the counnon heap of destruction ; they dashed down the hill in heedless
and headlong confusion ; the main passage of retreat was choked ; and for
miles the panic spread, flying teams and wagons confusing and dismem-
bering every corps, while hosts of troops, all detached from their regi-
ments, were mingled in one disorderly rout. Yehicles tumbled against
each other ; riderless horses gallopped at random ; the roar of the flight
M-as heard for miles through clouds of dust ; and as the black volume of
fugitives became denser, new terrours would seize it, which called for
agonizing efi:brts at extrication, in wliich horses trampled on men, and
great wheels of artillery crushed out the lives of those who fell beneath
150 THE LOST CAUSE.
It was not only at Cob Kun bridge that the retreat had been choked.
Fugitive thousands rushed across Bull Run bj the various fords, and
horse, foot, artillery, wagons, and ambulances were entangled in inextri-
cable confusion. Clouds of smoke and dust marked the roads of retreat,
and rolled over the dark green landscape in the distance. Where the
roads were blocked, some of the troops took to the fields and woods, throw-
ing away their arms and accoutrements ; and from the black mass of the
rout might be seen now and then a darting line of figures in Avhich panic-
stricken men and riderless horses separated from the larger bodies, and
fled wildly through the country. Even the sick and wounded were
dragged from ambulances ; red-legged Zouaves took their places ; men
in uniform mounted horses cut out of carts and wagons. Never was there
such a heterogeneous crowd on a race-course. Soldiers, in every style of
costume ; ladies, who luia come with opera-glasses to survey the battle ;
members of Congress and governors of States, Mdio had come with cham-
pagne and after-dinner speeches to celebrate a Federal victory ; editors,
special correspondents, telegraph operators, surgeons, paymasters, parsons
ā all were running for dear life ā disordered, dusty, powder-blackened,
screaming or breathless in the almost mortal agonies of terrour.
For three miles stretched this terrible diorama of rout and confusion,
actually without the pursuit or pressure of any enemy upon it ! The Con-
federates had not attempted an active pursuit. The only demonstration
of the kind consisted of a dash by a few of Stuart's and Beckham's cav-
alry, in the first stages of the retreat, and a few discharges of artillery at
Centreville, where the Confederates had taken a gun in position. The cry
of " cavalry " was raised, when not a Confederate horseman was within
miles of the panic-stricken fugitives, who did not abate their mad strug-.
gle to escape from themselves, or cease their screams of rage and fright,
even after they had passed Centreville, and were heading for the waters
of the distant Potomac.
Over this route of retreat, now thronged with scenes of horrour, there
had passed in the morning of the same day a grand army, flushed with the
hopes of victory, with unstained banners in the wind, and with gay trap-
pings and bright bayonets glistening through the green forests of Vir-
ginia. A few hours later, and it returns an indescribable rout ā a shape-
less, morbid mass of bones, sinews, wood and iron, throwing off here and
there its nebula of fugitives, or choking roads, bridges, and every avenue
of retreat ; halting, struggling, and thrilling with convulsions at each beat
of artillery that sounded in the far distance, and told to the calm mind
that the Confederates had rested on their victory.
It was not until the sight of the Potomac greeted the fugitives that
their terrours were at all moderated. Even then they were not fully
assured of safety, or entirely dispossessed of panic. At Alexandria, the
THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 151
rusli of troops upon tlie decks of the river boats nearly snnk them. At
Washington the raih'oad depot had to be put under strong guard to keep
off the fugitives, who struggled to get on the Northern trains. They were
yet anxious to put a greater distance between themselves and the terrible
army, whoso vanguard, flushed with victory and intent upon planting its
flag on the iS^orthern capitol, they aready imagined on the banks of the
Potomac, within sight of their prize, and within reacli of their revenge.
But the Confederates did not advance. The victorious army did not
move out of the defensive lines of Bull Kun. It is true, that within the
limits of the battle-field, they had accomplished a great success and accu-
mulated the visible fruits of a brilliant victory. They had not only de-
feated the Grand Army of the JSTorth, but they had dispersed and demoral-
ized it to such an extent, as to put it, as it were, out of existence. "With
an entire loss in killed and wounded of 1,852 men, they had inflicted a loss
upon the enemy which Gen. Beauregard estimated at 4,500, in killed,
wounded, and prisoners ; they had taken twenty-eight pieces of artillery
and live thousand small arms ; and they had captured nearly all of the
enemy's colours. But the Confederates showed no capacity to understand
the extent of their fortunes, or to use the unparalleled opportunlies they
had so bravely won. At any time within two ^veeks after the battle,
Washington might have fallen into their hands, and been taken almost aa
an unresisting prey. Patterson had only ten thousand men before the
battle. His army, like the greater part of McDowell's, was composed of
three months' men, who refused to re-enlist, and left for their homes in
thousands. The formidable hosts that had been assembled at Washington
were fast melting away, some slain, many wounded, more by desertion,
and yet more by the ending of their terms of enlistment and their persist-
ent refusal to re-enter the service. On the Maryland side, Washington
was then very inadequately defended by fortifications. The Potomac was
fordable above Washington, and a way open to Georgetown heights,
along which an army might have advanced without a pros23ect of success-
ful resistance. It needed but a marcb of little more than twenty miles to
crown the victory of Manassas witli the glorious prize of the enemy's
But the South was to have its first and severest lesson of lost oppor-
tunity. Por months its victorious and largest army was to remain inac-
tive, pluming itself on past success, and giving to the North not only time
to repair its loss, but to put nearly half a million of new men in the field,
to fit out four extensive armadas, to open new theatres of the war, to per-
fect its " Anaconda Plan," and to surround the Confederacy with armies
and navies whose operations extended from the Atlantic border to the
western tributaries of the Mississippi.
thk "v.-otory of manassas, a misfoetttife for the confederates. ā relaxation in eioh-
mond. ā plotting among confederate leaders for the presidential succession. ā
Beauregard's political letter. ā active and elastic spirit of the north. ā reso-
lution OF THE federal CONGRESS. ā ENERGY OF THE WASHINGTON ADMINISTRATION. ā
ITS IMMENSE PREPARATIONS FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR. niE MISSOURI CAM-
PAIGN. ā THE POLITICS OF MISSOURI. ā STERLING PRICE AND HIS PARTY. ā IMPRUDENCE
AND VIOLENCE OF THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES IN MISSOURI. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN
GENS. PRICE AND HARNEY. ā GOV. JACKSON's PROCLAMATION. ā MILITARY CONDITION OF
MISSOURI. ā HER HEROIC CHOICE. ā AFFAIR AT BOONEVILLE. ā COMPOSITION OF THE PATRIOT
ARMY OF MISSOURI. ā ENGAGEMENT AT CARTHAGE. ā CONFEDERATE EEINT0ECEMENT3
UNDER MCCULLOCH. ā DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN PRICE AND MCCULLOCH. ā NOBLE CONDUCT
OF PRICE. THE BATTLE OF OAK HILL. MCCULLOCH SURPRISED. A FIERCE FIGHT.
DEATH OF GEN. LYON. THE FEDERALS DEFEATED. ā WITHDRAWAL OF MCCULLOCH's
forces into arkansas. ā operations in northern missouri. ā fremont in command
of the federal forces in missouri. ā his proclamation emancipating the slaves.
ā its novelty and brutality. ā repudiated at washington. ā the siege of lexing-
ton. ā its surrender to price. ā gallantry of col. mulligan. ā critical position
of price. ā his disappointment of confederate succour. his adroit retreat.
Missouri's ordinance of secession. ā fremont superseded. ā three military mes-
sengers IN pursuit of him. ā excitement in his camp. ā PRICE AT SPRINGFIELD. ā CLOSE
OF THE FIRST CAMPAIGN IN MISSOURI. ā THE CAMPAIGN, A CHAPTER OF WONDERS. ā MIS-
SOURI MANHOOD. ā THE WESTERN VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. ā RESOURCES AND WEALTH OF THB
WESTERN SECTION OF VIRGINIA, ā WISE's COMMAND. ā THE ENEMY IN THE KANAWHA
VALLEY. ā wise's RETREAT TO LEWISBURG. ā THE FLOYD BRIGADE. ADVANCE OF THE
JOINT FORCES TOWARDS THE GAULEY. ā THE AFFAIR AT CROSS LANES. ā MOVEMENT OF
EOSEORANS. ā AFFAIR OF CARNIFAX FERRY. ā FLOYD AND WISE FALL BACK TOWARDS SEWELL
MOUNTAIN. ā AN UNFORTUNATE QUARREL OF COMMANDERS. ā OPERATIONS OF GEN. LEE IN
NORTHWESTERN VIRGINIA. ā HIS FAILURE AT CHEAT MOUNTAIN. ā COL. RUST's PART IN
THE AFFAIR. ā MOVEMENT OF LEE TO THE LINE OF LEWISBURG. ā HOW ROSECRANS ESCAPED
FROM HIM. ENGAGEMENT ON THE GREENBRIER RIVER. ā GEN. 11. E. JAOKSON's SUCCESS. ā ā
FAILURE OF THE WESTERN VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. GEN. LEe's NEW COMMAND.
The victory of Manassas proved the greatest misfortune that could
have befallen the Confederacy. It was taken by the Soutliern public as the
end of the war, or, at least, as its decisive event. Nor was this merely a
MISCONCEPTIONS OF THE SOUTH. 153
nilgar delusion. President Davis, after the battle, assured liis intimate
friends that the recognition of the Confederate States by the European
Powers was now certain. The newspapers declared that the question of
manhood between North and South was settled forever ; and the phrase
of " one Southerner equal to five Yankees " was adopted in all s}A-echos
about the war ā although the origin or rule of the precise proportion was
never clearly stated. An elaborate article in " De Bow's Review " com-
pared Manassas with the decisive battles of the w^orld, and considered that
the war would now degenerate into mere desultory affairs, preliminary to
a peace. On the whole, the unfortunate victory of Manassas was ibllowed
by a period of fancied security, and of relaxed exertions on the part of the
Southern people highly dangerous and inauspicious. The best proof of
this inactivity is to be found in the decrease of enlistments by volunteers.
There are to be found in the politics and literature of the Confederacy
at this time, some very singular indications of the exaggerated and foolish
confidence which took place upon the event of Manassas. So certain, after
this event, was supposed to be the term of Confederate existen(;e, that poli-
ticians actually commenced plotting for the Presidential succession, more
than six years distant. Mr. Hunter of Virginia about this time left Mr.
Davis' Cabinet, because it was said that he foresaw the errours and unpop-
ularity of this Administration, and was unwilling by any identiti cation
with it to damage his chances as Mr. Davis' successor in the Presi-
dential ofiice. Gen. Beauregard was already designated in some quarters
as the next Confederate President ; and the popular nominee of an honour
six years hence, wrote a weak and theatrical letter to the newspapers, dated
"Within Hearing of the Enemy's Guns," and declaring: "I am not
either a candidate, nor do I desire to be a candidate, for any civil ofiice in
the gift of the people or Executive." There was actually a controversy
between different States as to the location of the capital of a Government,
the existence of w^hich they could not understand was yet imperilled by war.
The controversy w^ent so far that the city council of Nashville, Tennessee,
approi)riated $750,000 for a residence for the Pi'esident of the Southern
Confederacy, as an inducement to remove the capital there.
It is remarkable that the statesmen of Pichmond did not observe the
singular temper of the authorities at Washington, on the news of their
defeat at Manassas. On the very day that Washington was crowded with
fugitives from the routed army, the Federal Congress legislated calmly and
patiently throughout ; and the House of Representatives, passed unani
mously the following resolution :
^^ Iiesohed, That the maintenance of the Constitution, the preservation of tlie Union,
and the enforcement of the laws, are sacred trusts which must be executed ; tliat no dis-
aster shall discourage us from the most ample performance of this hijih duty ; and that
154 THE LOST CAUSE.
we pledge to the country and the world the employment of every resource, national and
individual, for the suppression, overthrow, and punishment of rebels in arms."
"While tlio South reposed on the laurels of Manassas, the active and
elastic spirit of the North was at work to repair its fortunes. It accom-
plislied wonders. It multiplied its armies ; it huilt navies with infuriate
energy ; it recovered itself from linancial straits which distant observers
thought hopeless ; a few weeks after the battle of Manassas it negotiated
a loan of one hundred and fifty millions of dollars, at a fraction above the
legal interest of New York ; in short, its universal mind and energy were
consolidated in its war upon the South. There is no more remarkable
phenomenon in the whole history of the war than the display of fully-
awakened Northern energy in it, alike wonderful in the ingenuity of its ex-
pedients and in the concentrated force of its action. At every stage of the
war the North adojDted the best means for securing specific results. It
used the popularity of Fremont to bring an army into the Held. It com-
bined with tlie science of McClellan, Buell, and Ilalleck, such elements of
popularity as could be found in the names of Banks, Butler, and Baker.
It patronized the great ship-brokers and ship-owners of New York to create
a navy. The world was to be astonished soon to find the North more
united than ever in the prosecution of the contest, and the proportions of
the war so swollen as to cover with its armies and its navies the frontiers
of half a continent.
While these immense preparations were in progress in the North, and
while the South indulged its dreams of confidence, there was a natural
pause of large and active operations in the field. The months of summer
and early fall following the battle of Manassas are barren of any great
events in the history of the war. But within this period there occurred
two campaigns, remarkable fur other circumstances than decisive influence,
taking place on widely separated theatres, and yet much alike in their
features of discursive contest. These were the campaigns in the distant
State of Missouri and in the mountainous regions of Western Virginia.
THE MlSSOUfel CAMPAIGN.
The politics of Missouri had always been strongly Southern. As early
as 18iS-'9, when the North was evidently intent upon excluding the South
from the territory obtained in the Mexican war ā acquired principally by
the blood of Southern soldiers ā the Legislature of Missouri passed resolu-
tions affirming the rights of the States, as interpreted by Callioun, and
pledging Missouri to " co-operate with her sister States in any measure
they might adopt " against Northern encroachments. On opposition to
THE MISSOURI (JAJIPAIGN- 155
tlicse resolutions, Mr. Benton was defeated for the United States Senate ;
and they remained on the statute-book of Missouri unrepealed to the date
of the war.
In the last Presidential campaign, Missouri, under one of those appa
rent contradictions or delusions not uncommon in American politics, gave
her vote for Douglas. Thi^ result was obtained chiefly through the influ-
ence of Sterling Price, who had formerly been Governour of the State,
had previously represented her in Congress, and was a man of commanding
influence with his party.
Price and his party were strongly attached to the Union, and hoped
that it might be perpetuated with safety and honour to the Soutli. Of the
Convention called in January, 1861, not a single member was yet ready
to avow the policy of secession ; and Price himself, who had been returned
as a Union man without opposition, was elected its president.
But the Federal authorities in Missouri did not show that prudence
which the occasion called for ; they did nothing to conciliate the disposi-
tion of the Convention ; and as events marched onward, the designs of
the Washington Government were too plainly unmaslced, to leave any
doubt with the people of Missouri of the fate prepared for them.
In the city of St. Louis there had been several collisions between the
citizens and Federal soldiery ; and those anxious to keep the peace of the
State had reason to fear that these riots would be the inaugurating scenes
of revolution. On the 10th of May, 1861, Capt. (afterwards General)
Lyon of tlie Federal army, had compelled the unconditional surrender of
a brigade of Missouri militia, encamped under the State law. This high-
handed proceeding was attended by other outrages. All the arms and
ammunition in St. Louis were seized ; houses were searched ; and a line
of military posts extended around the city, gave evidence of a reign of
About this time, Sterling Price, having been commissioned by Gov.
Jackson of Missouri as major-general, proceeded to consult with Gen.
Harney, of the Federal forces, as to the best mode of " restoring peace and
good order to the people of the State, in subordination to the laws of the
General and State Governments." In view of the riotous demonstrations
at St. Louis, Price, having " full authority over the militia of the State,"
undertook, with the sanction of the Governour, to mauitain order ; and
Gen. Harney declared that he had no intention of using the military at
his connnand, to cause disturbance. Both recom.mended the citizens to
keep quiet, and attend to their ordinary occupations.
But soon after this. Gen. Ilai'ney was removed by orders from Wash-
ington. Gen. Price continued to busy himself with the duties of his com-
mand, and on the 4th of June, issued an address, in wJiich be declared tliat
the people of Missouri should exercise the right to choose their own posi-
156 THE LOST CAUSE.
tion in any contest which might be forced upon them, unaided by any
military force whatever. He referred to a report of the intention of the
Federal authorities to disarm those of the citizens of Missouri who did not
agree in opinion with the Administration at Washington, and put arms in
the hands of those who in some localities of the State were supposed to
sympathize with the views of the Federal Government ; and he added :
" The purpose of such a movement could not be misunderstood, and it
would not only be a palpable violation of the agreement referred to, and
an equally plain violation of our constitutional rights, but a gross indignity
to the citizens of this State, Avliich would be resisted to the last extremity,"
In the conclusion of his address he wrote : " The people of Missouri can-
not be forced, under the terrours of a military invasion, into a position not
of their own free choice. A million of such people as the citizens of Mis-
souri were never yet subjugated, and if attempted, let no appi-ehension be
entei'tained of the result."
On the 13th of June, 1861, Gov. Jackson issued his proclamation call-
ing for fifty thousand volunteers. Price appointed nine brigadier-generals.
These preparations were large on paper ; but the brigadiers had no actual
force at their command ; and even, if men wore not lacking, arms and
ammunition were ; and as for military training and discipline, there had
been for years no military organization, and not even a militia muster in
Missouri. It was thus poorly prepared for the contest that the State of
Missouii, separated from her confederates and alone, showed a heroism
almost unexampled in history in spurning the plea of " helplessness," and
confronting the entire power of the Korth, at a time indeed when North-
ern newspapers were declaring that she was but as a mouse under the
The lirst development of the campaign on the part of Gen. Price was
to issue orders to the several brigadiers just appointed, to organize their
forces as rapidly as j^ossible, and push them forward to Booneville and
Lexington. His ulterior design was, having collected at Lexington volun-
teers fVoni the whole region accessible to it, to march down to the extreme
southwest part of the State where subsistence was abundant ; where op-
portunity might be had to organize his army ; and where he expected to
be joined by Confederate forces from Arkansas under the command of
No serious thought was entertained of giving battle at Booneville.
About eighteen hundred Missourians were assembled in camp near there ;
and not more than one-third of them were armed. They had not a piece
of artillery ; and their small arms were generally of a very imperfect
kind, including single-barrelled shot-guns and rifles. On the 20th of June,
Gen. Lyun, with a well-appointed Federal force about three thousand
strong, debarked near Booneville. The six hundred armed Missourians,
AFFAIR AT BOONEVILLE. 157
ander command of Col. Marmaduke, were posted in loose order in a Avood
along a wheat-field not far from the water's edge. Seeing no reasonable
hope of holding his position against a column of Federals advancing with
eight pieces of artillery, Col. Marmaduke ordered his little force to retreat.
The men I'efused to obey the order ; and re(;eived the advancing enemy
with a close volley, under which more than a hundred fell killed and
wounded. But the shock of the encounter, as the enemy came on, was too
much for the thin and irregular line of these desperately brave men, and
they were soon scattered in flight. Their loss was inconsiderable ā three
men killed, and twenty-five or thirty wounded ; and they had given to
the enemy his first lesson of the com^age and adventure of the " rebel
militia " of Missouri.
After the singular affair of Booneville, Gov. Jackson, who had taken
the field, commenced to retire his small force towards Warsaw ; intending
to eff'ect a junction with Price, and to continue with him the line of march
to the southwestern angle of the State. This was efi'ected on the night of
the 3d of July ; the column from Lexington forming a junction with Jack-
son's forces in Cedar County. The plan of campaign w^as now to get as
far as possible from the line of the Missouri River, which gave facilities
for attack to the enemy, who could bring forward overwhelming numbers
before Gen. Price could possibly oi'ganize his forces in this vicinity and
throw them in fighting posture.
The very night of the junction of the two columns, an order was issued
for the report and organization of the entire force. Two thousand men
reported to Brig. -Gen. Bains, six hundred to Brig.-Gen. Slack, and about
five hundred each to Brig.-Gens. Clark and Parsons ; making an entire
force of about thirty -six hundred men. This, then, was the Patriot Army
of Missouri. It was a heterogeneous mixture of all human compounds,
and represented every condition of Western life. There were the old and
the young, the rich and poor, the high and low, the grave and gay, the
planter and labourer, the farmer and clerk, the hunter and boatman, the
merchant and woodsman. At least five hundred of these men were entirely
unarmed. Many had only the common rifle and shot-gun. None were
provided with cartridge-boxes or canteens. They had eight pieces of can-
non, but no shells, and very few solid shot or rounds of grape and canis-
ter. Rude and almost incredible devices were made to supply these
wants : trace-chains, iron-rods, hard pebbles, and smooth stones were sub-
stituted for shot ; and evidence of the effect of such rough missiles was to
be given in the next encounter wuth the enemy.
On the 4tli of July, with his motley, ill-provided, brave army. Gen.
Jackson, then in command, took up his line of march for the Southwest,
where he hoped to join McCulloch. In the mean time, however. Gen.
Sigel, with a column of Federals three thousand in number, had been sent
158 THE LOST CAUSE.
ont from St. Louis on the southwestern branch of the Pacific Kailroad to
Rolhi, and had arrived at the town of Cartilage, immediately in Jackson's
front, tlnis threatening him with battle in the conrse of a few hoin's.
About ten o'clock in the morning of the 5th of July, the Missouri ans ap-