before they could be concentrated. At the outset
the Germans came down on Nogent-le-Rotrou, where
Rousseau's column was stationed, inflicted a reverse
on him, and compelled him (January 7) to fall back
on Connerre a distance of thirty miles from
Nogent, and of less than sixteen from Le Mans. On
the same day, sections of Jouffroy's forces were
defeated at Epuisay and Poirier (mid-way between
Le Mans and Vendome), and also forced to retreat.
The French detachments (under Jouffroy, Curten,
and Barry) which were stationed along the line from
Saint Calais to Montoire, and thence to Saint Amand
and Chateau-Renault a stretch of some five-and-
twenty miles were not strong enough to oppose
the German advance, and some of them ran the risk
of having their retreat cut off. Chanzy realized the
danger, and on the morning of January 8 he de-
spatched Jaureguiberry to take command of all the
troops distributed from the south to the south-east,
between Chateau-du-Loir and Chateau-Renault, and
bring them to Le Mans.

But the 10th German Corps was advancing in these
directions, and, after an engagement with Barry's
troops at Ruille, secured positions round La Chartre.
This seriously threatened the retreat of the column
under General Curten, which was still at Saint
Amand, and, moreover, it was a further menace to
Barry himself, as his division was distributed over
a front of fourteen miles near Chateau-du-Loir.
Jaureguiberry, however, entreated Barry to continue
guarding the river Loir, in the hope of Curten being
able to retreat to that point.

Whilst, however, these defensive attempts were
being made to the south of Le Mans, the Germans
were pressing forward on the north-east and the



268 MY DAYS OF ADVENTURE

east, Prince Frederick Charles being eager to come
in touch with Chanzy's main forces, regardless of
what might happen on the Loir and at Saint Amand.
On the north-east the enemy advanced to La Ferte
Bernard ; on the east, at Vance, a brigade of German
cavalry drove back the French cuirassiers and
Algerians, and Prince Frederick Charles then pro-
ceeded as far as Saint Calais, where he prepared for
decisive action. One army corps was sent down the
line of the Huisne, another had orders to advance
on Ardenay, a third on Bouloire, whilst the fourth,
leaving Barry on its left flank, was to march on
Parigne-l'Eveque. Thus, excepting a brigade of
infantry and one of cavalry, detached to observe
the isolated Curten, and hold him in check, virtually
the whole of the German Second Army marched
against Chanzy's main forces.

Chanzy, on his side, now ordered Jaures (21st
Corps) to occupy the positions of Yvre, Auvours,
and Sarge strongly ; whilst Colomb (17th Corps)
was instructed to send General Paris's division
forward to Ardenay, thus reducing Colomb's actual
command to one division, as Jouffroy's column had
previously been detached from it. On both sides
every operation was attended by great difficulties
on account of the very severe weather. A
momentary thaw had been followed by another
sudden frost, in such wise that the roads had a
coating of ice, which rendered them extremely
slippery. On January 9 violent snowstorms set
in, almost blinding one, and yet the rival hosts did
not for an hour desist from their respective efforts.
At times, when I recall those days, I wonder whether
many who have read of Napoleon's retreat from
Moscow have fully realized what that meant.



BEFORE LE MANS 269

Amidst the snowstorms of the 9th a force of
German cavalry attacked our extreme left and com-
pelled it to retreat towards the Ale^on line.
Rousseau's column being in a dangerous position
at Connerre, Colin' s division of the 21st Corps was
sent forward to support it in the direction of Mont-
fort, Gougeard with his Bretons also advancing to
support Colin. But the 13th German Corps attacked
Rousseau, who after two engagements was driven
from Connerre and forced to retreat on Montfort
and Pont-de-Gennes across the Huisne, after losing
in killed, wounded, and missing, some 800 of his
men, whereas the enemy lost barely a hundred. At
the same time Gougeard was attacked, and compelled
to fall back on Saint-Mars-la-Bruyere.

But the principal event of the day was the defeat
of General Paris's force at Ardenay by a part of the
3rd German Corps. The latter had a superiority in
numbers, but the French in their demoralised con-
dition scarcely put up a fight at all, in such wise
that the Germans took about 1000 prisoners. The
worst, however, was that, by seizing Ardenay, the
enemy drove as it were a wedge between the French
forces, hampering their concentration. Meantime,
the 9th German Corps marched to Bouloire, which
became Prince Frederick Charles's headquarters. The
10th Corps, however, had not yet been able to advance
to Parigne 1'Eveque in accordance with the Prince's
orders, though it had driven Barry back on Jupilles
and Grand Luce. The sole advantage secured by
the French that day was that Curten managed to
retreat from Chateau-Renault ; but it was only on
the night of the 10th, when he could be of little or
no use to Chanzy, that he was able to reach Chateau-
du-Loir, where, in response to Chanzy's urgent



270 MY DAYS OF ADVENTURE

appeals, Jaureguiberry had succeeded in collecting
a few thousand men to reinforce the troops defending
Le Mans.

For four days there had been fighting on one
and another point, from the north-east to the south of
the town, the result being unfavourable to the French.
Chanzy, it is true, was at this critical moment in bad
health. According to one account which I heard
at the time, he had had an attack of dysentery;
according to another, he was suffering from some
throat complaint, combined with violent neuralgic
pains in the head. I do not think, however, that his
ill-health particularly affected the issue, which
depended so largely on the manner in which his plans
and instructions were carried out. The strategy
adopted by the Germans at Sedan and in the battles
around Metz had greatly impressed the generals who
commanded the French armies during the second
period of the war. One might really say that they
lived in perpetual dread of being surrounded by the
enemy. If there was a lack of concentration on
Chanzy's part, if he sent out one and another flying
column, and distributed a considerable portion of
his army over a wide area, it was precisely because
he feared some turning movement on the part of the
Germans, which might result in bottling him up at
Le Mans.

The earlier instructions which Prince Frederick
Charles forwarded to his subordinates certainly seem
to indicate that a turning movement was projected.
But after the fighting on January 9, when, as I have
indicated, the 3rd German Army Corps penetrated
wedge-like into the French lines, the Prince renounced
any idea of surrounding Chanzy's forces, and resolved
to make a vigorous frontal attack before they could



BEFORE LE MANS 271

be reinforced by any of the still outlying columns.
In coming to this decision, the Prince may well have
been influenced by the result of the recent fighting,
which had sufficiently demonstrated the superiority
of the German troops to show that, under the cir-
cumstances, a frontal attack would be attended with
far less risk than if he had found himself faced by
a really vigorous antagonist. Captain Hozier,
whom I had previously seen at Versailles, was at
this time acting as Times correspondent with the
Prince's army, and, in subsequently reviewing the
fighting, he expressed the opinion that the issue of
the Prince's operations was never for a moment
doubtful. Still, on all points but one, the French
put up a fairly good defence, as I will now show.



XII

LE MANS AND AFTER

The real Battle of Le Mans begins (January 10) Jouffroy and Paris are
driven back Gougeard's Fight at Champagne The Breton Mobilises
from Conlie Chanzy's Determination His Orders for January 11
He inspects the lines Paris driven from the Plateau of Auvours
Gougeard's gallant re-capture of the Plateau My Return to Le Mans
The Panic at La Tuilerie Retreat inevitable Withdrawal of the
French Entry of the Germans Street Fighting German Exactions
My Escape from Le Mans The French Retreat Rear-Guard
Engagements Laval My Arrest as a Spy A Dramatic Adventure.

SOME more snow fell on the morning of January 10,
when the decisive fighting in front of Le Mans really
began. On the evening of the 9th the French head-
quarters was still without news of Generals Curten,
Barry, and Jouffroy, and even the communications
with Jaureguiberry were of an intermittent character.
Nevertheless, Chanzy had made up his mind to give
battle, and had sent orders to Jaureguiberry to send
Jouffroy towards Parigne-l'Eveque (S.E.) and Barry
towards Ecommoy (S. of Le Mans). But the roads
were in so bad a condition, and the French troops
had been so severely tried, and were so ill-provided
for, that several of the commander-in-chief 's instruc-
tions could not be carried out.

Jouffroy at least did his best, and after a hard and
tiring march from Grand Luce", a part of his division
reached Parigne in time to join in the action fought
there. But it ended disastrously for the French, one

272



LE MANS AND AFTER 273

of their brigades losing as many as 1400 men, and the
Germans taking altogether some 2000 prisoners.
Jouffroy's troops then fell back to Pontlieue, the
southern suburb of Le Mans, in a lamentable con-
dition, and took care to place the Huisne between
themselves and the Germans. In the same direction
Paris's demoralised division, already worsted at
Ardenay on the previous day, was driven from
Change by the 3rd German Corps, which took no
fewer than 5000 prisoners. It had now almost cut
the French eastern and southern lines apart, threaten-
ing all direct communication between the 21st and
the 16th French Corps. Nevertheless, it was in a
dangerous position, having both of its flanks exposed
to attack, one from Yvre and Auvours, and the other
from Pontlieue and the Chemin des Bceufs, which
last line was held by the 16th French Corps.

Meantime, Gougeard's Bretons had been engaged
at Champagne, quite a close encounter taking place
in the fields and on the vineyard slopes, followed by
a house-to-house fight in the village streets. The
French were at last driven back ; but somewhat later,
on the Germans retiring from Champagne, they
reoccupied the place. The result of the day was
that, apart from the somewhat hazardous success
achieved by the 3rd German Corps, the enemy had
gained no great advantage. His 13th Corps had
made but little progress, his 9th had not been
brought into action, and his 10th was as yet no
nearer than Grand Luce. On the French side,
Barry had at last reached Mulsanne, thus covering
the direct southern road to Le Mans, Jaureguiberry
being lower down at Ecommoy with some 9000 men
of various arms and regiments, whom he had managed
to get together. As for Curten's division, as it

T



274 MY DAYS OF ADVENTURE

could not possibly reach the immediate neighbour-
hood of Le Mans in time for the fighting on the llth,
it received orders to march on La Suze, south-west
of the imperilled town. During the 10th, moreover,
Chanzy was strengthened by the welcome arrival
of several additional field-pieces and a large number
of horses. He had given orders to raise the Camp
of Conlie, but instead of the forty or fifty thousand
men, which at an earlier period it was thought that
camp would be able to provide, he now only derived
from it * some 9000 ill-equipped, badly armed, and
almost undrilled Breton Mobilises. They were
divided into six battalions one of which came from
Saint Malo, the others from Rennes and Redon
and were commanded by a general named Lalande.
They proved to be no accession of strength ; they
became, on the contrary, a source of weakness and
disaster, for it was their behaviour which eventually
sealed the fate of the Second Loire Army.

But Chanzy, whatever his ailments might be,
was personally full of energy and determination.
He knew, moreover, that two new army corps (the
19th and the 25th) were being got ready to reinforce
him, and he was still resolved to give battle and hold
on for another four or five days, when he relied 011
compelling Prince Frederick Charles to retreat.
Then, with his reinforced army, he hoped to march
once more in the direction of Paris. Curiously
enough, it was precisely on that critical day, January
10, that Gambetta sent Trochu a despatch by pigeon-
post, telling him that on the 20th, at the latest,
both Chanzy and Bourbaki would be moving on the
capital, having between them over 400,000 men.

* On the other hand, as I previously related, the camp had already
provided the bulk of the men belonging to Gougeard's division.



LE MANS AND AFTER 275

But if Chanzy's spirits did not fail him, those of
his men were at a very low ebb indeed. He was
repeatedly told so by subordinate commanders ;
nevertheless (there was something Napoleonic in
his character), he would not desist from his design,
but issued instructions that there was to be a resolute
defence of the lines on the llth, together with a
determined effort to regain all lost positions. At the
same time, the statements of the divisional generals
respecting the low morale of some of the troops
were not left unheeded, for a very significant order
went forth, namely, that cavalry should be drawn
up in the rear of the infantry wherever this might
appear advisable. The inference was obvious.

Three divisions and Lalande's Breton Mobilises
were to hold the south-eastern lines from Arnage
along the track known as the Chemin des Bceufs,
and to link up, as well as possible, with Paris's and
Gougeard's divisions, to which fell the duty of
guarding the plateau of Auvours and the banks of
the Huisne. The rest of the 21st Corps (to which
Gougeard's division belonged) was to defend the
space between the Huisne and the Sarthe. Colomb's
fragmentary force, apart from Paris's division, was
still to cover Le Mans towards the north-east.
Barry's men, on their expected arrival, were to
serve as reserves around Pontlieue.

The morning of January 11 was bright. The
snow had ceased falling, but lay some inches thick
upon the ground. In order to facilitate the passage
of troops, and particularly of military waggons,
through the town, the Mayor of Le Mans ordered
the inhabitants to clear away as much of this snow
as possible ; but it naturally remained undisturbed
all over the countryside. Little had been seen of



276 MY DAYS OF ADVENTURE

Chanzy on the two previous days, but that morning
he mounted horse and rode along the lines from the
elevated position known as Le Tertre Rouge to the
equally elevated position of Yvre. I saw him there,
wrapped in a long loose cloak, the hood of which was
drawn over his kepi. Near him was his picturesque
escort of Algerian Spahis, and while he was conversing
with some officers I pulled out a little sketch-book
which I carried, and tried to outline the group. An
aide-de-camp who noticed me at once came up to in-
quire what I was doing, and I therefore had to produce
the permit which, on returning to the front, I had
obtained from the Chief of the Staff. It was found
to be quite in order, and I went on with my work.
But a few minutes later the general, having given
his orders, gathered up his reins to ride away. As
he slowly passed me, he gave me just one little sharp
glance, and with a faint suspicion of a smile remarked,
" I will look at that another time." The aide-de-camp
had previously told him what my purpose was.

That day the 3rd German Corps again resumed the
offensive, and once more drove Gougeard out of
Champagne. Then the enemy's 9th Corps, which on
January 10 had done little or nothing, and was
therefore quite fresh, was brought into action, and
made a resolute attack on the plateau of Auvours.
There was a fairly long fight, which could be seen
from Yvre. But the Germans were too strong for
Paris's men, who at last disbanded, and came, helter-
skelter, towards the bridge of Yvre in terrible con-
fusion. Flight is often contagious, and Gougeard,
who had fallen back from Champagne in fairly good
order, feared lest his men should imitate their com-
rades. He therefore pointed two field-pieces on the
runaways, and by that means checked their stampede.



LE MANS AND AFTER 277

Having established themselves at the farther end
of the plateau, the Germans advanced very
cautiously, constantly seeking cover behind the
various hedges. General de Colomb, to whose
command Paris's runaway division belonged, insisted,
however, that the position must be retaken.
Gougeard thereupon collected a very miscellaneous
force, which included regular infantry, mobiles,
mobilises, and some of Charette's Volontaires de
P Quest previously known in Rome as the Pontifical
Zouaves. Placing himself at the head of these men,
he made a vigorous effort to carry out Colomb's
orders. The French went forward almost at the
charge, the Germans waiting for them from behind
the hedges, whence poured a hail of lead. Gougeard's
horse was shot under him, a couple of bullets went
through his coat, and another or, as some said, a
splinter of a shell knocked off his kepi. Still, he
continued leading his men, and in the fast failing
light the Germans, after repeated encounters, were
driven back to the verge of the plateau.

That was told me afterwards, for at the moment
I was already on my way back to Le Mans, which
I wished to reach before it was absolutely night.
On coming from the town early in the morning, I
had brought a few eatables in my pockets, but they
had soon been consumed, and I had found it impos-
sible to obtain any food whatever at Yvre, though
some of the very indifferent local wine was pro-
curable. Thus I was feeling very hungry as I
retraced my steps through the snow towards the
little hostelry in the Rue du Gue de Maulny, where
I had secured accommodation. It was a walk of
some four or five miles, but the cold urged me on,
and, in spite of the snow, I made the journey fairly



278 MY DAYS OF ADVENTURE

rapidly, in such wise that little more than an hour
later I was seated in a warm room in front of some
steaming soup, answering all sorts of questions as
to what I had seen during the day, and particularly
whether les notres had gained a victory. I could
only answer that the " Prussians " had taken
Auvours, but that fighting was still going on, as
Gougeard had gone to recapture the position. At
the moment, indeed, that was the extent of my
information. The landlord looked rather glum and
his daughter somewhat anxious, and the former,
shaking his head, exclaimed : " Voyez-vous,
Monsieur 1' Anglais, nous n'avons pas de chance
pas de chance du tout ! Je ne sais pas a quoi a
tient, mais c'est comme 9a. Et, tenez, cela ne me
surprendrait pas de voir ces sales Prussiens dans la
ville d'ici a demain ! " * Unfortunately for Le Mans
and for France also, his forebodings were accurate.
At that very moment, indeed, a great disaster was
occurring.

Jaureguiberry had reached the southern suburb
of Pontlieue at about nine o'clock that morning after
a night march from Ecommoy. He had divided his
miscellaneous force of 9000 men into three brigades.
As they did not seem fit for immediate action, they
were drafted into the reserves, so that their arrival
was of no particular help that day. About eleven
o'clock the 3rd German Corps, coming from the
direction of Change, attacked Jouffroy's lines along
the more northern part of the so-called Chemin des
Bceufs, and, though Jouffroy's men fought fairly well,
they could not prevent their foes from capturing

* " We have no luck, no luck at all. I don't know why, but there it is.
And, do you know, it would not surprise me to see those dirty Prussians
in the town between now and to-morrow."



LE MANS AND AFTER 279

the position of the Tertre Rouge. Still, the enemy
gained no decisive success in this direction ; nor was
any marked result attained by the 13th German
Corps which formed the extreme right of the attack-
ing forces. But Prince Frederick Charles had sent
orders to Voigts Rhetz, who was at Grand Luce,* to
advance with the 10th Corps on Mulsanne, which the
French had evacuated; and on reaching Mulsanne,
the same general received instructions to come to
the support of the 3rd Corps, which was engaged
with Jouffroy's force. Voigts Rhetz's men were
extremely fatigued ; nevertheless, the 20th Division
of Infantry, commanded by General Kraatz-
Koschlau, went on towards the Chemin des Bceufs,
following the direct road from Tours to Le Mans.

Here there was an elevated position known as
La Tuilerie otherwise the tile-works which had
been fortified expressly to prevent the Germans
from bursting upon Le Mans from the direct south.
Earth-works for guns had been thrown up, trenches
had been dug, the pine trees, so abundant on the
southern side of Le Mans, had been utilised for other
shielding works, as well as for shelter-places for the
defending force. Unfortunately, at the moment of
the German advance, that defending force consisted
of the ill-equipped, badly armed, and almost un-
trained Breton Mobilises,! who, as I have already
related, had arrived the previous day from the
camp of Conlie under the command of General
Lalande. It is true that near these men was stationed
an infantry brigade of the 6th Corps d'Armee, whose
duty it was to support and steady them. They

* A brigade of cavalry kept up communications between him and the
3rd Army Corps.

j- There were just a few old soldiers among them.



280 MY DAYS OF ADVENTURE

undoubtedly needed to be helped, for the great
majority had never been in action before. More-
over, in addition to the infantry brigade, there were
two batteries of artillery ; but I fear that for the most
part the gunners were little better than recruits.
Exaggerated statements have been made respecting
the quality of the firearms with which the Mobilises
were provided. Many of the weapons were after-
wards found to be very dirty, even rusty, but that
was the result of neglect, which their officers should
have remedied. It is true, however, that these
weapons were for the most part merely percussion
guns. Again, it has been said that the men had no
ammunition, but that statement was certainly
inaccurate. On the other hand, these Mobilises
were undoubtedly very cold and very hungry
even as I myself was that day no rations having
been served to them until late in the afternoon, that
is, shortly before they were attacked, at which
moment, indeed, they were actually preparing the
meal for which they had so long been waiting.

The wintry night was gathering round when
Kraatz-Koschlau found himself with his division
before the position of La Tuilerie. He could see
that it was fortified, and before attempting any
further advance he fired a few shells. The Mobilises
were immediately panic-stricken. They made no
attempt at defence ; hungry though they were, they
abandoned even their pots and pans, and fled in the
direction of Pontlieue, which formed, as it were, a
long avenue, fringed with factories, textile mills,
bleaching works, and so forth. In vain did their
officers try to stop the fugitives, even striking them
with the flats of their swords, in vain did Lalande
and his staff seek to intercept them at the Rond



LE MANS AND AFTER 281

Point de Pontlieue. Nothing could induce them to
stop. They threw away their weapons in order to
run the faster. At La Tuilerie not a gun was fired
at the Germans. Even the infantry brigade fell
back without attempting to fight.

All this occurred at a moment when everybody
thought that the day's fighting was over. But
Jaureguiberry appeared upon the scene, and ordered
one of his subordinates, General Lebouedec, to
retake the lost position. Lebouedec tried to do so
with 1000 tired men, who had been in action during
the day, and failed. A second attempt proved
equally futile. No effort apparently was made to
secure help from Barry, who was at Arnage with
5000 infantry and two brigades of cavalry, and who
might have fallen on the left flank of the German
Corps. La Tuilerie was lost, and with it Le Mans
was lost also.

I was quietly sipping some coffee and reading
the local newspapers three or four were published
at Le Mans in those days when I heard of that
disastrous stampede. Some of the men had reached
the town, spreading the contagion of fear as they
came. Tired though I was, I at once went towards
the Avenue de Pontlieue, where the excitement was