sistent with a complete subserviency to the smallest and most unworthy
of favourites. His scholarship smelt of the closet. He had no practical
judgment ; his intercourse with men was too distant and constrained for
studies of human nature ; and his estimate of the value of particular men
was grotesque and absurd. The especial qualifications of a great leader
in the circumstances in which Mr. Davis was placed would have been
strong and active common-sense, quick apprehension, knowledge of men,
and a disposition to consult the aggregate wisdom of the people, and to
gather the store of judgment from every possible source of practical
advice within its reach. Mr. Davis had none of these plain qualities.
He had, instead of these, certain elegant and brilliant accomplishments,
which dazzled the multitude, confused the world in its judgment of hia
merits, smd gave him a singular reputation, in which admirers and censora
were strangely mingled : one party, looking at a distance, extravagant in
its praise, the other, having a nearer view, unlimited in its condemnation.
* See Appendix.
92 THE LOST CAUSE.
But we must reserve a fuller estimate of President Davis' character for
other periods in our narrative. While the formidable events we liave
just been relating ā that of the secession of seven Southern States, and
their erection of a new government ā were taking place, there were on
foot measures of paciiication, to which attention nmst be given as well as
to measures of hostility. These measures looking towards peace involve
the action of the Congress of the United States ; the action of States
outside of Congress ; and certain strange proceedings on the part of the
Federal Executive, wliicli were undoubtedly influential in determining
the question of peace or war.
In the early part of the session of the United States Congress, a hope
of pacification had been generally indulged by the country, and was
largely shared by some of the Southern members. Even after the seces-
sion of South Carolina, Southern members, who made violent Disunion
speeches on the floor of Congress, yet entertained in their private conver-
sation a j)i'ospect of adjustment, and confidentially advised their constitu-
ents not to sell their city lots in Washington, or dispose of their property
interests in the Northern States. But as the session progressed it became
evident that no concessions were to be expected from Congress ; that the
temper of the Eepublicau party was unyielding and insolent ; that it was
not impressed with any serious danger, and even in the event of a crisis,
was confident of subduing the South with such expedition and decision
as to make an issue of arms rather to be desired than otherwise. Indeed,
the ultimatum of the Bepublican party was distinctly enough announced
in resolutions off'ered by Mr. Clarke of New Hampshire, which passed
both houses of Congress. These resolutions declared that the provisions of
the Constitution were already ample enough for any emergencies ; that it
was to be obeyed rather than amended ; and that an extrication from
present dangers "was to be looked for in strenuous eflforts to preserve the
peace, protect the public property, and enforce the laws, rather than in
new guaranties for peculiar interests, compromises for particular difiiculties,
or concessions to unreasonable demands. Under this surface of smooth
words, the proposition was plain that the demands of the South were
unreasonable, and not to be allowed, and were to be resisted to the
extremities of coercion and war.
Committees in both houses had been appointed to consider the state
of the Union. Neither committee was able to agree upon any mode of
settlement of the pending issue between the North and the South. The
Republican members in both committees rejected propositions acknowl-
edging the right of property in slaves, or recommending the division of
the Territories between the slaveholding and non-slaveholding States by
a geographical line.
On the 18th of December, 1860, Mr. Crittenden of Kentucky had
J
THE CKITTENDEN COMPKOMISE. 93
ntroduced in tlie Senate a series of resolutions wliich contained a plan
)f compromise, wLiicli it was long hoped would be effected, and wliicli for
nontbs continued a topic of discussion in Congress. The features of this
jlan may be briefly indicated. It sought to incorporate into the Consti-
;ution the following propositions :
1. That south of a certain geographical parallel of latitude. Congress,
)r a Territorial Legislature, shall have no power to abolish, modify, or in
my w ay interfere with slavery in the Territories.
2. That Congress shall have no power to abolish slavery in the
[)isiriot of Columbia ;
8. Or in the forts, arsenals, dock-yards, or wherever else the Federal
government has exclusive jurisdiction.
4. That in case of the failure to arrest any alleged " fugitive from
ervice," from violence to the officer of the law, or iutimidation of his
Luthority, the community where such faikire took place shall be compelled
o j)ay the value of such alleged fugitive to the owner thereof, and may
)e prosecuted for that purpose and to that effect.
The fate of this measure was significant enough of the views and tem-
)er of the Republican party, if any additional evidence of these had been
leeded. In the Senate it was voted against by every Eepublican senator;
md ao-ain, every Republican in that body voted to substitute for Mr. Crit-
enden's propositions the resolutions of Mr. Clarke, to which reference has
Jready been made.
In the House, certain propositions moved by Mr. Etheridge, which
vere even less favourable to the South than Mr. Crittenden's, were not
iven entertained, on a vote of yeas and nays ; and a resolution giving a
)ledge to sustain the President in the use of force against seceding States
vas adopted by a large inajority.
It is remarkable that of all the compromises proposed in this Congress
or preserving the peace of the country, none came from Northern men ;
hey came from the South, and were defeated by the JSTorth ! The " Crit-
enden Compromise" (for a geographical limit within wliich to tolerate^ not
istablish slavery in the Territories) was, as we have seen, the princi])al fea-
ure of these pacific negotiations ; it was considered fully capable to recon-
truct the Union ; it had even the adhesion or countenance of such influ-
intial leaders of Secession as Toombs, of Georgia, and Jefferson Davis, the
uture President of the Southern Confederacy ; it constituted under the
:ircumstances the only possible existing hope of saving the Union. But,
mfortunately for the peace of the country, the North deliberately de
eated it.
While the door of Congress w^as thus closed to peace, there was outside
>f it a remarkable effort at conciliation, which testified to the popular
mxiety on the subject. TRe action of the States w\as invoked. Commis-
94 THE LOST CAUSE.
sioners from twenty States, composing a " Peace Conference," held at the
request of the Legislature of Virginia, met in Washington on the 4:th of
February, and adjourned February 27th. All the Border Slave States
were represented. Most of the delegates from these States were willing to
accept the few and feeble guaranties of the Crittenden proposition. The
ultimate result was the recommendation of a project to Congress which, in
detail, was less favourable to the South than that contained in Mr. Critten-
den's resolutions, but generally identical with it in respect of running a
geographical line between the slaveholding and non-slaveholding territo-
ries, and enforcing the provisions of the Fugitive Slave Law, One cm-ious
additional feature was that no territory slioidd in the future be acquired
by the United States, without the concurrence of the Senators from the
Southern States and those from the Northern States. But it is useless to
go into the details of the rejDort of the Peace Commissioners ; for it never
received any steady or respectful consideration in either house of Con-
gress. In the Senate it was summarily voted down by a vote of twenty-
eight to seven ; and the House, on a call of yeas and nays, actually refused
to receive it.
There w^as an evident disposition on the part of the so-called Border
Slave States to avoid a decisive step. To this hesitation" the North gave
a significance which it did not really possess. It is true that Tennessee
and North Carolina decided against calling a State Convention ; but this
action implied simply that they were awaiting the results of the peace
propositions to which they had committed themselves. The State of Vir-
ginia, which had distinguished herself by a conspicuous eflbrt to save the
Union ā for it was on the unanimous invitation of her Legislature that the
Peace Conference had been assembled ā had called a State Convention in
the month of January. It was elected on the 4th of February ; and the
Northern party found singular gratification in the circumstance that a
majority of Union men was. returned to an assembly so critical.
There is no doubt the Convention of Virginia was sincerely anxious by
every means in its power to restore the Union. But the party in favour
of secession was steadily strengthening in view of the obstinate front
presented by the Black Republican party in Congress. Delegates
who "had been returned as Union men, were afterwards instructed to
vote otherwise. Petersburg, Culpepper, Cumberland, Prince Edward,
Botetourt, Wythe, and many other towns and counties, held meetings and
urged prompt secession. The action of the Federal authorities was daily
becoming more irritating and alarming. A garrison was thrown into Fort
Washington on the Potomac ; and it was observed that guns were being
mounted on the parapet of Fortress Monroe, and turned inland upon the
very bosom of Virginia.
However Virginia might have lingered, in the hope that the breach
i
\
VIRGINIA AN ADVOCATE OF STATE RIGHTS. 95
tLat liad taken place in the Union might be repaired by new constitu-
tional guaranties, there could be no doubt, in view of her record in the
past, that whenever the issue of war was made, whenever the coercion of
the seceded States should be attempted, she would then be on the side of
Southern Independence, prompt to risk all consequences. The Federal
government could not have been blind to this ; for the precedents of the
State were well known. The Kesolutions of '98 and '99, originated by
Mr. Jefferson, constituted the text-book of State-Rights, and vindicated
and maintained the right and duty of States suffering grievances from un-
just and unconstitutional Federal legislation, to judge of the wrong aa
well as of " the mode and measure of redress." At every period of con-
troversy between Federal and State authority, the voice of Virginia was
the first to be heard in behalf of State Rights. In 1832-33, the Governor
of Virginia, John Floyd, the elder, had declared that Federal troops should
not pass the banks of the Potomac to coerce South Carolina into obedience
to the tariff laws, unless over his dead body ; and a majority of the Legisla-
ture of Virginia had then indicated their recognition of the right of a State
to secede from the Union. At every stage of the agitation of the slavery
question in Congress and in the Iforthern States, Virginia declared her
sentiments, and entered upon her legislative records declarations that she
would resist the aggressive spirit of the ISTorthem majority, even to the
disruption of the ties that bound her to the Union. In 1848, she had
resolved, in legislative council, that she would not submit to the passage
of the Wilmot proviso, or any kindred measure. From the date of the
organization of the Anti-Slavery party, her people, of all parties, had
declared that the election of an abolitionist to the Presidency would be a
virtual declaration of war against the South. The Legislature that assem-
bled a few weeks after Mr. Lincoln's election, declared, in effect, with only
four dissenting voices, that the interests of Virginia were thoroughly iden-
tified with those of the other Southern States, and that any intimation
from any source, that her people were looking to any combination in the
last resort other than union with them, was unpatriotic and treasonable. ā
In view of a record so plain and explicit, it was madness to suppose that
the Convention of 1861 entertained any desire to cling to the Union other
than by constitutional guaranties, or that Virginia would hesitate for a
moment to separate from that Union whenever it should actually under-
take to subjugate her sister States of the South.
We have seen that there was but little prospect of j^eace in the pro-
ceedings of Congress, or in the action of the people, outside of Congress,
througli the forms of State authority. The conduct of the Federal Execu-
tive afforded no better prospect ; indeed, instead of being negative in its
results, it did much to vex the country and to provoke hostility.
The policy of Mr. Buchanan was unfortunately weak and hesitating ā ā
96 THE LOST CAUSE.
au attempt at ambidexteritj, in whicli he equally failed to conciliate the
Secessionists and -paeity their designs, or to make any resolute effort to
save the Union. He had, in his message to Congress, denounced secession
as revolutionary ; and although he was clear in the constitutional proposi-
tion that there was no right of " coercion " on the part of the Federal
Government, yet he did but little, and that irresolutely, to put that Gov-
ernment in a state of defence, in the event of violence on the part of the
seceded States, This timid old man ā a cautious, secretive politician, who
never felt the warmth of an emotion, and had been bred in the harsh
school of political selfishness ā attempted to stand between two parties ;
and the result was embarrassment, double-dealing, weak and despicable
querulousness, and, finally, the condemnation and contempt of each of the
parties bet^veen whom he attempted to distribute his favours.
It is true that Mr. Buchanan was over-censured by the ISTorth for his
failure to reinforce the garrisons of the Southern forts. When Gen. Scott.
on the 15th of December, "1860, recommended that nine Federal fortifica-
tions in the Southern States should be effectively garrisoned, there were
only five companies of Federal troops within his reach ; and he could
only have intended in proposing such an impracticable measure to make
a certain reputation rather as a politician than as a general. Again, when,
six weeks later, Gen. Scott renewed this recommendation, the fact was
that the whole force at his command consisted of six hundred recruits,
obtained since the date of his first recommendation, in addition to the
five regular companies. The army of the United States was still out of
reach on the remote frontiers ; and Gen. Scott must have known that it
would be impossible to withdraw it during mid-winter in time for this
military operation.
But w^iile Mr. Buchanan's course m refusing to distribute a thousand
men among the numerous forts in the Cotton States, as well as Fortress
Monroe, is, in a measure, defensible against Northern criticism, for such
a proceeding would have been an exhibition of weakness instead of
strength, and, at the time, a dangerous provocation to the seceded States,
yet, in this same matter, he was about to commit an act of perfidy, for
which there can be neither excuse nor disguise. He had refused to re-
inforce Fort Moultrie in Charleston Harbour, for the reason that it might
provoke and alarm the Secession party, and disturb the movements in
Congress and in the country then lookhig towards peace. But, for the
same reason, he gave the distinct and solemn pledge tliat he would permit
the military status quo in Charleston Harbour to remain unless South
Carolina herself should attempt to disturb it. Ko language could be more
explicit than that in which this pledge was conveyed.
The official instructions made on the 11th of December to Major
Anderson, then in command of Fort Moultrie, ran as follows :
rKESEDENT BUCHANAJSt's PERFIDY. 97
'' Toil are aware of tlie great anxiety of the Secretary of War tliat a
collision of the troops with the people of the State shall be avoided, and
of his studied determination to pursue a course with reference to the mili-
tary force and forts in this harbour, which shall guard against such a
collision. He has, therefore, carefully abstained from increasing the force
at tliis point, or taking any measures which might add to the present
excited state of the public mind, or which Avould throw any doubt on the
confidence he feels that South Carolina will not attempt by violence to
obtain possession of the public works or interfere with their occupancy.
The smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more
than one of the throe forts, but an attach on or attempt to tahe possession
of either one of them xoill he regarded as an act of hostility^ and you may
then put your conmiand into either of them which you may deem most
proper to increase its power of resistance."
On the day previous to the date of these instructions, the South Caro-
lina delegation had called on the President ; the distinct object of their
visit being to consult with him as to the best means of avoiding a hostile
collision between their State and the Federal Government. At the in-
stance of Mr. Buchanan, their communication was put in writing, and
they presented him the following note :
" In compliance with our statement to you yesterday, we now express to you our
strong conviction that neither the constituted authorities, nor any hody of the people of
the State of South Carolina, will either attack or molest the United States forts in the
harbour of Charleston, previously to the action of the convention ; and we hope and
believe not until an oifer has been made through an accredited representative to negoti-
ate for an amicable arrangement of all matters between the State and Federal Govern-
ment, provided that no reinforcements be sent into these forts, and their relative military
status shall remain as at present.''''
Yet we have seen how this military status was disturbed by Major
Anderson's removal to Fort Sumter, an act which greatly strengthened
his position, which put him from an untenable post into what was then
supposed to be an impregnable defence, which changed the status, quite as
much so as an accession of numerical force, and which, to the State of
South Carolina, could have none other than a hostile significance. Mr.
Buchanan was reminded of his pledge, and nsked to order Major Anderson
back to Fort Moultrie. He refused to do so. Mr. Floyd, of Virginia, the
Secretary of "War, in view of the President's violation of faith, and the
atempt to make him a party to it, withdrew from the cabinet in a high
state of indignation ; and thus was accomplished the first act of Mr. Bu-
chanan's perfidy on the eve of war.
The second was soon to follow. After determining not to order Ander-
son l)ack to Fort Moullrie, President Buchanan determined to take
7
98 THE LOST TAUSE.
another stej^ ā actually to send troops to Sumter. Under liis iirection the
"War Department chartered a steamer called the " Star of the West,"
which sailed from New York on the 5tli of January, 1861, having on
board two hundred and fifty soldiers, besides stores and munitions of war.
A specious plea was originated for this expedition, and it was declared
that its purpose was to provision a " starving garrison." When the vessel
appeared off Charleston Harbour, on the 9tli of January, heading in from
the sea, and taking the channel for Sumter, a battery at Poi}it Cumminga
on Morris Island opened upon her at long range. Not daring to penetrate
the fire, the Star of the West ran out to sea with all speed ; and the
soldiers on board of her were subsequently disembarked at their former
quarters on Governour's Island.
When the result of this expedition was known, Mr. Buchanan affected
surprise and indignation at the reception given the Federal reinforce-
ments, and declared that the expedition had been ordered with the con-
currence of his Cabinet. Mr. Jacob Thompson of Mississippi, who yet
remained in the Cabinet, repelled the slander, denounced the movement
as underhanded, and as a breach not only of good faith towards South
Carolina, but as one of personal confidence between the President and
himself, and left the Cabinet with expressions of indignation and con-
tempt.
Mr. Buchanan's administration terminated with results alike fearful to
the country and dishonourable to himself. He retired from office, after
having widened the breach between North and South, and given new
cause of exasperation in the contest ; obtaining the execrations of both
parties ; and going down to history with the brand of perfidy. When he
ceased to be President on the 4th of March, 1861, seven Southern States
were out of the Union ; they had erected a new government ; they had
secured every Federal fort within their limits with two exceptions ā
Sumter and Pickens ; they had gathered not only munitions of war, but
had obtained great additions in moral power ; and although they still
deplored a war between the two sections as " a policy detrimental to the
civilized world," they had openly and rapidly prepared for it. Fort
Moultrie and Castle Pinckney had been occupied by the South Carolina
troops ; Fort Pulaski, the defence of the Savannah, had been taken ; the
Arsenal at Mount Vernon, Alabama, with twenty thousand stand of arms,
had been seized by the Alabama troops ; Fort Morgan, in Mobile Bay,
had been taken ; Forts Jackson, St. Philip, and Pike, near New Orleans,
had been captured by the Louisiana troops ; the Pensacola Navy- Yard
and Forts Barrancas and MeRae had been taken, and the siege of Fort
Pickens commenced ; the Baton Pouge Arsenal had been surrendered to
the Louisiana troops ; the New Orleans Mint and Custom-House had been
taken ; the Little Rock Arsenal had been seized by the Arkansas troops ;
1
THE COUNTKT AWAITING THE CONFLICT. 99
and on the 18th of February, Gen. Twiggs had transferred the military
posts and public property in Texas to the State authorities.
It is remarkable that all these captures and events had been accom-
plished without the sacrifice of a single life, or the oflFusion of one drop of
blood. It was, perhaps, in view of this circumstance, that people lingered
in the fancy that there would be no war. Yet the whole country was
agitated with passion ; the frown of war was already visible ; and it
needed but some Cadmus to throw the stone that would be the signal of
combat between the armed men sprung from the dragon's teeth.
CHAPTER yi.
CHAEAOTKR OF ABEAHAM LINCOLN IN HISTOET. ā ABSTTRD PANEGYEIO. ā THE PERSONAL AND
POLITICAL LIFE OF THE NEW PRESIDENT. ā HIS JOURNEY TO WASHINGTON. ā HIS SPEECH
AT PHILADELPHIA. ā THE FLIGHT FROM HAERISBURG. ā ALARM IN WASHINGTON. ā MILI-
TARY DISPLAY IN THE CAPITAL. ā CEREMONY OF INAUGURATION. ā CRITICISM OF LINCOLN'S
ADDRESS. ā WHAT THE REPUBLICAN PARTY THOUGHT OF IT. ā SERIOUS PAUSE AT WASH-
INGTON. ā STATEMENT OF HORACE GREELEY. ā ^HOW THE INAUGURAL ADDRESS WAS RE-
CEIVED IN THE SECEDED STATES. ā VISIT OF CONFEDERATE COMMISSIONERS TO WASHING-
TON. ā SEWARd's PLEDGE TO JUDGE CAMPBELL. ā THE COMMISSIONERS DECEIVED. ā MILI-
TARY AND NAVAL EXPEDITIONS FROM NEW YORK. ā CONSULTATION OF THE CABINET ON
THE SUMTER QUESTION. ā CAPT. FOX's VISIT TO CHARLESTON. ā HIS PROJECT. ā OBJECTIONS
OF GEN. SCOTT. ā SINGULAR ARTICLE IN A NEW YORK JOURNAL. ā LINCOLN'S HESITATION.
ā HIS FINAL DEVICE. ā SEWARd's GAME WITH THE COMMISSIONERS. ā ^THE REDUCTION
OF FORT SUMTER. ā DESCRIPTION OF THE CONFEDERATE WORKS FOR THE REDUCTION
OF SUMTER. ā BEAUREGARD DEMANDS THE SURRENDER OF THE FORT. ā THE BOMBARD-
MENT. ā THE FORT ON FIRE. ā THE FEDERAL FLEET TAKES NO PART IN THE FIGHT. ā THE
SURRENDER. ā GREAT EXCITEMENT IN THE NORTH. ā ITS TRUE MEANING. ā THE CRUSADE
AGAINST THE SOUTH. ā DR. TYNG's EXHORTATION. ā CONDUCT OF NORTHERN DEMOCRATS.
ā DICKINSON, EVEEETT, AND COCHRANE. ā PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S PROCLAMATION. ā HIS
PACIFIC PROTESTS TO THE VIRGINIA COJIMISSIONERS. ā SECESSION OF VIRGINIA. ā DIS-
CONTENT IN THE WESTERN COUNTIES. ā SECOND SECESSIONARY MOVEMENT OF THE SOUTH-
ERN STATES. ā VIOLENT ACTS OF THE WASHINGTON ADMINISTRATION. ā PREPARATIONS OF
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT FOR WAR. ā RUSH OF VOLUNTEERS TO ARMS. ā PRESIDENT
DAVIs' ESTIMATE OF THE MILITARY NECESSITY. ā REMOVAL OF THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT