tive was afterwards treated with true chivalric courtesy by Gen. Price,
who induced him and his wife to become his guests, and entertained them
with all the hospitality at his command.

The entire loss of the Missourians in this series of engagements was
but twenty-five killed and seventy-two w^ounded. The enemy's loss was
considerably larger, and, though never officially reported, was estimated
by their own narratives as amounting to five hundred in killed and
wounded. The visible fruits of the victory were considerable. The
Missourians captured five colonels, a hundred and nineteen other com-
missioned officers, and thirty-five hundred non-commissioned officers and
privates, five cannon, two mortars, over three thousand muskets, rifles and
carbines, about seven hundred and fifty horses, a quantity of ammunition,
and more than one hundred thousand dollars worth of commissary stores.
There was also recovered about $900,000 of coin of which the Lexington
Bank had been robbed, in accordance with Fremont's instructions, which
Gen. Price ordered to be immediately restored to its owners.

The capture of Lexington and the bold and brilliant movements of the
Missouri patriots in other parts of the State — among them the operations
in Southeastern Missouri of the partisan JeJff. Thompson and his " Swamp
Fox Brigade " — excited rage and alarm in the "Washington administration.
Gen. Fremont, who was severely censured for not having reinforced Mul-
ligan, hoped to recover his position by activity and success ; he put him-
self at the head of the army, and advanced towards Jefferson City, sending
back the promise that he would overwhelm Price. It was at this period
that Gen. Price found his position one of the greatest emergency. He
had received intelligence that the Confederate forces, under Gens. PiUow
and Hardee, had been withdrawn from the southeastern portion of the
State. Gen. McCulloch had retired to Arkansas. Gen. Price was left
with the only forces in Missouri to confront an enemy sixty thousand
strong ; he was almost entirely without ammunition : and he was beset
with other difficulties and embarrassments. A large number of his men



ABILITY OF GEN. rEICE. 167

had volunteered in haste, and hied to the camps with hardly a change of
clothir.g. Many were naturally anxious to return to their homes. The
difficulty of maintaining a wagon train sufficient to support so large an
army was seriously felt. Thus surrounded by circumstances of the most
painful and unlooked-for misfortune, Gen. Price was compelled not only to
make a retrograde movement, but, also, to disband a considerable portion
of his forces.

With his army thus dirainished. Gen. Price commenced liis retreat
about the 2Yth of September. With Sturgis on the north side of the
river, Lane on the west, and himself on the east, Fremont expected to cut
off and captm-e the entire force of the Missourians. This Price adroitly
prevented by sending out cavalry as if intending to attack each of the
enemy separately, and so covering his retreat. This retreat was executed
in a most admirable manner, and amidst numerous obstacles. The Osage
river was crossed in two flat-bottomed boats, constructed for the occasion
by the Missouri soldiers ; and then Price moved to Neosho, on the Indian
frontier of the State. Here the Legislature had assembled, and here Price
again formed a junction with McCuUoch, at the head of 5,000 men. It
was at this time the State Legislature at length passed the Ordinance of
Secession, and Gen. Price had the satisfaction of tiring a hundred guns to
celebrate the event.

From Neosho Price and McCulloch fell back to Cassvillo and Pineville,
on the southern borders of the State. At Pineville, Price made prepara-
tion to receive Fremont, determined not to abandon Missouri without a
battle. But just at this juncture news came that Fremont had been
superseded as commander of the Federal forces. His course had given
great offence at Washington ; and Attorney-General Bates had declared
that it would be " a crime " to keep him in command. It was said that
his vanity had become so insolent that he paid no regard whatever to acts
of Congress, the orders of his sujDcriours, the usages of the service, or the
rights of individuals ; and that he was surrounded by a band of contractors,
and, in partnership with them, plundered the public funds without mercy.
On such persistent representations the order at Washington was at last
given for his removal and the appointment of Gen. Hunter in his place.

Fremont had obtained intimation that such an order was on the way
from Washington. He took singular pains to prevent it from reaching
him. He had two body-guards, one of whites and one of Indians. He
gave strict orders that no one should be admitted through the inner lines
surrounding his headquarters, except by his direct orders. Notwithstanding
his precautions, one of the three military messengers sent from St. Louis,
by address and stratagem succeeded in gaining admission, and, making hia
way to Fremont's presence on the night of the 7th of November, delivered
to him the fatal missive which concluded his career.



16S THE LOST CAUSE.

This event had the effect of demoralizing the Federal forces to such an
extent that an immediate retreat was thought advisable by the acting officers
in command. The degraded General showed symptoms of rebellion. The
Dutch vare greatly attached to him ; signs of mutiny were shown by these
adherents ; for a time open revolt was threatened ; but Fremont's subor-
dinates, Sigel and Asboth, positively refused to sustain him, and the army
was ordered to retreat from Springfield. The Federals accordingly lelt
that town in the direction of RoUa, and were pursued by Gen. Price to
Osceola. From Osceola, Gen. Price fell back to Springfield, to forage his
army and obtain supplies. Both armies having thus drawn off, we may
leave here for the present the history of the Missouri campaign.

Notwithstanding the adverse termination of this campaign with respect
to the occupation of Missouri, it had alreay accomplished much ; it had
given an exhibition of spirit and resource without a parallel in equal cir-
cumstances ; and it constitutes the most remarkable and brilliant episode
of the war. It was a chapter of wonders. Price's array of ragged heroes,
had marched over eight hundred miles ; it had scarcely passed a week
without an engagement of some sort ; it was tied down to no particular
line of operations, but fought tlie enemy wherever he could be found ; and
it had provided itself with ordnance and equipments almost entirely from
the prodigal stores of the Federals. The hero of Missouri started on his
campaign without a dollar, without a wagon or team, without a cartridge,
without a bayonet-gun. When he commenced his retreat, he had about
eight thousand bayonet-guns, fifty pieces of cannon, four hundred tents,
and many other articles needful in an army, for which his men were
almost exclusively indebted to their own strong arms in battle.

This campaign was little less than a puzzle to military critics. Price
managed to subsist an army M-ithout governmental resources. He seldom
complained of want of transportation. His men were never demoralized
by hunger. They would go into the cornfield, shuck the corn, shell it,
take it to the mill, and bring it into camp, ground into meal. Or, if they
had no flour, they took the wheat from the stack, threshed it themselves,
and asked the aid of the nearest miller to reduce it to flour. Price proved
that such an army could go where they pleased in an agricultural coun-
try. His men were always cheerful. They frequently, on the eve of an
engagement, danced around their camp-fires with bare feet and in rag
costumes, of which it was declared " Billy Barlow's dress at a circus
would be decent in comparison." Price himself wore nothing on his
shoulders but a brown-linen duster ; and this and his white hair streaming
on the battle-field made him a singular figure. Despite the exposure and
hardship of this campaign, the most remarkable fact remains to be
recorded : that in its entire course not more than fifty men died from
disease.



WESTERN VIRGmiA CAMPAIGN. 169

Such a record of courage, of expedient and of endurance, has no
known parallel in the war. It settled forever the question of Missouri
manhood. It did more than this : it proved that the spirit of the native
and true population of Missouri was strongly Southern, and that it needed
aothing but organization and opportunity for its triumph.



THE WESTERN VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN.

The campaign in Western Yirginia, which was mostly cotemporary
with that of Missouri, and very similar to it in its discursive character, un-
fortunately did not partake of its brilliancy. With but little compensa-
tion, either in the prestige of arms, or in the fruits of single victories, it
surrendered to the enemy a country of more capacity and grandeur than
perhaps any other of equal limits on the American continent ; abounding
in immense forests, possessed of almost fabulous mineral resources, ofi'ering
to the manufacturer the vastest water-power in the world, and presenting
in its deposits of coal and salt, fields of inexhaustible enterj)rise and wealth.

In the month of June, Brigadier-General Wise of Virginia was sent in-
to the Kanawha Yalley ; it being supposed that by his rare and character-
istic enthusiasm he would be able to rally the people of this region to the
support of the State. He established his headquarters at Chai-leston, and
succeeded in raising a brigade of twenty-five hundred infantry, seven hun-
dred cavalry and three batteries of artillery. With subsequent i-einforce-
ments his command amounted to four thousand men. It was obvious enough
that with this small force, his situation was extremely critical. The enemy
had already landed considerable forces at Parkersburg and Point Pleasant
on the Ohio River, and was rapidly using his superiour facilities for raising
troops in the populous States of Ohio and Indiana, and his ample means
of transportation by railroad through those States and by the navigation
of the Ohio and Kanawha Pivers, to concentrate a large force in the lower
part of the Kanawha Valley.

After some desultory movements, and a brilliant affair on Scary Creek,
in Putnam County, where Col. Patton with a small force repulsed three
Federal regiments. Gen. Wise prepared to give battle to the Federal
forces, which, under the command of Gen. Cox, had been largely increased,
and which were steadily advancing up the Valley, both by land and
water. But the conflict was not to occur. A more formidable danger,
from a different direction, menaced the Confederates. The disaster at
Rich Mountain — the surrender of Pegram's force, and the retreat north-
ward of Garnett's army, had withdrawn all support from the right flank,
and, indeed, from the rear of Gen. Wise. He was in danger of being cut off*
in the rear by several roads from the northwest, striking the Kanawha road



170 THE LOST CAUSE.

at various points between Lewisburg and Gaulej Bridge. The danger
seemed to him so pressing, that he fell back immediately with his entire
force, first to Gauley Bridge and thence to Lewisburg, reaching the
latter place about the 1st of August, and after a retreat which was neces-
sarily much disordered, on account of his meagre means of transportation.

Within a few weeks after Gen. Wise fell back to Lewisburg, the Con-
federate cause in Western Yirginia received the aid of a very effective
body of men. John B. Floyd, who had been at one time Governor of
Yirginia, and afterwards Secretary of War under President Buchanan,
was commissioned a brigadier-general in the Confederate army, and had
succeeded in raising a command of three regiments of infantry and a bat-
talion of cavalry. This force was intended for service in Western Virginia,
and Gen. Floyd soon decided, with the approval of the War Department,
that the defence of the Kanawha Yalley was the object of first importance.
He accordingly advanced to the White Sulphur Springs, nine miles east
of Lewisburg, and held conferences with Gen. Wise. An advance towards
the Gauley was promptly determined on, but the two bodies, under their
commanders, moved at difi'erent times, and with perfectly distinct organi-
zations, though within supporting distance.

Gen. Floyd moved first, and for some days skirmished vigorously with
Cox's troops, which were in force at Gauley Bridge and in the neighbour-
hood of the "Hawk's Nest," a picturesque and majestic monument of
wooded rocks, rising a thousand feet from the river road, at a point ten
miles below the mouth of the Gauley. Gen. Wise having come up, the
joint Confederate forces now approached nearer the enemy, skirmishing
with various success. But while thus occupied, it was ascertained that
another foe threatened their flank.

Col. Tyler, commanding the Seventh Ohio Regiment, of nearly thirteen
hundred men, was approaching the Gauley River at Carnifax Ferry,
about five miles south of Summerville, in Nicholas County, and twenty-
four miles above Gauley Bridge. His movement was therefore on the
right flank of the Confederates, and had he succeeded in crossing the
river and reaching their rear, he would have cut their communications
with Lewisburg. Gen. Floyd at once determined to cross the river at
Carnifax Ferry and encounter this movement of the enemy. He at once
put his brigade in motion, taking with him a part of Wise's cavalry ; that
commander remaining with the larger body of his troops at Pickett's Mills
in Fayette County, so as to hold the turnpike, and guard against any ag-
gressive movement of Cox, which might have embarrassed that against
Tyler.

The enterprise of Gen. Floyd was thoroughly successful. Having
crossed the Gauley, he, on the morning of the 26th of August, fell upon
Tyler at a place called Cross Lanes ; defeated and dispersed his force ; and



AFFAIK AT CE08S LANES. I7l

inflicted upon liim a loss of about two hundred in killed, wounded, a/id
prisoners.

Af\er the affair of Cross Lanes, Gen. Floyd proceeded to strengthen his
position on the Gauley. Owing to an unfortunate want of concert be-
tween AV^ise and himself, these two Confederate forces in Western Virginia
were separated by a deep and rapid river ; and Floyd himself was unable
to attempt a movement against Cox. He was far from his depot of provi-
sions in Lewisburg, and being unprovided with adequate transportation, it
would have been rash to have ventured forward on the north of the river.
Knowledge of this situation of affau's was not lost upon the enemy.
Gen. Rosecrans — a name which was hereafter to become familiar on more
important theatres of the war — commanded the Federal forces between
Buckhannon and Cheat Mountain. He at once conceived the idea of over-
whelming the Confederates on both sides of the Gauley, and accordingly
moved rapidly down the road leading from Weston to Summerville, with
at least nine thousand men and several heavy batteries of artillery.

Gen. Floyd was in a bend of Gauley River, very near Carnifax Ferry.
On the 10th of September, Rosecrans, by a rapid march of sixteen miles,
threw his entire force about Floyd's entrenchments, and commenced a vig-
orous attack. The force of Floyd's command did not exceed seventeen
hundred and fifty men. But his flanks were well protected by precipices
or cliffs heavily wooded ; and from three o'clock until nightfall his centre,
protected by an imperfect earthwork, sustained an assault from an enemy
live times his numbers, made with small arms, grape, and round-shot, from
howitzers and rifled cannon. As the sun was sinking, Rosecrans ordered
a final and desperate charge. His troops pressed rapidly forward to short
musket range ; the Southern lines were wrapped in fire ; a thousand bul-
lets darted into the adverse ranks, and for a few moments the carnage was
appalling. . The Federals fell back, and returned no more to the assault.
The ground was covered with hundreds of their dead and wounded. The
Confederates had not lost a man killed and not more than twenty wounded.

During the night. Gen. Floyd crossed the river by means of two ferry-
boats and a hastily constructed bridge of logs. He had accomplished a
brilliant success in the check and lesson he had already given the enemy ;
and knowing Rosecrans' superiority of numbers, and fearing for his own
connnunications in his rear, he determined to withdraw to Wise's camp,
and unite the two commands.

It appears that when Floyd had first learned of Rosecrans' advance, ho
had despatched orders to Gen. Wise for reinforcements, and that he failed
to procure them. He wrote to the War Department at Richmond that he
could have beaten the enemy, if these reinforcements had come up when
ordered ; that if he could have commanded the services of five thousand
men, instead of eighteen hundred, which he had, he could have opened



172 THE LOST CAUSE.

the road directly into the Yalley of the Kanawha. He indicated the
urgent necessity of shaping the command in that region of conntry so as to
ensure unity of action, — the condition of success in all military operations.

In a few days Rosecrans crossed the Gauley with his army, and as the
force opposing them was superiour in numbers, Floyd and Wise fell back
deliberately towards Sewell's Mountain. New differences now developed
themselves between these two leaders, which disturbed that unity of action
so much desired. After reaching Sewell's Mountain, Gen. Floyd held a
council of his officers, and determined to fall back still further, to Meadow
Bluff, eighteen miles west of Lewisburg. Gov. "Wise followed him onl}^ as
far as the eastern slope of the mountain, where he proceeded to strengthen
his position, which he named Camp "Defiance."

At this pause in military operations in the Kanawha Valley, it will be
convenient to note the events which had occurred further ^orth in this
Western region of Virginia, and to observe the movements of the Confed-
erate army there under the command of a man whose star was to be singu-
larly obscured before it mounted the zenith of fame — Gen. Robert E. Lee.

After the retreat of Gen. Garnett from Eich Mountain, and the death
of that officer. Gen. Lee was appointed to succeed him, and, with as little
delay as possible, repaired to the scene of operations. He took with him
reinforcements, making his whole force, in conjunction with the remnant
of Gen. Garnett's army, about sixteen thousand men. The roads in this
part of the country were deep in mud and horrible with precipices. By
patience and skill. Gen. Lee advanced with his army across the Alleghany
range, and deliberately approached the enemy in Randolph County.

Rosecrans was then the ranking officer of the Federal troops in North-
western Virginia ; but Gen. Reynolds held the approaches to Beverly
with a force estimated at from ten to twelve thousand men. The larger
part of these were strongly entrenched at a point at the junction of
Tygart's Valley River and Elk Run, w^hich post was called by the Federals
" Elk Water." The remainder held the pass at the second summit of
Cheat Mountain, on the best road from Staunton to Parkersburg. The
mountain had three well-defined summits. The second presented the
greatest advantages for fortification, and here the enemy had built a pow-
erful fort or block-house in the elbow of the road, flanked by entrench-
ments of earth and logs, protected by dense abattis on every side, and
rendered inaccessible, in two directions, by the steep and rugged walls of
the mountain.

Having approached the enemy. Gen. Lee directed careful reconnois*
sauces to be made of all his positions. Col. Rust, of the 3d Arkansas Regi-
ment, made what afterwards proved to be a very imf)erfect reconnoissance of
the enemy's position on Cheat Mountain, and reported that it was perfectly
practicable to turn it and carry it by storm. Gen. Lee at once issued liia



FAILURE AT CHEAT MOUNTAIN. 173

orders for a united movement upon the forces of the enemy, both at Elk
Water and on Cheat Mountain. After great labour and the endurance of
severe hardships on the mountain spurs, where the weather was very cold,
Gen. Lee succeeded in getting below the enemy at Elk Water, placing
other portions of his forces on the spurs of the mountain immediately east
and west of the enemy, and marching another portion of his troops down
the river close to the enemy. The forces were thus arranged in position
for making an attack upon the enemy at Elk Water, and remained there
for some hours, waiting the signal from Col. Uust's attack on Cheat
Mountain.

That officer, with fifteen hundred troops, chiefly his Arkansas men, had
'N^'- turned the Cheat Summit Fort, and was now in its rear. But he saw at
^ once that his former reconnoissance had been deceptive. The fortified
V post was literally unapproachable, by reason of thick abattis of felled trees,
^ with branches and undergrowth densely interlaced, extending from the
■^ block-house nearly half a mile down the rugged sides of the mountain.
5? Col. Rust gave no signal for the advance, awaited by the forces at Elk
\ Water ; he thought his enterprise hopeless, and withdrew his troops.
iSj Gen. Lee, informed of tlie miscarriage of this part of his plan, abandoned
^ the whole of it, and retired his command without any results whatever.
^, The failure to dislodge the enemy from Cheat Mountain, and thus re

^ lieve Northwestern Virginia, was a disappointment to the Southern public,
V whose expectations had been greatly raised by vague rumours of Lee's
(J strategy and plans. It was thought, too, that this distinguished com-
mander might have realized some results of his well-matured plan, if, de-
spite of the disconcert of Rust, he had risked an attack upon the enemy's
position at Elk Water, which a portion of his forces had surrounded. But
regrets were unavailing now ; danger was imminent in another quarter.
Learning by couriers of the union of Rosecrans and Cox, and of their ad-
vance upon Wise and Floyd, Gen, Lee decided at once to reinforce the
Southern armies on the line of Lewisburg. He reached Gen. Floyd's
camp at Meadow Blufi", on the 20tli of September, and after conferring
with him for two days, joined Gen. Wise at Sewell Mountain, on the 22d.
The experienced eye of Lee saw at once that Wise's position was very
strong, and capable of aiTcsting a very heavy hostile force. He accord-
ingly ordered forward his troops to the spot, and extended the defensive
works already planned.

Meanwhile Gen. Rosecrans, with fifteen thousand men, advanced, and
took possession of the top of Big Sewell Mountain, skirmishing with the
forward troops of the Wise brigade. Gen. Lee daily expected an attack,
and was prepared for it. His force was now quite equal to that of the
enemy. He was within sight of him ; each apparently awaiting an attack
^ from the other. But the opportunity of a decisive battle in Western Yir-



174 THE LOST CAUSE.

ginia was again to be lost. On the night of the 6th of October, Rosecrans'
troops moved to the rear in the dark, and the next morning, when the
Confederates looked out from their camp, the whole of the threatening
host that had confronted them for twelve days before, was gone. Gen.
Lee made no attempt to pursue tliem. It was said that the mud, the
swollen streams, and the reduced condition of his artillery horses mado
pursuit impracticable.

But one incident of success was to occur in a campaign of so many
disappointments. When Gen. Lee withdrew from the Cheat Mountain
region, he left Gen. IL R. Jackson with twenty-five hundred men to hold
his position on the Greenbrier River. On the 3d of October, the enemy,
about four thousand strong, attacked Jackson's position. A severe artil-
lery engagement occurred, in ■which Jackson could not bring more than
five pieces in action to return the fire of the enemy's eight. Masses of in-
fantry were then thrown forward on Jackson's right and front, marching
up the wooded sides of a hill that rose from the river. The location of the
hill was such that they could not fire effectively until they crossed the
river ; and as they attempted to form and deploy, in order to a charge, the
12th Georgia Regiment fired several rapid volleys of musketry into them,
which instantly checked their advance. At the same time, Shumaker's
guns were directed to the point in the woods in which they were known
to be crowded, and completed their discomfiture by playing upon them
with destructive efiect. The regiments on the hill-side retreated rapidly,