sail, canying two hundred and eighty-six guns and tsventy-one mortars ;
the whole utider the command of Flag-othcer Farragut, The raft con-
structed by Gen. Lovell was placed about a mi4e below Forts Jackson and
St. Philip. Unfortunately, a chasm was rent in it by a severe storm ; and
on the 16th of April, the enemy slowly steamed up the stream in strong
force, and prepared to attack the forts.

Still there was no alarm in New Orleans, as it was popularly supposed
that the enemy only intended a bombardment of the forts, and would ac-
complish but little in such an enterprise. Festivity prevailed in the city.
Bails, parties, theatres, operas, and the like were the incidents of every
twenty-four hours. Thousands flocked down the river, and on the levees
viewed the bombardment with evident pleasure, for it was soon ascertained



THE FALL OF NEW ORLEANS 251

tliat the enemy's fire was inueenrate, and that few, if any, of tlieir eleven-
inch sliell ever tonehed the forts. At night, the greatest vigihmce was
maintained, to inform connnandei's of the enemy's movements. On the
23d of Ajn-il, the terrific bombardment had continued a whole week ; the
enemy liad thrown over twenty-tive thousand shells ; and Gen. Duncan
reported that two of his guns in Fort Jackson were dismounted ; half a
dozen killed and wounded was the total loss, and the works were as sound
as ever.

The evening of the 23d of April closed without unusual incident. Our
defences were thought to be impassable, and strong hopes were entertained
that Farragut would soon give up the conflict as fruitless and abortive.
Towards three o'clock on the morning of the 24th, the enemy's vessels were
descried creeping up the river in full force, and as they steamed abreast of the
forts were received with deal'ening roars from our artillery. The conflict be-
came furious. Through a storm of fire the ships passed on, Farragut lead-
ing in the Hartford. They had not proceeded far when they encountered the
Confederate fleet, consisting of seventeen vessels in all, only about eight of
which were armed. The Confederate gunboats carried, some of them, two
guns, and others only one. Nevertheless, they fought with desperation
against the enemy's overwhelming force, until they were all driven on
shore and scuttled or burned by their commanders. The Louisiana was
unmanageable, and could only use two of her nine guns ; so when it was
perceived that nothing could prevent the enemy from breaking our line,
she was run ashore, and blown up, although the enemy's broadsides liad
not injured her in the least. The Governor Moore, another of our boats,
commanded by the brave Capt. Kennon, acted nobly among the enemy's
twelve heavy sloops-of-war and gunboats, and fired its last cartridge at
point-blank range, but was also run ashore and blown up, to prevent
capture.

The scene of confusion that ensued in ISTew Orleans, when the people,
on the morning of the 24:th of April, awoke to the news that the enemy's
fleet had passed the forts, and were actually approaching the city, defies
all description. People were amazed, and could scarcely realize tlie awful
fact, and ran hither and thither in speechless astonishment. Very soon the
flames seen issuing from shipyards in Algiers and other places, convinced
them that the news was authentic, and that Government officers were then
busily engaged destroying everything that was likely to be of value to the
enemy. The unfinished Mississippi and other vessels were scuttled or
fired, ammunition destroyed, and shot sunk in the river. The jjeople, on
their part, proceeded to the various cotton-presses, rolled out thousands of
bales, and applied the torch ; countless cotton ships were also sunk or
fired, and steamboats by the dozen similarly destroyed. The roar of can-
non sounded in the distance ; the heat of the sun, and conflagrations in



252 THE LOST CAUSE.

every direction, made tlie atmosphere oppressively hot, while dense col-
umns of smoke darkened the air. It was a scene of terrible grandeur. The
baleful glare of the conflagration struggled in rivalry with the sunlight ;
masses of smoke ascended grandly to the sky ; great ships and steamers,
wrapped in fire, floated down the river, threatening the Federal vessels
with destruction by their fiery contact. And in this scene of dire and
Bublime destruction, there were perpetually tolled the alarm-bells of the
city.

Having narrowly escaped capture in the naval engagement. Gen. Lovell
rode rapidly by the Levee road, and arrived in town about two o'clock in
the afternoon. Crowds gathered round him while he related the events
of the engagement below, bearing testimony to the heroism of our little
navy of indifferent vessels, and seeming bewildered at the unexpected ca-
lamity which had befallen him. He considered it advisable for his small
force to retire without the limits of the city to avert a bombardment, and
this idea was fully endorsed by the City Council. Accordingly, late in the
day, his whole force, of not more than twenty-eight hundred efiectivc men,
departed by rail some fifteen miles above the city, with orders to keep
within easy call in case of emergency.

The evacuation of the city by Gen. Lovell's troops was the signal for a
new consternation, and another era of disorder in the city. Uproar and
confusion continued throughout the day and all night, while now and
tlien heavy guns could be heard down the river, as if the enemy was
cautiously approaching, and firing at suspicious objects. Crowds of the
poor were enjoying a rich harvest by the wholesale destruction of proper-
ty, and scores of them could be seen with baskets, and bags, and drays,
carrying off Avhatever plunder fell in their way. A low, murmuring
voice filled the air — it was the conversation of assembled thousands. Some
were for burning the city, rather than permit it to fall into the hands of
the enemy ; but the opinion prevailed that such foolish excesses should be
at once put in check, and that the city, being entirely at the mercy of the
foe, nothing should be done to provoke a bombardment.

On the morning of the 2.^th of April, Farragut's advance was observed
steaming up towards the city. When abreast of the Chalniette batteries
on both sides of the city, he was saluted with volleys from the earthworks,
but, being uninjured, ran past and cast anchor at intervals before the city,
with ports open, and every preparation made for a bombardment. Farra-
gut then opened communication with the Mayor, and demanded the sur-
render of the city, together with Lovell's forces ; but the latter were away
the city had been left under the exclusive jurisdiction of Mayor Monroe
and he avoided a formal surrender, declaring that if the enemy desired the
removal of objectionable flags floating over the public buildings of New
Orleans, he must do it by his own force.



THE FALL OF NP:W OKLEANS. 253

The correspondence touching the surrender of the city was protracted
until the 28th of April. There was a purpose in this. Tlie coniidenee of
the people had, in a measure, ralKed ; there were yet glimpses of hope. Aa
long as Forts St. Philip, Jackson, and the Chalmette batteries remained
intact, it was thought that something might be done to save the city. The
enemy's fleet had no forces with which to occupy it ; his transports were
unable to get up the river, as long as the forts held out. The enemy's land
forces, under Gen. Butler, were at Ship Island and Mississippi City. Had
he attempted to march overland upon New Orleans, the levees would have
been cut, and his men drowned in the swamps.

But the last hope was to be extinguished. While Farragut and Mayor
Monroe were exchanging angry letters of great length, the overwhelming
news reached New Orleans, that Forts St. Philip and Jackson had surren-
dered to the enemy. The surrender was made in consequence of a mutiny
of the garrisons. On examining his guns in Fort Jackson, Gen. Duncan
found many spiked, several dismounted, and not less than three hundred
men clamoring around him for a surrender. Kemonstrances, threats, and
entreaties were alike useless. In vain Gen. Duncan declared to the men
that it would be an eternal shame to give up the works, provisioned as
they were, and scarcely touched by the enemy. In vain he vowed that
the forts were impregnable. In vain he promised that he would blow up
all Butler's transports in a trice, if his men would only stand by him. The
soulless creatures who disgraced the Confederate uniform had no reply to
these arguments and appeals. Nothing would satisfy them but surrender.
Pagged, dusty, powder-blackened, and exhausted, Duncan reached New
Orleans, to tell the story of the great misfortune ; and as he narrated it on
the levee he wept, and the hundreds who listened to him were silent with
amazement and shame.

Farragut, being informed of the surrender of the forts, was now anxious
to expedite the full and formal surrender of the city, before the arriv^al of
Butler with his transports. The correspondence with the Mayor had con-
tinued through several days. On the 28th of April, Farragut addressed
his ultimatum to that officer, complaining of the continued display of the
State flag of Louisiana on the City Hall, and concluding with a threat of
the bombardment of the city, by notifying him to remove the women and
children from its limits within forty-eight hours. The flag was not re-
moved, and the threat was not fulfllled. On the 1st of May, Farragut re-
luctantly consented to send his own forces to take down the flag.

About noon, he sent on shore a party of two hundred marines "svitli two
brass howitzers, who marched througli the streets and formed before the
City Hall. The officer in command ascended to the dome of the building,
and took down the objectionable State banner — the sign of all State rights.
The act was done in profound silence ; there were no idle utterances of



254 THE LOST CAUSE.

curiosity ; indignation was impotent, and men with compressed lips and
darkened brows witnessed the first ceremony of their humiliation, and saw
erected above them the emblem of tyrannical oppression. A speechless
crowd of many thousands thronged the streets ; a line of bayonets glis-
tened within the square ; the marines stood statue-like ; the very air was
oppressive with stillness ; and so, in dead silence, the Stars and Stripes
were hoisted over New Orleans, and the city passed forever from tlie rule
and power of the Confederates.

Thus, after an engagement the casualties of which might be counted by
liundreds, fell New Orleans, with its population of one hundred and seven-
ty thousand souls — the commercial capital of the South, and the largest
exporting city in the world. It was a terrible disaster to the Confederacy.
The fall of Donelson broke our centre in the West. The fall of New Ot-
leans yet more sorely punished the vanity of the Confederates ; annihi-
lated their power in Louisiana ; broke up their routes to Texas and the
Gulf ; closed their access to the richest grain and cattle country in the
South ; gave to the enemy a new base of operations ; and, more than any-
thing else, staggered the confidence of Europe in the fortunes of the Con-
federacy.* And yet these disasters were very far from deciding the war.

* The following document, put in our possession, discusses the evacuation of New Orleans in a
military point of view, in a very intelligible style that will interest the general reader, and completes
ill all respects the story of the disaster :

Major-General LoveWs reasons for evacuating Ne^o Orleans.
" I determined to evacuate the city, when the enemy suc(?eeded in passing the forts, for the fol-
lowing reasons : The principal and almost entire concentration of strength in guns, men, and ships,
had been made at that point. It had been selected as the spot where the battle for the defence of
New Orleans, against a fleet coming up the river, should be fought, and everything available for the
defence below, both ashore and afloat, had been collected there, except the twelve guns on the river
at the lower interior line, which had been put there to flank that line. The obstructions had been
placed there, and, until swept away, had been a complete bar to the passage of a hostile fleet, and
the Naval and River Defence ofiicers had brought to bear at that point all their available strength ;
and although New Orleans was still in condition to resist any attack by land, yet when, after six
days and nights of incessant conflict, the forts were passed, and all our defences afloat were either
burnt or sunk, I knew that there was no material obstacle to prevent the fleet from proceeding at
once to the city, and that all the guns, forts, and men on the other ten or twelve water approaches
would go for nought,

" The twelve guns in the open earthworks at the lower line had but twenty rounds of powder
each (the remainder havmg been given to the Louisiana), and could offer no serious resistance to a
fleet which had already passed more than one hundred guns in masonry works, better manned, and
amply supplied with powder.

" The city was surrounded by swamps, and there was but one outlet by land, viz., through the
narrow neck between the river and Lake Pontchartrain. At Kenner, on the Mississippi, ten miles
above the city, the firm ground between the river and swamp which borders the lake is narrowed to
about three quarters of a mile, through which passes the Jackson Railroad. The river at this time
was full to the tops of the levees, and a single one of their large ships of war, by anchoring at thia
point, would have commanded with her broadsides (at point-blank range) the only land exit from



THE FALL OF NEW OKLEANS. 255

A train of Confederate victories was to follow them, and the attention of
the world was now to be fixed npon the campaign in Virginia.

New Orleans, sweeping with her guns (which would have been higher than the surface of the coun-
try) every foot of ground between the river and the lake.

'* The obstructions placed across the Rigolets at Fort Pike had been swept away in a storm shorts
ly before by some vessels which'had broken adrift, and there was an open channel fully as wide aa
the Mississippi River into Lake Pontchartrain, which could easily be passed by the enemy at night
Such a movement, in connection with the placing of one or more ships at Kenner, would have com-
pletely surrounded New Orleans, cutting off all communications by land or water with the interiour.
My efforts to accumulate provisions enough in the city to feed the popiilation had proved abortive,
and an examination made a few days previous to the evacuation, had satisfied me that there were not
in the city provisions enough to sustain the population for more than eighteen days. Taking it for
granted that the enemy would occupy Kenner, as, indeed, he did in a few days, we should have been
starved into a surrender in less than three weeks, for Avhen the hostile fleet anchored in frout of the
city, we wer<» entirely cut off from Texas and Red River — our main sources of supply.

" I had more than three months' rations available for my troops (less than three thousand men),
but this would have answered but a few days for more than one hundred and fifty thousand persons.
Some of the steamers at the levee had been destroyed, and a number had fled up the river, so that
the Jackson Railroad was the only means of transportation for removing the women, children, and
non-combatants from the city, which removal it would have required months to accomplish. In the
vicinity of New Orleans, and for many miles above, there was nothing but swamps filled with water,
in which the families could take refuge, and, moreover, a great portion of the male protectors of
these families were absent with our armies in Tennessee and Virginia, and, of course, could not
superintend their removal. The plan, theretbre, of removing the non-combatants, and remaining
with the troops, was entirely impracticable. Thirteen of the enemy's ships were anchored abreast
of the city with their guns looking down the streets, which they could have swept to the swamps
in rear of the houses, or set on fire at a number of points, and had I continued to occupy it with
troops, they would have been justified by the laws of war in opening fire after due notice to the
women and children to withdraw from danger. I knew that they had not, and could not have for
several days, any land forces to take possession, and having determined, for the reasons above stated,
to evacuate the city, I thought it best to remove the troo|)S at once and speedily, and thus convert
New Orleans from a military position into that of an ungarrisoned city. By so doing, I should de-
prive the enemy of all pretext for a wanton and useless sacrifice of life and property, and as they
were unable to occupy it, I would have a number of days for the undisturbed removal of the vast
amount of public property which was on hand at that time. My troops, however, were placed at
Camp Moore, only four hours' run from the city by rail, and I could have reoccupied it at any time
for several days after the evacuation, if it had been deemed advisable. Had I regarded the outside
popular clamor that would ensue, I should have subjected the people of New Orleans to a bombard-
ment ; but I did not think myself justified lor such a purpose in spilling the blood of women and
children, when I knew that in two or three weeks at farthest, want of food for the inhabitants would
compel me to evacuate the city, or, if that had been then impossible, to surrender.

" I spoke to the Mayor, several members of the City Council, and many prominent citizens, on
the subject, and while none seemed unwilling to undergo any danger, if by so doing they could ar-
rive at favourable results, yet all, without exception, under the civcumstances, approved jf and
advised the withdrawal of the troops.

" In determining upon the evacuation, I necessarily, as soon as the enemy's fleet had passed the
forts, regarded the position the same as if both their army and navy were present before the city,
making due allowance simply for the time it would take them to transport their army up ; inas-
much as their ships, having passed Forts Jackson and St. Philip, they could at once place them-
selves in open and uninterrupted comnuinicaliou with their army at points from six to twt^nty miles
ibove the forts, through various small water couuuunications from the Gulf, made more available



256 THE LOST CAUSE.

But before passing to those memorable fields, we may glance at a se-
quel cif the suiTcnder of New Orleans, whicli, indeed, is among the most

by the extraordmarr height of the river, and which, -while we were in possession of the hitter, I had
easily and without risk defended with launches and a part of the River Defence fleet. I had also
stationed Skymanski's Regiment at Quarantine for the same object. These, howev?r, were all de-
stroyed or captured by the enemy's fleet, after they got possession of the river between the forta
and the city.

" There was a further and very important reason for the course which I pursued. I knew thai
if I remained in New Orleans, we should in all probability lose in a shoi't time troops, guns, and
supplies of all kinds, and the enemy would then be in full possession of the river as far as Memphis,
which eventually feU also into their hands. By withdrawing my command, however, I would be
enabled to fortify, arm, and garrison Vicksburg, a strong and defensible position. On the 17th of
April I had written to Gen. Beauregard, recommending the fortification of Vicksburg, and asking
him for an engineer officer ; and two days after the evacuation I advised the adjutant-general at
Richmond, Gen. Cooper, that I should occupy that place and Jackson. I sent thither a number of
heavy guns and quantities of ammunition, with the artillerists from the various forts near New Or-
leans, and sent Gen. Smith, with a brigade of infantry, to take command of the whole. The officers,
troops, and guns which held Vicksburg last summer, were almost entirely the same which I with-
drew from New Orleans, rather than remain and submit to an inevitable surrender.

" Results have fully proved the wisdom of the military policy pursued by me in collecting all the
means in Department No. One and taking a new and stronger position on the Mississippi River.

" The evacuation of New Orleans and its occupation by the enemy, would necessarily be followed
sooner or later by the abandonment of the several forts and small works on the exterior line, which
were erected principally to defend the approaches to that city, and after its evacuation could no
longer serve any useful purpose, as the position of the enemy (in the river abreast the city) gave him
control of the Opelousas Railroad, thus enabling him to get in rear of the works at Barrataria Bay,
Grand Caillou, Bayou Lafourche, and Berwick Bay, by which he could cut off and capture all the
garrison, with small arms, ammunition, and stores, all of which were greatly needed at that time. I
directed them to be abandoned at once. The officers in command were ordered to report with theii
troops and all transportable supplies at Camp Moore or Vicksburg. Some of them complied with
the order, but a portion of the garrison, after marching part of the way, refused to go further, and,
in spite of their officer, disbanded, and went to New Orleans.

" Forts Jackson and St. Philip surrendered in consequence of a mutiny among the men on the
2Sth of April. Forts Pike and Macornb were abandoned without my orders. When I returned to
the city from the lower forts on the 24th, I directed Col. Fuller, who was in command of the works
on the lakes, which comprised Forts Pike and Macomb, to have everything ready to abandon those
forts, in case I should so order it. Supposing that the enemy would occupy Kenner, and thus de-
prive me of the use of the Jackson Railroad, it was my intention to remove the troops, supplies, etc.,
across Lake Pontchartrain to Pass Manchac and Madisonville, holding the entrance to that lake by
the fort as long as possible. The enemy, however, did not interfere with the railroad at Kenner,
and the greater part of the men and public property were removed by rail. . I went to Camp Moore
on the night of the 25th to arrange matters there, and on the morning of the 27th I received infor-
mation that Col. Fuller had arrived at Covington, La., with the garrison of Forts Pike and Macomb.
This was the first knowledge I had of the abandonment of those works. I immediately directed
them to be reoccupied, and sent a letter to Capt. Poindexter of the navy, in command of the ships
on the lake, requesting his cooperation in this movement. Col. Fuller rephed on the 2Sth that the
forts had been dismantled, the guns spiked, and the carriages destroyed, and thr.t it was impossible
to reoccupy them. I was officially informed of the surrender of Forts Jackson and St. Philip on the
morning of the 29th, and deemed it, therefore, useless to make any further attempt to reoccupy
Forts Pike and Macomb. The cisterns in the two last-named works only held water enough lu
serve the g;irrison a short time, and had to be supplied by steamers from a distance. They coulJ



KULE OF BUTLER IN KEW ORLEANS. 251

remarkable records of the war. Any story of New Orleans is inconi];>lete
without the hero, Benjamin F. Butler. This man, who was to reap the
fruits of the victory of the Federal fleet, and enact the part of military
ruler in New Orleans, was an example of that reputation so easily made
in the North by brazen assertions, sensational dispatches, and coarse abuse
of rebels. Gen. Butlei^ had been a small lawyer in Massachusetts ; his
first experiment in politics was that of a Northern man with Southern
principles ; he was a delegate to the Charleston Convention of 1860, and
ho was accustomed to relate with singular satisfaction the circumstance
that he had voted in that body, more than forty times, for Jefferson Davis
as the nominee for President of the United States ! When the war broke
out, he was a ready convert to the popular doctrine in his State, and went
in advance of it in his expressions of ferocity towards the people of the
South. He had already made himself infamous in Baltimore by his war
U23on non-combatants ; by browbeating quiet citizens ; by examining courts
in which the severity of the military judge was curiously mingled v.'ith the
peculiar skill and disreputable adroitness of the pettifogger ; and by his
quick and apt invention of various instruments of moral torture. The ap-