Francis Lieber.

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undeniably more akin to the oriental mind than to the Greek.) Posidonius was
acquainted with Marius and Pompey, and taught Cicero; but the moral tieatise of Cicero,
De Offici'is, is derived from a work of Panaetius. The third period of Stoicism is Roman.
In this period we have Cato the younger, who invited to his house the philosopher
Athenodorus; and, under the empire, the three Stoic philosophers whose writings have
come down to us SENECA (6 u.c.-Go A.D.), EPICTETUS (60-140 A.D.), who began life as
a slave, and the emperor MARCUS AURELIUS AXTONIHUS (121-180 A.D.). Stoicism pre-
vailed widely in the Roman world, although not to the exclusion of Epicurean views.

The leading Stoical doctrines are given in certain phrases or expressions, as "lire
according to nature," the ideal "wise man," "apathy" or equanimity of mind, the
power of the " will." the worship of "duty," the constant "advance" in virtue, etc.
But perspicuity will be best gained by considering the moral system under four heads
the theology; the psychology or theory of mind; the theory of the good or human hap-
piness ; and the scheme of virtue or duty.

II. Their theological doctrines comprehended their system of the universe, and of
man's position in it. They held that the universe is governed by one good and wise God,
together with inferior or subordinate deities. God exercises a moral government: under
it the good are happy, while misfortunes happen to the wicked. According to Epictetus,
God is the father of men; Antonius exults in the beautiful arrangement of all things.
They did not admit that the Deity intermeddled in the smaller minutiaj; they allowed
that omens and oracles might be accepted as signs of the foreordained arrangement of
God. They held this foreordination even to the length of fatalism, and made the tame
replies as have been given in modern times, to the difficulty of reconciling it with free
will, Avhich in their system was unusually prominent. As to the existence of evil, they
offered explanations such as the following: God is the author of all things except wick-
edness; the very nature of good supposes its contrast evil, and the two are inseparable,
like light and dark, which may be called the argument from relativity; in the enormous
extent of the universe, some things must be neglected ; when evil happens to the good,
it is not as a punishment, but as connected with a different dispensation; parts of the
world may be presided over by evil demons; what we call evil may net be evil.

Like most other ancient schools, the Stoics held God to be corporeal like man; body
is the only substance; nothing incorporeal could act on whuat is corporeal; the first cause
of all, God or Zeus, is the primeval fire, emanating from which is the soul of man in the
form of a warm ether.

It is for human beings to recognize the universe as governed by universal law, and
rot only to raise their minds to the comprehension of it, but. to enter into the views of
the Creator, who must regard all interests equally; we are to be, as it were, in league
with him, to merge self in the universal order, to think only of that, and its Avelfare.
As two is greater than one, the interests of the whole world are infinitely greater than
the interests of any single being, and no one should be satisfied with a regard to any-
thing less than the whole. By this elevation of view we are necessarily raised far above
the consideration of the petty events befalling ourselves. The grand effort of human
reason is thus to rise to the abstraction or totality of entire nature; " No ethical subject,"
says Chrysippus. "could be rightly approached except from the preconsideration of
entire nature, and the ordering of the whole."

As to immortality, the Stoics precluded themselves, by holding the theory of the
absorption of the individual soul at death into the divine essence; but, on the other hand,
their doctrine of advance and aspiration is what has in all times been the mftin natural
argument for tlie immortality of the soul. For the most part, they kept themsolves
undecided as to this great doctrine, giving it as an alternative, reasoning as to our con-
duct on either supposition, and submitting to the pleasure of God in this as in all other

In arguing for the existence of divine power and government, they employed what
has been called the argument from design, which is as old as Socrates. Man is conscious
that he is in himself an intellectual or spiritual power, from which, by analogy, he is
led to believe that a greater power pervades the universe, as intellect pervades humanity.

II. Next, as to the constitution of the mind. We have bodies like animals, but reason
or intelligence, like the gods. Animals have instinctive principles of action; man alone
has a rational intelligent soul. According to Antonius, we come into contact with
Deity by our intellectual part, and our highest life is thus the divine life.

But the most important Stoical doctrine respecting the nature of man is the recogni-
tion of reason as a superior power or faculty that subordinates all the rest the governing
intelligence. (Very nearly the same phraseology is used by bishop Butler in setting
forth the supremacy of conscience.) This, however, is not a mere intellectual principle,
but an active force," uniting intellect and -will. The bodily sensibilities are opposed to
this higher reason and will, which, however, is strong enough to control them. Another
way of expressing the same view was the power of the mind over the body, which was



dwelt upon by Epictelus in the most exaggerated form. The introduction of so glaring
a mistake as that sickness may affect the body without enfeebling the mind could only
end in practical failures, or else in contradiction.

In order to maintain their contrast with the Epicureans, the Stoics said that pleasure
and pain are not principles of nature; by which they must have meant that humanity is
not in fact, at least exclusively, governed by these, and that, in the regenerated man,
they are not governing principles at all. Now, it is true, and a truth important for
many practical purposes, that we are sometimes impelled to action without reference, to
our pleasures and pains; our habits often exemplify this state; it is still better shown in
what are called "fixed ideas," as in involuntary imitation and sympathy. But the,-".
are exceptions; and any system that sets itself against the main fact that pleasure and
pain are the great moving forces of mankind must somewhere or other contradict

In Seneca we find something very closely approaching to the Christian doctrine of
the corruption of human nature. The littleness of humanity was a favorite theme of
Antonius, and naturally followed from the Stoical mode of contemplating the universe
at large.

The doctrine called the freedom of will may be said to have originated with the
Stoics, although with them it was chiefly a rhetorical mode of expressing the dignity
of the wise man, and his power of rising superior to circumstances.

To prepare the way for the Stoical precepts, Epictetus distinguished between things
in our power and things not in our power. The things in our power are our opinions
and notions about objects, and all our affections, desires, and aversions; the things not
in our power are our bodies, wealth, honor, rank, authority, etc., and their opposites.
The application is this: wealth and high rank may not be in our power, but we have,
the power to form an idea of these namely, that they are unimportant, whence the want
of them will not grieve us. A still more pointed application is to death, whose force is
entirely in the idea.

III. We must consider next the Stoical theory of happiness, or rather of the good,
which with them was not identified with happiness. The} r began by asserting that hap-
piness is not necessary, and may be dispensed with, and that paiu is no evil, which,
however, if followed consistently, would dispense wifch all morality and all human
endeavor. Substantially and practically, they held that pains are an evil, but, by a
proper discipline, may be triumphed over. They disallowed the direct and ostensible
pursuit of pleasure as an end (the point of view of Epicurus), but allured their followers
partly by promising them the victory over pain, and partly by certain enjoyments of an
elevated cast that grew out of their plan of life.

Pain of every kind, whether from the casualties of existence, or from the severity of
the Stoical virtues, was to be met by a discipline of endurance, a hardening process,
which, if persisted in, would succeed in reducing the mind to a state of apathy or indif-
ference. A great many reflections were suggested in aid of this education. The influ-
ence of exercise and repetition in adapting the system to any new function, was
illustrated by the Olympian combatants, and by the Lacedemonian youth who endured
scourging without complaint. Great stress was laid on the instability of pleasure, and
the constant liability to accidents; whence we should always be anticipating and adapt-
ing ourselves to the worst that could happen, so as never to be in a state where anything
could ruffle the mind. It was pointed out how much might still be made of the worst
circumstances poverty, banishment, public odium, sickness, old age and every con-
sideration was advanced that could "arm the obdurate breast with stubborn patience,
as with triple steel."

It has often been remarked that such a discipline of endurance was peculiarly suited
to the unsettled condition of the world at the time, when any man, besides the ordinary
evils of life, might in a moment be sent into exile, or sold into slavery. Moreover, it is
a discipline adapted to a certain class of dispositions existing in aJl ages the men that
prefer above all things "equanimity" of mind, and would rather dispense with great
occasional pleasures than risk their state of habitual composure.

Next to the discipline of endurance, we must rank the complacent sentiment of pride,
which the Stoic might justly feel in his conquest of himself, and in his lofty independ-
ence and superiority to the casualties of life. The pride of the Cynic, the Stoic's prede-
cessor, was prominent and offensive, showing itself in scurrility and contempt toward
everybody else; the Stoical pride was a refinement upon this, but was still a grateful
sentiment of superiority, which helped to make up for the surrender of indulgenries.
It was usual to bestow the most, extravagant laudation on the " wise man," and every
Stoic could take this home to the extent that he considered himself as approaching that
great ideal.

The last and most elevated form of Stoical happiness was the satisfaction of contem-
plating the universe and God. Epictetus says that we can discern the providence that
rules the world, if we possess two things the power of seeing all that happens with
respect to each thing, and a grateful disposition. The work of Antoninus is full of
studies of nature in the devout spirit of "passing from nature to nature's God;" he is
never weary of expressing his thorough contentment with the course of natural events,
and his sense of the beauties and fitness of everything. Old age has its grace, and

Stokes.] CPCO


death is the becoming termination. This high strain of "exulting contemplation recon-
ciled him to that complete submission to whatever might befall, which was the essential
feature of the " life according to nature."

IV. The Stoical theory of virtue is implicated in their ideas of the good, now de-

The fountain of all virtue is manifestly the life according to nature, as being the life
of subordination of self to more general interests to family, country, mankind, the
whole universe. If a man is prepared to consider himself absolutely n&thing in com-
parison with the universal interest, and to regard it as the sole end of life, he has
embraced an ideal of virtue of the loftiest order. Accordingly, the Stoics were the lirst
to preach what is called ''Cosmopolitanism ;" for although, in their reference to the good
of the whole, they confounded together sentiment, life, and inanimate objects rocks,
plants, etc., solicitude for which was misspent labor yet they were thus enabled to
reach the conception of the universal brotherhood of mankind, and could not but
include in their regards the brute creation. They said: "There is uo difference between
Greeks and barbarians; the world is our city." Senecn urges kindness to slaves, for
"are they not men like ourselves, breathing the same air, living and dying like our-

The Epicureans declined, as much as possible, interference in public affairs, but the
Stoical philosophers all urged men to the duties of active citizenship. Athough there
had been many good and noble men among the pagans, yet positive beneficence had not
been preached as a virtue before the Stoics. They adopted the four cardinal virtues
(wisdom, or the knowledge of good and evil; justice; fortitude; temperance) as part of
their plan of the virtuous life, the life according to nature. Justice, as the social virtue,
was placed above all the rest. But most interesting to us are the indications of the idea
of beneficence. Epictetus is earnest in his exhortations to forgiveness of injuries. An-
toninus often enforces the same virtue, ami suggests considerations in aid of the practice
of it; he contends as strongly as Butler and Hume for the existence of a principle of
pure, that is, unselfish, benevolence in the mind in other words, that we are made to
advance each other's happiness.

There is also in the Stoical system a recognition of duties to God, and of morality as
based on piety. Not only are we all brethren, but also the " children of one Father."

The extraordinary stress put upon human nature by the full Stoic ideal of submerging
self in the larger interests of being, led to various compromises. The rigid following
out of the ideal issued in one of the paradoxes, namely, that all the actions of the wise
man are equally perfect, and that, short of the standard of perfection, all faults and
vices are equal; that, for example, the man that killed a cock without good reason was
as guilty as he that killed his father. This has a meaning only when we draw a line
between spirituality and morality, and treat the last as worthless in comparison of the
first. The later Stoics, however, in their exhortations to special branches of duty, gave
a positive value to practical virtue, irrespective of the ideal.

The idea of duty was of Stoical origin, fostered and developed by the Roman spirit
and legislation. The early Stoics had two different words for the "suitable" (kathekon)
and the "right" (katorthdma); although it is a significant circumstance that the
"suitable" is the lineal ancestor of our word "duty" (through the Latin (yfficium).
. It was a great point with the Stoic to be conscious of "advance," or improvmcnt.
By self-examination, he kept himself constantly acquainted with his moral state, and it
was both his duty and his satisfaction to be approaching to the idoal of the perfect man.
When renouncing the position of "wise," he yet claimed to be advancing. This idea,
familiar to the modern world, was unknown to the ancients before the Stoics. It is very
illustrative of the unguarded points and contradictions of Stoicism, that contentment
and apathy were not to permit grief even for the loss of friends. Seneca, on one
occasion, admits that he was betrayed by human weakness on this point. On strict
Stoical principles, we ought to treat the afflictions and the death of others with the same
frigid indifference as our own; for why should a man feel for a second person more
than he ought to feel for himself, as a mere unit in the infinitude of the universe? This
is the contradiction inseparable from any system that begins by abjuring happiness as the
end of life. "We may be allowed to regard our own happiness as of no importance, but
if we apply the same measure to happiness in general, we are bereft of all motives to
benevolence; and virtue, instead of being set on a loftier pinnacle, is left without any

The Stoical system has largely tinctured modern ages, in spite of its severity. It
has always had a charm as an ideal, even when men were conscious of not realizing it.
It may be still considered as a grand experiment in the art of living, from Avhich valu-
able lessons have resulted; just as a believer in alchemy, or in the perpetual motion, might
make useful experimental discoveries. The limitation of wants, the practice of content-
ment, the striving after equanimity, the hardening of erne's self against the blows of
fortune, are all familiar to the moralist of later ages. A qualified form of the sub-
ordination of self to the general welfare, belongs to the modern theories of virtue.

The chief ancient authorities on the Stoics are the writings of Epictetus, Marcus
Antoninus, and Seneca, themselves Stoical philosophers, together with notices occurring
in Cicero, Plutarch, Scxtus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius, and Stobcieus. The completest

Stole, j

modern account of the system occurs in Zeller's Philosophie der Griechen, vol. iii. See
also an article by sir Alexander Grant in the Oxford Essays for 1858.

STOKES, a co. in n. North Carolina, adjoining Virginia, drained by the Dan river,
about 500 sq.m., pop.'SO, 15,353 3,624 colored. The surface is hilly and heavily tim-
bered. The soil is fertile. The principal productions are corn, wheat, rye, and
tobacco. Co. seat, Danbury.

STOKES, GEORGE GABRIEL, one of the greatest living mathematicians and natural
philosophers in Europe, was born, in 1819, at Skreen, co. Sligo, Ireland; educated at
the school of rev. II. II. Wall, D.D., Dublin; afterward at the Bristol college. He entered
Pembroke college, Cambridge, in 1837; graduated in 1841, as senior wrangler, and first
Smith's prizeman; became fellow of Pembroke in the same year; and was elected, in
1849, to till, as one of the worthiest of Newton's successors, the Lucasian chair of mathe-
matics in Cambridge. In 1854, he was appointed secretary to the Royal society.

He is best known, popularly, and by his beautiful discovery of fluorescence (see
PHOSPHORESCENCE). His paper On the Change of ihe Refrangibility of Light, is printed
in the P]iH<>v>[Jit<'it! Transactions for 1852-1853. His recent important physiological
application of optical methods to the study of the oxidation of the blood, is noticed
under SPECTRUM. But to mathematicians and natural philosophers, Stokes is known
by a number of admirable papers in the Cambridge Philosophical Tranxactions, the Cam-
inn! Dn'ilin Matliuitaticitl Journal, and the Pliiloxopltical Magazine. In them he
has greatly extended and improved the mathematical treatment of questions connected
with the distortion of elastic solids, the motion of waves in water, theundulatory theory
of light, the summation of series, the internal friction of fluids, etc. Another excellent
work by Stokes is his Report on Double Refraction, published in the British association
reports for 1802. He was president of the British association at Exeter in 1869; and in
1871 the university of Edinburgh conferred on him the degree of LL.D.

STOKE-UPON-TRENT, a parliamentary borough, and manufacturing t. of Stafford-
shire, 145 m. from London by the London and ISorth-western railroad. The "district"
of Stoke consists of the parish 10,490 acres in extent, is familiarly named the "Pot-
teries," and contains the towns of Burslem, Handley, Lane-End (with Longton), Stoke,
and Tunstal court. The town of Stoke is regularly built, and contains many modern
houses. Its church, an edifice in modern Gothic is surmounted by a tower 112 ft. high.
The earthenware manufactures of the parish of Stoke are carried on in about 200 fac-
tories. In the vicinity are numerous coal-mines. Pop. of parl. borough, which sends
two members to the house of commons, 1871, 130,507.

STOLBERG, CHRISTIAN, Count von, a German poet, b. at Hamburg, Oct. 15, 1748.
He belonged to one of the oldest German families, originally of Tliuringia, and which
is mentioned in authentic documents of the llth century. Stolberg studied at Gottingen
from 1769 to 1774, where he was one of a distinguished literary circle in n. Germany,
embracing Boje. Burger, Miller, Voss, Holty, and Leisewitz. In 1777 he married
Louise, countess of Reventlow, whom he had previously celebrated in his verses; and
after 1800, lived apart from public life on his estate of "Windebye, near Eckernforde in
Slesvig, where he 'died Jan. 18, 1821. As a poet, he was inferior in genius to his younger
brother, but his pictures of family life are very fine. His principal works are Gedichte
(Leip. 1779); Gedichte aus dem Griechischen (Hamb. 1782); Schauspielc mit Choren (Leip.
1787); and Vattrliindische Gedichte (along with his brother; Hamb. 1815).

STOLBERG, FRiKimion-LEOPoiJ), Count von, younger brother of the preceding, was
b. at Bramstcdt, Nov. 7, 1750. studied at Halle and Gottingen, and after a visit to
Switzerland and Italy, in the course of which he made the acquaintance of Goethe at
Frankfort, and of Lavater at Zurich, he became in 1777 minister-plenipotentiary of
the episcopal prince of Lubeck at the court of Denmark. Stolberg filled various other
official situations in the course of his public life; but becoming a convert to Roman
Catholicism, he resigned all his employments, and henceforth lived mainly in the society
of his co-religionists. The causes tha't led him to take a step which lost kirn many old
and dear friends, were partb/ the theological strifes between the Rationalists and ortho-
dox Lutherans in Holstein the country where he mostly resided, and partly his study of
the controversial works of the Catholic writers during a second visit to Italy in 1790-
91. He died at Sondermiihlen, near Osnabriick. Dec. 5, 1819. Stolberg is a superior
poet to his skier brother. There is greater boldness in his ideas and imagery, and he
displayed a wonderful facility in versification. We have from him specimens of all
sorts of poetry, songs, odes, elegies, metrical romances, satires, descriptive verse,
dramas, which are contained in the Werke der ]ii-iid<r Stolbtrr/ (22 vols., Hamb. 1821-
26) . See Frialr. -'Leopold. GrafzuStolberfl, by Nicolovius (Main/, 1846). A very good
account of Stolberg's change of faith, ami of that literary circle of n. Germany in which
he moved until his conversion, will be found in a book called 7i'/////r ^ki::.< n \Skch -his
of Entiu), by Wili.elm von Bippen (Weimar, 1862).

STOLE (Gr. xtole, Lat. sto'a. n robe) is the name of one of the sacred vestmcrts
in the Latin church, and with some modification, in the Greek church also. It origin
nted in a wide and flowing robe of linen, called also orarinm. which hung from the
shoulder, and vrhich had a narrow embroidered border of a different color, as we learu


from St. Ambrose's sermon on the death of Satyrus (n. 43), and from Jerome's letter to
Isepotianus (Ep. 52). The present stole seems to be the traditionary representative of
the embroidered border of the orarium in the Roman Catholic church, and consists of a
narrow band of silk or precious stuff, edged and fringed with gold or embroidery. It
is worn over the shoulders by priests and deacons, but in a different fashion the former
wearing it over both shoulders, with the ends hanging in front, or crossed upon the
breast; the latter carrying it only from the left shoulder to the right side, where the
pendent ends are fastened. In the eastern church the stole is worn pendent, over both
shoulders by priests, over the left shoulder only by deacons. The stole is worn atina>s,
and in the administration of sacraments, in certain blessings, and in more solemn forms
of preaching. It is also used, in some cases, as a symbol of jurisdiction, in which scn>e
it is constantly worn by the pope, even when not officiating; and there is a very re-
markable usage in Italy and other Catholic countries, illustrative of the same principle
as to jurisdiction, of the parish priest, after he has administered extreme unction to
a sick person, leaving the stole upon the foot of the bed, not to be withdrawn until the t/mt/i or
recovery of the invalid. Like the other sacerdotal vestments, the stole must be blessed by
a bishop, or a priest delegated by a bishop. In the English church the stole is now gen-
erally used by the clergy, and is worn with the same difference by priests and deacons.

Online LibraryFrancis LieberLibrary of universal knowledge. A reprint of the last (1880) Edinburgh and London edition of Chambers' encyclopaedia, with copious additions by American editors (Volume 13) → online text (page 197 of 203)