" would make Europe think \ve had caved, who thereupon would decline
to recognize us or to intervene." Such were the fancies and punctilios
which persuaded the Confederate Government to persist in a line of policy,
the steady and inevitable tendency of which was to bring its armies to the
verge of starvation.
The project of getting supplies through the enemy's lines thus discour-
aged, it was necessary for the Commissary General to cast about for a new
resource ; and in 1863 the experiment was first attempted of obtaining sup-
plies, especially meat and coffee, from foreign ports through the blockade.
A scheme of contract was prepared on the basis of an association of indi-
vidual entcrjDrise with government capital, which, it was thought, if prop-
erly arranged, would combine the power and money of the one with the
energy and skill of the other. Especially in a business as hazardous as
blockade running would such an association, it was thought, be an advan-
tage as securing to the individuals the insurance of many ventures, and to
the government the vigilance and intelligence of private parties. It was
contemplated that the private parties should sell the cotton and purchase
the return cargo, charging two and a half per cent, commission on each
transaction ; and that the government should purchase the cotton on this
side at a commission of two and a half per cent,, with a reserved right to
the government to all the private freight room, when claimed at an agreed
rate per ton ; which was two-thirds less than had been previously demand-
ed by other blockade runners, and paid by the government.
Here again was the story of gross mismanagement and slip-shod admin-
istration on the part of the Confederate authorities. Great quantities of
meat were left to rot at Il^assau and Bermuda ; payments were not prompt-
ly made ; and the new resource that had promised such grand results dwin-
dled into insignificant numbers. Contracts for supplies, payable in cotton,
in our x\tlantic ports, were made with several parties ; but in no instance
with success. Either the amount involved was too small to tempt the
venality of those who could control or purchase an evasion of the blockade,
or tlie engagement to deliver meat alone was found to be too small an
ind'jcement to those enirao'ed in blockade runninir.
4:86 THE LOST CAUSE
In consequence of these failures, and of tlie refusal to be allowed to pur
cliase on the Mississippi, the army, especially in Virginia, was put upon
short rations. First, they were reduced to one half pound of meat per day
— which, if it could have been kept up at that, would have been sufficient
— then to one-third of a pound — though this allowance was not agreed to
or adhered to by several of the G-euerals commanding — and then to one
quarter of a pound. Upon this last allowance the Army of ISTorthern
Virginia wintered.
The policy of running the blockade, so far as the government was
interested in it for subsistence, was the occasion of odious monopolies,
violations of contract, misunderstandings, &c., and proved of little advan-
tage to the government, and of questionable profit to private parties. What
was known as the Crenshaw or Collie line of steamers did not start until
the spring of 1864, and then under unfavourable auspices. One steamei
was lost on the coast of Ireland, in coming out ; another upon her second
trip ; but two others, both very superiour steamers, were put upon the
line, one or both of which had been paid for by large advances made by
Crenshaw & Co., and were running successfully. Under their contract
the government was obliged to furnish the whole cargo of cotton for each
vessel, but, havhig failed to do so, and the private parties having been
required, against the terms of the contract, to supply their own cotton to
the vessel at market rates — a demand which was acceded to rather than
raise the issue — it was determined to take other parties into the contract.
This was rendered necessary by the inability of the government to trans-
port the cotton, and by the inability of the private parties to supplement
the government deficiencies in that particular. The government was ac-
cordingly induced by the private parties to sell one-fourth of its three-fourths
interest in the steamers to the Supply Importing Company, composed of
vai'ious railroad companies and others interested in railroads in the South.
This — though the terms of the contract were changed, and the parties be-
came, as was contended by the government, mere carriers, whereby the
subsistence department lost the benefit of the arrangement it had proposed
— at once obviated the difficulties about transporting cotton ; and, as this
new contract provided for twelve steamers, it was hoped that some good
results might be at last reached. But just as this business had got well
under way, the government decided upon taking the Atalanta, tlie best of
the steamers referred to above, for a cniiser. It was urged, in opposition
to this, that the tested speed and capacity of this vessel had induced the
private parties interested to enter into large contracts for vessels in Eng-
land, and to assume heavy obligations to pay for the government interest
in them ; that there were large quantities of subsistence stores at the Isl-
ands, purchased by Crenshaw & Co. for the commissariat, which were
much needed by the army, and might spoil if permitted to remain. Bat
THE IMPKESSIVIENT LAWS. 481l
the government insisted upon taking the ship. Other vessels wero built,
and paid for by the credit of the private parties, and l)y receipts of cotton
from those successively put on the line ; and the enterprise went on, but
with results far below the necessities of the country.
During the whole period of the efforts to put the question of meat sup-
ply from abroad upon Avhat the bureau of subsistence deemed a proper
footing, the meat in the limits of the Confederacy was being constantly
reduced in amount, though under constantly increasing efforts to get it for
the army.
The well-known effects of a depreciating currency in causing supplies
to be hoarded, rendered it necessary to impress them. This mode was
legalized by acts of Congress, which failed, however, to enforce it by any
penalty, and rendered it nugatory in many instances by requiring that in
all cases the impressment should be accompanied by a proffer of the money.
In some States the feeling against it had rendered it almost inoperative,
and the judiciary, gubernatorial or legislative action of several had practi-
cally nullified the law. As a substitute, to last until the currency could
have been amended, it might have answered ; but experience showed that,
as a permanent system, it would be resisted and evaded to such an extent
as to render it of little avail in drawing out a sufiiciency, when to furnish
it even for the army was to produce privation at home. Under the rapid
depreciation of our currency, which was now thought by many to have
reached a point of hopeless bankruptcy, and when the prices under the
schedule fixed by the Commissioners of Appraisement in the various States
were merely nominal, it was regarded by the people as an unjust and tyran-
nical tax, to be resisted to the point of compelling its abandonment as a
mode of supply.
It will thus be seen, on a general survey of the whole subsistence policy
of the Confederate government — its practical rejection of trade with the
enemy, its feeble and mismanaged efforts in running the blockade, and the
small yield of impressments — that there could be but one result and that a
constant diminution of supplies to the point of starvation. It was a policy
of blunders ; it lacked some steady and deliberate system ; and it finally,
as we shall see, in the close of the year 1864, got to that point where the
whole system of Confederate defence was bound to break down by the want
of suhsistence^ even without a catastrophe of arms!
It is astonishing what silly devices were hit upon in Richmond to meet
the coming necessity, and how the empirical remedies of shallow brains
aggi'avated the disorder. One of these so-called remedies proved one of
the vilest curses that was ever fastened upon the Confederacy. On the
6tli November, 1863, an order was issued by the Secretary of "War, that
no supplies held by a party for his own consumption, or that of his em-
ployes or slaves, should be impressed, and that " no officer should at any
488 THE LOST CAUSE.
time, unless specially ordered so to do by a general Commanding, in a ease
of exigency, impress supplies which were on their way to market for sale
on arrival."
The construction given to that order filled the land with purchasers —
private individuals, railroad companies, manufacturers of all kinds, corpora-
tions of every class, relief associations of cities, towns and counties, were per-
sonally or by their agents in the market buying a year's supply, imlimited
as to price, and protected from impressment. Speculators, whose pur-
chases were generally m transitu, found themselves protected, and the
government playing into their hands. The sudden influx of purchasers into
the market stimulated the cupidity of producers and holders of the neces-
saries of life, and induced them to withhold their supplies, under the expec-
tation of higher prices, and actually raised the prices of all the prime arti-
cles fully one hundred per cent, within a single month. The purchasing
officers of the government could not buy ; nor was it reasonable to expect
parties to sell to the government at schedule price, when double that price
was offered at their doors by others. They could not impress, for holders
had, with great promptness, contracted for all their supplies to parties
who paid them higher prices, and thus it naturally and surely happened
that the regular supplies of the government were cut off. The whole
land was infected by speculators pampered by Mr. Seddon, the Secretary
of War ; and the soldier, who was without shelter fighting our battles,
found himself discriminated against in favour of the private citizen — who,
with a roof above him, could better stand a short allowance of food, — and
put at the mercy of the most heartless and hateful speculators, who had no
conception of the war beyond that of dollars and cents.
It has been remarked that the shiftlessness of the people of the South,
their want of commercial tact or of business hnowledge, so to speak, how-
ever it might have been doubted before, was fully proved in the war, and
that this cause, as much as anything else, contributed to the ruin and pros-
tration of the Confederacy. The unbusiness-like mind of the South was
well illustrated in its commissariat ; and the mismanagement of this bureau
confirms the truth of the general observation. It is curious, indeed, how
this observation extends to all the affairs of the Confederacy. There was
a stock of childish expedients in times of grave distress in the Confederacy,
at which the world was rather disposed to laugh, despite the necessities
they indicated. When iron became scarce, an association of ladies was
formed to advertise an appeal all through the Confederacy for broken pots
and pans with which to build an armoured steamer. When the Confed-
erate finances declined, it was proposed by a foolish woman of Mobile,
who had probably never heard of the law of supply and demand, that all
of her sex in the Confederacy should be shorn, and each head of hair bring-
ing a certain price in the European markets, to realize thus many millious
MAKE-SHIFTS OF THE CONFEDEEACY. 489
of dollars ; and the proposition Avas seriously entertained in the newspapers.
But what shall be said of the government that actually and officially, in the
course of a system of finance to meet necessities counted by thousands of
millions of dollars, made appeals to the peoj)le to donate silver plate and
jewelry, and published monthly lists of contributions of rings, sugar-pota
and spoons ! These curious lists may still be found in the files of the Kich-
mond newspapers. Such vagaries are subjects of grave consideration by
the historian. They illustrate the general character of make-shifts in the
war. He who seeks to solve the problem of the downfall of the Southern
Confederacy, must take largely into consideration the absence of any intel-
ligent and steady system in the conduct of public affairs ; the little circles
that bounded the Kichmond Administration ; the deplorable want of the
commercial or business faculty in the Southern mind.
CHAPTER XXX.
A. TRAIN OF CONFEDERATE STJ00ESSE3 IN THE BEGINNING OF 1864. — THE BATTLE OF OOKAK
POND. — GEN. SEYMOUE's EXPEDITION INTO FLORIDA. — ^ITS DEFEAT AND COMPLETE DISAS-
TER. — Sherman's expedition in the southwest. — nis first experiment of " thb
MOVABLE COLUMN." — HIS DESIGNS UPON MOBILE AND THE CONFEDERATE LINES IN NORTH
GEORGIA. — THE CO-OPERATING COLUMN OF CAVALRY. — GEN. POLK EVACUATES MERIDIAN,
AND FALLS BACK TO DEMOPOLIS. — FORREST DEFEATS THE FEDERAL CAVALRY. — DISAS-
TROUS AND DISGRACEFUL CONCLUSION OF SHERMAN's ADVENTUUE. — THE RED RIVER EX-
PEDITION. — GEN. banks' designs UPON TEXAS. — THE CONFEDERATE COMMANDS IN THB
TRANS-MISSISSIPPI. — THE FEDERAL ADVANCE UP RED RIVER. — THE CONFEDERATES FALL
BACK TOWARDS SHEEVEPORT. — BATTLE OP MANSFIELD. — HOW THE ACTION WAS BROUGHT
ON. — EOUT OF THE ENEMY. — SINGULAR SCENES ON THE PURSUIT. — BATTLE OF PLEASANT
HILL, — AN UNFORTUNATE MISTAKE OF OEDEES. — CHUECHILL's COEPS PANIO-STEIOKEN. —
GEN. WALKER HOLDS THE FIELD. — THE ENEMY CONTINUES HIS RETREAT TO ALEXANDRIA. —
HIS MAECH A CAREEE OF TTNPAEALLELED OOWAEDICE AND CEIME. — LAEGE SPOILS OF THB
CONFEDEEATES. — THE EXTENT OF BANKS' DISASTEE. — TERMINATION OF HIS VISION OP
EMPIRE WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI. — FORREST's EXPEDITION UP THE MISSISSIPPI. — CAPTURE
OF FORT PILLOW. — HOKE's OPERATIONS ON THE NORTH CAEOLINA COAST. — COMPAEATIVE
UNTMPOETANCE OF THESE CONFEDERATE SUCCESSES. THE EAID OF TJLEIO DAHLGEEN. —
THE PARTS OF CUSTEE AND KILPATEICK. — FAILUEE AND LUDI0E0U3 COWARDICE OF THE
SEVERAL EXPEDITIONS. DAHLGREN's ATROCIOUS DESIGNS. — HE RETREATS, AND 13
CHASED BY POLLARD. — MANNER OF HIS DEATH. — DISCOVERY OP " THE DAHLGREN PA-
PEES." — SENSATION IN RICHMOND. — PRESIDENT DAVIs' MELODEAMA. — STATEMENT OP
EDWARD W. HALBAOH IN RELATION TO THE " DAHLGEEN PAPERS." — THE PAPERS FIRST
FOUND BY THE SCHOOLBOY LITTLEPAGE. HOW TRANSMITTED TO EIOKMOND. THE THEORY
OF FORGERY. ITS UTTER ABSURDITY.
Although the Nortliern public was gratified in eontemplatirig the sum
of Federal victories in the jear 1863, it had yet to see in the early months
of ISGi a remarkable train of Confederate successes, which, in the aggre-
gate, did much to re-animate the Confederates, and to subdue expectation
at "Washington. These successes were principally a decisive victory in
Florida ; the defeat of Sherman's expedition in the Southwest ; and a tri-
umphant issue in the most important campaign that had yet taken place
west of the Mississippi River.
V H B.HaU.tJ
-T,«nn,ed ..mressly forlhelosl Causei^jx^roilari.
shekman's expedition in the southwest. 491
BATTLE OF OCEAN POND.
The operations against Charleston having been virtually abandoned, it
was decided at "Washington to use the surplus trooj)s in an attempt upon
Florida. A command of six or seven thousand men, including two regi-
ments of negroes, was organized under Gen. Seymour, left Charleston har-
bour in eighteen transports, and in the month of February ascended the
St. Mary's Eiver. The enemy was allowed to land, as the small Confed-
erate force under Gen. Finnegan was unequal for anything like a battle,
and was awaiting reinforcements despatched by Gen. Beauregard, in whose
military department the State of Florida was included. Colquitt's brigade
arrived in time to unite with Finnegan and hold the position at Oulustre
not far from Ocean Pond, an inland lake, where it was proposed to cover
the capital of the State and defend the road from Lake City to Tallahassee.
The joint Confederate force did not number more than five thousand men.
On the 20th February, this little force was advanced several miles to
meet the enemy. A severe battle opened in the afternoon ; for two hours
the enemy was steadily pushed back ; until at last about sunset, a simul-
taneous attack of the Twenty-Seventh and Sixth Georgia Kegiments on
the enemy's centre and flank broke his whole line into confusion. Five
pieces of artillery were taken, two thousand small arms, and five hundred
prisoners. The enemy left upon the field three hundred and fifty dead,
and abandoned all of his severely w^ounded. The action was decisive, as
it resulted in the expulsion of the enemy from Florida, and the preserva-
tion of this State to the Confederacy.
Sherman's expedition in the southwest.
Another notable event about this time Avas Sherman's expedition into
Central Mississippi, in wdiich, with an army of about thirty thousand men,
he proposed to sever his communications behind him, and to strike ofi" into
the heart of the country. ^ It was his first experiment of " the movable
column," but unlike that in the later months of 1864, it had opposing
military forces to encounter, and came to the most wretched grief.
The conceit of the Federal commander was to operate upon what was
called a " strategic triangle " — to move from Yicksburg to Mobile, by the
way of Selma ; a heavy column of cavalry to start from Mem23]iis, move
rapidly across Mississij^pi and Alabama, come upon the flank of Gen.
Polk's army, and harass his retreat while Sherman rushed upon him in
front ; and thus by the possession of Mobile and Selma to obtain two im-
portant w^ater-bases — the one on the Mississippi at Yicksburg, the other at
492 THE LOST CA.USE.
Mobile on the Gulf, and to establish his army firmly in the triangle
formed by the Alabama and Tombigbee Rivers, and the railroad leading
from Selma to Demopolis and Meridian. The immediate objects of the
morement were to cut off Mobile from Johnston, who lay in front of Grant
on the lines in North Georgia, to break np Polk's army, and then to turn
down on Mobile, and co-operate with Farragut's fleet, which was at that
time thundering at the gates of this city.
On the 3d February, Sherman left Vicksburg with about thirty thou-
sand infantry, pushed east, and crossed the entire State of Mississippi to
Meridian. A few days later the cavalry column, eight thousand strong,
under command of Gens. Smith and Grierson, started from Corinth and
Holly Springs, and passed, with the usual incidents of pillage and destruc-
tion, through one of the richest districts of the Confederacy. The junction
of this cavalry force with Sherman at Meridian was the critical point of
his plan, and it was thought would enable him to advance upon Demopolis
and Selma.
Gen. Polk's little army having been reinforced by two or three
brigades from the Mobile garrison for the purpose of checking the enemy
far enough to save his accumulated stores and supplies, was yet in no con-
dition to give battle, being but half of Sherman's numbers ; and, therefore,
evacuated Meridian, and retired to Demopolis. Meanwhile Gen. Forrest,
with not more than twenty-five hundred cavalry, had been detached to
watch the movements of Smith's and Grierson's commands, and was left
to confront eight thousand of the best-equipped cavalry that the enemy
had ever put in the field. But the great cavalry chief of the "West showed
no hesitation. He struck the enemy on the broad prairies near "West
Point ; and at Okalona, on the 21st February, he had a more important
action, and put the enemy in shameful retreat back to Memphis.
This action of Forrest was decisive of the campaign ; it broke down
Sherman's means of subsisting his infantry ; and it illustrated on what
slight conditions depend the defeat or success of an enterprise which leaves
a well-defined base to penetrate the interiour of a country. Sherman in
his first experiment of " the movable column " obtained only the cheap
triumphs of the ruffian and plunderer. He was compelled to make a hasty
retreat over one hundred and fifty miles of a country he had ravaged and
exhausted ; he accomplished not a single military result ; he demoralized
a fine army ; and of the cavalry which was to co-operate with him, this
mastei of billingsgate in the army declared " half went to h — 11, and half
to Memphis.^'
THE KED KIVER EXPEDITION.
Gen. Banks, the Federal commander, had remained for some months
idle and ostentatious in Kew Orleans, with just as much of the State of
BATTLE OF MANSFIELD. 493
Louisiana in tlie Union as was covered by liis pickets. But he hoped to
signalize the year 1S64: by a remarkable expedition, which was to proceed
up Red River as far as Shreveport, thence across the country into the cen-
tral region of Texas, thereby destroying the Confederate lines on Red
River, and their supplies, which were then drawn principally from that
portion of Texas.
He proposed to move on this expedition with a land force, and a squad
ron of gunboats and transports — the former numbering about forty thou
sand men. Maj.-Gen. " Dick " Taylor was at this time commanding the
Confederate forces operating along the west bank of the Mississippi River.
Gen. Kirby Smith was commanding the Trans-Mississippi Department,
with headquarters at Shreveport. Gen. Price was temporarily command-
ing the district of Arkansas, with headquarters in the field, in the neigh-
bourhood of Camden. The Confederate force in Arkansas numbered
about eight thousand effective men. That of the Federals was conjectured
to be about fifteen thousand men, the greater part of which, under Gen.
Steele, held Little Rock. Gen. Taylor had about ten thousand men, Louis-
iana and Texas troops.
About the middle of March, Gen. Banks commenced his advance up
Red River ; and about two weeks later, Gen. Steele commenced advancing
from Little Rock, in the direction of Shreveport, intending to unite with
Banks at that point, and to assist in capturing the place. Gen. Taylor
made some desultory attempts to oppose or check the advance of the
enemy, but he was gradually forced back by overwhelming numbers, re-
treating as slowly as possible in order to give his reinforcements time to
reach him before he fell back to Shreveport. Gen. Smith had ordered two
brigades of Missouri infantry and two brigades of Arkansas infantry, which
had been operating in Arkansas, to go to Taylor's relief; and he also hur-
ried up some cavalry from Texas.
BATTLE OF MANSFIELD.
Red River is a very narrow and tortuous stream, and at the time of the
expedition was quite low. At Alexandria, one hundred and sixty miles
below Shreveport, are the " Falls," which obstruct the channel and prevent
navigation in low water. On the road from Shreveport to Alexandria,
forty miles from the former place, is Mansfield, a little village of about
five hundred inhabitants. Twenty miles from Mansfield, on the same
road, is the village of Pleasant Hill. Twenty miles further on is Blair's
Landing on Red River. Still further on, forty miles above Alexandria, on
Old River, which in high water communicates with Red River, we come
to Natchitoches, the oldest town on Red River, the scene of the last con
494 THE LOST CAUSE.
ference between the agents of Aaron Burr and Gen. Hamilton in reference
to the expedition of the former to conqn'er the Spanish and unfriendly
powers in Louisiana and Mexico.
Gen. Smith had determined to make a stand at a point between Mans-
field and Shreveport, wliere he calculated on having his army concentrated,
expecting by the superiour valour of his men to defeat the enemy's largo
force, but if not, to fall back on Shreveport, and figlit from fortifications.
On the morning of April 8th, Gen, Taylor, with his command now aug-
mented to fifteen thousand, had reached within two miles of Mansfield, and
had halted, determined to have an afi'air with the enemy. The Arkansas
and Missouri infantry organized into two divisions, the Missourians under
Gen. Parsons and the Arkansians under Gen, Tappan, and both under
Gen. Churchill, were at Iveachi, a village twenty miles from Mansfield.
Cliurchill was under orders to march his command until he formed a junc-
tion with Taylor. Accordingly, his command, on the 8th of April, marched
from Keachi to Mansfield, a distance of twenty miles, and reached their
camp after dark.
Gen, Banks was marching his army by brigades, with intervals of from