-
middle term, as thus restricted, is lish that the dark colour of her for-
still found in the minor term, the mer offspring A depended not on
argument is valid ; if not, it fails, his being her son, but on her hap-
Thus, in " The mountain has smoke pening to have fed on vegetables
because it has fire " (which rests on instead of ghee. If we can prove
the false premiss that " all fire is ac- that she still keeps to her old diet,
companied by smoke "), we must add of course our amended middle term
"wetfuel"astheconditionof "fire;" will still prove B to be dark, but
and if the mountain has wet fuel not otherwise,
as well as fire, of course it will have"
276 APPENDIX.
accompanies that which is accepted as the major term,
does not thus invariably accompany that which our oppo-
nent puts forward as his middle term. [Thus in the false
argument, " The mountain has smoke because it has fire,"
we may advance " wet fuel," or rather " the being produced
from wet fuel," as an upddhi, since " wet fuel " is neces-
sarily found wherever smoke is, but not always where fire
is, as e.g., in a red-hot iron ball.]
" But," the opponent may suggest, " if this were true,
would it not follow that (a) in the case of the too wide
middle term in the argument, ' This [second] son of Mitra's,
whom I have not seen, must be dark because he is Mitra's
son/ we could not allege ' the being produced from feeding
on vegetables ' x as a ' condition,' inasmuch as it does not
invariably accompany a dark colour, since a dark colour
does also reside in things like [unbaked] jars, &c., which
have nothing to do with feeding on vegetables ? (6)
Again, in the argument, ' The air must be perceptible to
sense 2 because it is the site of touch,' we could not allege
the ' possessing proportionate form ' as a ' condition ; ' be-
cause perceptibility [to the internal sense] is found in the
soul, &c., and yet soul, &c., have no form [and therefore the
' possessing proportionate form ' does not invariably accom-
pany perceptibility], (c) Again, in the argument, ' Destruc-
tion is itself perishable, because it is produced/ we could
not allege as a ' condition ' the ' being included in some
positive category of existence ' 3 [destruction being a
form of non-existence, called " emergent/ 'dvam$dbhdva],
1 The Hindus think that a child's fire, are sparsavat, but by si. 27 of
dark colour comes from the mother's these air is neither pratyaksha nor
living on vegetables, while its fair r&pavat.
colour comes from her living on 3 This condition would imply that
ghee. we could only argue from this middle
2 By Bhasha-parich. si. 25, the term "the being produced "in cases of
four elements, earth, water, air, and positive existence, not non-existence.
APPENDIX. 277
inasmuch as perishability is found in antecedent non-
existence, and this certainly cannot be said to be included
in any positive category of existence."
We, however, deny this, and maintain that the true mean-
ing of the definition is simply this, that whatever fact or
mark we take to determine definitely, in reference to the
topic, the major term which our condition is invariably to
accompany, that same fact or mark must be equally taken
to determine the middle term which our said condition is
not invariably to accompany. Thus (a) the " being pro-
duced from feeding on vegetables " invariably accompanies
" a dark colour," as determined by the fact that it is Mitra's
son, whose dark colour is discussed [and this very fact is
the alleged middle term of the argument ; but the pre-
tended contradictory instance of the dark jar is not in
point, as this was not the topic discussed]. (&) Again,
" possessing proportionate form " invariably accompanies
perceptibility as determined by the fact that the thing
perceived is an external object ; while it does not in-
variably accompany the alleged middle term " the being
the site of touch," which is equally to be determined by the
fact that the thing perceived is to be an external object. 1
(c) Again, in the argument " destruction is perishable
from its being produced," the "being included in some
positive category of existence " invariably accompanies
the major term "perishable," when determined by the
attribute of being produced. [And this is the middle term
advanced; and therefore the alleged contradictory in-
stance, " antecedent non-existence," is not in point, since
nobody pretends that this is produced at all.]
But it is to be observed that there is nothing of this
kind in valid middle terms, i.e., there is nothing there
1 " Soul," of course, is not external ; but our topic was not soul but air.
278 APPENDIX.
which invariably accompanies the major term when
determined by a certain fact or mark, and does not so
accompany the middle term when similarly determined.
This is peculiar to the so-called condition. [Should the
reader object that " in each of our previous examples there
has been given a separate determining mark or attribute
which was to be found in each of the cases included under
each; how then, in the absence of some general rule,
are we to find out what this determining mark is to be in
any particular given case ? " We reply that] in the case
of any middle term which is too general, the required
general rule consists in the constant presence of one or
other of the following alternatives, viz., that the subjects
thus to be included are either (i.) the acknowledged site
of the major term, and also the site of the condition, 1 or
else (ii.) the acknowledged site of the too general middle
term, but excluding the said condition ; 2 and it will be
when the case is determined by the presence of one or
other of these alternatives that the condition will be con-
sidered as " always accompanying the major term, and not
always accompanying the middle term." 3
1 As, e.g., the mountain and though possessing the respective
Mitrd's first son in the two false middle terms " fire " and " the being
arguments, "The mountain has Mitre's offspring " do not possess the
smoke because it has fire" (when respective conditions " wet fuel " or
the fire-possessing red-hot iron ball " the mother's feeding on vege-
has no smoke), and " Mitre's first tables," nor, consequently, the
son A is dark because he is respective maj>r terms (sddhya)
Mitre's offspring " (when her second " smoke " and " dark colour."
son B is fair). These two subjects 3 This will exclude the objected
possess the respective sddhyas or case of "dark jars" in (a), as it
major terms " smoke " and " dark falls under neither of these two alter-
colour," and therefore are respec- natives ; for, though they are the
tively the subjects where the con- sites of the sddhya " dark colour,"
ditions " wet fuel " and " the they do not admit the condition
mother's feeding on vegetables " are "the feeding on vegetables," nor
to be respectively applied. the middle term " the being Mitrd's
2 As, e.g., the red-hot ball of iron son."
and Mitrd's second son ; as these,
APPENDIX. 279
cxxxviii. All true Conditions reside in the same subjects with
their major terms ; x and, their subjects being thus com-
mon, the (erring) middle term will be equally too general
in regard to the Condition and the major term. 2
cxxxix. It is in order to prove faulty generality in a
middle term that the Condition has to be employed.
The meaning of this is that it is in consequence of the
middle term being found too general in regard to the
condition, that we infer that it is too general in regard
to the major term; and hence the use of having a con-
dition at all. (a.) Thus, where the condition invariably
accompanies an unlimited 3 major term, we infer that the
middle term is too general in regard to the major term,
from the very fact that it is too general in regard to the
condition ; as, for example, in the instance " the mountain
has smoke because it has fire," where we infer that the
" fire " is too general in regard to " smoke," since it is too
general in regard to " wet fuel ; " for there is a rule that
what is too general for that which invariably accompanies
must also be too general for that which is invariably
accompanied. (6.) But where we take some fact or mark
to determine definitely the major term which the condition
is invariably to accompany,- there it is from the middle
term's being found too general in regard to the condition in
cases possessing this fact, or mark that we infer that the
middle term is equally too general in regard to the major
term. Thus in the argument, " B is dark because he is
Mitra's son," the middle term " the fact of being Mitra's
1 I.e., wherever there is fire pro- ball of iron), there the upddhi also
duced by wet fuel there is smoke, is not applicable.
The condition and the major term 3 I.e., one which requires no deter-
are " equipollent " in their extension, mining fact or mark, such as the
2 Where the hetu is found and three objected arguments required
not the sddhya (as in the red-hot in 137.
280 APPENDIX.
son " is too general in regard to the sddhya, " dark colour,"
because it is too general in regard to the upddhi, " feeding
on vegetables," as seen in the case of Mitra's second son
[Mitra's parentage being the assumed fact or mark, and
Mitra herself not having fed on vegetables previous to his
birth].
[But an objector might here interpose, " If your defini-
tion of a condition be correct, surely a pretended condi-
tion which fulfils your definition can always be found
even in the case of a valid middle term. For instance, in
the stock argument ' the mountain must have fire because
it has smoke,' we may assume as our pretended condition
'the being always found elsewhere than in the moun-
tain;' since this certainly does not always 'accompany
the middle term,' inasmuch as it is not found in the
mountain itself where the smoke is acknowledged to be ;
and yet it apparently does ' always accompany the major
term/ since in every other known case of fire we certainly
find it, and as for the present case you must remember
that the presence of fire in this mountain is the very point
in dispute." To this we reply] You never may take such
a condition as " the being always found elsewhere than in
the subject or minor term " (unless this can be proved by
some direct sense-evidence which precludes all dispute) ;
because, in the first place, you cannot produce any argu-
ment to convince your antagonist that this condition does
invariably accompany the major term [since he naturally
maintains that the present case is exactly one in point
against you] ; and, secondly, because it is self -contradictory
[as the same nugatory condition may be equally employed
to overthrow the contrary argument].
But if you can establish it by direct sense-evidence, then
the " being always found elsewhere than in the subject "
APPENDIX.
281
becomes a true condition, [and serves to render nugatory
the false argument which a disputant tries to establish].
Thus in the illusory argument " the fire must be non-hot
because it is artificial," we can have a valid condition in
" the being always found elsewhere than in fire," since we
can prove by sense-evidence that fire is hot, 1 [thus the
upddhi here is a means of overthrowing the false argu-
ment].
Where the fact of its always accompanying the major
term, &c., is disputed, there we have what is called a
disputed condition. 2 But "the being found elsewhere
than in the subject " can never be employed even as a dis-
puted condition, in accordance with the traditional rules
of logical controversy. 3
E. B. C.
1 The disputant says, " Fire must
be non-hot because it is artificial."
"Well," you rejoin, "then it must
only be an artificiality which is al-
ways found elsewhere than in fire,
i.e., one which will not answer
your purpose in trying to prove
your point." Here the proposed
upddhi "the being always found
elsewhere than in fire " answers to
the definition, as it does not always
accompany the hetu " possessing arti-
ficiality," but it does always accom-
pany the sddhya " non-hot," as fire is
proved by sense-evidence to be hot.
2 As in the argument, " The earth,
&c., must have had a maker because
they have the nature of effects,"
where the Theist disputes the Athe-
istic condition " the being produced
by one possessing a body." See
Kusumanjali, v. 2.
3 In fact, it would abolish all dis-
putation at the outset, as each
party would produce a condition
which from his own point of view
would reduce his opponent to si-
lence. In other words, a true con-
dition must be consistent with either
party's opinions.
THE END.
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