us upon a level one step higher than any party platform.' You thus compel us to allude to matters
which we should have preferred to pass by. But we cannot omit to notice your criticism, as it casts,
at least, an implied reproach upon our motives and our proceedings. We beg to remind you that
when the hour of our country's peril had come, when it was evident that a most gigantic effort was
to be made to subvert our institutions and to overthrow the government, when it was vitally impor-
tant that party feelings should be laid aside, and that all should be called upon to unite most cor-
dially and vigorously to maintain the Union ; at the time you were sworn into office as President
of the United States, when you should have urged your fellow-citizens in the most emphatic man-
ner to overlook all past differences and to rally in defence of their country and its institutions when
you should have enjoined respect for the laws and the Constitution, so clearly disregarded by the
South, you chose, for the first time, under like circumstances, in the history of our country, to set
op a party platform, called the ' Chicago platform,' as your creed ; to advance it beyond the Consti-
tution, and to speak disparagingly of that great conservative tribunal of our country, so highly
respected by all thinking men who have inquired into our institutions — The Supreme Court of tab
United States.
" Your administration baa been true to the principles you then laid down. Notwithstanding
4:78 THE LOST CAUSE.
would have been more ' manly ' to scream — ' I demand to get out ; I pro*
claim on the house-tops that I will get out.' "
While thus " the strong government " at Washington had grasped tho
liberties of the country, it promised a fresh infusion of vigour in the war.
It increased its army ; it exhibited, as its strength on the water, a navy of
nearly six hundred vessels, seventy-five of which were iron-clads or
armoured steamers ; and it jnade preparations for the prosecution of hos-
tilities which were alarming enough by the side of the now rapidly
decreasing resources of the Southern Confederacy. The Congress which
assembled at Richmond in the winter of 1863, was immediately and
anxiously occupied with the decrease of our armies, and the yet more
alarming diminution of our subsistence. These two concerns engaged all
the resources and ingenuity of its legislation. It was said that the war
had become a question of men and of food.
The conscription law had disappointed expectation. When the first
measure was passed, limited to the ages of eighteen and thirty-five, it was
estimated that even that partial call would yield eight hundred thousand
men. A very simple arithmetical process will disclose this number. The
free population of the several States of the Confederacy not wholly occu-
pied by the enemy was at the time of the passage of the first act of
the fact that several hundred thousand Democrats in the loyal States cheerfully responded to the
call of their country, filled the ranks of its armies, and by ' their strong hands and willing arms '
aided to maintain your Excellency and the officers of government in the possession of our national
capital ; notwithstanding the fact that the great body of the Democrats of the country have in the
most patriotic spirit given their best efforts, their treasure, their brothers and their sons, to sustain
the government and to put down the rebellion, you, choosing to overlook all this, Jiave made your
appointments to civil office, from your cabinet officers and foreiga ministers down to the persons of
lowest official grade among the tens of thousands engaged in collecting the revenues of the country,
exclusively from your poUtical associates.
" Under such circumstances, virtually proscribed by your administration, and while most of the
leading journals which supported it approved the sentence pronounced against Mr. Vallandigham, it
was our true course — our honest course to meet as ' Democrats,' that neither your Excellency nor
the country might mistake our antecedents or our position.
" In closing this communication, we desire to reaffirm our determination, and we doubt not that
of every one who attended the meeting which adopted the resolutions we have discussed, expressed
in one of those resolutions, to devote ' all our energies to sustain the cause of the Union.'
" Permit us, then, in this spirit, to ask your Excellency to reexamine the grave subjects we have
considered, to the end that on your retirement from the high position you occupy, you may leave
behind you no doctrines and no further precedents of despotic power to prevent you and your poa-
terity from enjoying that constitutional liberty which is the inheritance of us nil, and to the end,
also, that historv rr-ay speak of your administration with indulgence if it cannot with approval.
" We are, sir, with great respect, yours very truly,
" John V. L. Prutk,
" Chairman of Committee.
" Albany, June 30, 1863."
THE CONFEDERATE CONSCRIPTION. 4:Y9
conscription (1862) as follows, giving only fractions of the population for
tliose States partially overrun by the enemy :
Alabama, .... 529,164
Arkansas, 324,323
Florida, 78,686
Georgia, 595,097
Louisian.i, ' 376,913
Mississippi, 354,699
North Carolina, 661,586
A fourth of Missouri, 264,588
South Carolina, 301 ,271
Two thirds of Tennessee, 556,042
Texas, 420,651
Half of Virginia, 552,591
Total, 5,015,618
This being the aggregate population, what proportion of it were males
between the ages of eighteen and thirty -five ? By the census of 1850, the
population of the United States was twenty-three millions one hundred
and ninety-one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six. Of this total,
seven millions forty-seven thousand nine hundred and forty-live were
given as between the ages in question. Half this number would give
three milliong live hundred and twenty-three thousand nine hundred and
seventy-two as the males between those ages ; which number is fifteen
per cent, of the aggregate population. This ratio applied to the white
population of the Confederacy, as stated above, would give as the number
that should have been produced by the first act of conscription seven hun-
dred and fifty-two thousand three hundred and forty-two men. If we
should add to this number the volunteers from that population of the
States of Kentucky, Maryland, and portions of Virginia and Missouri not
embraced in the basis of estimate, and the volunteers offering from ages
not embraced in tlie prescribed figures, the aggregate soldiery of the Con-
federacy would reach tlie number of eight hundred thousand.
The conscription law of the Confederacy had since been extended to the
age of forty-five ; and in 18G3 it was further extended, by the repeal of tlie
clause allov/ing substitutions, which it was declared would add more than
Beventy thousand men to the ai-my. And yet about this time the rolls of
the Adjutant-General's office in Richmond showed little more than four
hundred thousand men under arms ; and of these, Mr, Seddon, the Con-
federate Secretary of War, declared that, owing to desertions and other
causes, " not more than a half, never two-thirds of the soldiers were in the
ranks." When we contemplate the actual result to which the conscription
480 THE LOST CACSE.
was tliiio reduced, we may imagine how liarsli had bef,ome the war, and
how averse the people of the South to the demands of '!ts necessities. In-
deed, the Confederate Government had committed a great oversight in fail-
ijUT to enlist trooj^s for the whole period of the w/ir, when it lirst com-
menced ; for, as is usual at the beginning of all political revolutions, great
uuanimitj and patriotic zeal prevailed among the people throughout the
countrv, which rendered that measure both feasible and easy. But lost
opportunities seldom return. This important measure, so easy at the out-
set of the war, was quite impossible in its adv.'inced stages, as the ardour
of the people was cooled or abated by the hardships and vicissitudes insep-
arable from a state of hostility.
The most striking of these hardships was the want of food, the actual
pang of starvation in the army. Provisions were very scarce all through
the country, so much so as to excite fears of a famine. Poverty and its
attendant necessities befell those who had never dreamed of want. Many
families who had been reared in affluence and luxury, were in need of the
common necessaries of life. Young, delicate ladies often had to perform
menial offices, such as cooking and washing for their families, having lost
their servants by the war, or having been driven by other necessities to
the last resources of economy. In the army the suffering was more vital ;
and had it not been for the scanty additions of provisions and clothing,
which the love of relatives and friends occasionally sent them, many of
the troops would have been compelled to disband, or would have perished
in their camps. As it was, desertions were rapidly taking place, as the
rigour of winter came on. It required all the popularity of Gen. Lee, and
the exercise of every available faculty of his mind, to keep even his veteran
army in Virginia together. A tithe-tax was instituted by the Confederate
Congress, by which it was hoped to furnish supplies to the armies ; but
this and all kindred measures on the subject of subsistence were so badly
executed, that the results invariably disappointed the calculation.
Indeed, the subject of the Confederate commissariat was so closely con-
nected with the general fortunes of the war ; it did so much to determine
its conclusion ; it exhibits so many characteristic instances of mal-adminis-
tration in Richmond, that a distinct consideration of it here, up to the time
we are now discussing, is not out of place, and will prepare the reader for
much that is to follow in the general history of the war.
HISTOKT OF THE CONFEDERATE COMMISSARIAT.
In January, 1863, a report was made to the Confederate Congress in
Richmond, on the general administration of the Bureau of Subsistence,
particularly with reference to certain contracts for obtaining supplies,
THE OONFEDEEATE COMMISSARIAT. 481
which had been unfavourably reported to the public and to Congress. In
that report, the following occurs : " In the packing season of 1S60-'G1 up-
ward of three million head of hogs were packed at the various porkerics
ot the United States, besides those packed by farmers at home, of whici:.
less than twenty thousand were packed at regular establishments south of
the lines of our armies. Of this whole number, experts estimate that the
product of about one mull on two hundred thousand hogs was imported in
the early part of the last year from beyond our present lines into what is
now the Southern Confederacy. This was accomplished, and to the extent
of a bountiful supply by the action of the State authorities in some cases,
by the enterprise of private parties, and by this department, through agen-
cies of its own. Of this number it is estimated that about three hundred
thousand hogs, or their bacon equivalent, have been consumed by our
State and Confederate armies since the commencement of hostilities. Ten-
nessee then became the main reliance for the future use of the army,
which, together with the accessible portions of Kentucky, had been so rav-
aged by hog cholera and injured by short corn crops for three years pre-
ceding the year just closed, that the number slaughtered at the porkeries
within her limits had deviated from two hundred thousand head to less
than twenty thousand. It was into this field, just recovering from these
disasters, and almost the sole resource of the army, and the planters and
inhabitants of cities, that this department had to enter as a pm-chaser,
dubious of a sufiiciency, but assured of a heavy and active compe-
tition."
Shortly after the date of this report, the successive captures of Forts
Henry and Donelson caused the loss of a considerable portion of the sup-
plies referred to. The subsequent campaign lost us Kentucky and much
of Tennessee, and left the Confederacy comparatively bare of meat.
In tliis early prospect of distress a number of propositions were made to
the Confederate Government by responsible and energetic parties, to ex-
change through the enemy's lines meat for cotton. But to this favourable
exchange President Davis was opposed ; he was actually weak enough to
suppose that if a little cotton was kept from the enemy, the l^^orth would
be unable to pay the January interest of 1863 ; and he was among those
stupid financiers who were for confining cotton, as if there were magical sal-
vation in it, and hoarding this inert wealth of the South.
In the fall of 1862, a party properly vouched for proposed, for an equiv-
alent in cotton, to deliver thirty thousand hogsheads of bacon through the
lines. It was alleged that there was enough cotton to feed and clothe our
army, in a section tributary to Memphis, which city was then, and had
been for some time previous, in the secure possession of the enemy ; that
such cotton must otherwise probably be destroyed to prevent its falling
into the hands of the enemy ; but that the owners, as a general rule,
SI
482 THE LOST CACi&»
though willing to let the government have their crops, "were averse, if not
stubbornly opposed to having them destroyed.
This proposition was submitted to President Davis. It was emlorsed
111 the bureau of subsistence : " The alternative is thus presented of violat-
ing our policy of withholding cotton from the enemy or risking the starva-
tion of our armies ; " and it was suggested that the Commissary General be
authorized to contract for bacon and salt, limiting the amount of purchase
to what was absolutely necessary to feed the army and supply it with blank-
ets and shoes, showing that no law forbade this traffic ; that the precedents
of other wars justified it ; and advising that the Commissary General
should, under such circumstances, upon his own statement of the necessity,
be allowed to make the contract, which, this officer added, nothing less
tihan the danger of sacrificing our armies would induce " him to acquiesce
in." Upon that letter the President endorsed as follows :
" SecPwEtaet op "War — Is there any necessity for immediate action ? Is there satis-
factory evidence that the present opportunity is the last which will be offered ? Have
you noted the scheme of the enemy for the payment of their next accruing interest on
their public debt ? You will not fail to perceive the effect of postponing the proposed
action until January 1, 1863, if it be necessary at anytime to depart from the well-defined
policy of oup government in relation to cotton.
"JEFF. DAVIS.
"October 31, 18G2."
President Davis was assured that the consequences of the refusal of this
policy of exchange would be most serious. Col. ISTorthrop, the Commis-
sary General, informed him that present efforts, even if successful, would
not produce cm'ed bacon for the next year. The departments of the east
had been exhausted, while the increasing number of refugees, driven from
their homes by the enemy's arms, added to the consumers. The results
hoped for from Tennessee were not probably equal to the demands of the
troops on the west of the mountains and in Tennessee. A statement was
made in the bureau of subsistence, that the su2:)ply of hogs for 1863 would
be about one hundred thousand short of the supply for the preceding year,
and that the supply of beef was well nigh exhausted. This statement was
communicated to President Davis, with the following endorsement by Mr.
Eandolph, then Secretary of "War : " Unless the deficiency be made up by
purchases beyond the limits of the Confederacy, I apprehend serious conse-
quences."
President Davis refused to see the necessity so plainly indicated to
him. He still lingered in the conceit of an early termination of the war,
and in spite of the plainest figures he persisted in the belief that the requi-
site amount of supplies for the army might still be procured from sources
within the Confederate States. How far he was mistaken in this, will be
SUPPLIES OF MEAT IN THE CONFEDERACY. 483
eliown by the following reply to one of liis calls for information about the
close of the year 1862 :
" It Avill be observed that the Presidcut, through Gen. Smith, calls for information on
<]iree points, and to these exclusively is the answer addressed.
" First — Every source within the Confederate lines from which supplies could have
been obtained last year or this has been fully explored. All such have either been
exhausted or found inadequate. If in any small portion of the Confederacy supplies
have not been aimed at, it was because it was known that such portion would not afford
enough for the current domestic supply of that particular area. It has been erroneouslj'
supposed that Southern Georgia and Alabama, and certain portions of Florida, would
afford large amounts of stock, but they have not done it. They have not even fully fed
those posts which from geographical position would naturally draw from them, and they
cannot do as much in the future as they have done in the past.
" This appears abundantly from facts within my knowledge and from testimouy in
this office.
" Second — To state more fully the reasons for immediate action it is necessary to
recapitulate :
"The report states a clear deficit of bacon of 8,116,194 pounds, or twenty-five i>er
cent. ; a clear deficit in salt beef of 36,000 beeves, at an average of five hundred pounds
— making 18,000,000, or ninety per cent, per bullock. Whole value of the above, in
rations, 22,516,194. Total deficit per cent., 43.
" This calculation is upon the basis of the forces this year in camp and field. Fur-
ther : it does not include immense supplies purchased from private hands, which cannot
be had at all for this winter, because the stock to create them is not in the Confederate
lines, and the salt cannot be had if the stock could. Besides, large local supplies have
been completely exhausted, as in Loudon and Fauquier and other districts. And even
the above estimated subsistence is not at all secure. The hogs, though bargained for,
have not all been driven to places of safety. The salt to cure them has not all been
secured, and what has been engaged has not all been delivered, and must take its chances
for transportation over long distances, upon uncertain roads discordantly connected.
It is not safe, then, to rely on these estimates. Added to that, the winter is at hand ; the
rises of the rivers all impending ; invasion on a large scale is imminent ; the supplies
which had been hoped for from the enemy's lines are not to be expected.
" The supplies now ofli'ered are ample, and are tendered at lower rates in cotton, even
at the extreme bid, than they can be bought at for Confederate currency in our own lines.
If not availed of now they most probably never will be, for lack of power and oppor-
tunity.
" And, finally, both Mobile and Charleston are pressing for large supplies out of
resources which must be held for the armies of Virginia, or the border States will be
lost ; while the same reserves, and the accumulations I have been endeavouring to make
in Tennessee, are demanded by the armies of General Bragg.
" Third — As to the relative advantages of procuring supplies from Jfemphis and from
the vicinity of New Orleans, the proposition to make sucli purchases is not a new idea.
They were made at the commencement of the war to an extent which is little known. In
an elaborate report on the operations of this Bureau, made by Major Euffin, under my
order and superintendence, and submitted to Congress in January last, it is stated : Ex-
perts estimate that the product of about 1,200,000 hogs was imported in the early part
f'f last year (1861), from beyond our present lines into what is now the Southern Con-
federacy. This was accomplished by the action of State authorities ; in some cases by
484 THE LOST CATJSE.
the enterprise of private parties, and by this department, through agencies of its own.
Of this number it is estimated that about 300,000 hogs, in their bacon equivalent, have
been consumed by our State and Confederate armies since the commencement of hostili-
ties. This was for a period of eight months, and shows a requirement of 450,000 hogs
per annum. For a considerable part of that i^eriod the army was a mere fraction of tlie
magnitude which it has since reached. Those who think that the stimulus of high prices,
under the apprehension of a great scarcity, has so increased our supply of meat as to
enable us to dispense with this large balance, forget that the counties most capable of
such development are precisely those which have suffered most from the war. Elsewhere
it must have been a new enterprise, such as could not be expected to succeed when the
best men were in the army.
" Therefore I urge that supplies be engaged both from Memphis and from the vicinity
of New Oi'Ieans, and for these additional reasons : It may be safely estimated that the
army will consume and waste the product of not less than five hundred thousand hogs,
of which we calculate to receive only about one third from our Confederate limits. I*
will not be prudent to rely upon obtaining the amount needed from one single source of
supply ; it will be well to divide the risk. Moreover, other articles are needed nearly aa
much as meat. The salt works in Louisiana are not to be depended on ; the supply to
be obtained from Saltville, in Virginia, is limited. The wants of citizens, daily becoming
more urgent and alarming, will absorb aU of that, if permitted, and the drafts of the
Government upon the same fund wUl cause ruinous prices and great destitution,
" One reliable party in New Orleans offers to supply one hundred thousand sacks of
gait, or more than is called for by the rapidly expiring contract at Saltville. Other arti-
cles — such as coffee and flour — are also offered from New Orleans. The supply of flour
from that quarter will enable the soldiers from the Southwest to use that in part as a
bread ration instead of corn meal, which must otherwise be their sole reliance for bread
Tiie reserve of coffee for the sick is being rapidly consumed. No other prospect of get-
ting more presents itself, but the necessity of a sufficiency is important. The success of
the enterprise is doubtful ; but the opportunity afforded by the venality of the enemy
ought not to be lost. If we thereby obtain the use of the Mississippi from Memphis to
New Orleans, until such time as the whole or a large part of the needed supplies shall
have been obtained, it will be a great benefit.
" Its effect upon the morale of the enemy, and the political results of such a policy,
however important in themselves, are questions which, as they have not entered into my
calculations, I do not discuss. My action proceeds entirely from a sense of the absolute
necessity of these supplies to feed the army, and to subdue the want which has already
manifested itself both in Gen. Lee's army and the Army of the "West, under the priva-
tions to which they have been subjected. Eespectfully,
"L. B. NORTHROP."
No official reply was ever received to this communication. Indeed
about this time President Davis left Richmond on a visit to Mississippi,
and in a speech before the Legislature of that State pronounced the solemn
opinion that the war would soon come to an end. For this reason and
" on political principles " the policy of using cotton to get supplies through
the lines, and taking advantage of the wide-spread venality of the enemy
was negatived. The arguments against this trade were specious and
triflinor. It was said that the Federal finances were in such a condition
SUPPLIES THROUGH THE BLOCKADE. 485
that if they could not obtain cotton, upon -which to draw bills where-
with to pay their then accruing January interest, their credit would
explode, and the war would speedily cease from the bankrupting of our
assailants. Hence they wanted cotton. It was also asserted that they did
not want cotton, but only sought, under cover of a contract for supply, to
find out the channels of navigable streams, to ascertain the locatibn and
condition of certain defences, and otherwise to spy out the land. A third
argument was that the trade on the part of the government would demoralize
the people amoug whom it might be conducted ; and the newspapers added
that to trade through ISTew Orleans and let cotton clear from that port