chasing them, the yeomanry of the country were obliged to rate their own
proj)erty at higher prices in Confederate money than the old prices obtain-
ing before the war. It is a well-known fact that the Kichmond rates of
Confederate money were, throughout the war, far below those which pre-
vailed in the Confederacy at large ; and it is a general fact, that the rates
of this money improved as the distance from Richmond increased. This
fact was partly due to the circumstance, that Richmond was the great focus
of Government disbursements, and was constantly flooded to excess with
the currency ; partly to the circumstance, that it Avas the base from which
all smuggling operations were carried on, at which of course gold for the
smuggling trade was more in demand, and commanded the highest prices ;
and thirdly, to the circumstance that it was the centre and resort of the
speculating classes, and the principal depository of their wares, at which
the final sales and last profits on the commodities bought up in the country
for speculation, were realized. It may be remarked, without a material
aberration from the truth, that after the first eighteen months of the war
had elapsed, and the Confederate money had become very redundant, the
business of the country, at a distance from Richmond, was done, for prob-
ably as long a period as twelve months, upon the basis of five for one in
Confederate currency. After that period, the change of rate to fifteen or
twenty for one was rather abrupt ; and upon the latter basis transactions
proceeded for another twelve months ; after which the rate was very un-
Bettled in the iuteriour.
Another observation must be made with reference to the brokers' prices
of gold. A comparison of Confederate money with gold did not, during
the war, afford a true criterion of the value of either commxodity. Gold
was unnaturally scarce and dear in the Confederacy. The old dollar's value,
in property not affected by the condition of war, was not suflicient to pur-
chase a dollar in gold. Real estate did not approximate the prices in gold
which it had commanded before the war. Boarding at the best hotela
could be procured for fifty cents a day in gold, which had cost two dollars
426 THE LOST CAUSE.
and fifty cents before the war. A suit of clothing which before the wai
would have cost thirty dollars, could now be obtained for ten or fifteen in
gold. In short, gold had greatly appreciated in the Confederacy, and the
gold dollar no longer represented the old dollar's worth. The extraordi-
nary demand for it produced by blockade running, and the smuggling
trade, and the small supply of it which the war had found in the Confed-
eracy, rendered still smaller by the process of hoarding, had imparted to
it an extraordinary value. It had thus ceased to be a standard of value,
and had become a very scarce commodity of commerce. The real value
of Confederate money is not to be estimated by the quantity of gold which
it commanded at the brokers' shops.
The case of gold was different at the North, from that which we havA
just described. There commerce was unaffected by a blockade ; the usual
supplies of gold continued to be received ; no extraordinary demands of
specie for exportation were experienced, and it remained, throughout the
period of war, as accurate and reliable a standard of value as ever. The
depreciation of Federal currency can therefore be measured with absolute
certainty by comparing it with gold. In the Confederacy, however, the
case was not the same. As we have seen, gold bore an abnormal value ;
and conclusions in regard to the depreciation of Confederate money founded
merely upon its relation to gold, would be erroneous. The old dollar's
worth, if it could be definitely ascertained, in such commodities as were
not aft'ected by the condition of war, would be the true standard of value.
Until the final six or eight months of the Confederacy, the general transac-
tions of the interiour country proceeded on a basis of value for Confederate
money measured by the old dollar's worth, which was, much higher than
the values furnished by the brokers' quotations in Richmond.
It is interesting to observe the similarity of career which is presented
in the cases of the money of the Southern Confederacy, and of tlie Con-
gress of the first American Confederation. We have ah'eady stated the
gradual depreciation of the one. The progress of the depreciation in the
old Continental money, though somewhat more tardy, was in the same
degree. In May, 1777, the Continental paper dollar was worth at the rate
of two and two-thirds for one in specie. In December it was worth four
for one. In March, 1778, it was worth five for one ; in December, six for
one. In February, 1779, it was worth ten for one ; in June, twenty ; in
September, twenty-four ; in December, thirty-nine. After the year 1779 it-
seemed to have no value. The total amount of this old Continental money
that was issiied, was two hundred millions of dollars ; and it was worth to
those who received it, at the period when paid out by the Government,
only thirty-six and a half milh'ons of dollars. A similar scaling of the
money of the Confederate Treasury would reduce the cost of the war on the
Southern side to less than a thousand millions of dollars. The differ-
COMMEKCIAL SPECULATION IN THE WAK. 427
ence between that sum and tlie nominal cost measures the aggregate de-
preciation of the money.
The principal cause of the depreciation of this money, in the last twelve
months of the war, was the distrust of success entertained by the classes
w^ho controlled the value of the money. The principal causes of its depre-
cation in the antecedent j)eriod, were the excessive issues of it by Govern-
ment, and the influence of speculation. It is probably useless to declaim
against a vice so prejudicial as speculation to both the individual and general
interests of a country circumstanced like the Confederacy. It is a display of
the worst form of selfishness ; a selfishness that feeds upon the privation, want,
and necessity of fellow-citizens engaged in mortal struggle with a formi-
dable public enemy ; a selfishness that appropriates all that it can grasp, at
a time wdien each individual should give up for the general good all that
can be spared ; a selfishness worse than tliat for which Ananias and Sap-
phira were struck down by the hand of God, inasmuch as it seeks not only
to withhold what is one's own, but to engross also w'hatever else can be
compassed by craft and greed. The best communities contain persons of
this sordid temper ; and the temptation to its indulgence in a country iso-
lated and beleaguered by armies and blockading fleets, where the supplies
of every article are limited, are too strong to be resisted by the class
whose inclinations are set in that direction. The speculation commenced
in such articles as cut nails, salt, and leather. There were but two nail
factories in the Confederacy, and the stocks of these establishments were
accessible and easily engrossed. Within the first six months of the war,
the entire stock of cut nails in the Confederacy were in the hands of less
than half a dozen speculators in Richmond ; and the price was abruptly
put up from four dollars to seven, and then to ten per keg. There was but
one considerable saline in the Confederacy, and this was operated by a single
firm, which ran up the price of this prime necessary of life, within two years,
from the ante-war price of one cent per pound, to twenty-five cents per
pound in specie or fifty cents in Treasury notes. Leather w^as one of those
articles which, though tanned in very numerous establishments conducted
on a small scale throughout the country, yet w^as everywhere found to be in
smaller quantity than was needed by the people, and which might safely
be bought up right and left wherever found. These arc but examples of
the subjects of the speculation and extortion that became rife throughout
the Confederacy. The efiect was greatly to augment and aggravate the
burden of the war upon the people ; but its most serious evil was in the
depreciating influence it exerted upon the currency. The great mass of
the people were desirous to receive this money at the normal rates ; but
finding themselves obliged to pay extortionate prices for commodities
which they stood in need of purchasing, they were driven, against their
mil, to demand increased prices for the products and property which they
4:28 THE LOST CAUSE.
sold. The fury and intensity of speculation forced tne people into reluc-
tant acquiescence in the depreciation of the currency. But there is this
consolatoi-y observation to be made on the subject : namely, that the
classes who devoted themselves assiduously to speculation, as a general
rule, came out losers at the close of the war ; while the masses of people
who eschewed this disreputable avocation, generally saved a comfortable
portion of their original means.
That the depreciation of the Confederate currency was partially super-
induced by speculation and circumstances other than its mere redundancy,
is sufficiently proved by the fact, that the grand total of circulation in the
iN'orth reached the stupendous figure of nine hundred and fifty millions of
dollars, while the depreciation of greenbacks, at the close of the war, was
less than one and a half for one. It is plain, therefore, that depreciation is
not the necessary result of mere redundancy, and may be prevented by
provident and timely measures. The ability w4th which the Federal
finances w^ere conducted, especially in avoiding this depreciation, is one of
the most remarkable incidents of the war.
If early and proper measures had been adopted, the Confederate cur-
rency would doubtless, likewise, have proved as manageable as any other
branch of the Confederate finances. These measures should have looked
to the provision of an adequate demand for the circulation that was issued
in such profusion. This demand could have been abundantly established
by means of taxation, of the sale of Government bonds of long dates, and
by the intervention of a system of discounts through the instrumentality
of a Bank of Exchequer. The circulation should not' have been issued
directly from the Treasury. It should have been placed under the abso
lute control of an issuing agency, which would have served as a regulator
and balance-sheet in the movement, and preserved an equilibrium between
the efflux and influx of the circulation. Taxation should have been im-
posed from the beginning, and executed promptly ; not postponed several
years, and then tardily put in force. The sales of bonds should have been
conducted by a great and respectable banking institution, directed by emi-
nent and reputable financiers ; not entrusted to ignorant and irrespon-
sible stock and exchange brokers. Such a financial institution could have
established and maintained an influx of the circulation commensurate with
the efflux. With this reflux in full flow, the volume of the currency might
have been increased with impunity. And, if, besides, the circulation had
been in the form of notes of the bank, rather than in that of notes of the
Treasury ; then, when the unfortunate end came, the debts due to the
bank would still have given a partial value to this circulation ; and pre-
vented the total wreck of cash means which at last overtook the people of
the South,
CHAPTER XXYI.
THK NEW ATTEMPT UPON FOET SUMTEE AND CHAELESTON. — GEN. GILLMOEE's COMMAND. — HIS
PLAN OF OPEEATIONS. — WHAT WAS PEOPOSED BY THE EEDUCTION OF THE TVOEKS ON MOE-
EI8 ISLAND. — A BASE OF OPEEATIONS ON FOLLY ISLAND. — HOW GEN. BEAUEEGAED "WAS
BLINDED AND DECEIVED. — FOETY-SEVEN GUNS OF THE ENEMY UNMASKED. — THE ASSAULT
ON FOET WAGNEB. — 6ALLANTEY OF A CONNECTICUT EEGIMENT. — THE ASSAULT EEPULSED.
GEN. BEAUEEGAEd's PLANS. — HIS OBJECT IN HOLDING MOREIS ISLAND. — SECOND ASSAULT
ON FOET WAGNER IN CONJUNCTION WITH DAHLGEEN's FLEET. — THE BOMBARDMENT OF
FOET WAGNEE. — PROFOUND AND SIGNIFICANT SILENCE OF THE GAEBISON. — ADVANCE OF
THE STOEMING COLUMN. ITS REPULSE. — TEEEIBLE SCENES OF CAENAGE. — SIEGE OPERA-
TIONS. — APPEALS TO THE SOUTH CAROLINA PLANTERS, AND THEIE INDIFFERENCE. — GILL-
MORE PREPARES TO BOMBARD AND DESTROY CHAELESTON. — " THE GREEK FIEE." — " THE
SWAMP ANGEL." — GILLMOEE's NOTICE OF BOMBAEDMENT. — SHAEP AND MEMOEABLE EEPLY
OF GEN. BEAUREGARD. — COWARDLY REJOICINGS IN THE NORTH, — THE BOMBAEDMENT A
FAILUEE. — ATTEMPTED DEMOLITION OF FOET SUMTEE. — HOW FAE THE FORT WAS INJURED
BY THE BOMBAEDMENT. — GILLMOEE ANNOUNCES ITS REDUCTION. — THE ANNOUNCEMENT
FALSE AND AB3UED. — PE0GEES3 OF THE SIEGE OPEEATIONS AGAINST FORT WAGNER. — A
TERRIFIC FIRE OPENED UPON IT. — SURPASSING GRANDEUR OF THE SCENE. — GILLMORE PLANS
ANOTHER ASSAULT UPON THE FORT. — THE CONFEDERATES EVACUATE IT AND MORRIS
ISLAND. — WHAT GEN. BEAUREGARD ACCOMPLISHED BY THE RETENTION OF MORRIS ISLAND
FOR TWO MONTHS. — THE ISLAND NOT THE KEY TO CHAELESTON. — ADMIRAL DAHLGREN
REFUSES TO ASCEND THE HARBOUR WITH HIS lEON-CLADS. — HE SUMMONS FOET SUMTEE TO
SUEEENDER. — BEAUEEGARd's REPLY. — A BOAT-ATTACK ON THE FORT. — ITS DISASTROUS
REPULSE. — THE ENEMY's OPERATIONS AGAINST CHARLESTON DEGENERATE INTO A CHRONIC
AND FRUITLESS BOMBARDMENT. — DISAPPOINTMENT IN THE NORTH.
The most remarkable military event of the midsummer of 1863 was
the successful defence of Charleston against a most imposing demonstration
of the enemy's power by land and by sea. We have seen how unsuccessful
was the naval attack upon this city in April, 1863. It was not long, however,
before another attempt was planned upon Fort Sumter and Charleston, the
steps of which were the military occupation of Morris Island and the estab-
lishment of batteries on that island to assist in the reduction of Fort
Sumter. The establishment of these batteries and the reduction of the
Confederate works — Fort Wagner and Battery Gregg — was a matter of
430 THE LOST CAUSE.
great engineermg skill, and Gen. Q. A. Gillmore was selected to command
the land forces of the enemy engaged in these operations. Morris Island
was on the south side of the entrance to the harbour, about three and a
half miles in length, low, narrow, and sandy, and separated from the main-
land adjacent to it by soft, deep, and impracticable marshes. Its capture,
although principally designed to open a way to the enemy's iron-clads,
would also serve the purpose of making the blockade of Charleston har-
bour more thorough and complete, by allowing a portion or all of the
blockading fleet to lie inside the bar. But the most important object, as
we have indicated, was to secure a position whence it was hoped Fort
Sumter might be demolished, and the co-operation of a heavy artillery fire
extended to the fleet, when it was ready to move in, run by the batteries
on James and Sullivan's Islands, and reach the city.
Gen. Gillmore assumed command on the 12th June, and at once pro-
posed to commence a base of operations on Folly Island, This island, the
south end of which controlled the waters of Stone Harbour and Inlet and
the water approaches from James Island, had been occupied in force by
the enemy since the Yth April. But Gen. Beauregard appears to have had
no idea of what was going on there ; he never made a reconnoisance of
the enemy's outposts on the island ; and he was bitterly accused in the
Richmond Sentinel^ the organ of President Davis' administration, for a
want of vigilance, which had permitted the enemy, unknown to him, to
construct a base of operations actually within speaking distance of his
pickets. It is true that the enemy threw up earthworks and mounted
heavy guns on Folly Island under a screen of thick undergrowth ; but it is
certainly to the last degree surprising that he should have succeeded in
secretly placing in battery forty-seven pieces of artillery so near to the
Confederate lines that a loud word might have revealed the work, and ex-
posed moreover to a flank and reverse view fi-om their tall observatories on
James Island. Indeed there was a circumstance yet more curious. A
blockade runner had been chased ashore just south of the entrance to Light-
house Inlet, and it actually occurred that the vessel was wrecked by
Confederate soldiers within pistol range of the enemy's battery on
Folly Island, without their being in the least aware of such a grim
neighbour.
This battery was ready to open fire on the 6th July. A plan of attack
upon Morris Island was now deliberately formed, one part of which was a
strono- demonstration of Gen. Terry's division, some four thousand infantry,
on James Island so as to draw ofl' a portion of the Confederate force on
Morris Island. While this demonstration was taking place, two thousand
men of Gen. Strong's brigade were to embark in small boats in Folly
River, efi'ect a landing on Morris Island, and, at a given signal, attempt to
carry Fort "Wagner by assault. The batteries on the north end of Folly
J
ASSAULT ON FOET WAGNEK. 431
Island were also ordered to be unmasked, by openinpj out the embrasures
and cutting away tlie brushwood in front of tliem.
At daybreak of tlie lOtli July, forty launches containing Strong's as-
saulting column crept up Folly Eiver with muffled oar-locks ; the iron-
clad fleet crossed the bar, and took up its position in the main ship-channel
off J\Iorris Island ; two hundred axemen suddenly sprung from behind the
batteries on Folly Island, and felled the trees which hid them from view ;
embrasure after embrasure was laid bare ; and at five o'clock the first gun
was heard from the suddenly revealed battery, and the dense white smoke
which rose above the tall pines marked the new line of conflict. Mean-
while the assaulting column had landed ; the Confederate lines were drawn
within eight hundred yards of Fort "Wagner ; and ofiensive operations were
suspended for the day. .
An assault on Fort Wagner was ordered at five o'clock the next morn-
ing. The Seventh Connecticut Regiment was to take the lead, followed
by the Seventy-Sixth Pennsylvania and Ninth Maine. Gen. Strong, who
led the assaulting column, gave a Cromwellian order : " Aim low, and
put your trust in God ! " The Connecticut soldiers took the double-quickj
and with a cheer rushed for the works. Before they reached the outer
works, they got a terrible fire from the Confederate rifles, and the fort
opened with three 8-incli howitzers, heavily charged with grape and canis-
ter. The men went over the outer works with an extraordinary courage,
that must be recorded to their honour, and were advancing to the crest of
the parapet, when it was discovered that the regiments which were to sup-
port them had staggered back and lost their distance. The Connecticut
regiment was left to eflfect its retreat through a sheet of fire. Nearly one
half of them were killed or wounded. But the loss of the Confederates
was quite as large. Gen. Beauregard estimated his losses in opposing the
landing of the enemy at three hundred killed and wounded, including six-
teen ofticers. Tlie attack was undoubtedly a surprise to him, as he had
persisted in the belief that the demonstration against Charleston would be
made by the old route — James Island — and accordingly had almost strip-
ped Morris Island of his artillerymen and infantry, to meet the advance
of Terry.
But although the assault on Fort Wagner was repulsed, the remissness
of Gen. Beauregard with respect to the battery on Folly Island was to cost
dear enough. It compelled the evacuation of all the fortified positions of
the Confederates on the south end of Mori-is Island ; in fact, surrendered
all the island except about one mile on the north end, which included Fort
Wagner and Fort Gregg on Cumming's Point ; and virtually made the
reduction of these works but a question of time. It was very clear that
the enemy, having once obtained a foothold on Morris Island, would even-
tually compel an evacuation by the operations of siege, and that it was im«
432 THE LOST CAUSE.
possible to defend forever a small island cut off from communication by an
enormous fleet. It only remained for Gen. Beauregard to repair as far as
possible the errour lie had already committed, and to find some compensa-
tion for what had already occurred. And well did he do this secondary
duty. Admitting the impracticability of defending Morris Island after the
position of the enemy on it was fully established and covered by the iron- .
clads, Gen. Beauregard yet appreciated the opportunity of holding the
island long enough to replace Sumter by interiour positions, and saw clearly
that every day of defence by Wagner was vital to that of Charleston.
For two months this policy was successful.
Gen. Gillmore was not content with his first essay to take Fort Wagner
by storm. He held a conference with Admiral Dahlgren, commanding
the fieet, and determined to attempt, with the combined fire of the land
batteries and the gunboats, to dismount the principal guns of the work,
and either drive the Confederates from it, or open the way to a successful
assault. Batteries were accordmgly established, and were ready to open
fire on the 18th July, when the enemy's fieet, consisting of four Monitors,
the Ironsides, a frigate, and four gunboats, some of which threw shell from
mortars, closed in opposite Fort Wagner.
About noon the enemy's vessels commenced hurling their heaviest shot
and shell around, upon, and within Fort Wagner, and, with intervals of
but a very few minutes, continued this terrible fire, until one hour after the
sun had gone down. Yast clouds of sand, mud, and timber were sent high
up into the air. Forty-eight hours the Monitors and the Ironsides had
kept up a continuous fire, and Fort Wagner had not surrendered. For
eight hours, fifty-four guns from the land batteries had hurled their shot
and shell within her walls, and still she fiaunted the battle-fiag of the Con-
federacy in the face of the enemy. Once during the day the fiag was shot
down. Immediately it was run up about ten feet above the parajDct, a
little cluster of men rallied around it, waved their hats, and then disap-
peared, and were not again seen during the day. There was no other sign
o£ human life about the fort. It appeared as if the garrison was dead or'
conquered. " But," said a Federal officer, who watched the scene, '' there
were a few later developments that proved their opinion was the correct
one who said this profound silence on the rebel side was significant, not of
defeat and disaster, but of ultimate success in repulsing our assault ; that
they were keeping themselves under cover until they could look into the
eyes of our men, and send bullets through their heads, and would then
Bwarm by thousands with every conceivable deadly missile in their hands,
and drive us in confusion and with terrible slaughter back to our en
trenchments."
Gillmore had selected the time of twilight for the storming party to
move to the attack, in order that it might not bo distinctly seen from the
\
SECOND ASSAULT ON FOKT WAGNEK, 433
James Island and Sullivan's Island batteries, and from Fort Sumter. But
this time there was to be no surprise. As the bombardment relaxed, it
was known at Fort "Wagner that such a demonstration on the part of the
enemy was not without its object ; and every man was ordered by Gen.
Taliaferro, who commanded the fort, to the parapet to prepare for the ex-
pected assault of the enemy.
At dusk the assaulting oolumn was fonned on the beach. A regiment
of negro soldiers, the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts, was, for peculiar reasons,
put in the extreme advance. There were eleven regiments in solid column
As the head of it debouched from the first parallel, a tremendous fire froni
the barbette guns on Fort Sumter, from the batteries on Cumming's Point,
and from all the guns on Fort Wagner, opened upon it. The guns from
Wagner swept the beach, and those from Sumter and Cumming's Point
enfiladed it on the left. Still the column staggered on within eighty yards
of the fort. And now a compact and most destructive musketry lire was
poured upon it from the parapet, along which gleamed a fringe of fire.
In five minutes the first line of the enemy had been shot, bayoneted, or
were in full retreat. The First Brigade, under the lead of Gen, Strong,
failed to take the fort. The Second recoiled ; and the few troops that had
clambered to the parapet, now found the most desperate task to efi'ect a
retreat. It was a night black with tempest. Even if they surrendered,