the way of White Post, nearer the Yallej turnpike, Early's line of com-
munication, than a greater portion of the Confederate troops, with the ad-
vantage of coming out in rear of Early's right at "Winchester, Sheridan
saw the opportunity oflered : Kershaw, with his large division gone, and
the remaining troops stretched out for twenty-two miles. He decided, of
course, to attack, and commenced moving up with the intention of seizing
and occupying Winchester before Early could retrace his steps. On the
afternoon and night of the 18th he began his movement from Berryville,
eleven miles from Winchester.

Gen. Early left Martinsburg, though in ignorance of the enemy's move-
ment, on the morning of the 18th, and encamped Gordon and Kodes' divi-
sions that night in the vicinity of Bunker's Hill, some twelve miles from
Winchester.

By daylight on the 19th the Confederate pickets had been driven in,
and the enemy's cannon were thundering at Ramseur's little band, drawn
up beyond the town of Winchester. Lee's cavalry division was soon in
position on Ramseur's left, and the battle began. Never did men fight
better, for they sustained the repeated and furious assaults of an enemy
immensely their superiour, and alone maintained the contest until eleven
o'clock in the morning, when the advance of Rodes' division made its ap-
pearance, Rodes' troops were hastily thrown into action, and their com-
mander soon after killed, Gordon arrived next, and went in on our ex-
treme left. Wharton, in command of Breckinridge's old division, arrived
last, though nearer to Winchester than the other two. It had been holding
in check two divisions of the enemy's cavalry under Torbert at Stephenson's
depot, which had been sent around towards that place for the purpose of re-
tarding the march of the troops hastening to the relief of Winchester.

A portion of Lomax's division arrived with Breckenridge, the remainder
having previously come up ; and with the greater j)art of Lee's division of
csfvalry were transferred to the extreme right and placed opposite Wilson's
cavalry to prevent it from swinging around and getting possession of the
tm'npike in rear of Winchester,

Gordon, previous to Bi'eckenridge's arrival, had driven the enemy by a
most gallant charge in line of battle, but going too far, had been driven
back in turn. A battery of six guns, supported by a brigade of cavalry,
had been placed on Gordon's extreme left. It allowed the enemy's ad-
vancing lines to pass it, their right almost brushing it, so close did it march
I to its position. The battery was concealed under the edge of a hill.
Hardly had the Federal lines got beyond it than its intrepid, adventurous
commander. Major Breathed,* ordered the guns to be placed in battery

* Of thte officer, whose reputation for daring was Imown throughout the armies of Vir^nia, and
of whom Gen. Fitzhugh Lee says, '* he was the most recMesslj brave man I ever knew," there is



BATTLE OF WINCHESTER. 595

apon the crest of tlie liill. In a few minutes, a most destructive and un-
expected "fire was poured into the enemy's ranks. It was sometliing more
than an enfilading fire. The Federal line of battle was soon broken by it.
Gordon seized the opportunity, turned, and charged ; and the retreat of
the enemy soon degenerated into a rout. There appeared now but little
doubt that the day was for the Confederates.

But at this time the enemy's reserve infantry, the greater part of
Crook's Corps (the Eighth), made its appearance, prolonging their extreme
right. Gordon's successful advance was stoj)ped, for fear his flank was
endangered. Breckinridge's troops, coming up at this time, were placed
in opposition to Crook, and on Gordon's left ; but his flank was very much
overlajjped by the superiour numbers of Crook.

The movement which placed Breckinridge in line of battle to confront
Crook, freed the enemy's two cavalry divisions, Merritt's and Averill's,
under Torbert. Their line was formed on Crook's right, in the shape of a
semi-circle, and completely environed the Confederate left and rear. Every
man on the Confederate side was closely engaged. A few hundred cav-
alry, and a small regiment of infantry, under Col. Patton, withdi-awn fi-om
fighting in Crook's front, stayed for a little time the heavy movement of
the enemy's cavalry. But it was impossible to hold it in check. The
country was open ; every movement of the enemy was discernible on the
Confederate left ; and yet there were no troops available to counteract what

an authentic incident, related by his commander, connected with Lee's early battles on the Rapi-
dan.

Of this incident Fitzhugh Lee writes : " Maj. Jas. Breathed, commanding my horse artillery, by
my order placed a single gun in position on a little knoll, as we were falling back, disputing the
enemy's advance towards Spottsylvania Court-house. We knew the enemy's infantry were march-
ing in column through a piece of woods, and the object was to fire upon the head of the column, as
it debouched, to give the idea that their further advance would again be contested, and to compel
them to develop a line of battle with skirmishers thrown out, &c. The delay which it was hoped
to occasion by such demonstration was desirable in order to increase the chances of our infantry,
then marching by another and parallel route to the Court-house. Under Maj. B's personal super-
intendence, shells were thrown, and burst exactly in the head of the column as it debouched. The
desired effect was obtained ; the head of the enemy's advance was scattered, and it was only with
some difficulty a line of battle with skirmishers in its front was formed to continue the advance,
I was sitting on my horse near Breathed, and directed him to withdraw his gun, but he was so
much elated with his success that he begged to be allowed to give the enemy some more rounds.
He fired until their line got so close that you could hear them calling out, " Surrender that gun, you
rebel son of a b — h." Breathed's own horse had just been shot. The cannoneers jumped on their
horses, expecting of course the gun to be captured, and retreated rapidly down the hill. B. was
left alone. He Umbered the gun up, and jumped on the lead horse. It was shot from under him.
Quick as lightning he drew his knife, cut the leaders out of the harness, and sprang upon a ewlhg
horse. It was also shot from under him just as he was turning to get into the road. He the a
severed the harness of the swing horse, jumped upon one of the wheel horses, and again made the
desperate trial for life. The ground was open between the piece and woods ; the enemy had a
full view of the exploit ; and Breathed at last dashed off unharmed, almost miraculously escaping
through a shower of bullets."



596 THE LOST CAUSE.

was now the decisive movement of the enemy's cavalry. The Confederate
left was comjaletelj turned ; the enemy was let in on the rear of the re-
mainder of the line ; and the Confederate infantry, which had so long
withstood fourfold odds, now pressed heavily in front by the enemy's in-
fantry, and on the right by his cavalry, was compelled to give way under
the combined assault, and at last broke in confusion, retiring from the field
and through Winchester, with the enemy in pursuit.

In this battle Gen. Early lost twenty-five himdred prisoners and five
pieces of artillery. But in this battle there had been a surpassing display
of courage in the men who had held their ground so long against the
swarming forces of the enemy. It is quite certain that up to the moment
when he put his cavalry in motion against the Confederate left, Sheridan
had been virtually defeated, l^ot until the enemy's cavalry advanced on
the Martinsburg road, attained the Confederate rear, and charged them in
flank and rear, was there the least wavering. It is true that from that
moment the action was lost. Early's line gave way in confusion ; his ar-
tillery was fought to the muzzle of the guns, but could do nothing, and
that night the Confederate forces were in full retreat up the Yalley.



BATTLE OF FISHER S HILL.

Gen. Early retired to Fisher's Hill, near Strasburg, a position overlook-
ing the north branch of the Shenandoah River, and protected on the west
by the North Mountain. Tliis position has been described as a very de-
fensible one, indeed the strongest in the Yalley of Virginia. But a Con-
federate officer, who has ably reviewed the campaign, remarks : " "When
Early took up a position on the great range of hills above Strasburg, and
waited to be attacked, he committed an error under the circumstances,
which the General himself, at this day, would probably acknowledge. The
ground there is unsuitable to receive an attack upon, unless the force stand-
ing on the defensive is strong enough to reach from mountain to moun-
tain. Gen. Jackson is said to have expressed this opinion, and it is certain
that he never made a stand there. Gen. Early did so, and was flanked on
the left."

On the 22d October, Sheridan formed his force for a direct attack on
Early's position, while Torbert's cavalry moved by the Luray Yalley to
gain Newmarket, twenty miles in Early's rear, to cut off his retreat.
While making a feint of an attack in front, a corps of infantry was sent
around to Early's left, resting on the North Mountain, flanked it, attacked
it in rear, and drove it from its entrenchments. The whole Confederate
line was easily disrupted, and Early retired in great disorder, losing eleven
pieces of artillery. Happily his line of retreat was secured, as Torbert had



GEN. Sheridan's devastations. 597

been held in check at Milford by a small division of Confederate cavalry
under Gen. Wickham.

The retreat was continued to the lower passes of the Blue Ridge. Gen.
Early had lost half his army, and it was supposed that his career was now
at an end. Sheridan pushed the pursuit to Staunton and the gaps of the
Blue Ridge ; but, before returning to Strasburg, and taking position on the
north side of Cedar Creek, this Federal commander resolved upon an act
of barbarism, competing with the worst reputations of the war. He de-
termined to devastate the upper portion of the Yalley as he abandoned it.
This ruthless measure was not confined to the destruction of the crops, pro-
visions, and forage ; mills were burned, farming implements were de-
stroyed, and a wanton vengeance was inflicted upon the country for many
years to come. Gen. Sheridan wrote from Strasburg, as if he were com-
memorating a great deed, instead of writing down a record of imperish-
able infamy : " In moving back to this point, the whole country, from the
Blue Ridge to the North Mountain, has been made entirely untenable for
a rebel army. I have destroyed over two thousand barns filled with wheat
and hay and farming implements ; over seventy mills filled with flour and
wheat ; have driven in front of the army over four thousand head of stock,
and have killed and issued to the troops not less than three thousand sheep
This destruction embraces the Luray Yalley and the Little Fort Valley, as
well as the main valley."

Of this and other like atrocities of the enemy, there has been attempted
a very weak excuse, to the efi'ect that if the private property of the inhabit
ants of the Confederacy had not been destroyed, it might have been con-
verted to the uses of the belligerent Government, and have helped to sus-
tain it. Once for all, it may be said that this excuse excludes every senti-
ment of humanity in war, and may be logically carried to the last extremi-
ties of savage warfare. Some time ago a great indignation was awakened
in Northern newspapers, when a Northern officer justified his putting to
ieath some children belonging to a hostile Indian tribe on the gi-ound
that, if they had not been killed, they would have grown up to be men and
chiefs, to fight the armies of the United States. But the logic of this was
unimpeachable, quite as sound as that which justified the outrages of pri-
vate property and deeds of devastation and horrour, committed by such
men as Sheridan and Sherman. There are some things, even in war,
which are to be done, or to be left undone, without regard to consequences.
Modern war is not based upon logic ; it is not merely a question of how
much ruin may be done ; it is not simple " cruelty," as Sherman defined
it to the mayor of Atlanta ; it recognizes certain claims of humanity and
indicates a class of outrages for which no selfish reason is commensurate,
A writer of authority, treating of the law of nations, says : " When the
French armies desolated, with fire and sword, the Palatinate in 1674, and



598 THE LOST CAUSE.

again in 1689, there was a general outcrj througliout Europe against such
a mode of carrying on war ; and when the French minister Lonvois alleged
that the object in view was to cover the French frontier against the inva-
sion of the enemy, the advantage which France derived from the act was
universally held to be inadequate to the suffering inflicted, and the act
itself to be therefore unjustifiable."



BATTLE or CEDAR CKEEK.

Having received reinforcements, Gen. Early returned to the Valley in
October. These reinforcements consisted of one division of infantry (Ker-
shaw's), numbering twenty-seven hundred muskets, one small battalion of
artillery, and. about six hundred cavalry, which about made up the Con-
federate losses at Winchester and Fisher's Hill. On the 9th October,
Rosser's cavalry, which had hung on Sheridan's rear, was attacked on the
Strasburg pike, while a division of cavalry, moving by a back road, took
him in flank. In this affair the enemy took eleven pieces of artillery and
several hundred prisoners. On the 18tli October, Early was again at
Cedar Creek, between Strasburg and "Winchester. He had less than ten
thousand men, and about forty pieces of artillery. His force was inade-
quate for open attack, and his only opportunity was to make a surprise.
The enemy was posted on a line of low hills, the Eighth corps on the left,
the Nineteenth corps in the centre, and the Sixth corps on the right, some-
what in rear and in reserve. Early's dispositions for attack were to make
a feint with light artillery and cavalry against the enemy's right, while the
bulk of his forces marched towards the left where the Sixth corps was
posted.

The movement commenced a little past midnight. Whilst demonstra-
tions were made against the Federal right, whence the sounds of musketry
already announced a fight on the picket line, the flanking columns of the
Confederates toiled along seven miles of rugged country, crossing the north
fork of the Shenandoah by a ford about a mile to the east of the junction
of Cedar Creek with that stream. The march was performed in profound
silence. Many places had to be traversed by the men in single file, who
occasionally had to cling to bushes on the precipitous sides of the moun-
tain to assist their foothold. At dawn the flanking column was across the
ford : Gordon's division in front, next Ramseur's, and Pegram's in reserve.
A heavy fog yet favoured them. The enemy's pickets had not yet taken
the alarm ; some of them had reported that they heard a heavy, muffled
tramp and rustling through the underbrush, but no attention was paid
to a supposed fancy, and no reconnoissance was sent out. Early had
brought his coltimn, unperceived. to the rear of the left flank of the Fed-



BATTLE OF CEDAR CEEEK. 59&

eral force ; and it remained now but to close in npon the enemj, and fight
rapidly.

The surprise was complete. The Eighth corps was unable to form a
Kne of battle, and in five minutes was a herd of fugitives. Many of the
men awoke only to find themselves prisoners. The ISTineteenth corps was
soon involved in the rout. The valorous Confederates pressed on, driving
the whole Federal left and centre, slaying many of the enemy in their
camps, capturing eighteen pieces of artillery, fifteen hundred prisoners,
small arms without number, wagons, camps, everything on the ground.

The retreat of the enemy was now a general one, the Sixth corps doing
what it could to cover it. At Middletown an attempt was made to form
a line of battle ; but tlie Confederates threatened a flank movement, got
possession of the town, and put the enemy on what was supposed to be hie
final retreat to "Winchester.

The vigour of the pursuit was lost here. The fire and. flush of the
valorous charge was quenched, as the men now betook themselves to
plundering the Federal camps, taking no notice of the enemy in the dis-
tance beyond some skirmishing and desultory artillery fire. But the ene-
my had no idea of continuing his retreat to Winchester. At the first good
ground between Middletown and Newtown the troops were rallied, a com-
pact line formed, and the enemy soon put in a condition to resist further
attack or take the offensive.

The ]S[orthern newspapers, with their relish for dramatic circumstance,
had a singular story of how the sudden apparition of Gen. Sheridan on a
black horse flecked with foam, which he had galloped from Winchester,
where he had slept the previous night, reassured his fugitive army, and
restored the battle. But the fact is that Sheridan did not appear on the
field until the army had reorganized a new line of battle and made its
dispositions for attack, which he did not change in any respect. The
counter-charge was made at three o'clock in the afternoon. The Con-
federates were not prepared for it ; they had been demoralized by pillage ;
when urged forward they had moved without enthusiasm ; and. when in
the afternoon Gen. Early decided to attempt an advance, he was compelled
to move cautiously, feeling his way with artillery.

At the first contact with the enemy, Gordon's division broke ; Ker-
shaw's and Kamseur's followed in retreat, and the field became covered
with flying men. The artillery retired, firing slowly, and sustained only
by Pegram's old brigade and Evan's brigade. Across Cedar Creek the
enemy's cavalry charged in rear of the Confederate train without provok-
ing a shot ; and a bridge on a narrow part of the road between the creek
and Fisher's Hill having broken down, guns and wagons were abandoned.
Many ordnance and medical stores, and twenty -three pieces of artillery,
besides those taken in the morning by Early, were captured. About fif



600 THE LOST CAUSE.

teen hundred prisoners were taken, -whicli fully made up for those
lost by the enemy in the morning. The day was completely turned
against the Confederates and night closed with the enemy's infantry
occupying their old camps, and his cavaliy pursuing the wreck of Early's
army.

"With reference to the disaster of Cedar Creek, Gen. Early published an
address to his troops, ascribing to their misconduct the loss of the field,
and attemping to break the censure levelled at the commander. He
wrote : " 1 had hoped to have congratulated you on the splendid victory
won by you on the morning of the 19th, at Belle Grove, on Cedar Creek,
when you surprised and routed two corps of Sheridan's army, and drove
back several miles the remaining corps, capturing eighteen pieces of artil-
lery, one thousand five hundred prisoners, a number of colours, a large
quantity of small arms and many wagons and ambulances, with the entire
camps of the two routed corps ; but I have the mortification of announc-
ing to you that, by your subsequent misconduct, all the benefits of that
victory were lost, and a serious disaster incurred. Had you remained
steadfast to your duty and your colours, the victory would have been one
of the most brilliant and decisive of the war ; you would have gloriously
retrieved the reverses at Winchester and Fisher's Hill, and entitled your-
selves to the admiration and gratitude of your country. But many of you,
including some commissioned officers, yielding to a disgraceful propensity
for plunder, deserted your colours to appropriate to yourselves the aban-
doned property of the enemy ; and, subsequently, those who had pre-
viously remained at their posts, seeing their ranks thinned by the absence
of the plunderers, when the enemy, late in the afternoon, with his shat-
tered columns made but a feeble efibrt to retrieve the fortunes of the day,
yielded to a needless panic, and fled the field in confusion, thereby con-
verting a splendid victory into a disaster."

But this explanation of the conversion of a victory into a disaster, as a
personal defence of Gen. Early, is scarcely fair. If soldiers resort to pillag-
ing on a field of victory the commander is the responsible party, unless
where it is shown that he resorted to the most extreme measures to restrain
a disorder so shameful and j)lainly deserving death on the spot, and that,
despite all eSbrts, the men had passed completely beyond his control.
The broad fact cannot be concealed that for four or five hours Gen. Early
was in the condition of a commander who had lost the vigour of pursuit
and was satisfied to put up with a half-way success. This disposition to
pause in battle and be satisfied with a half victory was not the peculiar
story of Cedar Creek. It was the cm-se of more than one Confederate
commander. As Gen. Early counted his victory and paused in his career,
the refluent wave of the enemy overtook him, swept away his laurels, and
overwhelmed him with an unexpected disaster. The story is not difierent



CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 601

from that of other Confederate battle-fields where a mediocre commandei
has trifled with success.

Gen. Early had received a stunning defeat from which his army never
recovered. The battle of Cedar Creek practically closed the campaign in
the Yalley, and most of Early's infantry were returned to Gen. Lee's
lines. Breckinridge was detached and sent to command in the Soutli-
western Department. The three divisions (composing what was known
as the Second Army Corps) formerly conmianded by Rodes, Gordon, and
Ramseur, were placed under the command of Gordon, the sole survivor of
the three, and sent back to Gen. Lee. Nearly the whole of the cavalry
were temporarily furloughed, the Government being unable to supply them
with forage. Early was left with his. headquarters at Staunton, and what
remained of Wharton's division constituted the Army of the Yalley.

The unfortunate commander continued for some time to move uneasily
up and down the Yalley, with his small force ; but all operations of
moment had plainly ceased there ; there was not forage enough for any
considerable body of cavalry ; and some weeks later we shall see the last
appearance of Gen. Early on the military stage, at Waynesboro' ,where his
command, consisting of about a thousand infantry, was captured, and the
General with two staff officers escaped to Charlottesville, the melancholy
remnant of an enterprise that had been planned to relieve Richmond and
turn the scales of the war.

In consequence of the disastrous campaign we have narrated, but not
until a very late period of the war. Gen. Early was removed from com-
mand. Gen Lee wrote to his subordinate with characteristic generosity :

HEAD-auARTERS 0. S. ARMIES, March 30, 1865,

Lieut.- Gen. J. A. Barly, FranTclin C. H., Ya. :

Dear Sib : My telegram will have informed you that I deem a change of commanders
in your department necessary, but it is due to your zealous and patriotic services that I
Bhould explain the reasons that prompted my action. The situation of affairs is such
tliat we can neglect no means calculated to develop the resources we possess to the
greatest extent, and make them as efficient as possible. To this end it is essential that
we should have the cheerful and hearty support of the people and the full confidence of
the soldiers, without which our etforts would be embarrassed, and our means of resis-
tance weakened. I have reluctantly arrived at the conclusion that you cannot command
the united and willing co-operation which is so essential to success. Tour reverses in
the Yalley, of which the public and the army judge chiefly by the results, have, I fear,
impaired your influence both with the people and the soldiers, and would add greatly
to the difficulties which will, under any circumstances, attend our military operations iu
Southwestern Virginia. While my own confidence in your ability, zeal, and devotion
to the cause is unimpaired, I have nevertheless felt that I could not oppose what seems to
\e the current of opinion without injustice to your reputation and injury to the service.
I therefore felt constrained to endeavour to find a commander who would be more likely
to develop the strength and resources of the country, and inspire the soldiers with confi-