the north side of that stream, even at the risk of
losing much material of war, and endeavor to
make his way in the direction of Hanover Court-
House; but in no event to retreat with his army
further to the south than the White House on
York River. I stated to the President that the
retreat to James River was canying General Mc
Clellan away from any reinforcements that could
possibly be sent him within a reasonable tirae,
344
REBELLION RECORD, 1862.
and was absolutely depriving him of any sub
stantial aid from the forces under my command ;
that by this movement the whole army of the
enemy would be interposed between his army
and mine, and that they would then be at liberty
to strike in either direction, as they might con
sider it most advantageous ; that this movement
to James River would leave entirely unprotected,
except in so far as the small force under my com
mand was able to protect it, the whole region in
front of Washington, and that it would then,
therefore, be impossible to send any of the forces
under my command to reenforce Gen. McClellan
without rendering it certain that the enemy, even
in the worst case for themselves, would have the
privilege and power of exchanging Richmond for
Washington City ; that to them the loss of Rich
mond would be trifling, while the loss of Wash
ington to us would be conclusive, or nearly so,
in its results upon this "war. I was so deeply
impressed with these views that I repeatedly and
earnestly urged them upon the President and the
Secretary of War. After General McClellan had
taken up his position at Harrison s Landing, I
addressed him a letter, stating to him my posi
tion and the distribution of the troops under my
command, and requesting him, in all earnestness
and good faith, to write me fully and freely his
views, and to suggest to me any measures which
he thought desirable to enable me to cooperate
with him, or to render any assistance in my power
in the operations of the army under his command.
I stated to him that I had no object except to
assist his operations, and that I would undertake
any labor and run any risk for that purpose. I
therefore desired him to feel no hesitation in com
municating freely with me, as he might rest as
sured that every suggestion that he would make
would meet all respect and consideration at my
hands, and that so far as it was in my power to
do so, I would carry out his wishes with all en
ergy, and with all the means at my command.
In reply to this communication, I received a let
ter from General McClellan, very general in its
twins, and proposing nothing towards the accom
plishment of the purpose I had suggested to him.
It became apparent that, considering the situa
tion in which the army of the Potomac and the
army of Virginia were placed in relation to each
other, and the absolute necessity of harmonious
and prompt cooperation between them, some mili-
taiy superior both of Gen. McClellan and myself
should be called to Washington and placed in
command of all the operations in Virginia. In
accordance with those views, Major-Gen. Halleck
was called to Washington and placed in general
command. Many circumstances, which it is not
necessary here to set forth, induced me to ex
press to the President, to the Secretary of War,
and to General Halleck, my desire to be relieved
from the command of the army of Virginia, and
to be returned to the Western country. My serv
ices, however, were considered necessary in the
projected campaign, and my wishes were not com
plied with. I accordingly took the field in Vir
ginia with grave forebodings of the result, but
with a determination to carry out the plans of the
Government with all the energy and with all the
ability of which I was master. Previous to tali-
ing the field I issued the following orders, which
set out very fully the policy which I considered
advisable, and which, at the time, received the
sanction of the Government, and, so far as I know,
the approval of the country.
The order requiring the troops to subsist upon
the country in which their operations were con
ducted has, with a wilful disregard of its terms,
been construed greatly to my discredit, as author
izing indiscriminate robbery and plunder. Yet
the terms of this order are so specific as to the
manner and by whom all property or subsistence
needed for the use of the army should be seized,
and the order is so common in the history of war
fare, that I have been amazed that it could have
been so misinterpreted and misunderstood. It
is, therefore, submitted here for the calm exam
ination of the Government and of the public. I
believed then, arid believe now, that the policy
there laid down was wise and just, and was well
calculated to secure efficient and rapid operations
of the army ; and in case of reverse, to leave the
enemy without the means of subsisting in the
country over which our army had passed, and
over which any pursuit must be conducted. The
long delay and embarrassment of the army under
Gen. Lee, in its subsequent movements toward
Washington, occasioned largely by the want of
supplies taken from the country under this order,
fully justified its wisdom.
It was determined, before I left Washington to
take the field in Virginia, that the union of the
armies of Virginia and of the Potomac was abso
lutely essential both to the safety of the national
capital and to the further successful prosecution
of the operations against Richmond. The mission
of the army under my command, therefore, was
to cover, as far as possible, the front of Washing
ton, and make secure the valley of the Shenan-
doah, and so operate upon the enemy s lines of
communication to the west and north-west, as to
force him to make such heavy detachments from
his main force at Richmond as would enable the
army of the Potomac to withdraw from its posi
tion at Harrison s Landing, and to take shipping
for Acquia Creek or for Alexandria ; and if, as was
feared, the enemy should throw his whole force
in the direction of Washington, it became my
duty to resist his advance at all hazards, and so
to delay and embarrass his movement as to gain
all the time possible for the arrival of the army
of the Potomac behind the Rappahannock. Mean
time, before the arrival of Gen. Halleck, I in
structed Gen. King, at Fredericksburgh, to send
forward detachments of his cavalry to operate
upon the line of the Virginia Central Railroad,
and as far as possible to embarrass and destroy
communication between Richmond and the val-
ey of the Shenandoah. Several cavalry expedi
tions which that officer despatched for the pur
pose were completely successful, and succeeded
in breaking up the railroad at several points upon
several occasions. At the same time I directed
DOCUMENTS.
345
Major-Gen. Banks to send forward an infantr}
brigade, with all his cavalry, to march rapidl}
upon Culpeper Court-House, and after taking
possession of that place, to push forward cavalry
toward the Rapidan, in the direction of Gordons
villc. On the fourteenth of July, after this move
ment was successfully accomplished, I directec
Gen. Banks to push forward, during the night of
that day, the whole of his cavalry force, under
Brig. -Gen. Hatch, from Culpeper, with orders to
take possession of Gordonsville, and to destroy
the railroad for ten or fifteen miles east of that
place, with a portion of his forces, while all re
maining pushed forward in the direction of Char
lottesville, destroying the railroad bridges and in
terrupting that line of communication as far as
practicable. At that time, there was no force of
the enemy at Gordonsville or in the vicinity, and
the whole operation as ordered was not only
easily practicable, but would have been attended
with serious consequences to the enemy ; but, to
my surprise and dissatisfaction, I received, on the
seventeenth of July, from Gen. Banks, a report
that Gen. Hatch had taken with him infantry,
artillery, and trains of wagons, and that in con
sequence of bad roads he had at that date only
succeeded in going as far as Madison Court-
House. Meantime, on the sixteenth of July, the
advance of Jackson s forces, under Ewell, had
reached Gordonsville, and the proposed move
ment, as ordered, became impracticable. No sat
isfactory explanation has ever been made to me
of this departure from my orders on the part of
Gen. Hatch. Finding it no longer practicable to
occupy Gordonsville as I had designed, I sent or
ders to Gen. Banks to direct Gen. Hatch to select
from his own cavalry and that of Gen. McDowell,
which I had sent forward, fifteen hundred to two
thousand of the best mounted men, and to pro
ceed from Madison Court-House around the west
side of the Blue Ridge, to a point whence he could
make an easy descent upon the railroad west of
Gordonsville, and, if successful, to push forward
to Charlottesville, and if possible destroy the
railroad between that place and Lynchburgh. In
compliance with this order, Gen. Hatch com
menced to make the movement as directed, but
abandoned it very soon after he started, and re
turned by the way of Spcrryville to his post. As
soon as 1 had received the report of this second
failure, I relieved Gen. Hatch from the command
of the cavalry of General Banks s corps, and sent
Brig. -Gen. Buford to report to Gen. Banks as the
Chief of Cavalry of his corps. On the twenty-
ninth of July I left Washington, and, after re
viewing Ricketts s division, of McDowell s corps,
at Waterloo Bridge, repaired to the headquarters
of Geri. Banks, a few miles south-east of Little
Washington. All preparations having been com
pleted, I instructed Gen. Banks to move forward
on the seventh of August, and take post at the
point wh,ere the turnpike from Sperryville to Cul
peper crosses Hazel River. Gen. McDowell was
ordered on the day previous to move forward
with Ricketts s division from Waterloo Bridge to
Culpeper Court-House, so that on the seventh of
August all the infantry and artillery forces of the
army of Virginia were assembled along the turn
pike from Sperryville to Culpeper, and numbered
about twenty-eight thousand men. King s divi
sion, as I have before stated, was left on the
Lower Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburgh,-
and was not then available for active operations
in the direction of Gordonsville. The cavalry
forces covering the front of the army on that day
were distributed as follows: Gen. Buford, with
five regiments, was posted at Madison Court-
House, with his pickets along the line of the Ra
pidan, from Burnett s Ford, as far west as the
Blue Ridge. Gen. Sigel had been directed to post
a brigade of infantry and a battery of artillery at
the point where the road from Madison Court-
House to Sperryville crosses Robertson s River,
as a support to the cavalry of Gen. Buford, in
front of him. Gen. Bayard, with four regiments
of cavalry, was posted near Rapidan station, the
point where the Orange and Alexandria road
crosses Rapidan River, with his pickets extended
as far to the east as Raccoon Ford, and connect
ing with Gen. Buford on his right at Burnett s
Ford. From Raccoon Ford to the forks of the
Rappahannock, above Falmouth, the Rapidan was
lined with cavalry pickets. On the top of Thor
oughfare Mountain, about half-way between Gen
erals Bayard and Buford, was established a signal-
station, which overlooked the whole country as
far south as Orange Court-House.
On the seventh I proceeded to Sperryville, and
nspected the corps of Major-Gen. Sigel. I re-
nained at Sperryville until four o clock in the
afternoon of that day, during which time I re
ceived several reports from the front that the en
emy was crossing the Rappahannock at several
points between the railroad-crossing of that river
and Liberty Mills. I reached Culpeper Court-
House on the morning of the eighth of August.
The town had been occupied for several days by
Crawford s brigade, of Gen. Banks s corps ; and
on the seventh Ricketts s division, of McDowell s
corps, had also reached there from Waterloo
ridge. During the whole of the morning of the
eighth, I continued to receive reports from Gen.
3ayard, who was slowly falling back in the di
rection of Culpeper Court-House, from the ad-
ance of the enemy, and from Gen. Buford, who
Iso reported the enemy advancing in heavy force
.ipon Madison Court-House. My instructions re
quired me to be careful, and keep my communi-
:ations good with Fredericksburgh, and by no
neans to permit the enemy to interpose between
lie and that place. Although during the whole
f the eighth of August it was very doubtful,
rom the reports of Generals Bayard and Buford,
vhether the enemy s movement was in the dircc-
ion of Madison Court-House or of Culpeper, I
;onsidered it advisable, in view of my relations
vith Fredericksburgh, to concentrate my whole
Dree in the direction of Culpeper, so as to keep
nyself constantly interposed between the main
)ody of the enemy and the lower fords of the
lappahannock. Early in the day I pushed for-
vard Crawford s brigade, of Banks s corps, in the
346
REBELLION RECORD, 1862.
direction of Cedar or Slaughter Mountain, to sup
port Gen. Bayard, who was falling back in that
direction, and to assist him as far as practicable
in determining the movements and the forces of
the enemy. I sent orders also to Gen. Banks to
move forward promptly from Hazel River to Cul-
peper Court-House, and also to Gen. Sigel to
march at once from Sperryville to the same place.
To my surprise, I received, after night on the
eighth, a note from Gen. Sigel, dated at Sperry
ville, at half-past six o clock that afternoon, ask
ing me by what road he should march to Cul-
peper Court-House. As there was but one road
between those two points, and that a broad stone
turnpike, I was at a loss to understand how Gen.
Sigel could entertain any doubt as to the road by
which he should march. This doubt, however,
delayed the arrival of his corps at Culpeper
Court-House several hours, and rendered it im-
Eracticable for that corps to be pushed to the
-out, as I had designed, on the afternoon of the
next day.
Early on the morning of the ninth of August I
directed Gen. Banks to move forward toward Ce
dar Mountain with his whole corps, and to join
the brigade of that corps, under Gen. Crawford,
which had been pushed forward on the day pre
vious. I directed Gen. Banks to take up a strong
position at or near the point occupied by that
brigade, to check the advance of the enemy, and
to determine his forces and the character of his
movement as far as practicable. The consolidated
report of Gen. Banks s corps, received some days
previously, exhibited an effective force of some
thing over fourteen thousand men. Appended
to this report will be found the return in ques
tion. It appeared subsequently, however, that
Gen. Banks s forces at that time did not exceed
eight thousand men. But although I several
times called Gen. Banks s attention to the dis
crepancy between this return- and the force he
afterward stated to me he had led to the front,
that discrepancy has never been explained, and I
do not yet understand how Gen. Banks could
have been so greatly mistaken as to the forces
under his immediate command.
I directed him when he went forward from
Culpeper Court-House, that if the enemy ad
vanced to attack him in the strong position which
I had instructed him to take up, that he should
push his skirmishers well to the front and notify
me immediately. Three miles in his rear, and
within easy supporting distance, Ricketts s divi
sion, of McDowell s corps, had been posted at the
point where the road from Madison Court-House
to Culpeper intersects the road from Culpeper to
Cedar Mountain. This division was so posted
because it was not certain whether a considerable
force of the enemy was not advancing on Culpep
er from the direction of Madison Court-House,
Gen. Buford having reported to me very early on
the morning of the ninth from MadisSon Court-
House that the enemy was in heavy force on his
right, his left, and partly on his rear, and that he
was retreating in the direction of Sperryville.
Desultory artillery firing had been kept up all
day on the ninth, in the direction of Gen. Banks ?
corps, but I continued to receive, during the
whole of that day, reports from Gen. Banks that
no considerable force of the enemy had come for
ward, and that his cavalry had been ostentatious
ly displayed. He did not believe that the enemy
was in sufficient force to make any attack upon
him. As late as five o clock in the afternoon
Gen. Banks wrote me substantially to the same
effect ; but before I had received this last note
the artillery firing had become so rapid and con
tinuous, that I feared a general engagement was
going on, or might be brought on at any moment,
I therefore instructed Gen. McDowell to move
forward Ricketts s division rapidly to the field,
and accompanied that division myself. At no
time during the day did Gen. Banks express any
apprehensions of attack in force by the enemy,
nor did he ask nor intimate that he needed re-
enforcements.
General Sigel s corps began to march into Cul
peper Court-House late in the afternoon, and
just as I was leaving that place, having been de
layed several hours by General Sigel s singular
uncertainty as to what road he ought to pursue.
I had given orders a number of days previously
that all the troops belonging to the army of Vir
ginia should be ready to march at the shortest
notice, and should habitually keep two days
cooked rations in their haversacks. Notwith
standing this order, General Sigel s corps arrived
n Culpeper without any rations, and was unable
to move forward until provisions could be pro
cured from McDowell s train, and cooked at Cul
peper Court-House. *
I have received no report from General Banks
of his operations at Cedar Mountain, but I had
sent forward Brig. -Gen. Roberts, Chief of Cavalry,
of my staff, and had directed him to report to
General Banks in the early part of the day of the
ninth, and to advise freely with him as to the op
erations of his corps. General Roberts, as well
as General Banks, was fully advised of my wish
es, and that I desired Gen. Banks merely to keep
;he enemy in check, by occupying a strong posi
tion in his front, until the whole of the disposable
"orce under my command should be concentrated
n the neighborhood. General Roberts reported
X) me that he had conferred freely with General
Banks, and urgently represented to him my pur
poses, but that General Banks, contrary to his
suggestions and to my wishes, had left the strong
3osition which he had taken up, and had ad-
ranced two miles to assault the enemy, believing
ihat they were not in considerable force, and that
ic would be able to crush their advance before
;heir main body could come up from the dircc-
ion of the Rapidan. He accordingly threw for
ward his whole corps into action, against superior
brces of the enemy, strongly posted, and shelter
ed by woods and ridges. His advance Jed him
over the open ground, which was every where
swept by the fire of the enemy, concealed in tho
woods and ravines beyond. Notwithstanding
these disadvantages, his corps gallantly respond
ed to his orders, and assaulted the enemy with
DOCUMENTS.
347
great fury and determination. The action lasted
about an hour and a half, and during that time
our forces suffered heavy loss, and were gradu
ally driven back to their former position, at which
point, just at dusk, Ricketts s division of McDow
ell s corps came up and joined in the engage
ment.
As soon as I arrived on the field, at the head
of llicketts s division, I directed General Banks
to draw in his right, which was much extended,
and to mass the whole of his right wing at the
centre of his line, pushing forward at the same
time Rlcketts s division to occupy the ground
thus vacated. The enemy followed Banks as he
retived with great caution, and emerging from the
woods which had sheltered him all day, attempt
ed to push forward to the open ground in front
of our new line. A sharp artillery engagement
immediately commenced, when the enemy was
driven back to the woods, principally by the bat
teries of Ricketts s division. The artillery firing
was kept up until near midnight of the ninth.
Finding that Banks s corps had been severely cut
up, and was much fatigued, I drew it back to the j
eleventh. The whole day was spent by ooth
armies in burying the dead and in bringing off
the wounded.
Although, even after King joined me, my whole
effective force was barely equal to that of the en
emy, I determined, after giving King s division
one night s rest, to fall upon him at daylight on
the twelfth on his line of communications, and
compel him to fight a battle, which must have
been entirely decisive for one army or the other.
But during the night of the eleventh, Jackson
evacuated the positions in front of us, and re
treated rapidly across the Rapidan, in the direc
tion of Gordonsville, leaving many of his dead
and wounded on the field and along the road
from Cedar Mountain to Orange Court-House.
No material of war nor baggage-trains were lost
on either side, but the loss of life on both sides
were severe. Brig. -Gens. Geary, Augur and Car
roll were badly wounded, and Brig. -Gen. Prince
was captured by accident. Very many of our
best field and company officers
killed
or
wounded. From the verbal reports and state
ments of General Bunks and others, the Massa-
rear, and pushed forward the corps of Sigel, which j chusetts regiments behaved with especial gallant-
had began to arrive, to occupy the woods on the ry, and sustained the heaviest losses, but the
left road, with a wide space of open ground on conduct of the whole corps of General Banks
his front. Ricketts s division was also drawn was beyond all praise. Although I regret that
back to the cover of the woods, and the ridges in j General Banks thought it expedient to depart
the open ground on the right of Sigel. These from my instructions, it gives me pleasure to bear
dispositions were completed about daybreak on
the morning of the tenth. Banks s corps, re
duced to about five thousand men, was so cut up,
and worn down with fatigue, that I did not con-
testimony to his gallant and intrepid conduct
throughout that action. He exposed himself as
freely as any one under his command, and his
example went far to secure that gallant and noble
sider it capable of rendering any efficient service } conduct which has made his corps famous. Gens,
for several days. I therefore directed General j Gear}-, Augur, Carroll, Gordon and Green bchav-
Banks, or in his absence, General Williams, who
succeeded to the command, to assemble his corps
on the road to Culpeper Court-House, and about
two miles in rear of our front, to collect his strag
glers, send back his wounded to Culpeper Court-
House, and proceed as rapidly as possible to put
the corps in condition for service. In consequence
ed with distinguished gallantry. Gen. Prince,
who had led his brigade throughout the action
with coolness and courage, was captured after
dark while passing from one flank of his com
mand to the other. As I have not received any
report from Gen. Banks, it is not in my power to
mention the field and company officers who dis-
of the vigorous resistance of the night previous, tinguished themselves under his immediate eye
and the severe loss of the enemy in trying to ad
vance, before daylight of the tenth, Jackson drew
back his forces toward Cedar Mountain, about
two miles from our front. Our pickets were im
mediately pushed forward, supported byMilroy s
brigade, and occupied the ground.
The day of the eighteenth was intensely hot,
and the troops on both sides were too much
fatigued to renew the action. My whole effective
force on that day, exclusive of Banks s corps,
which was in no condition for service, was about
twenty thousand artillery and infantry, and about
two thousand cavalry General Buford, with the
in this action ; but as soon as his report is receiv
ed, I will transmit it to the Government, and en
deavor to do justice to every officer and soldier
who belonged to his corps. Brig.-Gen. Roberts,
Chief of Cavalry, of rny staff, accompanied Gen.
Banks throughout the day, and rendered most
important and gallant service.
No report of killed and wounded has been made
to me by Gen. Banks. I can, therefore, only
form an approximation of our losses in that bat
tle. Our killed, wounded and prisoners, amount
ed to about one thousand eight hundred men,