seventh of August, I estimated my whole effect
ive force (and I think the estimate was large) as
follows : Sigel s corps, nine thousand men ;
Banks s corps, five thousand men ; McDowell s
corps, including Reynolds s division, fifteen thou
sand five hundred men ; Reno s corps, seven
thousand ; the corps of Heintzclman and Porter,
(the freshest, by far, in that army,) about eighteen
thousand men, making in all fifty -four thousand
five hundred men. Our cavalry numbered on
paper about four thousand men ; but their horses
were completely broken down, and there were
not five hundred men, all told, capable of doing
such service as should be expected from cavalry.
The corps of Heintzelman had reached Warren
ton Junction, but was without wagons, without
artillery, with only four rounds of ammunition to
the man, and without even horses for the General
and field-officers. The corps of Porter had also
reached Warrenton Junction, with a very small
supply of provisions, and but forty rounds of am
munition for each man. On the morning of the
twenty-seventh, in accordance with the purpose
previously set forth, I directed McDowell to move
forward rapidly on Gainesville, by the Warren
ton turnpike, with his own corps and Sigel s, and
the division of Reynolds, so as to reach that point
during the night. * I directed General Reno, with
his corps, followed by Kearny s division of



S52



REBELLION RECORD, 1862.



Heintzclman s corps, to move rapidly on Green
wich, so as to reach there that night, to com
municate at once with General McDowell, and to
support him in any operations against the enemy
in the vicinity of Gainesville. I moved forward
along the railroad toward Manassas Junction
with Hooker s division of Heintzelman s corps,
leaving orders for Gen. Porter to remain with his
corps at Warrenton Junction until relieved by
General Banks, who was inarching to that place
from Fayetteville, and as soon as he was relieved
to push forward also in the direction of Gaines
ville, where, at that time, I expected that the
main collision with the enemy would occur.

The army trains of all the corps I instructed
to take the road to Warrenton Junction, and
follow in the rear of Hooker s division toward
Manassas Junction, so that the road pursued by
the trains was entirely covered from any possible
interruption by the enemy. On the afternoon of
the twenty-seventh a severe engagement occurred
between Hooker s division and Swell s division
of Jackson s forces. The action commenced
about four miles west of Bristow station. Ewell
was driven back along the railroad, but still con
fronted Hooker at dark along the banks of Broad
Run, immediately in front of Bristow station, at
which point I arrived at sunset. The loss in this
engagement was about three hundred killed and
wounded on each side, the enemy leaving his
dead, many of his wounded, and much of his
baggage on the field of battle.

The railroad had been torn up and the bridges
burned in several places between Bristow station
and Warrenton Junction. I accordingly directed
Major-Gen. Banks to cover the railroad trains at
Warrenton Junction until General Porter s corps
had marched from that place, and then to run
back the trains as far as practicable, and, cover
ing them with his troops, to repair the bridges as
fast as possible. I also directed Capt. Merrill, of
the engineers, with a considerable force, to repair
the railroad track and bridges as far as possible
in the direction of Bristow station. The road
was accordingly put in order from Warrenton
Junction to Kettle Run, during the twenty-
seventh, and the trains ran back to that point
early next day. At dark on the twenty-seventh,
Gen. Hooker reported to me that his ammunition
was nearly exhausted, and that he had but five
rounds to a man left. I had by that time be
come convinced that the whole force under Jack
son, consisting of his own, A. P. Hill s and
E well s divisions, was south of the turnpike, and
in the immediate neighborhood of Manassas Junc
tion. McDowell reached his position during the
night of the twenty-seventh, as did also Kearny
and Reno, and it was clear on that night that he
had interposed completely between Jackson and
the main body of the enemy, which was still west
of the Bull Run range, and in the neighborhood
of White Plains. Thinking it altogether likely
that Jackson would mass his whole force and at
tempt to turn our right at Bristow station, and
knowing that Hooker, for want of ammunition,
was in little condition to make long resistance, I



sent back orders to Gen. Porter, about dark of
the twenty-seventh, to move forward at one
o clock in the night, and report to me at Bristow
by daylight in the morning, leaving instructions
in some detail for Banks, who was expected at
Warrenton Junction during that night or early
in the morning. The orders for all these move-
ments are herewith appended. General Porter
failed utterly to obey the orders that were sent
him ; giving as an excuse that his men were
tired, that they would straggle in the night, and
that a wagon-train, proceeding eastward, in the
rear of Hooker s division, would offer obstructions
to his march. He, however, made no attempt
whatever to comply with this order, although it
was stated to him in the order itself that his
presence was necessary on all accounts at day
light, and that the officer delivering the despatch
was instructed to conduct him to the field.

There were but two courses left open to Jack
son in consequence of this sudden and unex
pected movement of the army. He could not
retrace his steps through Gainesville, as it was
occupied by McDowell, having at command a
force equal, if not superior to his own. He was
either obliged therefore to retreat through Cen-
treville, which would carry him still further from
the main body of Lee s army or to mass his
force, assault us at Bristow station and turn our
right. He pursued the former course, and retired
through Centreville. This mistake of Jackson s
alone saved us from the serious consequences
which would have followed this disobedience of
orders on the part of General Porter.

At nine o clock on the night of the twenty-
seventh, satisfied of Jackson s position, I sent
orders to General McDowell to push forward at
the very earliest dawn of day, toward Manassas
Junction from Gainesville, resting his right on
the Manassas Gap Railroad and throwing his left
well to the east. I directed Gen. Reno to march
at the same hour from Greenwich, direct upon
Manassas Junction, and Kearny to march at the
same hour upon Bristow. This latter order was
sent to Kearny to render my right at Bristow
perfectly secure against the probable movement
of Jackson in that direction. Kearny arrived
at Bristow about eight o clock in the morning,
Reno being on the left, and marching direct upon
Manassas Junction. 1 immediately pushed Kear
ny forward in pursuit of Ewell, toward Manassas,
followed by Hooker. General Porter s corps did
not arrive at Bristow until half-past ten o clock
in the morning ; and the moment he found that
Jackson had evacuated Manassas Junction, ho
requested permission to halt at Bristow and rest
his men. Sykes s division, of Porter s corps, had
spent the whole day of the twenty-seventh, from
ten o clock in the morning until daylight of tho
twenty-eighth, in camp at Warrenton Junction.

Morrcll s division of the same corps had arrived

at Warrenton Junction during- the day of the

twenty-seventh, and also remained there during

the whole of that night. Porter s corps was by

| far the freshest in the whole army, and should

I have been, and, I believe, was in better condition



DOCUMENTS.



353



for service than any troops we had. Genera
McDowell reported to me afterward that he hat
given orders for the movement of his comrnaru
upon Manassas Junction at two o clock at night
in accordance with the directions I had sent him
but that General Sigcl, who commanded hib
advance, and was at Gainesville, instead of mov
ing forward, from Gainesville at daylight, as lu
was ordered, was absolutely with his advance in
that town as late as half-past seven o clock ir
the morning. Meantime, beginning about three
o clock in the morning of the twenty-eighth,
Jackson commenced evacuating Manassas Junc
tion, and his troops were marching from that
point in the direction of Centreville until ten or
eleven o clock in the day. If the whole force
under McDowell had moved forward as directed,
and at the time specified, they would have inter
cepted Jackson s retreat toward Centreville by
eight o clock in the morning, and [ do not believe
it would have been possible for Jackson to have
crossed Bull Hun, so closely engaged with our
forces, without heavy loss. (See McDowell s re
port concerning the delay of General Sigel.)

I reached Manassas Junction with Kcarny s
division and Reno s corps about twelve o clock
in the day of the twenty-eighth, less than an
hour after Jackson in person had retired. I im
mediately pushed forward Hooker, Kearny, and
Reno upon Centreville, and sent orders to Fit/
John Porter to corno forward to Manassas Junc
tion. I also wrote to McDowell, and stated the
facts so far as we were then able to ascertain
them, and directed him to call back the whole of
his force that had come in the direction of Ma
nassas Junction, and to move forward upon Cen
treville. He had, however, without my know
ledge, detached Rickctts s division in the direc
tion of Thoroughfare Gap, and that division was no
longer available in his movement toward Centre
ville. Late in the afternoon of the twenty-eighth,
Kearny drove the enemy s rear-guard out of Cen
treville, and occupied that town, with his ad
vance beyond it, about dark. The enemy retreat
ed through Centreville, one portion of his force
taking the road by Sudley Springs, and the
other pursuing the \Varrenton turnpike toward
Gainesville, destroying the bridges on that road
oyer Bull Run and Cub Run McDowell with
his whole force, consisting of his own corps, (ex
cept Ricketts s division,) Sigel s corps, and the
division of Reynolds, marching in the direction of
Centreville, encountered the advance of Jack
son s force retreating toward Thoroughfare Gap,
about six o clock on the evening of the twenty-
eighth. A severe action took place between
King s division, of McDowell s corps, and the ad
vance of Jackson, which was terminated by dark
ness. Each party maintained its ground. Gib
bon s brigade, of King s division, which was in
the advance of that division, sustained the brunt
of the action, but was supported handsomely by
Doubleday s brigade, which came into action
shortly after. This engagement, and its result,
were reported to me, near Centreville, about ten
o clock that night.

VOL. V. Doc. 23



I felt sure then, and so stated, that there was
no escape for Jackson. I accordingly sent orders
to General McDowell, as also to General Kinir,
several times during the night of the twentieth,
and once by his own staff-ofliccr, to hold his
ground at all hazards, and prevent the retreat of
Jackson to the west, and that at daylight in the
morning our whole force from . Centreville and
Manassas Junction would be up with the enemy,
who must be crushed between us. I also sent
orders to General Kearny to push forward at
one o clock that night, cautiously, from Centre
ville along the AVarrenton turnpike, to drive in
the pickets of the enemy, and to keep closely in
contact with him during the night ; to rest his
left on the Warren-ton turnpike, and throw his
right well to the north, if possible across Little
River turnpike; at daylight in the morning to
assault vigorously with his right advance; and
that Hooker and Reno would be up with him
very shortly after day-dawn. I sent orders to
General Porter, whom I supposed to be at Ma-,
nassas Junction, where he should have been, in
compliance with my orders of the day previous,
to move upon Centreville at the earliest dawn,
and stated to him the position of the forces, and
that a severe battle would undoubtedly be fought
luring the morning of the twenty-ninth. The
only apprehension I had at that time was that
Jackson might attempt to retreat to the north in
;he direction of Lecsburgh, and for the purpose
of preventing this, I directed Kearny to keep
closely in contact with him during the whole of
he night of the twenty-eighth. My force was so
disposed that McDowell, Sigcl, and Reynolds,
vhose joint forces amounted to about twenty-five
,housand men, were immediately west of Jack
son, and between him and Thoroughfare Gap,
vhile Kearny, Hooker, Reno, and Porter, about
wenty-five thousand strong, were to fall on the
iiiemy from the east at daylight in the morning,
}r very shortly after. AVith this disposition of
roops we were so far in advance of Longstreet,
hat by using our whole force vigorously, we
;hould be able to crush Jackson before Long-
itreet could by any possibility reach the scene of
iction.

To my great disappointment, however, I learn-
id, toward daylight, on the morning of the
wenty-ninth, that King s division had fallen
>ack in the direction of Manassas Junction, thus
caving open the road to Thoroughfare Gap, and
nakirig new movements and dispositions of
roops immediately necessary.

I submit herewith the reports of Generals
ting, Gibbon, and Doublwlay, of the action of
he evening of the twenty-eighth, as also a de-
ailed report of General McDowell. The orders
Erecting all these movements are also appended,
nd they bring the operations of the army up
o the twenty-ninth of August. The losses in
Cing s division, in the action of the evening of
lie twenty-eighth, were principally in Gibbon s
rigade of that division, and numbered j .

Gibbon s brigade consisted of some of the best
roops in the service, and the conduct of both



354



REBELLION" RECORD, 1862.



men and officers was gallant and distinguished.
The report of General King is herewith appended,
exhibiting his high opinion of the conduct of this
brigade, and of the officers who distinguished
themselves in that action. The disposition of the
troops on the west of Jackson having failed
through Ricketts s movement toward Thorough
fare Gap, and the consequent withdrawal of King,
an imminent change in the disposition and pro
posed movements of the troops for the succeed
ing day became necessary ; and about daylight
on the morning of the twenty-ninth, shortty
after I received information of the withdrawal of
King s division, I sent orders to General Sigel,
who was in the nighborhood of Groveton, sup
ported by Reynolds s division to attack the enemy
vigorously as soon as it was light enough to see



and bring



to a stand, if it were possible to



do so. I instructed General Heintzclman to push
forward from Centreville toward Gainesville at
the earliest dawn, with the divisions of Hooker
and Kearny, and directed General Reno to fol
low closely in his rear ; to use all speed, and as
soon as they came up with the enemy to estab
lish communication with Sigel, and attack with
the utmost promptness and vigor. I also sent
orders to Major-General Fitz-John Porter, at
Manassas Junction, to move forward with the
utmost rapidity, with his own corps, and King s
division of McDowell s corps, which was supposed
to be at that point, upon Gainesville, by the
direct road from Manassas Junction to that place.



I arrived on the field from Centreville about
noon, and found the two armies confronting each



other, both considerably cut up by the sharp ac
tion in which they had been engaged since day
light in the morning. Heintzelman s corps occu
pied the right of our line, in front or west of the
Sudley Springs road. Gen. Sigel was on his left,
with his line extended a short distance south of
the Warrcnton turnpike ; the division of Gen.
Schenck occupying the high ground to the left
of that road. The extreme left was occupied by
Gen. Reynolds. Gen. Reno s corps had reached
the field, and the most of it had been pushed for
ward into action, leaving four regiments in re
serve, and in rear of the centre of our line. Im
mediately after I reached the ground Gen. Sigel
reported to me that his line was weak ; that the
divisions of Schurz and Steinwehr were much
cut up, and ought to be drawn back from the
front. I informed Gen. Sigel that this was ut
terly impossible, as there were no troops to re
place them, and that he must hold his ground ;
that I would not again push his troops into ac
tion, as the corps of Porter and McDowell were
moving forward from Manassas Junction, on the
road to Gainesville, and must very soon be in
position to fall upon the enemy s right flank, and
probably upon his rear. I rode to the front of
our line, and inspected it from right to left, giving
the same information to Gens. Hcintzelman and
Reno.
rest in

[ urged him to make all speed, that he might j selves with ammunition. From twelve until four
come up with the enemy and be able to turn his o clock very severe skirmishes occurred constant-
flank near where the AVarrenton turnpike is in- ly at various points on our line, and were brought
terscctcd by the road from Manassas Junction to ! on at every indication the enemy made of a clis-
Gainesville. Shortly after sending this order, I position to retreat. About two o clock in the
received a note from General McDowell, whom I
had not been able to find during the night of the



The troops were accordingly suffered to
their positions, and to re-supply them-



twenty-eighth, dated at Manassas Junction, re
questing that King s division might not be taken
from his command. I immediately sent a joint
order to Generals McDowell and Porter, directing
them, with their two corps, to march with all
speed toward Gainesville, on the direct road from
Manassas Junction. This order, which is ap
pended, sets forth in detail the movements they
were directed to make.

Sigel attacked the enemy about daylight on the
morning of the twenty-ninth a mile or two east
of Groveton, where he was soon joined by the di
visions of Hooker and Kearny. Jackson fell
back several miles, but was so closely pressed
by these forces that he was compelled to make a
stand, and to make the best defence possible.
He accordingly took up a position with his left in
the neighborhood of Sudley Springs, his right a
little to the south of Warrenton turnpike, and
his line covered by an old railroad-grade which
leads from Gainesville in the direction of Lees-
bunrh. His batteries, which were numerous, and
gome of them of heavy calibre, were posted _ be
hind the ridges in the open ground on both sides
of Warrenton turnpike, while the mass^ of his
troops were sheltered in dense woods behind the
ailroad embankments.



afternoon several pieces of artillery were dis
charged on the extreme right of the enemy s
line, and I fully believed that Gens. Porter and
McDowell had reached their positions and had
become engaged with the enemy. I did not hear
more than three shots fired, and was at a loss to
know what had become of those two corps, or
what was delaying them, but I received informa
tion shortly afterward that Gen. McDowell was
advancing to join the main body by the Sudley
Springs road, and Tould probably be up with us
in two hours. At half-past four o clock, I sent a
peremptory order to Gen. Porter to push forward
at once into action on the enemy s right, and if
possible to turn his rear, stating to him generally,
the condition of things on the field in front of
me. About half-past five o clock, when Gen.
Porter should have been coming into action in
compliance with this order, I directed Generals
Heintzehnan and Reno to attack the enemj*.
The attack was made with great gallantry, and
the whole of the left of the enemy was" doubled
back toward his centre, and our own forces,
after a sharp conflict of an hour and a half,
occupied the field of battle, with the dead and
wounded of the enemy in our hands. In this
attack, Grover s brigade of Hooker s division was
particularly distinguished by a determined bay
onet-charge, breaking two of the enemy s lines



DOCUMENTS.



and penetrating to the third before it could be
checked. By this time Gen. McDowell had ar
rived on the field, and I pushed his corps imme
diately to the front, along the Warren ton turn
pike, with orders to fall upon the enemy, who
was retreating toward the pike from the direction
of Sudley Springs. The attack along the turn
pike was made by King s division at about sun
set in the evening ; but by that time the advance
of the main body of the enemy, under Long-
street, had begun to reach the field, and King s
division encountered a stubborn and determined
resistance at a point about three fourths of a mile
in front of our line^of battle.

While this attack was going on, the forces
under Heintzelman and Reno continued to push
back the left of the enemy in the direction of
Warrenton turnpike, so that about eight o clock
in the evening the greater portion of the field of
battle was occupied by our army. Nothing was
heard of Gen. Porter up to that time, and his
force took no part whatever in the action, but
were suffered by him to lie idle on their arms,
within sight and sound of the battle during the
whole day. So far as I know, he made no effort
whatever to comply with my orders or to take
any part in the action. I do not hesitate to say
that if he had discharged his duty as became a
seldior under the circumstances, and had made a
vigorous attack on the enemy, as he was expect
ed and directed to* do, at any time up to eight
o clock that night, we should have utterly crush
ed or captured the larger portion of Jackson s
force before he could have been by any possibili
ty sufficiently reenforced to have made an effect
ive resistance. I did not myself feel for a mo
ment that it was necessary for me, having given
Gen. Porter an order to march toward the ene
my, in a particular direction, to send him in ad
dition specific orders to attack, it being his clear
duty, and in accordance with every military pre
cept, to have brought his forces into action
wherever he encountered the enemy, when a
furious battle with that enemy was raging during
the whole day in his immediate presence. I be
lieve, in fact I am positive, that at five o clock on
the afternoon of the twenty-ninth, Gen. Porter
had in his front no considerable body of the en-
envy. I believed then, as I am very sure now,
that it was easily practicable for him to have
turned the right flank of Jackson, and to have
fallen upon his rear ; that if he had done so, we
should have gained a decisive victory over the
army under Jackson before he could have been
joined by any of the forces of Long-street, and
that the army of Gen. Lee would have been so
crippled and checked by the destruction of this
large fprce as to have been no longer in condition
to prosecute further operations of an aggressive
character.

Our losses during the twenty-ninth were very
heavy, but no separate returns of killed and
wounded for that day have been made to me. I
believe, from all I could learn from corps com
manders, and so reported, that our loss during
that day was not less than six or eight thousand



killed and wounded, and I think this estimate
will be confirmed by the general reports, which
cover the los.ses during the battles of the twenty-
seventh, twenty-eighth, twenty-ninth and thirti
eth August, and the first of September. My es
timate of the loss of the enemy, reported to the
Department on the morning of the thirtieth, was
based upon the statements made to me by Gens.
Hooker and Kearny, who had been over the
whole field on the left. Gen. Hooker estimated
the loss of the enemy as at least two to one, and
Gen. Kearney as at least three to one of our own.

Every indication, during the night of the twenty-
ninth and up to ten o clock on the morning of the
thirtieth, pointed to the retreat of the enemy from
our front. Paroled prisoners of our own, taken
on the evening of the twenty-ninth, and who came
into our lines on the morning of the thirtieth, re
ported the enenvy retreating during the whole
night in the direction of and along the Warrenton
turnpike. Generals McDowell and Heintzelman,
who reconnoitred the positions held by the ene
my s left on the evening of the twenty-ninth, con
firmed this statement. They reported to me that
the positions occupied by the enemy s left had
been evacuated, and that there was every indica
tion that he was retreating in the direction of
Gainesville.

On the morning of the thirtieth, as may be sup