it was discharged ; his clothing and his body were blackened M'ith powder.
His murderer then dismounted and threw the General's body across his
horse, in front of the saddle, and rode about town shouting, " Here's your
horse thief." When permission was given to some of Gen. Morgan's
officers to take possession of the body, they found it lying in the road,
534 . THE LOST CAUSK.
about one mile from the place where he had been shot. It was so covcied
with mud that thej could scarcely recognize it. Tiie ball struck the centra
of the breast, about three or four inches below its junction with the neck,
and came out behind the hip bone. The brave commander met his death
as he met his foes a thousand times before ; there was no shrinking â€” not a
quiver of a nerve â€” though he saw murder in the brawny felon's eye. He
fell, leaving to his countrymen a testimony of Kentucky chivalryâ€” tho
record of a gallant, dashing life and a fearless death.
EARLY S ESrVASION OF MARTLAJTD.
We left the situation in Virginia with Lee covering Richmond and
Petersburg, and meditating a menace upon the Federal capital. Ko
sooner was the defeat of Hunter known, than the rapidity of a new move-
ment became imperative, and not a moment was lost in pushing Early's
column towards Maryland. In spite of the prostrating heat, the troops
made twenty miles a day, and the rumour of this determined advance
came to the Federal authorities, at the time when Grant was supposed to
be carrying everything before him. It was another illustration of Gen.
Lee's wonderful enterprise, and showed this commander tu bo one of the
most daring as well as the most skilful Generals of the age. That popular
opinion which regarded Lee as a good slow, prudent commander without
dash is one of the lowest and most imperfect estimates of his character.
"We see now that when Grant was hoping to suffocate him with numbers,
he dared to detach a considerable portion of his army to threaten the capi-
tal of the enemy. He was left at Petersburg with only the corps of A. P.
Hill, two divisions of E well's corps, and one division of Longstreet's. But
Lee had rightly calculated that the diversion towards Washington, coupled
with the panic it would occasion, would weaken Grant to a greater extent
than himself, besides impressing him and the Northern public with the
extent, and activity of his resources, and obtaining an important moral
It became necessary for Grant at once to lind troops to meet the new
movement. For this purpose the Sixth Corps was taken from the armies
operating against Richmond and sent up the Chesapeake Bay to man the
fortifications around Washington, while orders were sent to hurry forward
the forces of Gen. Hunter from the Ohio. To the Sixth Corps was added
the Nineteenth, which was under orders to proceed from the Gulf Depart-
ment to the lines of Yirginia, and which was already debarking in Hamp-
ton Roads. The garrisons of Baltimore and Washington were at this time
made up of heavy artillery regiments, hundred-days' men, and detachments
BATTLE OF MONOCACY BRIDGE. 635
from ^.he invalid corps ; and the rapidity of reinforcements was the im-
portant and critical concern.
On the 3d July, Gen. Early approached Martinsbnrg, accompanied by
n cavalry force under Ransom. Gen. Sigel, who was in command of the
Federal forces there, retreated across the Potomac at Shephardstown ; and
Gen. "Weber, commanding at Harper's Ferry, crossed the river, and occu-
pied Hagerstown, moving a strong colunm towards Frederick City. Mean-
while Gen. " Lew." Wallace, a commander much akin in character to
" Beast " Butler, and who had distinguished himself in Baltimore by a
cowardly ferocity and an easy prowess in the arrest and persecution
of citizens, pushed out from that city with Ricketts' division and his own
command, and took a position at' Monocacy Bridge.
BATTLE OF MONOCACY BKIDGE.
Gen. Early had pressed on, crossed the Potomac, and, advancmg to
Frederick City, found it evacuated by the Federal troops, and that the
enemy had concentrated his forces at Monocacy Bridge, four miles dis-
tant. The Federals held the east bank of the river, which runs due north
and south, and were drawn up along the railroad. Early, having crossed
the river south of the bridge, sent forward Evans' brigade across an open
field to develop the strength of the enemy. It moved steadily under a
heavy fire of musketry until within fifty yards of the enemy's position,
when another body of Federals emerged from the woods on its right, and
took it in flank. The other forces of Early were rapidly moved to the
critical ])oint ; a simultaneous charge was made ; and the enemy broke in
shameful confusion, leaving the railroad and national pike, and retreating
in the direction of Gettysburg. His losses were more than a thousand
killed and wounded, and seven hundred prisoners.
From Monocacy Gen. Early moved on "Washington, his cavalry ad-
vance reaching Roekville on the evening of the 10th July. He was now
within sight of Washington, and the fire of the skirmishers was heard at
the " White House," and in the department buildings of the capital. The
enormous march, however, had diminished his army. The five hundred
miles of incessant advance, at twenty miles a day, left him only eight
thousand infantry, about forty field pieces and two thousand cavalry with
which to assault the works around Washington.
The most im^jortant of these works was Fort Stevens. On the 12th a
severe skirmish, resulting from a reconnoissance, occurred in front of this
fort ; but Gen. Early declined to follow it up, and, by a decisive blow,
attempt the capture of Washington. Ileflecting that he was in the heai-t
of the enemy's country, and not knowing what force defended the capital,
636 THE LOST CAUSE.
he abandoned his design upon it, and in the night of the 12th commenced
There has been much question as to the extent of the danger to which
Washington was at this time exposed, and as to the merit of Early's decli-
nation of attack. Northern writers declare that if Early had made a vigor-
ous attack when he first came up, and not lost a day in a fruitless recon-
noissance, it would have resulted in the capture of the city, so fegbly was
it then defended. Fortunately we have some distinct evidence on this
point. Gen. Grant has testified that two divisions of the Sixth Corps, and
the advance of the Nineteenth Corps had reached Washington before Early
got there. Whether it would have been prudent for Early to match this
force, while Hunter was hastening from the AVest to strike his rear, and
cut him off from his only avenue of retreat across the Potomac, is a ques-
tion for the military critic to decide.
Gen. Early, having broke up his camp before Washington, retreated,
and with little molestation recrossed the Potomac, and finally stood at bay
on the Opequon to protect tlie Shenandoah Yalley. The results of the ex-
pedition fell below public expectation at the South, where again had been in-
dulged the fond imagination of the capture of Washington. But the move-
ment was, on the whole, a success ; Early brought off fi re thousand horses
and twenty-five hundred beef cattle ; and the primary object of the march
liad been accomplished when he retreated and posted himself in the Shenan-
doah Valley â€” a standing threat to repeat the enterprise upon Washington
â€” for we shall see that it was no longer a mere detached column that op-
posed him, but an army of forty or fifty thousand men. To that extent
Gen. Grant had been weakened, and the heavy weight upon Gen. Lee's
THE IVnNE FIASCO AT PETERSBUKG.
While Early was detached from Lee's lines. Gen. Grant made what may
be described as his last attempt to take Petersburg by a coup de main.
There were three parts of the enterprise : an assault on the Federal posi-
tion on Burnside's front ; the explosion of a mine under an angle of the
Confederate works, to open the way to the attack ; and a feint of opera-
tions on the north side of the James, to deceive Lee into sending away a
portion of his troops.
In June a plan had been suggested by one of Burnside's officers to ex-
cavate a tunnel under an angle of the Confederate works that was covered
by a six-gun battery. On the 25th July the work was completed. Its
length was about five liundred feet, and at the end of the tunnel the mine
was formed, running parallel with and directly under tlie fort that was to
THE MINE EXPLOSION OF PETERSBUKG. 537
be destroyed. On the 27th, the enormous quantity of 12,000 lbs. of pow-
der was placed in the mine, fuses were constructed and connected with
the magazine, and everything was in readiness for the grand explosion.
The mine was exploded between four and five o'clock in the morning
of the 30th July, An immense mass of dull, red earth was thrown two
hundred feet in the air ; human forms, gun-carriages, and small arms were
mingled in what appeared to be a bank of clouds blazing with lightning ;
a great shock smote the ear, and the ground trembled as if by an appalling
convulsion of nature. Instantly, before the rumble of the explosion had
died away, every piece of siege artillery on the enemy's line, and all the
field artillery that could be brought into position opened as with the grand
chorus of death. With such an infernal display to strike terrour into the
Confederates and to demoralize men suddenly awakened from sleep, the
Ninth Corps, fifteen thousand strong, marched out to attack, and complete
what was thought to be an easy and certain victory.
But Lee's soldiers were not men who could be fought after the Chinese
fashion of assailing the ears with terrible sounds. They were quickly pre-
pared to meet the enemy. The assaulting column, on reaching the scene
of explosion, found that there had been opened here a huge crater, one
hundred and fifty feet -ong, sixty feet wide, and from twenty-five to thirty
deep. It did not advance beyond it ; instead of rushing forward and
crowning the crest, the assailants made the most shameful exhibition of
timidity; they huddled into the ci'ater, they sought shelter there, and no
commands or persuasions could move them further. A division of negro
troops was thrown into the crater â€” this maw of death ; and for two hours
the mingled mass of white and black troops, utterly demoralized, unable to
pluck up courage to make a determined charge upon the crest, swayed to
and fro in the hollow of the exploded earthworks^ while the Confederates
were rapidly bringing up their artillery on the right and left of the crater
to destroy the enemy before he could extricate himself from the disgraceful
coil. Once a feeble charge, in which the black troops were put in advance
was made towards the crest. It was encountered by Mahone's brigade.
His men were ordered not to fire until they could see the whites of the
negroes' eyes. At the first volley delivered at this distance, the blacks
broke ; they were panic-stricken and past control ; they rushed through
the troops in the crater back to the original lines, while into this slaughter-
pen the Confederates now poured an incessant storm of bombs and shells.
Retreat across the 0})en space in rear of it was to run the gauntlet of death.
The ground all around was dotted with the fallen ; while the sides and bot-
tom of the crater were literally lined with dead, the bodies lying in every
conceivable position. Some had evidently been killed with the butts of
muskets, as their crushed skulls and badly smashed faces too plainly indi-
cated ; while the greater portion were shot, great pools of blood having
538 THE LOST CAUSE.
flowed from their wounds and stained the ground. In a few short houra
of morninf^ the enemy had lost between four and tive thousand men, and
had accomplished nothing.
" This miserable aft'air," as Gen. Grant himself was forced to entitle it^
appears to have been sufficient to satisfy him that he could not hope for
the capture of Petersburg from expedients, partial eflorts and coujps de
main^ and that the task was one of magnitude far beyond his original com-
prehension. His last spasmodic effort went far to persuade the Northern
public that his whole campaign was a failure, and that they had miscalcu-
lated the importance of his mere vicinity to the Confederate capital, when
Gen. Lee had been able to hold Petersburg against an attack combining so
many elements of success, and that too after he had detached dn important
column into the valley of Virginia, and sent five of his divisions to the
north side of the James. The commentary of the New York Times was
logical and significant. It said : " Under the most favourable circum-
stances, with the rebel force reduced by two great detachments, we failed
to carry their lines. Will they not conclude that the twenty-five thousand
men that held Grant in check are sufficient to garrison the works of Peters-
burg % "Will they not conclude that, if they were able thus to hold their
own with the force of from eighteen to twenty thousand men sent to the
north side of the James River neutralized, this force is available for active
operations elsewhere ? "
SHEEMAN's OAMPAIGX in GEORGIA THE IMPORTANT CORRESPONDENT OF GRANt's IN VIEQINIA*
THE " ON-TO-RIOHMOND," AND TOE " ON-TO-ATLANTA," THE TWO IMPORTANT MOVE-
MENTS OF 1864. â€” Sherman's demand of numbers. â€” gen. joseph e. jorxston's com-
mand. HE proposes an OFFENSIVE MOVEMENT. IS BALKED BY BRAGG AT RICHMOND.
STATEMENT OF JOHXSTON's FORCES ON IST MAT. JOIINSTON's POLICY OF RETREAT.
HE PROPOSES TO FIGHT AT CASSVILLE ; BUT IS OVERRULED BY HOOD AND HARDEE. HB
crosses THE ETOWAH â€” ENGAGEMENT AT NEW HOPE CHURCH. BATTLE OF KENESAW
MOUNTAIN. â€” Sherman's ghastly experiment, â€” he resorts to manoeuvring. â€” John-
ston RETIRES TO ATLANTA. THE SITUATION AROUND ATLANTA. DEFEAT OF STURGIS'
COLUMN IN NORTH MISSISSIPPI. JOHNSTON MASTER OF THE SITUATION. â€” WONDERFUL
SUCCESS OF HIS RETREAT. HE HOLDS SHERMAN SUSPENDED FOR DESTRUCTION. NAVAL
FIGHT IN MOBILE BAY, â€” A MATCH OF 212 GUNS AGAINST 22. â€” HOW THE GUN-BOATS 8ELMA
AND MORGAN FOUGHT THE ENEMY. â€” GALLANT FIGHT OF THE IRON-CLAD TENNESSEE. â€”
SURRENDER OF THE FORTS IN THE HARBOUR. â€” LITTLE VALUE OF FARKAGUT's CONQUEST.
EXCESSIVE LAUDATION OF HIM IN THE NORTH. SINKING OF THE CONFEDERATE PRI-
VATEER ALABAMA. REVIEW OF THE RESULT OF THE PRIVATEERING SERVIC.i; OF THE OON-
FEDERATES. A GLANCE AT BRITISH " NEUTRALITY." HOW EARL RUSSELL WAS BULLIED
BY THE WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT. THE STORY OF THE LAIRDs' RAMS, OHUISE OF THE
ALABAMA. WHY SHE FOUGHT THE KEARSARGE OFF THE FRENCH COAST. CAPT. SEMMES'
MOTIVES FOR A NAVAL DUEL. THE ALABAMA SINKING. â€” THE FEDERAL VlfSEL SENDS
NO RELIEF. â€” MR. SEWARd's LITTLE REMARK ABOUT " PIRATES." â€” DISCOVERT OF CON-
CEALED ARMOUR ON THE KEARSARGE. â€” HOW THE RICHMOND EDITORS â– WOUID HAVE
TREATED CAPT. WINSLOW. A CURIOUS ANECDOTE OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. CAITl'RE OF
THE PRIVATEER FLORIDA. THE EXPLOIT OF NAPOLEON COLLINS IN A NEUTRAL PORT.
HE ATTEMPTS TO SINK AND THEN STEALS THE CONFEDERATE VESSEL. THE NEW YORK
HERALD AND " THE PAGES OF HISTORY." â€” INVASION OF MISSOURI BY GEN. PRICE. â€” HOW
AND WHY IT FAILED. THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI SUNK OTTT OF SIGHT IN THE VAR.
The important correspondent of Grant's campaign in Yirn;inia was
that of Sherman in Geoi'gia ; the great military effort of ISOi being re-
solved into two imj^ortant movements : the " On-to-Kichmond," and the
" On-to-Atlanta." These grand movements were on different sides of the
Alleghany mountains ; a thousand miles of distance intervened between
them ; but both concurred in the design of attempting deep operations in
the South, and reaching what were deemed vital points of the Confederacy.
640 THE LOST CAUSE.
Gen. Sherman demanded what Federal commanders invariably named
as the condition of their success against the brave Confederate armiesâ€”
vastly superiour numbers. Questions of generalship, skill and courage
were concerns for the Confederates. Slierman did not discuss these ; he
wanted physical momentum ; he demanded a hundred thousand men and
two hundred and fifty pieces of artillery. The lavish government at
Washington supplied the demand, minus twelve hundred men. Three
armies were united under Sherman, viz. : the army of the Cumberland,
Maj.-Gen. Thomas commanding; the army of tlic Tennessee, Maj. -Gen.
McPherson commanding ; and the army of the Ohio, Maj.-Gen. Scliofield
commanding. The effective strength of these three armies was 98,797
men, and two hundred and fifty-four guns.
Fortunately for the Confederacy the military genius of Gen. Joseph E.
Johnston had been called again, although unwillingly, into service by
President Davis, who had displaced Bragg from the Army of Tennessee
only after he had accomplished a complete sum of disaster, and capped his
career of misfortune on Missionary Ridge. On the 27tli December, 1863,
Gen. Johnston had assumed command of the army at Dalton, Georgia.
In January he had fallen back from Dalton, and his advanced posts ; on
the 7th February he was encamped at Rome, Georgia ; but he again ad-
vanced to Dalton shortly afterwards, and proposed then an offensive move-
ment against the enemy, whose strength he knew would be greatly increased
in the spring, and who, therefore, could be attacked with better advantage
before such increase of the disproportion of numbers. Gen. Johnston
knew very well that he could not expect reinforcements at pace with the
enemy, and was, therefore, wisely determined to make at once a forward
movement and try issues with him as soon as possible. But a most un-
timely controversy in Richmond defeated Johnston's just and promising
plan of operations. Gen. Bragg had been removed from command of the
army he had so disastrously led, to take the post, by the persistent par-
tiality of President Davis, of " consulting or advising officer " to the Exec-
utive. The favourite in Richmond had his own plan of offensive opera-
tions differing from that of Johnston; President Davis agreed with him.
Gen. Johnston, in vain, telegraphed to Richmond : " I expressly accept
taking the offensive â€” I only difier with you as to details " ; but the dis-
cussion of 'â€¢ details " lingered in Richmond, until, when in the month of
April the President sent a messenger to Georgia to explain his plans, the
opportunity of the ofi'ensive was past, the enemy was being reinforced to
more than twice Johnston's number, and was only waiting for the signal
from over the Alleghanies to commence the " On-to- Atlanta " movement.
On the 1st May, the eftective artillery and infantry of the Array of
Tennessee amounted to 40,900 ; the effective cavalry to about four thou-
sand. Gen. Johnston was thus greatly overmatched in numbers ; and he
Sherman's on-to-atlanta. 541
had no prospect of compensation, but in snperioiir skill and strategy But
the condition of his army was excellent in every respect, and had been
made so by the admirable skill and inspiration he had brought to the
work of its regeneration. It was well-fed, well-clad, in high and hopeful
spirits ; and for the first time in its history there was no barefoot soldier
in its ranks. Ninety days before, the army left by Bragg was dishearten-
ed, despairing, and on the verge of dissolution. By judicious measures
Gen. Johnston had restored confidence, re-established discipline, and
exalted the hearts of his army. There was reason now to hope that the
Army of Tennessee, tlie most ill-starred and successless of all our armies,
had seen its worst days.
In the first days of May, simultaneous with the onward movement of
Grant in Virginia, Sherman began his grand march into Georgia. The
Federal advance was in three columns â€” Thomas moving in front, direct
upon Johnston's centre at Dalton, with his advance at 3\inggold and Tun-
nel Hill ; Schofield from Cleveland thirty miles northeast of Chattanooga,
via Red Clay, on the Georgia line, to unite with Thomas ; and JMcPher-
6on, by a flank movement of some forty or fifty miles upon Johnston's
lines of communications at Resaca, a station on the Western and Atlantic
railroad, at the crossing of the Oostanaula river, eighty-four miles from
Atlanta, and fifteen miles south of Dalton.
The flank movement on Resaca forced Johnston to evacuate Dalton.
On the Ittth May, having moved to Resaca, he sustained, with perfect suc-
cess, two attacks of the enemy on his breastworks, and drove him witli a
loss of two thousand men. But Johnston did not design to fight here ;
he determined to fall back slowly until circumstances should put the
chances of battle in his favour, and he hoped by taking advantage of posi-
tions and opportunities to reduce the odds against him by partial engage-
ments. In pursuance of this characteristic policy, he took up at leisure
his line of retrograde movement in the direction of the Etowah River, pass-
ing through Kingston and Cassville.
In rear of Cassville Gen. Johnston had proposed to deliver a decisive
battle, taking position on a bold ridge with an open valley before it.
Two of his corps commanders, however â€” Polk and Hood â€” questioned the
value of the position against the enemy's artillery, flatly declared their
distrust, and were for abandoning the ground immediately. " So unwill-
ing were they," writes Gen. Johnston, " to depend on the ability of their
corps to defend the ground, that I yielded, and the army crossed the Eto-
wah on the 20th of May â€” a step which I have regretted ever since.^'' He
had reason to regret it. While he retreated towards Allatoona Pass, a
division of Thomas' army was sent to Rome, ca])turing it with its forts and
artillery, and its valuable mills and foundries. Meanwhile Sherman pressed
Bteadily on for Dallas with a view of turning the difficult pass at Allatoona,
642 THE LOST CAUSE.
On the 25th the Federal advance under Hooker struck Stewart's divi-
sion at the 'New Hope Church, and a hot engagement of two hours ensued.
The next two days there was constant skirmishing and fighting. Late in
afternoon of the 27th, Cleburne's division assaulted McPherson at Dallas
and left six hundred of the enemy's dead on the field. But these sharp
encounters were of little significance ; for it was evidently not Sherman's
intention to make a great battle, and risk dashing his army to pieces in
trying to force the pass at Allatoona. He was merely developing his lines
for a movement on Johnston's flank ; and when, on the 30th of May, his
left had readied the railroad near Marietta, Johnston had no other choice
than to abandon his position at New Hope Church, and retreat to the
strong positions of Kenesaw, Pine and Lost Mountains.
BATTLE OF KENESAW MOUNTAIN".
These natural battlements covered the railroad back to the Chatta-
hoochie river. On the 19th June the disposition of Johnston's forces was :
Hood's corps with its right on the Marietta and Canton road, Loring's
on the Kenesaw Mountain, and Hardee's, with its left extending across the
Lost Mountain, and the Marietta road. Subsequently Cheatham's and
Cleburne's divisions of Hardee's corps were moved up to Kenesaw Moun-
tain, which was properly the apex of Johnston's lines.
On the 27th June Sherman attempted an assault by McPherson and
Thomas on Johnston's left centre on Kenesaw Mountain. The battle was
but the slaughter of thousands of his men. They never came in contact
witli the Confederate works ; they were swept by a fiery torrent of shot
and shell ; and when the attack was withdrawn more than three thousand
of the enemy were scattered over the rugged ground, dead or bleeding.
On the Confederate side, Cheatham's division lost one hundred and ninety-
five men, while two thousand of the enemy were killed and wounded in
his front. In Cleburne's division the loss was eleven ; that in Loring's
whole corps two hundred and thirty-six ; while on this part of the line the
loss of the enemy was more than a thousand. Of this ghastly experiment
Gen. Sherman was satisfied to write : " Failure as it was, and for which I
assume the entire responsibility, I yet claim it produced great fruits, as it
demonstrated to Gen. Johnston that I would assault, and that boldly."
After his repulse at Kenesaw Moimtain, Sherman again resorted to
manoeuvring. On the night of the 2d July, he commenced moving his
army by the left flank, and on the morning of the 3d found that Johnston,
in consequence of this movement, had abandoned Kenesaw, and retreated
across the Chattahoochie. He remained on the Chattahoochie to give hia
men rest and get up stores, until tlie 17th July, when he resumed opera*