ally cripple him."
Gen. Polk, left at Bardstown in command, was directed by Gen. Bragg,
if pressed by a force too large to justify his giving battle, to fall back in
the direction of the new depot, near Bryantsville, in front of which it was
proposed to concentrate for action. Arriving in Lexington on the 1st
332 THE LOST CAUSE.
October, Gen. Bragg met the Provisional Governor of the State, who had
previously been invited to accompany him, and arranged for his installa-
tion at the Capitol on the 4th. The available forces of Kirby Smith, just
returned to Lexington, were ordered immediately to Frankfort. Learning
of a heavy movement of the enemy from Louisville, Gen. Bragg ordered
Polk, " to move from Bardstown with his whole available force, by way
of Bloomfield towards Frankfort, to strike the enemy in flank and rear,"
and informed him that Smith would attack in front.
The plan of battle, however, was disarranged, as Polk, after a council
of his officers, decided not to risk the attack, but to move as originally in-
structed by Bragg towards Harrodsburg. Proceeding rapidly to that point
himelf, Gen. Bragg was met there by Polk on the 6th of October, with the
head of the column which had marched from Bardstown on the 3d. It
was now determined to concentrate all the forces in front of Lexington,
and to make a battle there. But before this order was put in full opera-
tion, information was received that the enemy, in limited force, was press-
ing upon Gen. Hardee at Perryville ; that he was nowhere concentrated
against us, but was moving by separate columns ; his right near Lebanon,
a corps in front of Perryville, and his left, two entire corps, extending by
way of Macksville to Frankfort, a line of at least sixty miles.
"Written orders were given to Gen. Polk to move Cheatham's division,
now at Harrodsburg, back to Perryville, and to proceed to that point him-
self, " attack the enemy immediately, rout him, and then move rapidly to
join Maj.-Gen. Smith," as before ordered ; and it was added, " No time
should be lost in this movement." Meanwhile, during the same day. Gen.
Bragg had received repeated and urgent applications from Gen. Smith
(near Frankfort) by express, representing the enemy to be in strong force
in his immediate front, and earnestly asking for reinforcements. Accord-
singly, "Withers' division had been detached and sent to him, and was far
on the way thither at the time when the movement to Perryville was
BATTLE OF PEEEYVILLE.
It thus happened that by misapprehension, Bragg had made an unfor-
tunate distribution of his forces, and deceived as to the real strength of the
enemy in the vicinity of Perryville, was forced to give battle there at seri-
ous disadvantage. Polk arrived at Perryville with Cheatham's division
before midnight of the 7th, and the troops were placed by Gen. Hardee in
the line of battle previously established. Our forces now in this position
coniiisted of three divisions of infantry, about 14,500 â and two small
brigades of cavalry, about 1,500 strong.
It was past noon of the 8th October when the action commenced. It
BRAGG's EETEEAT FEOM KENTUCKY. 333
was fought by our troops with a gallantry and persistent determination to
conquer, which the enemy could not resist ; and though he was largely
more than two to our one, he was driven from the field with terrible loss.
Night closed the operation just as a thu*d corps of the enemy threw the
head of its columns against our left flank. We had entire possession of
the battle-field, with thousands of the enemy's killed and wounded, several
batteries of artillery, and six hundred prisoners.
In the progress of the engagement, we had advanced so far as to expose
our left flank to the third corps under McOook, just arrived from the direc-
tion of Lebanon. Gen. Bragg, therefore, caused our line, which rested
upon the field till midnight, to fall back to its original position.
Assured that the enemy had concentrated his three corps against him,
and finding that his loss had already been quite heavy in the unequal con-
test against the two corps under Crittenden and Gilbert, Gen. Bragg gave
the order to fall back at daylight on Harrodsburg, and sent instructions to
Smith to move his command to form a junction with him, at that place.
Thence, on the 11th, the whole force was retired upon Bryantsville.
Gen. Bragg was now no longer able to attack and rout an enemy
largely superiour in numbers ; and to evacuate Kentucky had become an
imperative necessity. The season of autumnal rains was approaching ;
the rough and uneven roads leading over the stupendous mountains of
Eastern Tennessee and Kentucky, to and through Cumberland Gap, would
then become utterly impassable to an army. Should Bragg remain till
then, and meet with a reverse, his army would be lost. Accordingly all
necessary arrangements were made, and the troops put in motion by two
columns, under Polk and Smith, on the 13th October for Cumberland Gap.
After a rapid march, with some privations in the absence of baggage
trains, which had been sent ahead, the Confederate forces passed the Gap
with immaterial loss from the 19th to the 24th of October.
This retreat of Bragg was certainly a sore disappointment to the hopes
which his first movements in Kentucky had occasioned and his sensational
despatches had unduly excited. His campaign was long a theme of vio-
lent criticism in the Confederacy. The detachment of Kirby Smith and
tlie operation on difibrent lines in Kentucky ; the loss of the opportunity
at Mumfordsville ; and the failure to assemble all the Confederates in the
field at Perryville, were pointed out as so many errom's in the campaign.
But the popular mind in criticising military operations is too prone to for
get what is accomplished, while pointing out what might have been a1/-
tempted. The Kentucky campaign was in a great measure a Confederate
success. Though compelled to yield a portion of the valuable territory
from which we had driven the enemy, the fi'uits of the campaign were
large. With a force enabling us at no time to put more than forty thou-
sand men, of all arms, and in all places in battle, we had redeemed North
334 THE LOST CAUSE.
Alabama and Middle Tennessee, and liad recovered possession of Cumber-
land Gap, the gateway to the heart of the Confederacy. "We had killed,
wounded, and captured no less than twenty-five thousand of the enemy ;
taken over thirty pieces of artillery, seventeen thousand small arms, some
two million cartridges for the same ; destroyed some hundreds of wagons,
and brought off several hundred more, with their teams and harness com-
plete ; replaced our jaded cavalry horses by a fine mount ; lived two months
upon supplies wrested from the enemy's possession ; secm-ed material to
clothe the army ; and, finally, secured subsistence from the redeemed
country to support not only Bragg's army, but also large forces in other
parts of the Confederacy, In four weeks after passing Cumberland Gap,
Bragg's army was found, with serried ranks, in front of the enemy at Nash-
ville ; better organized, better disciplined, better clothed and fed, in better
health and tone, and in larger numbers than when it entered on the cam-
paign, though it had made a march at least three times as long as that of
the enemy in reaching the same point, and was moreover entirely self-
OPEKATIONS IN THE SOUTHWEST. â BATTLE OF COEINTH.
When Gen. Bragg moved into Kentucky, he left to Yan Dorn and
Price the enemy in West Tennessee. These orders were however changed,
and Price was directed to follow Rosecrans across the Tennessee Kiver
into Middle Tennessee, whither it was then supposed he had gone. To
make a demonstration in favour of Price, Gen. Van Dorn marched his
whole command on the 20th day of September to within seven miles of
Bolivar, driving three brigades of the enemy back to that place, and
forcing the return from Corinth of one division, which had been sent there
to strengthen Grant's army.
Gen. Price, in obedience to his orders, marched in the direction of
luka, to cross the Tennessee, but was not long in discovering that Rose
crans had not crossed that stream. This officer, in connection with Grant,
attacked him on the 19th day of September, and compelled him to fall
back towards Baldwin, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. On the 25th
Yan Dorn received a despatch, by courier, from Price, stating that he
was at Baldwin, and was then ready to join Avith his forces in an attack on
Corinth, as had been previously suggested. The forces met at Ripley, on
the 28tli September, according to agreement, and marched the next morn-
ing towards Pocahontas, which place w^as reached on the 1st October.
The disposition of the enemy's forces at this time was as follows :
Sherman, at Memphis, with about six thousand men ; Hurlburt, afterwards
Ordj at Bolivar, with about eight thousand ; Grant (headquarters at Jack
BATTLE OF COEmTH. 335
Bon), with about three thousand ; Rosecrans at Corinth, with about fifteen
thousand, together witli the following outposts, viz. : Rienzi, twenty-five
hundred ; Burnsville, Jacinto, and luka, about six thousand ; at important
bridges, and on garrison duty, about two or three thousand, making in the
aggregate about forty-two thousand (42,000) men in West Tennessee.
Memphis, Jackson, Bolivar, and Corinth were fortified, the works mount-
ing siege guns, the outposts slightly fortified, having field pieces. Mem-
phis, Bolivar, and Corinth are in the arc of a circle, the chord of which,
from Memphis to Corinth, makes an angle with a due east line about fifteen
degrees south. Bolivar is about equi-distant from Memphis and Corinth,
somewhat nearer the latter, and is at the intersection of the Ilatchie River
and the Mississippi Central and Ohio Railroad.
It was a situation in which the enemy could scarcely determine at
what point the Confederates would make their principal attack. In the
event of operations being conducted against Bolivar, Rosecrans was pre-
pared to fall on the Confederate right rear, whilst if Corinth should be at-
tacked, a similar duty would devolve on the garrison of Bolivar.
Gen. Van Dorn determined to attempt Corinth. He had a reasonable
hope of success. Field returns at Ripley showed his strength to be about
twenty-two thousand men. Rosecrans at Corinth had about fifteen thou-
sand, with about eight thousand additional men at outposts, from twelve
to fifteen miles distant. He might surprise him, and carry the place be-
fore these troops could be brought in. Yan Dorn therefore marched
towards Pocahontas, threatening Bolivar, then turned suddenly across the
Hatcliie and Tuscumbia, and on the morning of the 3d October, attacked
Corinth without hesitation, and did surprise that place before the outpost
garrisons were called in.
Rosecrans' forces occupied a position outside the defences of the town,
three divisions forming the first two lines, and one division slightly in rear
as a neserve. He was anxious to retire slowly within the inner line of
works, and gave orders to that efi'ect ; but Price's troops, fiushed with the
excitement of an attack, and anxious to wipe out the recollection of their
repulse at luka, advanced rapidly, and pressed hai'd on the Federal centre,
capturing two guns from Davies' division, and driving the Federals within
their inner line of redoubts.
Gen. Yan Dorn anticipated an easy success on the following morning,
and telegraphed to Richmond the aimouncement of a great victory. It
would seem that he was entirely unaware of the strength of the enemy's
works at Corinth, and of the trial which yet remained for the courage and
devotion of his troops.
The Confederate plan of battle for the next day was, that Price should
open with a large battery of artillery, and then attack in force with his
left, and that while thus engaged, Lovell's division should press forward,
336 THE LOST CAUSE.
and attack witli vigour ou our right. Gen. Hebert, wlio commanded a
dirision on the left, Tvas to lead in the attack. Dajlight came, and there
was no attack on the left. Of this faihu'e to execute his orders, Gen. Yan
Dorn says, in his official report : " A staff officer was sent to Hebert to
inquire the cause. That officer could not be found. Another messenger
was sent, and a third ; and about seven o'clock Gen. Hebert came to my
headquarters, and reported sick." Gen. Price then put Brig.-Gen. Green
in command of the left wing ; and it was eight o'clock before the proper
dispositions for the attack at this point were made. In the mean time, the
centre, held by Mamy's division, became engaged with the enemy's sharp-
shooters, and the battle was brought on, and extended along the whole
centre and left wing. One brigade after another went gallantly into the
action, and, pushing forward through direct and cross-fire, over every ob-
stacle, reached Corinth, and planted their colom's on the last stronghold
of the enemy. A hand to hand contest was being enacted in the very
yard of Gen. Rosecrans' headquarters, and in the streets of the town.
The enemy was followed and driven from house to house with great
slaughter. In the town were batteries in mask, supported by heavy re-
serves, behind which the retreating enemy took shelter, and which opened
upon our troops a most destructive fire at short range. The heavy guns
of College Hill â the enemy's most important work â were for a moment
silenced, and all seemed about to be ended, when a heavy fire from fresh
troops from luka, Bm-nsville, and Rienzi, that had succeeded in reaching
Corinth in time, poured into our thinned ranks.
Our troops gave way. They were pushed down College Hill, and
followed by the enemy through the woods and over the ground they had
gained by such desperate courage. At the very time the day was lost,
Lowell's division was advancing, and was on the point of assaulting the
enemy's works, when he received orders to throw one of his brigades
(Yillepigues') rapidly to the centre, to cover the broken ranks thrown
back from Corinth. The movement was well executed, and the enemy
did not dare to press his success.
The next day it was determined by Yan Dorn to fall back towards
Eipley and Oxford, and thus again take position behind the lagoons and
swamps of Mississippi. The movement was accomplished with but little
molestation from the enemy, beyond an affair in crossing the Hatchie, in
wliich Gen. Ord, who commanded the enemy's advance, was held in check
and pimished. The following was found to be onr loss in the severest con-
flicts with the enemy, and on the march to and from Corinth, viz. : killed,
59^! ; wounded, 2,162 ; prisoners and missing, 2,102. One piece of artil-
lery was driven in the night by a mistake into the enemy's lines, and cap-
tured. Four pieces were taken at the Hatchie bridge, the horses being
shot. Two pieces of artillery were captured from the enemy at Corinth
EE8ULT8 OF THE AUTUMN CAMPAIGNS OF 1862. 337
by Gen. Lovell's division, one of which was brought off. Five pieces were
also taken by Gen. Price's corps, two of which were brought off â thus
resulting in a loss to ns of only two pieces. The enemy's loss in killed
and wounded, by his own account, was 2,127. We took over three
Tlie retreat from Corinth was not a rout. But the engagement there
was a serious disaster to the Confederates, and cost Van Dorn his com-
mand ; censured as he was for having carried his men against works, the
strength of which he had underrated, and then having failed to make
proper combinations in the attack. This event may be said to have closed
for some time the campaign in the West. It had not completed all the
expectations of the Southern public. It is true that the country between
Nashville and Chattanooga was re-occupied by the Confederate forces ;
but the decisive event of the campaign was the retreat from Kentucky,
and as public expectation in the South had been disappointed when Lee
retired across the Potomac, so did it experience a similar feeling when it
was known that Bragg had retreated through the Cumberland Mountains.
These were the two turning-points of the autumn campaigns of 1862.
Whatever the territorial results of these campaigns, their moral effect was
great, and the position of the Confederates was now very different from
what it had been in the early part of the year. The glory of their arms
now attracted the attention of the world. They had carried their arms
from Chattanooga to Louisville, and, although forced to retire, had proved
that the subjugation of the West was a task which the enemy had only
commenced. They had raised the siege of Richmond, threatened Wash-
ington, and beaten the enemy back in that quarter to what hiid been the
threshold of the war. The London Times declared that the history of
these campaigns comprised a hst of military achievements almost without
parallel, and added : " Whatever may be the fate of the new nationality,
or its subsequent claims to the respect of mankind, it will assuredly begin
its career with a reputation for genius and valour which the most famous
nations may envy."
THR TWO MAIN THEATRES OF THE WAR. â OPERATIOXS IN VIRGINIA. â BATTLE OF FREDEBIOKft-
BUEG. PEELIMINAKT MOVEMENTS OF THE TWO ARMIES. â EXPEDITION OF STUARt's CAV-
ALRY INTO PENNSYLVANIA. â REMOVAL OF m'oLELLAN. â THE TRUE REASONS FOR IT. â
GEN. BURNSIDE's " ON TO RICHMOND." HIS MOVEMENT TOWARDS FREDERICKSBURG.
THE SURRENDER OF THE TOWN DEMANDED. IT IS ABANDONED BY THE CITIZEN-POPULA-
TION. SORROWFUL SCENES. BURNSIDE FORCES THE PASSAGE QF THE RAPPAHANNOCK. â
THE CONFEDERATE POSITION. â BURNSIDE's HOPE TO SURPRISE GEN. LEE. HOW DISAP-
POINTED. THE CONFEDERATE LINE OF BATTLE. â THE ATTACK ON THE CONFEDERATE
EIGHT. YOUNG PELHAm's GALLANTRY. THE CONFEDERATE RIGHT BROKEN. â THE BATTLE
RESTORED. â INTEREST OF THE FIELD ON THE LEFT. â THE ATTACK ON MARYE's AND WIL-
Lis' HILLS. â GALLANTRY OF THE FEDERALS. THEY MAKE SIX ATTACKS. A TERRIBLE
SCENE OF CARNAGE. BURNSIDE's ARMY DRIVEN INTO FREDERICKSBURG. HIS APPALLING
EXTREMITY. EXPECTATIONS IN RICHMOND OF THE DESTRUCTION OF HIS ARMY. â HE
ESCAPES ACROSS THE RAPPAHANNOCK. GEN. LEE's OWN EXPLANATION OF HIS FAILURE
TO FOLLOW UP HIS VICTORY. â COMPARATIVE LOSSES IN THE BATTLE. â DEATH OF GENS.
GREGG AND COBB. â GEN. LEE's SENTIMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE OBJECTS OF THE WAR.
OPERATIONS IN TENNESSEE. BATTLE OF MURFREESBORO'. THE SITUATION IN THB
WEST. â THE LINES IN TENNESSEE AND MISSISSIPPI. â ROSECEANS' ADVANCE FROM NASH-
VILLE. â CONFLICTING STATEMENTS OF HIS FORCE. â POSITION OF GEN. BRAGG's ARMY
AEOUND MURFREESBORO'. BRAGG ANTICIPATES THE FEDERAL ATTACK. HARDEE COM-
MENCES THE BATTLE. HE DRIVES THE ENTIRE EIGHT WING OF THE FEDERALS. DESPK-
EATE SITUATION OF ROSECRAN8. HIS SANG-FROID. HE DEVELOPES A NEW LINE OF BAT-
TLE. â THE CONFEDERATES RENEW THE ATTACK. HOW BRAGG LOST AN OPPORTUNITY. â
SPLENDID CHARGE OF THE CONFEDERATES. THE DAY UNDECIDED, BUT THE ADVANTAGE
â¢WITH THE CONFEDERATES. â BRAGg's " HAPPY NEW YEAR," BRECKINRIDGE ATTEMPTS TO
DISLODGE THE ENEMY. â " THE BLOODY CROSSING OF STONE RIVER." REPULSE OF BRECK-
INRIDGE. WHY BRAGG DETERMINED TO RETREAT. THE RESULTS OF THE BATTLE OF MUR-
FREESBORO' IN FAVOUR OF THE CONFEDERATES. â A PECULIARITY OF GEN. BRAGG. â HIS
ELOQUENT TRIBUTE TO THE PRIVATE SOLDIER OF THE CONFEDERACY. OPERATIONS IN THB
TRANS-MISSISSIPPI. â THE CAMPAIGN WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI FEEBLE AND IRREGULAR. â
GEN. HINDMAN's COMMAND. â HIS EXTRAVAGANT ADDRESS TO HIS SOLDIERS. BATTIE OP
PRAIRIE GROVE. HINDMAN's FIRST SUCCESS AND UNFORTUNATE DELAY. HIS BLUNDERS
AND EXTRAORDINARY RETREAT. â CONDITION OF THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI COUNTRY. â HIND-
MAn's " GOVERNMENT AD INTERIM." HIS DESPOTIC ORDERS. AN EXTRAORDINARY LIST
OF OUTRAGES. â VIRTUE AND FIDELITY OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES WEST OF THE MlSSIfl-
BATTLE OF IKEDEKICKSBUKG. 339
About the close of the year 1862, two heavy battles were fought on tho
two main theatres of the war, Yirginia and Tennessee, and were the great
topics of the period referred to.
OPERATIONS IN VIKGINIA. â BATTLE OF FREDEEICKSBUKG.
After Lee's retreat into Virginia, McClellan appeared to be concen-
trating in and near Harper's Ferry, but made no forward movement. On
the Gth October President Lincoln had ordered an immediate advance,
recommending that McClellan should take the interiour line between
Washington and Lee's forces, and make an early battle. McClellan hesi-
tated, and seemed disposed to spend time in complaints of inadequate sup-
plies, and in incessant demands for reinforcements. Meanwhile, to ascer-
tain the position and designs of the enemy, Gen. Lee ordered the famous
cavalry commander Gen. Stuart to cross the Potomac above Williamsport,
to reconnoitre the Federal positions, and, if practicable, to enter Pennsyl-
vania, and do all in his power to impede and embarrass the military opera-
tions of the enemy. The order was executed with skill, address, and
courage. Gen. Stuart, with twelve or fifteen hundred cavaliy, passed
through Maryland, occupied Chambersburg, and destroyed a large amount
of public property, making the entire circuit of Gen. McClellan's army,
and thwarting all tlie arrangements by which that commander had report-
ed his capture certain.
About the last of October, the Federal army began to incline eastward-
ly from the mountains, moving in the direction of Warrenton. As soon as
this intention developed itself, Longstreet's corps was moved across the
Blue Ridge, and about tlie 3d of November, took position at Culpepper
Court House, while Jackson advanced one of his divisions to the east side
of the Blue Ridge. The enemy gradually concentrated about Warrenton,
his cavalry being thrown forward beyond the Rappahaimock, in the direc-
tion of Culpepper Court House, and occasionally skirmishing with our
own, which was closely observing his movements.
Here McClellan's hesitation and timidity were very evident. "Weeks
wore on without any decided movement. The beautiful autumn weather
had passed, without any demonstration of moment from the enemy, and
now cold, bleak November whistled over the fields and mountains of Vir-
ginia. But on the 5th of November there was an unusual sensation and
stir in the Federal camp, for on that day a messenger arrived at Warren-
ton, and delivered to McClellan an order to resign the command of the
army to Gen. Burnside, and to report himself at Trenton in New Jersey.
The order was unexpe^jted. Whatever the military demerits of McClellan,
340 THE LOST CAUSE.
it was inidoubtedly designed at Washington as a coup d'etat^ with reference
to the fall elections of 1862, and influenced by the argument that a time
\Then the Administration party was incurring defeat in the elections, it
was dangerous to allow a political opponent to ])ossess the confidence and
to hold the chief command of the main army.
Gen. Burnside found at his command a splendid army. It was now
divided into three grand divisions, each consisting of two corps, and com-
manded by Gens. Sumner, Hooker, and Franklin. It was at once pro-
posed by Burnside to move from AVarrenton to a new line of operations,
and to make a campaign on the Lower Rappahannock. His plan was to
march rapidly down the left bank of that river, to cross by means of pon-
toons at Fredericksburg, and to advance on Kichmond by Hanover Court
House. For this plan of operations against the Confederate capital, the
advantages were claimed that it would avoid the necessity of the long lines
of communication which would have to be held in case of a movement
against Richmond by Gordonsville ; that, in fact, the Federal army, after
arriving at Fredericksburg, would be at a point nearer to Richmond than
it would be even if it should take Gordonsville ; and that it would all the
time be as near Washington as would be the Confederates, thus covering
that city and defeating the objection to the adoption of the line of the
On the 15th November, it was known by Gen. Lee Ibat the enemy
was in motion towards the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and one regi-
ment of infantry, with a battery of light artillery, was sent to reinforce the
garrison at Fredericksburg. On the 17th, it was ascertained that Sumner's
corps had marched from Catlett's Station, in the direction of Falmouth,
and information was also received that, on the 15th, some Federal gunboats
and transports had entered Acquia Creek. This looked as if Fredericks-