posed, our troops, who had been so continually
marching and fighting for so many days, were in
a state of great exhaustion. The}* had had little
to cat for two days previous, and artillery and
cavalry horses had been in harness and saddled
continuously for ten days, and had had no forage
for two days previous. It may easily be imagined
how little these troops, after such severe labors,
and after undergoing such hardship and priva
tion, were in condition for active and efficient
service. I had telegraphed to the General-in-
Chief on the twenty-eighth our condition, and
had begged of him to have rations and forage sent
forward to us from Alexandria with all despatch.
I informed him of the. imminent need of cavalry-
horses to enable the cavalry belonging to the
army to perform any service whatever. About
daylight of the thirtieth, I received a note from
Gen. Franklin herewith appended written by
direction of Gen. McClellan, and dated at eight
o clock P.M. on the twenty-ninth, informing me
that rations and forage would be loaded into the
available wagons and cars at Alexandria, as soon
as I would send back a cavalry escort to bring
out the trains. Such a letter, when we were
fighting the enemy, and Alexandria was swarm
ing with troops, needs no comment. Bad as was
the condition of our cavalry, I was in no situation
to spare troops from the front, nor could they
have gone to Alexandria and returned within the
time by which we must have had provisions or
have fallen back in the direction of Washington.
Nor do I yet see what service cavalry could have
rendered in guarding railroad trains. It was not
until I received this letter that I began to feel
discouraged and nearly hopeless of any successful
issue to the operations with \vhich I was charged;
356
REBELLION RECORD, 1862.
but I felt it to be my duty, notwithstanding the
desperate condition of my command, from great
fatigue, from want of provisions and forage, and
from the small hope that I had of any effective
assistance from Alexandria, to hold my position
at all hazards and under all privations, unless
overwhelmed by the superior forces of the enemy.
I had received no sort of information of any troops
coming forward to my assistance since the twenty-
fourth, and did not expect, on the morning of the
thirtieth, that any assistance would reach me
from the direction of Washington ; but I deter
mined again to give battle to the enemy on the
thirtieth, and at least to lay on such blows as
would cripple him as much as possible, and delay
as long as practicable any further advance toward
the capital. I accordingly prepared to renew the
engagement. At that time my effective forces,
greatly reduced by losses in killed, wounded,
missing and broken-down men, during the severe
operations of two or three days and nights pre
vious; the sharp actions of Hooker, King, and
Ricketts on the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth,
and the furious battle on the twenty-ninth, were
estimated by me and others as follows : Mc
Dowell s corps, including Reynolds s division,
twelve thousand men ; Sigel s corps, seven thou
sand ; Reno s corps, seven thousand ; Heintzel-
inan s corps, seven thousand ; Porter s corps,
which had been in no engagement, and was, or
ought to have been, perfectly fresh, I estimated
at about twelve thousand men, including the bri
gade of Piatt, which formed a part of Sturgis s
division, and the only portion that ever joined
me. But of this force the brigade of Piatt and
of Griffin, numbering, as I understood, about five
thousand men, had been suffered to march off at
daylight on the thirtieth to Centreville, and were
not available for operations on that day. This
reduced Porter s effective force in the field to
about seven thousand men, which gave me a total
force of forty thousand men. Banks s corps,
about five thousand strong, was at Bristow sta
tion, in charge of the railroad trains, and of a
portion of the wagon trains of the army, still at
that place. Between twelve and two o clock in
the day I advanced the corps of Porter, support
ed by King s division of McDowell s corps, to at
tack the enemy along the Warrenton turnpike ;
at the same time I directed Heintzclman and
Reno, on our right, to push forward to the left
and front toward Warrenton turnpike, and attack
the enemy s left in flank if possible. For a short
time Ricketts s division of McDowell s corps was
placed in support of this movement on our right.
It was necessary for me to act thus promptly,
and make the attack, as I had not the time, for
want of provisions and forage, to await an attack
from the enemy, nor did I think it good to do so
under the circumstances. During the whole night
of the twenty-ninth, and " the morning of the
thirtieth, the advance of the main army, under
Lee, was arriving on the field to roenforce Jack
son, so that by twelve or one o clock in the day
we were confronted by forces greatly superior to
our own ; and these forces were being every mo
ment largely increased by fresh arrivals of the
enemy from the direction of Thoroughfare Gap.
Every moment of delay increased the odds against
us, and I therefore advanced to the attack as
rapidly as I was able to bring my forces into
action. Shortly after Gen. Porter moved forward
to the attack by the Warrenton turnpike, and
the assault on the enemy was begun by lleint-
zelman and Reno on the right, it became appar
ent that the enemy was massing his troops, as
fast as they arrived on the field, on his right, and
was moving forward from that direction to turn
our left ; at which point it was plain he intended
to make his main attack I accordingly directed
Gen. McDowell to recall Ricketts s division im
mediately from our right, and post it on the left
of our line. The attack of Porter was neither
vigorous nor persistent, and his troops soon re
tired in considerable confusion. As soon as they
commenced to fall back the enemy advanced to
the assault, and our whole line, from right to left,
was soon furiously engaged. The main attack
of the enemy was made upon our left, but was
met with stubborn resistance by the divisions of
Gen. Schenck, Gen. Milroy, and Gen. Reynolds,
who, shortly after the action began, were ree en-
forccd on their left and rear by the whole division
of Ricketts s division. The action raged furious
ly for several hours, the enemy bringing up his
heavy reserves, and pouring mass after mass of
his troops upon our left. So greatly superior in
number were his forces, that, while overpowering
us on our left, he was able to assault us also
with superior forces on our right. Porter s forces
were rallied and brought to a halt as they were
retiring to the rear. As soon as they could bo
used, I pushed them forward to support our left,
and they there rendered distinguished service,
especially the brigade of regulars under Colonel
Buchanan.
Tower s brigade of Ricketts s division was
pushed forward into action in support of Rey
nolds s division, and was led forward in person
by Gen. Tower with conspicuous skill and gal
lantry. The conduct of that brigade, in plain
view of all the forces on our left, was especially
distinguished, and drew forth hearty and enthu
siastic cheers. The example of this brigade was
of great service, and infused new spirit into all
troops who witnessed their intrepid conduct.
Reno s corps was also withdrawn from its posi
tion on our right centre late in the afternoon, and
thrown into the action on our left, where it be
haved with conspicuous gallantry.
Notwithstanding these great disadvantages, our
troops held their ground with the utmost firm
ness and obstinacy. The losses on both sides
were very heavy. By dark our left had been
forced back about half or three quarters of a mile,
but still remained firm and unbroken, and still
covered the turnpike in our rear.
About six o clock in tae afternoon I heard ac
cidentally that Franklin s corps had arrived at a
point about four miles east of Centreville, and
twelve miles in our rear, and that it was only
about eight thousand strong. The result of tho
DOCUMENTS.
857
battle of the thirtieth, the veiy heavy losses we
had suffered, and the complete prostration of our
troops from hunger and fatigue, made it plain to
me that we were no longer able, in the face of
such overwhelming odds, to maintain our position
so far to the front ; nor could we have been able
to do so under any circumstances, suffering, as
were the men and horses from fatigue and hunger,
and weakened by the heavy losses incident to the
uncommon hardships which the} r had suffered.
About eight o clock at night, therefore, I sent
written instructions to the commanders of corps
to withdraw leisurely toward Centreville, and
stated to them what route each should pursue,
and where they should take post. General Reno
was instructed, with his whole corps, to cover the
movement of the army toward Centreville. The
withdrawal was made slowly, quietly, and in
good order, no pursuit whatever having been at
tempted by the enemy. A division of infantry,
with its batteries, was posted to cover the cross
ing at Cub Run.
The exact losses in this battle I am unable to
give, as the reports received from the corps com
manders only exhibit the aggregate losses during
the whole of the operations from August twenty-
second to September second. Before leaving the
field that night, I sent orders to Gen. Banks, at
Bristow station, to destroy the railroad trains and
such of the stores in them as "he was unable to
carry off, and join me at Centreville. I had pre
viously sent him orders to throw into each wagon
of the army trains as much as possible of the
stores from the railroad cars, and to be sure and
bring off with him, from "SVarrenton Junction and
Bristow station, all the ammunition and all the
sick and wounded that could be transported, and
for this purpose, if it were necessary, to throw
out the personal baggage, tents, etc., from the
regimental trains. These several orders are ap
pended. At no time during August twenty-
eighth, twenty-ninth, thirtieth, and thirty-first,
was the road between Bristow station and Cen
treville interrupted b} r the enemy. The whole of
the trains of the army were on that road, in charge
of Gen. Banks, and covered and protected by his
whole corps. If any of these wagons were lost,
as I believe none were, it was wholly without ne
cessity. I enter thus specifically into this mat
ter, and submit the orders sent to Gen. Banks,
and his subsequent report to me, because no part
of the misrepresentation of this campaign has
been greater than the statement of our heavy loss
of wagons and supplies. The orders submitted
will show conclusively that every arrangement
was made, in the utmost detail, for the security
of our trains and supplies, and I am quite con
vinced that Gen. Banks is not the man to neglect
the duty with which he was charged.
I arrived at Centreville between nine and ten
o clock on the night of the thirtieth. On the
same night I sent orders to the corps command
ers to report to me in person as early after day
light as possible on the morning of the thirty-
first, and on that morning the troops were di-
tected to be posted as follows : Porter was to oc
cupy the intrenchments on the north or right of
Centreville ; Franklin on his left, in the intrench-
mcnts ; in rear of Centreville, between Franklin
and Porter, as a support, was posted the corps of
Heintzclman ; Sigel occupied the intrenchments
on the left and south side of the town, with Reno
on his left and rear. Banks was ordered to take
post, as soon as he arrived, on the north side of
Bull Run, and to cover the bridge on the road
from Centreville to Manassas Junction ; Sumner,
as soon as he arrived, was ordered to take post
between Centreville and Chantilly, and to occupy
Chantilly in force ; McDowell was posted about
two miles in the rear of Centreville, on the road
to Fairfax Court-House. Ammunition-trains and
some provisions were gotten up on the thirty-first,
and all corps commanders were notified, by spe
cial order to each, that the ammunition-trains
were parked immediately in rear of Centreville,
and were directed to send officers to procure such
ammunition as was needed in their respective
corps. I directed the whole of the trains of the
army to be unloaded at Centreville, and sent to
Fairfax station to bring up forage and rations.
We remained during the whole day of the
thirty-first, resting the men, getting up supplies
of provisions, and re-supplying the commands
with ammunition.
The enemy s cavalry appeared in force in front
of our advance at Cub Run, during the morning
of the thirty-first, but made no attempt to cross,
and no attack upon our troops posted there. A
few pieces of artillery were fired, but with no re
sult on either side.
The whole force that I had at Centreville, as
reported to me by the corps commanders, on the
morning of the first of September, after receiving
the corps of Sumner and Franklin, was as follows :
McDowell s corps, ten thousand men; Sigel s
corps, about seven thousand ; Heintzelman s
corps, about six thousand; Reno s, six thousand;
Banks s, five thousand; Summer s, eleven thou
sand ; Franklin s, eight thousand in all, sixty-
three thousand men. From these forces two
brigades, as I before stated, had been sent to
Fairfax station, to guard the trains and the depot
at that place, which makes it necessary to deduct
four thousand men. It is proper for me to state
here, and I do it with regret and reluctance, that at
least one half of this great diminution of our
forces was occasioned by skulking and straggling
from the army. The troops which were brought
into action fought with all gallantry and deter
mination, but thousands of men straggled away
from their commands, and were not in any action.
I had posted several men in rear of the field of
battle, on the twenty-ninth of August, and- al
though many thousand stragglers and skulkers
were arrested by them, many others passed round
through the woods, and did not rejoin their com
mands during the remainder of the campaign. I
had telegraphed to -the General-in-Chief, from
Rappahannock station, on the twenty -second, this
practice of straggling was very common, and was
reducing our force considerably, even at that
time. I also sent orders, on the same day, to
358
REBELLION RECORD, 1862.
Gen. Sturgis, to arrest all stragglers arriving at
Alexandria ; to confine them in military prisons,
and to bring them to speedy trial. The active
and incessant movements of the army prevented
me, during the whole of this campaign, from giv
ing that attention to the subject, except in orders,
which ought to be and must be given to it, to
preserve efficiency and discipline among any
troops. Our cavalry at Centreville was com
pletely broken down, no horses whatever having
reached us to remount it. Generals Buford and
Bayard, Commanding the whole of the cavalrj"
force of the army, reported to me that there were
not five horses to the company that could be
forced into a trot. It was impossible, therefore,
to cover our front with cavalr} , or to make cav
alry reconnoissances, as is usual and necessary
in front of an army.
I directed Gen. Sumncr, on the morning of the
first of September, to push forward a reconnois-
sance of two brigades toward the Little River
turnpike, to ascertain if the enemy were making
any movements in the direction of Germantown
or Fairfax Court-House. The enemy was found
moving again slowly toward our right, heavy
columns of his force being in march toward Fair
fax along Little River pike. The main body of
our forces was so much broken down, and so com
pletely exhausted, that they were in no condition,
even on the first of September, for any active op
erations against the enemy ; but I determined to
attack at daylight on the second of September, in
front of Chantilly. The movement of the enemy
had become so developed by the afternoon of the
first, and was so evidently directed to Fairfax
Court-House, with a view of turning my right,
that I made the necessary disposition of troops to
fight a battle between the Little River pike and
the road from Centreville to Fairfax Court-House.
I sent General Hooker early in the afternoon to
Fairfax Court-House, and directed him to assem
ble all the troops that were in the vicinit} , and to
push forward to Germantown with his advance.
I directed McDowell to move back along the road
to Fairfax Court-House, as for as Difficult Creek,
and to connect by his right with Hooker. Reno
was to push forward to the north of the road from
Centreville to Fairfax, in the direction of Chan
tilly. Heintzelman s corps was directed to take
post on the road between Centreville and Fairfax,
immediately in the rear of Reno. Franklin took
post on McDowell s left and rear; Sumner was
posted on the left of Heintzelman, while the corps
of Sigel and Porter were directed to unite with
the right of Sumner ; Banks was instructed with
the wagon trains of the army, to pursue the old
Braddock road and come into the Alexandria
turnpike in rear of Fairfax Court-House. Just
before sunset on the first, the enemy attacked us
on our right, but was met by Hooker, McDowell,
Reno, and Kearny s division, of Hcintzelman s
corps. A very severe action occurred in the
midst of a terrific thunder-storm, and was termi
nated shortly after dark. The enemy was driven
back entirely from our front, but during that en
gagement we lost two of the best, and one of our
most distinguished officers Major-Gen. Kearny
and Brig. -Gen. Stevens who were both killed
while gallantly leading their commands, and in
front of their line of battle. It is unnecessary for
me to say one word of commendation of two offi
cers who were so well and widely known to the
country. Words cannot express my sense of the
zeal, the gallantry, and the sympathy of thai-
most earnest and accomplished soldier. Major-
Gen. Kearny. In him the country has suffered
a loss which it will be difficult, if not impossible,
to repair. He died as he would have wished to
die, and as became his heroic character.
On the morning of the second of September,
the enemy still continuing his movements toward
our right, my whole force was posted behind Dif
ficult Creek, from Flint Hill to the Alexandria
turnpike. Although we were quite able to main
tain our position at that place until the stragglers
could be collected, and the army, after its labors
and perils, put into condition for effective service,
I considered it advisable, for reasons which de
veloped themselves at Centreville, and were ap
parent to the General-in-Chief, and are set forth
herewith in the appendix, that the troops should
be, drawn back to the intrenchmente in front of
Washington, and that some reorganization should
be made of them, in order that earlier effective
service should be secured than was possible in
their condition at that time. I received orders
about twelve o clock on the second of September
to draw back the forces within the intrcnchments,
which was done in good order, and without any
interruption by the enemy.
The reasons which induced me, before I took
the field in Virginia, to express to the Govern
ment my desire to be relieved from the command
of the army of Virginia, and to return to the
West, existed in equal if not in greater force at
this time than when I first stated them. I ac
cordingly renewed urgently my application to be
relieved. The Government assented to it with
some reluctance, and I was transferred to the
Department of the North- West, for which depart
ment I left Washington on the seventh of Sep
tember.
It seems proper for me, since so much misrepre
sentation has been put into circulation as to the
support I received from the army of the Potomac,
to state precisely what forces of that army came
under my command, and were at any time en
gaged in the active operations of the campaign.
Reynolds s division of Pennsylvania reserves,
about two thousand five hundred strong, joined
me on the twenty-third of August, at Rappahan-
nock station. The corps of Heintzelman and
Porter, about eighteen thousand strong, joined
me on the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh of
August at Warrenton Junction. The Pennsylva
nia reserves, under Reynolds, and Ileintzehaan s
corps, consisting of Hooker and Kearny, ren
dered most gallant and efficient service in all the
operations which occurred after they had report
ed to me. Porter s corps, from unnecessary and
unusual delays, and frequent and flagrant disre
gard of my orders, took no part whatever, except
DOCUMENTS.
359
in the action of the thirtieth of August. This
small fraction of twenty thousand five hundred
men was all of the ninety-one thousand veteran
troops from Harrison s Landing which ever drew
trigger under my command, or in any way took
part in that campaign. By the time that the
corps of Franklin and Sumner, nineteen thousand
strong, joined me at Centreville, the original army
of Virginia, as well as the corps of Heintzelman
and the division of Reynolds, had been so much
cut up in the severe actions in which they had
been engaged, and were so much broken down
and diminished in numbers by the constant and
excessive duties they had performed, that they
were in little condition for any effective service
whatever, and required and should have had
some days of rest to put them in any thing like
condition to perform their duties in the field.
Such is the history of a campaign, substanti
ated by documents written during the operations,
and hereto appended, which has been misunder
stood to an extent perhaps unparalleled in the
history of warfare. I submit it here to the pub
lic judgment, with all confidence that it will be
fairly and deliberately considered, and a just ver
dict pronounced upon it, and upon the army en
gaged in it. Upon such unbiased judgment I am
very willing (setting aside any previous record I
have made during the war) to rest my reputation
as a soldier. I shall submit cheerfully to the
verdict of my countrymen ; but I desire that that
verdict shall be rendered upon a full knowledge
of the facts.
I well understood, as does every military man,
bow difficult and how thankless was the duty de
volved upon me ; and I am not ashamed to say
that I would gladly have avoided it if I could
have done so consistently with my sense of duty
to the Govermneut. To confront with a small
army vastly superior forces ; to fight battles with
out hope of victory, but only to gain time, and to
embarrass and delay the forward movement of
the enemy, is of all duties the most hazardous
and the most difficult which can be imposed upon
any general or any army. While such opera
tions required the highest courage and endurance
on the part of the troops, they are perhaps un
likely to be understood or appreciated, and the
results, however successful, have little in them
to attract popular attention and applause.
At no time could I have hoped to fight a suc
cessful battle with the immensely superior force
of the enemy which confronted me, and which
was able at any time to outflank me and bear my
small army to the dust. It was only by constant
movement, by incessant watchfulness and hazard
ous skirmishes and battles that the forces under
my command were not overwhelmed, while at the
same time the enemy was embarrassed and de
layed in his advance upon Washington until the
forces from the Peninsula were at ^length assem
bled for the defence of the city. I did hope that,
in the course of these operations, the enemy
might commit some imprudence or leave some
opening, of which I could take such advantage as
to gain, at^least, a partial victory over his forces.
This opportunity was presented by the advance
of Jackson upon Manassas Junction ; but, al
though the best dispositions possible, under the
circumstances, were ordered, the object was frus
trated in a manner and by causes which are now
well understood. I am gratified that the conduct
of that campaign, every detail of which was com
municated, day by day, to the General-in-Chief,
was fully approved by him and by the Govern
ment, and I now gladly submit the subject to the
judgment of the country.
Gen. Banks rendered most efficient and faith
ful service throughout the campaign, and his con
duct at the battle of Cedar Mountain, and the
operations on the Upper Rappahannock, was
marked by great coolness, intrepidity, and zeal.
Gen. McDowell led his corps during the whole of
the campaign with ability and vigor, and I am